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Monetary cooperation, in the sense of different political entities adopting 
or supporting a single coin or currency to foster trade and economic 
development, has had a long history in Europe. Its roots reach as far back 
as Roman times. In post-1945 Europe, ideas and reminiscences of such 
cooperative endeavours, notably those undertaken in the latter half of the 
19th century, struck a chord. Recovering from the gravest conflict in history 
that had brought unprecedented suffering and devastation, more than a few 
European thinkers and policy makers regarded such unions as exemplary. 
The particular circumstances of the late 1940s formed the backdrop to 
renewed promotion of monetary cooperation in talks between nations that 
had, until recently, been at war with each other. An attractive prospect of a 
stable monetary island where badly needed economic reconstruction would 
profit from the abolition of barriers to trade beckoned on the horizon. 
 This book does not cover the entire ascent of ideas from the late 1940s to 
the creation of the euro area in 1999 and the euro’s subsequent introduction 
as a common currency in 2002, but focuses on the exchanges that took 
place up to the adoption by the European Council, on 8 and 9 June 1970, of 
the basic plan for the achievement by stages of an economic and monetary 
union at the European level. This, after all, was the crucial turning point in 
the process moving from option to necessity. In December 2010 it found 
its wording in the stated conviction of the euro as our ‘common fate’, and 
Europe as our ‘common future’ – to quote the German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel before the German Parliament, on the eve of one of the summits to 
discuss the monetary crisis enveloping Europe since 2009. Her statement 
subsequently became one of the cornerstones of German policy in this respect.1 
 The recent crisis has highlighted the challenges and difficulties of 
financial and monetary cooperation in the European Union (EU). This 
publication seeks to contribute to the quality of the debate on this subject 
by offering a more historical perspective. Its contents will reveal that the 
basic issue to be resolved – how to organise effective monetary cooperation 
between ultimately sovereign states – has remained the same over time. To 
demonstrate this and shed light on various past approaches to overcome this 
fundamental dilemma, this book offers a selection of primary sources from the 
period after the end of the Second World War until 1973, when the important 
decisions to move towards adopting a single European currency had been 
taken. Together they provide an insight into the political and technical issues 
surrounding the process towards an economic and monetary union from the 
early days of European integration. Before moving to the core of the book, 
the selection of sources, this introduction will provide a short overview of 
monetary integration in Europe up to the end of the Second World War, as well 
as information on how the book is structured.
1 Angela Merkel: ‘Der Euro ist unser gemeinsames Schicksal, und Europa ist unsere 
gemeinsame Zukunft‘, quoted in: Die Welt, 16 December 2010. See also: ‘Wie und warum 
soll der Euro gestärkt werden?‘, at: http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/
Themen/Euro/EFSFundESM/gruende_eurp/_node.html;jsessionid=177C633AB22AA0
EDB01A6C78FB62DA53.s1t2#doc183204bodyText1 [accessed January 2012].
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Cover of ‘L’Altinonfo’ by Gasparo Scaruffi (1582).
His book was one of the first which discussed the introduction of a universal 
currency in Europe. 
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Monetary unions in the past
Transnational currencies and monetary unions in Europe go back to the times 
of the Roman Empire. As early as 45 BC, Julius Caesar introduced a monetary 
standard based on precious metals, particularly gold. This arrangement lasted 
for more than twelve centuries, with the Roman denarius, aureus, solidus, 
nomisma and besant as universal units of account in all parts of the empire. 
With the decline of the Roman Empire, coinage took on a more regional form, 
corresponding to the relative size of political unities in Europe. Expansive 
realms, such as that of the Carolingians, again introduced a more general 
coinage, the silver penny, the use of which lasted well into the Middle Ages. Yet 
with the growth of the economy, monetary requirements increased, especially 
as trade surpassed the boundaries of the polity that used the penny. In its place, 
a complex myriad of exchanges emerged, with the golden florin at its centre. In 
an effort to reintroduce uniformity, the Italian merchant and banker, Gasparo 
Scaruffi (1519-1584), published a book l’Alitinonfo in 1582 (a name derived 
from the Greek meaning ‘true light’). In this book he proposed the introduction 
of a universal mint, and the adoption of a uniform coinage throughout Europe, 
with the same shape, weight and name in every country, ‘as if the world was 
one city and one monarchy’.2
 Scaruffi’s ideas did not extend beyond the printed domain. Actual trade in 
the modern age came to depend on ‘bank money’, as the renowned economist 
Adam Smith called it: coinage valued as bullion upon deposit at a trading 
bank, and given out in the shape of paper credits to pay for trade goods3 – an 
elaborate system that gave rise to new ideas on common currencies.
 In the second half of the 19th century an internationalization and 
liberalization of trade could be observed in Europe that created, as one author 
has written, ‘conditions for monetary integration in a situation parallel to 
that of the Single European Market and the euro in the late 20th century’.4 In 
this period three monetary unions were established that can be seen as the 
‘ancestors’ of the current European Monetary Union: the German-Austrian 
Monetary Union or ‘Wiener Münzvertrag’ (1857), the Latin Monetary Union or 
‘Union Latine’ (1865) and the Scandinavian Currency Union (1872).5
 
 
2 Gasparo Scaruffi Regiano, l’Altinonfo. Per fare ragione et concordanza d’oro e d’argento, 
che servirá in universale, tanto per provedere a gli infiniti abusi del tosare, et guastare 
monete, quanto per regulare ogni sorte di pagamenti et ridurre anco tutto mondo ad 
una sola moneta (Reggio: Hercoliano Bartoli, 1582), cited by: Robert A. Mundell, ‘The 
sixth Lord Robbins Memorial Lecture: Reform of the international monetary system’, in 
Robert A. Mundell, Paul J. Zak (ed.), Monetary Stability and Economic Growth. A Dialog 
between Leading Economists (Cheltenham/Northampton, 2002), 15.
3 Adam Smith, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: 
Strahan and Candell, 1776), 211-212.
4 Luca L. Einaudi, ‘From the Franc to the “Europe”: The Attempted Transformation of 
the Latin Monetary Union into a European Monetary Union, 1865-1873’, The Economic 
History Review, New Series, 53, no. 2 (May 2000), 286.
5 For 19th-century Monetary Unions, see: Robert J. Bartel, ‘International Monetary 
Unions: The 19th Century Experience’, Journal of European Economic History 3, no. 3 
(1974), 689–704; Wim F.V. Vanthoor, European Monetary Union Since 1848: A Political 
and Historical Analysis (Cheltenham UK/Northampton USA, 1996).
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 Although these were all regional arrangements, plans for a larger 
monetary union were also discussed. The French government took the lead in 
this area, organizing an international monetary conference in Paris in 1867. All 
European nations sent representatives, as well as the Ottoman Empire and the 
United States. The meeting was chaired by Napoleon III’s Vice-President of the 
State Council, Félix Esquirou de Parieu. Since all delegates (except the Dutch) 
voted in favour of the introduction of the gold standard, monetary coordination 
and the creation of an international coin, De Parieu summarized the final day 
of the conference by noting that ‘the whole world agrees upon the benefits to 
be derived from monetary unity’.6 Nonetheless the international conference 
did not lead to concrete results, and Parieu’s plans for monetary integration, 
including his idea for the introduction of a European currency named ‘Europe’, 
were shelved.7
 As opposed to the European, or even universal, monetary union as 
envisaged by Parieu, a German-Austrian Monetary Union did get established in 
the 1860s. This union was a result of the Austrian efforts to become part of the 
German Customs Union (‘Zollverein’) that promoted economic ties between 
the various Prussian and Hohenzollern territories in what subsequently 
became Germany. The monetary union, which was based on the silver standard, 
linked three currencies: the Prussian Thaler, the South-German Gulden and the 
Austrian Gulden. The union was not a success. Austria did not manage to make 
its paper money convertible into silver coins, as had been agreed. The treaty 
broke up in 1866 as a result of a war between Prussia and Austria.
 The Latin Monetary Union (LMU) was based on the double standard 
(silver and gold) of France. After gaining political independence, Belgium 
adopted the French monetary system in 1832, which implied that the content 
and the value of the Belgian franc became equal to the French franc. After the 
political unification of Switzerland (1848) and of Italy (1861), the new nations 
also introduced the French monetary system. As France was the main trading 
partner for Belgium, Switzerland and Italy, the four countries decided to 
standardize their coinages so that they could circulate freely within the union. 
Three years later Greece joined this union.
 The LMU started in unfavourable political conditions. In 1866 a war 
broke out between Italy and Austria, which forced Italy to issue inconvertible 
paper money and consequently block the outflow of Italian coins to the other 
countries of the union. In 1870 the same happened in France after the outbreak 
of the Franco-German War. The effects of this war on France’s economy and 
status in the world also put a stop to French hopes to use the LMU as a lever 
towards a worldwide monetary system. More crucial were the difficulties in 
maintaining the double standard. The depreciation of silver eventually led 
to a suspension of silver coinage, effectively transforming the union from a 
bimetallic standard into a ‘limping gold standard’.8 In 1893 Italy decided to 
nationalize its subsidiary coins so that these could no longer be exchanged. 
Greece followed in 1908. The LMU came de facto to an end during the First 
6 Report by Parieu cited by: Luca L. Einaudi, ‘From the Franc to the “Europe”’, 286.
7 José Luís Cardoso, ‘A Proposal for a “European Currency” in 1861: The Forgotten 
Contribution of Carlos Morato Roma’, History of Political Economy 36, no. 2 (2004), 273-
290.
8 Angela Redish, ‘The Latin Monetary Union and the Emergence of the International 
Gold Standard’, in Michael D. Bordo, Forrest Capie, Monetary Regimes in Transition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 68-85 [quoted p. 79].
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World War, when the convertibility of paper money and later also coins was 
abolished. The union was not formally dissolved until 1927. This came about 
after Belgium announced its intention to resign from the treaty. Soon after that 
Switzerland announced the union to be dissolved.
 Although the Latin Monetary Union existed for more than 60 years, 
con-temporary experts were not positive about its achievements. In 1901 the 
American economist Henry Parker Willis stated that the Union had proved to 
be a failure. ‘Its history serves merely to throw some light upon the difficulties 
which are likely to be encountered in any international attempt to regulate 
monetary systems in common. From whatever point of view the Latin Union 
is studied, it will be seen that it has resulted only in loss to the countries 
involved.’9
 The Scandinavian Currency Union (SCU) is sometimes described as the 
most successful of the monetary unions that came into being in the latter half 
of the 19th century.10 It was the result of discussions on the reform of the 
monetary system in Denmark, Norway and Sweden in around 1860 in which 
two adaptations were suggested. First, the Scandinavian countries wanted to 
change their old silver-based currencies to a gold-based system and they wan-
ted to replace their national coinages with a single Scandinavian denomination. 
Apart from this, there was discussion on whether the Scandinavians should 
become part of a larger European or global union.11 Sweden negotiated on 
accession to the LMU but eventually pulled out for political and economic 
reasons.
 In 1872 a joint commission was appointed by the three Scandinavian 
governments to look into the monetary question. On 18 December 1872 the 
countries signed an agreement. This was, however, rejected by the Norwegian 
parliament (mainly for technical reasons). Thereafter Denmark and Sweden 
signed a bilateral agreement on 27 May 1873. As a semi-dependent territory 
ruled by the Swedes, Norway inevitably joined the union in October 1875. 
The treaty meant the introduction of the gold standard and of a new common 
unit of account: the Scandinavian krone, or krona. The three countries not 
only adopted uniform coinage but later also signed agreements to make their 
banknotes freely convertible. The monetary policy of the three countries 
resided with the three central banks.
 In 1905 tensions arose when the political union between Sweden and 
Norway came to an end and Norway became independent. The monetary 
policies of the three central banks started to diverge. Denmark’s restrictive 
policy, which strengthened the domestic purchasing power of the Danish 
krone, resulted in the Swedish and Norwegian currencies finding their way 
to Denmark. The outbreak of the First World War and the end of the gold 
standards in the three countries sealed the fate of the Scandinavian Currency 
9 Henry Parker Willis, A History of the Latin Monetary Union. A Study of International 
Monetary Action (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1901), 267.
10 See: Marcello de Secco, ‘European Monetary and Financial Cooperation before the 
First World War’, Rivista di Storica Economica 9 (1992), 67.
11 Niels Kaergard and Ingid Henriksen, ‘Historical Experience with Monetary Unions: 
the Case of Scandinavia, 1875–1914’, in Mark Baimbridge and Philip Whyman (eds.), 
Economic and Monetary Union in Europe: Theory, Evidence and Practice (Cheltenham 
UK/Northampton USA, 2003), 48. See also: Ingrid Henriksen and Niels Kaergard, ‘The 
Scandinavian Currency Union 1875-1914’, in Jaime Reis (ed.), International Monetary 
Systems in Historical Perspective (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), 
91-112.
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Union. In August 1914 the convertibility of banknotes was suspended and in 
the subsequent years the exchange rate of Danish and Norwegian banknotes 
increasingly came under pressure due to a deterioration of their balances of 
payments. As a result, Sweden ended the parity agreement unilaterally. In the 
end the diverging growth rates in the Scandinavian countries brought about 
the collapse of the currency union. In 1924 the member states agreed that they 
could mint their own subsidiary coins, which would no longer be a legal tender 
in the partner countries. The end of the monetary union was never formally 
ratified, but the decision in 1931 to pursue the stabilization of exchange rates 
within the Sterling Bloc marked the formal end of the SCU.
Ideas for a European currency
In the interwar years between 1919 and 1939 monetary cooperation in Europe 
largely disappeared. The Latin Monetary Union and Scandinavian Currency 
Union ceased to exist and only the (smaller) monetary union between Belgium 
and Luxembourg, the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU), was 
formed in 1921. Nonetheless, some politicians, bankers and economists 
pointed out the case for monetary cooperation and, moreover, the introduction 
of a single European currency. Their pleas were more or less linked with the 
Pan-European Movement that was established in 1923 by the Austrian Count 
Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. The objective of this movement was to unite all 
countries in Europe, except the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, in one 
European federation where each country could retain its national sovereignty 
and identity. According to Pan-Europeanists’ ideas, only the establishment of 
such a confederacy could prevent a new world war and the expansion of the 
Bolshevik Revolution.12
 Although a European currency did not figure prominently in Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s political ideas, his economic expert Otto Deutsch presented a Pan-
European Economic Programme in 1927 that included the formation of a Pan-
European central bank and a Pan-European currency. In these plans, national 
currencies would still exist but their exchange rates would be linked with the 
European currency.13 At the third Pan-Europa Congress in Basel in 1932 the 
German banker Hans Fürstenberg repeated Deutsch’s proposals. A year later, a 
common European currency became part of the programme of the Pan-Europa 
Movement.14 Although some leading European politicians were sympathetic 
to the ideas of Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-Europa Movement (among 
them the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briand, and Konrad 
Adenauer, who was at that time Mayor of Cologne), they were at that time 
purely hypothetical.
 The field of European politics in the interwar years was dominated by the 
bad relationship between France and Germany. The Treaty of Locarno (1925) 
that confirmed the territorial situation in Western Europe resulting from the 
12 Vanthoor, European Monetary Union since 1848, 53. See also Anita Ziegerhofer, 
Botschafter Europas: Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi und die Paneuropa-Bewegung 
in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2004).
13 Otto Deutsch, ‘Paneuropäisches Wirtschafsprogramm’, in: Paneuropa 3, Heft 1 (1927), 
16.
14 Ziegerhofer, Botschafter Europas, 96.
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First World War created a spirit in which French-German relations could be 
normalized. This was made possible by the cooperative policies of the French 
Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, and the German Foreign Minister, Gustav 
Stresemann. The peak of the improved international relations in Europe 
became visible in September 1929 at the Assembly of the League of Nations. On 
5 September Briand presented a plan for a confederation of European nations, 
which he called a United States of Europe. Four days later, Gustav Stresemann 
also discussed the European issue:
‘Combien y a-t-il de choses, dans l’Europe actuelle, dans sa structure 
économique, qui paraissent extraordinairement grotesques! Il me paraît 
grotesque que l’évolution de l’Europe ait l’air de se faire, non en avant, 
mais en arrière. Et pourtant, regardez l’Italie. Qui de vous pourrait se 
représenter une Italie qui ne serait pas une, où des régions économiques 
indépendantes s’opposeraient l’une à l’autre et se combattraient 
mutuellement? De même, peut-on songer sans sourire à la situation 
de l’Allemagne avant le “Zollverein” (…) Si cela nous paraît aujourd’hui 
étrange, médiéval et désuet il existe cependant de nos jours, dans notre 
nouvelle Europe, bien des choses qui font une impression entièrement 
semblable’.15
Stresemann pleaded for the incorporation of the new states created after the 
Treaty of Versailles (1919) into a general economic system of Europe, which 
should also include monetary issues: ‘Où sont la monnaie européenne, le 
timbre-poste européen qu’il nous faudrait?’ 16 However, these notions of Briand 
and Stresemann and the ‘Spirit of Locarno’ were soon forgotten. Stresemann 
died four weeks after his speech from a stroke; Briand died in March 1932.
 The only truly international institution of monetary cooperation that was 
created in the interwar years was the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
in Basel. The BIS was founded in 1930 with the primary objective of securing 
reparation payments by Germany and was the first institutionalized form of 
cooperation between central banks. The BIS subsequently became and has 
remained an important instrument for securing financial and monetary sta-
bility in the world, operating as a bank for central banks.
Preparations for the post war period
The Second World War provided the setting for a renewed focus on monetary 
integration on a global scale and stabilization of exchange rates. Discussions 
on the topic were held against the background of the Lend-Lease Agreement of 
1941 that provided for American material assistance to the Allied war effort. 
To repay the costs incurred in this and other arrangements, adaptations of the 
international trade, financial and monetary systems appeared inevitable. In 
1942 the British economist John Maynard Keynes first presented a plan for 
an International Currency (or Clearing) Union that he had been working on 
15 Société des Nations, Journal Officiel. Supplément Spécial No.75. Actes de la Dixième 
Session Ordinaire de l’Assemblée. Séances Plénières. Compte Rendu des Débats (Genève: 
Société des Nations, 1929), 67-71 [quote p. 70].
16 Ibid.
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since 1940. In the various drafts of the plan that circulated within the British 
Treasury, Keynes maintained that the authors of the Versailles Peace Treaty 
had neglected the economic reconstruction of Europe in their preoccupation 
with political frontiers and safeguards. It was important not to make the same 
mistake again.17
 In his original plan, Keynes proposed to establish several currency 
unions. Within Europe he distinguished as possible regional currency unions 
the sterling area, the Germanic countries (including the Netherlands), the 
Scandinavian countries, the Latin Union, Central Europe and the Balkan Union. 
In the final version the proposal for regional currency unions was dropped. The 
basis of the Keynes Plan was to provide for a single currency union, designated 
as an International Clearing Union and based on inter-national bank money. 
This bank money, called bancor, was to be fixed in gold and accepted as the 
equivalent of gold in the British Commonwealth, the United States and all 
members of the Union for the purpose of settling inter-national balances. The 
par value of the national currencies was to be set in bancor. The fund of the 
Clearing Union, which was to contain 26 billion US dollars, would have the 
right to create new bancors. In Keynes’ view, each country would be assigned 
a quota of loans from the fund, but debtors would face increasing penalties 
as they drew on their quotas.18 A revised version of the Keynes Plan became 
the official British negotiating position on the all-important United Nations 
Monetary and Financial Conference in Bretton Woods in July 1944.
 By contrast, the Americans presented a plan in 1943 devised in April 
of the previous year by Harry Dexter White, Director of Monetary Research 
and Special Assistant to the Secretary of the US Treasury. The White Plan put 
emphasis on monetary stabilization and envisaged the creation of a special, 
dedicated United Nations Stabilisation Fund. Initial subscription to the Fund 
was to amount to 5 billion dollars, to which each country would contribute 
a quota in gold and in its own currency. Support would be given to a deficit 
country by permitting it to sell its currency to the Fund in exchange for that of 
another member state. White proposed the introduction of the unitas, equal 
to ten US gold dollars, as the international unit of account in which countries 
would be required to declare their par value.19
 Before the start of the Bretton Woods Conference, British and American 
negotiators reached a compromise on a joint statement on the establishment 
of an International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF agreement was mainly 
based on the White Plan, except that the Americans accepted that countries 
should have greater flexibility to set their own exchange rates, and to impose 
controls on capital movements. The IMF began its operations on 1 March 1947. 
17 John Maynard Keynes ‘First draft statement’, 1 December 1940, in: Kenneth Dyson and 
Lucia Quaglia, European Economic Governance and Policies, Volume I, Commentary on 
Key Historical and Institutional Documents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 56-
57. John Maynard Keynes, ‘Proposals for an International Currency (or Clearing) Union’ 
[fourth draft], 11 February 1942, in: J. Keith Horsefield (ed.), The International Monetary 
Fund 1945-1965. Twenty years of International Monetary Cooper-ation. Volume III: 
Documents (Washington DC: IMF, 1969), 3-18.
18 John F. Chown, A History of Monetary Unions (London: Routledge, 2003), 166-169.
19 ‘Preliminary Draft Proposal for United Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations’, April 1942, 
published in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume I, General (Washington 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1960), 178-190. A revised draft d.d. 10 July 1943 was 
published in: Horsefield (ed.), The International Monetary Fund. Volume III, 83-97.
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The Bretton Woods system established the US dollar as the world standard, 
linked to gold at a fixed price of 35 dollars per troy ounce. The dollar-based 
monetary system lasted until 1971, when the United States decided to leave 
the gold standard.
 Parallel to the discussions on a world wide scale, the Belgian, Netherlands 
and Luxembourg governments in exile in London started discussions in the 
spring of 1943 on monetary cooperation and freedom of currency transfers in 
the post war period. Prior to the Benelux Customs Treaty of 5 September 1944 
the three countries signed a monetary convention on 21 October 1943 that 
fixed the exchange rates of the Belgian-Luxembourg franc and the Dutch guilder 
in the interest of common trade.20 According to the Belgian Finance Minister 
Camille Gutt, the main aim of the agreement was to prepare for and facilitate 
a general economic agreement to be concluded at a later stage: ‘For too long 
now – since the end of the last war – countries have been caught in a vicious 
circle in which their economies would not prosper without a healthy currency, 
but their currency would not be stable without a prosperous economy. This 
vicious circle needs to be broken somewhere, and we have broken it in the 
financial sector. Incidentally, this is also what Keynes and White are each doing 
in the two plans with which you are familiar. But it goes without saying — for 
our bilateral agreement and for a wider international agreement — that we 
cannot stop once the financial sector has been organised, we need to carry on 
to the economic sector.’21
Developing monetary and financial cooperation after 1945
The above developments indicate that monetary issues played a considerable 
role in thinking on post-war economic recovery, the period that forms the focus 
of this book. It was no surprise that talks on monetary integration coincided 
with reconstruction and started long before there was any question of the 
European Economic Community (EEC). The story as presented here starts in 
1947, when five countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France and 
Italy) began negotiations on a draft agreement on monetary cooperation. It 
ends 25 years later with the Paris Summit of 19 to 21 October 1972, where 
the Heads of State or Government of the enlarged European Community 
reconfirmed their aim of creating an economic and monetary union within 
eight years.
 The period in between comprises three stages. During the first ten years 
monetary cooperation meant the realization of convertibility between the 
national currencies of the 16 Western European countries that were members 
of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). As a result 
of these discussions, the European Payments Union (EPU) came into being in 
20 Text of the Monetary Agreement between the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, 
21 October 1943. Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (1944) no. E76.
21 Circular from the Belgian Foreign Ministry (2 November 1943) with the text of the 
speech of Finance Minister Camille Gutt, 21 October 1943, in: José Gotovitch (ed.), 
Documents diplomatiques belges 1941-1960, De l’indépendance à l’interdépendance. Tome 
I: Le gouvernement belge de Londres 1941-1944 (Bruxelles: Académie royale de Belgique, 
1998), 408. Translation by CVCE. This document is available on the CVCE website: www.
cvce.eu.
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1950. In 1950 Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, Italy and the 
Federal Republic of Germany started negotiations on the establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and shortly afterwards they also 
opened negotiations on military, political and economic integration. During 
their talks on economic cooperation and the establishment of a common 
market, monetary aspects were also discussed. The second stage, 1958-1969, 
spanned the formative years of the EEC. During this period institutions such 
as the Monetary Committee (1958) and the Committee of Governors of the 
Central Banks (1964) were established. Discussions focused on monetary 
aspects of the implementation of the common market and on the common 
agricultural policy. The third stage covered in this book started with the 
presentation of the memorandum of the European Commission of 12 February 
1969 (also called the Barre Plan) with the first proposals for the establishment 
of an economic and monetary union. A steering committee, set up in March 
1970 and led by the Luxembourg Prime Minister Pierre Werner, worked out 
a plan for the realization of that union within ten years. The latter part of the 
book focuses on the discussions in and around the Werner Committee and the 
reactions to the Werner Plan after its presentation on 8 October 1970.
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Ruined street in Hamburg, Germany in 1945.
After the end of the Second World War European cities and economies were 
devastated. The thinking on post war economic recovery coincided with the 




 Introduction to document 1
After the Second World War, all European countries suffered severe 
foreign trade problems, as national measures for reconstruction and the 
need to jump-start the economy called for protective barriers on imports. 
The feeble state of national financial systems, war debts and a general 
shortage of dollars constituted obstacles for the free convertibility of 
currencies. International trade generally was in crisis and European 
countries lacked hard currency necessary for dependable exchanges. 
Although the potential value of trade for the process of reconstruction was 
commonly realised, non-convertibility formed an obstacle.   
 To overcome impediments and enable at least some form of financing 
between countries, several trade and payment agreements were established 
in the immediate post war years, totalling more than 200 of these by the end 
of 1947.22 These agreements were based on foreign-exchange controls, an 
inflexible system partly inherited from the 1930s. Moreover, such agreements 
were contrary to the spirit of the international monetary system outlined at 
Bretton Woods in 1944. This bilateral network in Western Europe aimed to 
deal with the issue of convertibility and the nonexistence of an international 
system for balancing payments. Nonetheless, predictions in 1947, when the 
IMF became operational, were that world trade might even come to a halt 
in the next twelve to eighteen months because of convertibility issues and 
shortages of hard currency. 
 In this situation the U.S. proposed the famous Marshall Plan for the 
economic reconstruction of Europe in June 1947. Washington pressed for the 
formation of a cooperative group of European countries, including the western 
occupation zones of Germany. Within weeks after the presentation of Marshall’s 
ideas the British and French foreign ministers, following up on earlier calls 
for financial and economic collaboration, issued a joint communiqué inviting 
twenty-two European nations to send representatives to Paris to draw up a 
joint European Recovery Program.
 In the following months the participants in the conference managed to 
agree to set up an Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 
to tackle the crisis in economic reconstruction and trade. Sixteen countries 
joined.23 The convertibility issue was key to the discussions. In September, 
directly after the close of the meeting in Paris, a Committee on Payments 
Agreements assembled in London to develop the plan further. The idea was 
launched to create a ‘clearing pool’ to facilitate trade. A draft agreement on 
monetary cooperation and the reorganization of financial transfers within 
Europe was set up between France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands.
 It was this meeting on which the Netherlands representative, Frans 
Keesing, reported in the document below. As Keesing noted at the time, the 
meeting’s significance lay in this being the first attempt at European monetary 
22 William Diebold, Trade and payments in Western Europe: A Study in Economic 
Cooperation, 1947-’51 (New York: Harper, 1952), 19; Gardner Patterson and Judd Polk, 
‘The Emerging Pattern of Bilateralism’, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics 62, no. 1 
(1947), 118-142.
23 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
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cooperation in the post war era. The final agreement was signed on 18 
November in 1947. Later Bi-zone Germany (i.e. the combined American and 
British occupation zones) joined as a member, while eight other countries that 
took part in the European Recovery Program became ‘occasional members’.24 
 Nonetheless, from the annual report of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) over 1947-1948, it transpired that the results of the 
agreement remained limited, as member states were reluctant to accept 
automatic compensation of their balances. All the same, the BIS argued that 
the agreement should be considered useful: 
‘Although the volume of compensations arranged during the early months 
has not been considerable in itself, the scheme may be regarded as the 
germ of something more useful which may develop in the future, and 
its operation has, moreover, made it possible to gain a new insight into 
the working of the monetary system under the difficult circumstances of 
present-day Europe.’25
1.
Note by Ministry Advisor (Frans Keesing) to the Netherlands Minister of Finance 
(Piet Lieftinck) on Inter-European monetary Cooperation, 27 October 1947. 
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Cabinet of the 
Prime-Minister (2.03.01), inv.no. 2707. Translation: Huygens ING, The Hague.
Between the 15th and the 25th of October a meeting took place in Paris on 
the reorganisation of financial transfers within Europe. This conference has 
provided more results than the previous meeting in London.
 The countries that had already shown their intentions in London 
(Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union26, France, Italy and the Netherlands), 
reached agreement on a draft-accord on monetary cooperation. I hereby send 
you the text of this accord and the accompanying Annex. I would like you to 
consider to discuss this draft in the REA27 so that, if the REA agrees with the 
draft proposal, H.Ms. Ambassador in Paris28 can sign the accord on behalf of 
the Netherlands government.
 The following may serve as an explanation on this agreement. The 
four countries decided, when appropriate, to proceed to an automatic 
compensation of the balances they hold between them under their respective 
payment agreements, if and insofar as this exclusively causes a reduction of 
credits outstanding. They have furthermore left open the possibility to allow 
additional compensation that does not meet the above requirement, if the 
24 Austria, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, United Kingdom, Greece and the French 
zone of Germany. 
25 Bank of International Settlements, Eighteenth Annual Report, 1st of April 1947-31st 
March 1948, 10. (Basle: Bank for International Settlements, June 14, 1948), http://www.
bis.org/publ/arpdf/archive/ar1948_en.pdf [accessed November 2011].
26 Belgium and Luxembourg formed an Economic Union, abbreviated to BLUE or UEBL, 
since 1921. 
27 Council for Economic Affairs, sub-council of the Netherlands Council of Ministers (the 
Cabinet).
28 Jhr. Mr. A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer.
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parties involved in the compensation so agree. The delegations present in 
Paris requested the Bank for International Settlements in Basel to act as an 
agent in this regard. The representative of the BIS semi-officially stated that 
the Bank is willing to follow up this request. 
 To the agreement all countries can accede that are accepted as a member 
by the four signatory parties. It was communicated to the representatives of 
the other 16 countries present in Paris, that their accession will be appreciated. 
The cooperation of countries other than the four signatory parties is possible 
in two ways. They may join as a member, in case of which they accept all rights 
and duties of the accord, or they may announce that they would appreciate to 
participate in the compensation from time to time, in case of which they will 
have to grant ad-hoc permission to bring about a particular compensation. The 
representatives of Great Britain and Denmark have declared at the conference 
that their governments took great interest in the monetary cooperation 
planned here. It is to be expected that both countries, together with others, 
will grant their cooperation to the accord on the basis of one of the two 
arrangements discussed above.
 Concerning the material significance of the accord the following can 
be said. In the present situation automatic compensation between the four 
participating countries is not possible. The possibilities of non-automatic 
compensation will need to be examined from month to month, based on the 
information that is provided at each time. The compensation options will 
increase as the number of participants increases. The report of the conference, 
which is to appear within a few days, also includes an Annex in which a few 
theoretical compensation options are drawn up.
 From a formal point of view, this first attempt at inter-European 
monetary cooperation is to be considered, in my opinion, as important. The 
idea that in so many words lies behind this agreement, is that payments in 
gold and currencies between the participating countries need to be avoided as 
much as possible. The agreement offers a firm basis on which to build further. 
On the basis of the information that members and ‘membres occasionnels’ 
will share on a monthly basis, an insight in the European monetary situation 
can be acquired, something which is currently non-existent. The experience 
to be gained furthermore in the practice of compensation, may also indicate 
the road that leads to an expansion and a strengthening of that what has now 




Projet de premier accord de compensation monétaire multilatérale
Le gouvernement de la Belgique, agissant tant en son nom qu’au nom du 
gouvernement luxembourgeois, les gouvernements de la France, de l’Italie et 
des Pays-Bas, désireux de favoriser le développement des échanges entre les 
pays européens, et à cet effet d’établir entre eux, à titre de première étape, une 
coopération monétaire plus étroite, sont convenus de ce qui suit:
 Article 1er - Les parties contractantes procéderont de la façon la plus large 
possible, dans les conditions indiquées aux articles suivants, à des opérations 
de compensation multilatérale entre les soldes résultant du fonctionnement 
des accords de paiement qu’elles ont conclus ou concluront entre elles.
 – – –
27
document 2-3
 Introduction to document 2-3
In the summer of 1949 it became clear that despite of the established 
payments agreement, intra-European trade remained limited and plans for 
further political and economic integration were slow to materialize.29 The 
lack of progress worried policy makers in Washington. Under increasing 
pressure from Congress to produce concrete results in European integration 
the European Co-Operation Administration (ECA), installed to administer 
the Marshall plan, developed a proposal for a European monetary union.30 
This plan was the first of its kind after the Second World War. It proposed a 
European currency as well as the instalment of a European Central Bank.31 
 Since the plan required important transfers of sovereignty to prospective 
European institutions, the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, 
considered it unlikely that the American ideas would be acceptable.32 In a 
telegram to the US embassy in Paris, sent on 19 October 1949, Acheson pointed 
out that: ‘Rather we feel that the Europeans must themselves analyze the 
problems and develop the institutions to handle these problems, and that the 
US should confine itself, as in the case of ERP, to friendly advice and assistance. 
We should avoid committing ourselves to the public, the Congress, and the 
Europeans about such a definitive statement of the problem and its solution 
in order that failure by the Europeans to take this action will not appear to be 
a failure of US policy or a justification for discontinuing ERP aid.’33 Eventually, 
Acheson was just in time to refrain ECA administrator Paul Hoffman from 
proposing the ECA-plans to the OEEC.34 
 On 31 October 1949 Hoffman addressed the OEEC in Paris, pleading for 
‘the formation of a single large market within which quantitative restriction 
on the movements of goods, monetary barriers to the flow of payments and, 
eventually, all tariffs are permanently swept away.’35 He indicated that speed 
was of the essence, as the economic and financial support from the United 
States would be temporary. Not all goals needed to be achieved at once: ‘there 
are other arrangements, some already in prospect, involving smaller groups of 
countries which, I am convinced, will also turn out to be steps toward the same 
objective.’36 One of the arrangements Hoffman referred to was the Fritalux plan. 
This union between France, Italy and the Benelux was proposed earlier by the 
French Minister of Finance, Maurice Petsche, and the increasing pressure from 
29 Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (Berkely: University of 
California Press, 1984), 282.
30 Femke van Esch, Mapping the Road to Maastricht: A Comparative Study of German and 
French Pivotal Decision Makers’ Preferences concerning the Establishment of a European 
Monetary Union during the early 1970s and late 1980s (Wageningen: Polsen & Looyen, 
2007), 142.
31Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 297.
32 Ibid.
33 Telegram from Dean Acheson to the US Embassy in Paris, Washington, 19 October 
1949. This document is available on the CVCE website: www.cvce.eu.
34 Ibid.
35 Statement by ECA Administrator, Paul Hoffman, at the 75th Council meeting Paris, 
31st October, 1949 C (49)176 Or. Engl.. Paris: OEEC, 31 October 1949. This document is 




US congress at the end of 1949 gave the plans a new incentive.37 
 Document 2 offers an excerpt of a French memorandum, issued two 
weeks after Hoffman’s speech. It discusses the plans for economic and 
monetary union in the framework of Fritalux. The document considers 
the need to coordinate economic and financial policies in order to reach an 
economic and monetary union. A European investment bank is also proposed, 
as well as regular meetings between Ministers of Finance and the Central Bank 
Governors. Although the document does not specifically refer to the issue, the 
French had, at an earlier date, proposed a system based on floating exchange 
rates, contesting the principle of fixed rates established at Bretton Woods.38 
The document also offers reflection on membership of the proposed union.
 On invitation of France an expert conference was organized in Paris 
between the Fritalux-countries from 29 November till 9 December 1949 
to discuss the plans for regional cooperation. The opinions diverged quite 
strongly between the five countries, but in the end the experts were able to 
draw up a report. Document 3 includes the excerpts that deal specifically with 
the monetary arrangements, including the establishment of a common reserve 
fund. 
 After the conference, the leader of the Italian delegation, Umberto Grazzi, 
discussed the results at the British Foreign Office. In his opinion the proposals 
did not go far enough to satisfy the Americans.39 Indeed, the plans stayed too 
limited according to the ECA and the organisation came with an initiative of its 
own in presenting the so called Bissell-Plan on 10 December 1949.40 
2.
Memorandum presented by France (Hervé Alphand, French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs) on economic and monetary cooperation in Western Europe, 14 November 
1949.
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1945-1954 (2.05.117), inv.no. 21443.
1. Dans une résolution en date du 2 novembre 1949 le Conseil de l’OECE41 
a reconnu qu’afin d’atteindre les objectifs contenus dans la Convention de 
Coopération Economique Européenne,42 ‘il pouvait être utile de prévoir une 
association économique et monétaire plus étroite sur le plan régional entre 
certains pays membres où les conditions requises auront déjà été réalisées. 
37 William Diebold, Trade and Payments in Western Europe: A Study in Economic 
Cooperation, 1947-51 (New York: Harper, 1952), 142.
38 During the conference this was a point of discussion. Point 3 in Document 3 reflects a 
compromise that leaves each country room for manoeuvre.
39 Record of Conversation, 14 December 1949, Foreign Office UK (The National Archives, 
Kew, UK) inv.no. FO 371, 12728. This document is available on the Huygens ING website: 
www.europadocs.eu.
40 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 314.
41 Résolution relative à de nouvelles mesures de coopération adoptée par le Conseil le 2 
novembre 1949. Archives Diplomatique (EU Europe, 1949-1955, Généralités) (Paris (La 
Courneuve)), inv.no. 110.
42 This Convention, signed on 16 April 1948 by sixteen Western European Countries, was 
the basis of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC/OECE).
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Les dits arrangements devront être compatibles avec les possibilités plus 
larges que peut offrir l’action collective de tous les pays membres’. Le Conseil 
reconnaissait en outre ‘qu’il peut être nécessaire pour les Gouvernements 
intéressés de confronter leur politique financière, économique, sociale 
et tarifaire et leur politique d’investissement en vue de réaliser la mise 
en harmonie qui s’avérerait nécessaire à une association économique et 
monétaire plus étroite’.
2. Le Gouvernement français, conformément à ces recommandations, estime 
qu’il convient d’examiner les possibilités de former un pareil Groupement 
régional en Europe Occidentale, A un premier stade, cette étude serait 
entreprise parles représentants de la France, de la Belgique, du Luxembourg, 
des Pays-Bas et de l’Italie? Il conviendra de décider s’il ne sera pas désirable 
d’inviter l’Allemagne occidentale à se joindre à ce premier Groupe. En raison 
des déclarations très nettes du Chancelier de l’Echiquier43, toute invitation de 
cette nature adressée actuellement à la Grande-Bretagne n’aurait pas de suite. 
Il est bien évident cependant que le Groupement resterait ouvert à tous les 
pays membres de l’OECE qui se déclareraient prêts à accepter d’y participer.
3. Entre les pays membres du Groupement, les échanges de marchandises, 
de capitaux et de services devraient être rendus progressivement aussi libres 
que possible. Toutefois, cette libération n’est pas un but en soi. Elle constitue 
le moyen de réduire les coûts de production et les prix, grâce à une meilleure 
spécialisation des activités industrielle et agricoles, à l’extension des marchés 
nationaux, de telle sorte que, le plus tôt possible, les pays membres puissent 
équilibrer leurs économies au plus haut niveau possible sans aide extérieure 
exceptionnelle.
4. La suppression des contingents et des contrôles des changes permettrait 
d’atteindre un pareil objectif. Mais, si cette suppression immédiate apparaît 
possible dans un certain nombre de cas, elle risque dans d’autres d’amener, 
des perturbations graves et un chômage étendu dans certains secteurs de 
l’économie des pays participants. Sa généralisation automatique semble 
impossible sous le régime politique démocratique qui est commun à tous les 
Etats participants au Groupement. Elle ne pourra donc être réalisée qu’en 
plusieurs étapes et en prenant un certain nombre de précautions dont le 
Délégué de la France a fait état devant le Groupe Consultatif de l’OECE le 29 
Octobre 1949. Ces idées ont été reprises dans la Résolution du Conseil du 2 
novembre. 
5. Le présent Mémorandum a pour objet, d’une part de préciser les 
conditions dans lesquelles une certaine coordination des politiques intérieures 
des différents pays membres devrait s’organiser afin que puissent être 
progressivement atteints les buts ci-dessus définis, d’autre part, de déterminer 
les mesures qui pourraient être prises entre les cinq pays dans la première 
phase du Groupement.
6. Le Gouvernement français estime que la libération des échanges ne 
pourra être rapidement et utilement réalisée que si des politiques économiques 
et financières des pays participants ne sont pas contradictoires. Sans doute ne 
43 The British Minister of Finance Richard Stafford Cripps.
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s’agit-il pas de fondre toutes ces politiques dans un moule commun, mais nous 
ne parviendrons pas à unifier les économies des pays participants sans risquer 
de provoquer de graves désordres sociaux si certains éléments de base sont 
par trop divergents.
 
 Le Gouvernement français a notamment en vue:
a) l’élimination des pratiques discriminatoires (subventions, doubles prix, 
etc...) qui faussent le jeu normal de la concurrence.
b) la mise en harmonie des politiques budgétaires et des politiques de crédit. 
Ces politiques doivent être telles que, d’une part, elles écartent l’inflation, 
que, d’autre part, elles contribuent à maintenir ou à promouvoir dans chaque 
pays un emploi optimum de la main d’œuvre nationale. Si un parallélisme 
suffisant n’existe pas dans ce domaine, l’équilibre de la balance des comptes 
serait compromis, les obstacles à la libération souhaitée des échanges et des 
paiements seraient multipliés.
– – –
13. Conformément à la résolution du Conseil de l’OECE les pays membres 
doivent faire rapport à l’Organisation sur les progrès qu’ils auraient accompli 
dans la voie d’une association économique ou monétaire plus étroite entre 
eux. Il est prévu que dans les cas où cela sera possible, un premier rapport 
devrait être, soumis à ce sujet à l’OECE le 15 décembre 1949 au plus tard. C’est 
dire qu’il reste peu de temps pour accomplir ce premier pas dans la voie de 
l’intégration européenne.
 Le Gouvernement français croit qu’il serait illusoire de vouloir cacher les 
difficultés de cette tentative et que le meilleur moyen est de les aborder de 
front, non pour faire de nouvelles recommandations ou de nouveaux rapports, 
mais pour prendre, dans chaque cas particulier, des dispositions concrètes.




Report of the experts of Belgium (Maximilien Suetens), France (Hervé Alphand), 
Italy (Umberto Grazzi), Luxembourg (Pierre Elvinger) and the Netherlands (Dirk 
Spierenburg) on the establishment of an economic and monetary association in 
Western Europe, 9 December 1949.
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Directorate-
General of Foreign Economic Relations, Ministry of Economic Affairs (2.06.107.01), 
inv.no. 414.
– – –
Chapitre II: Dispositions Financières
Les experts constatent qu’une association des efforts de leurs pays dans 
le domaine monétaire se recommande. Ils sont animés d’un même désir 
d’instituer des consultations permanentes entre eux en matière de politique 
financière et de taux de change en vue d’appliquer à cet égard des principes 
communs.
 Tel étant le point de départ de cette association, il ne peut s’agir de 
créer une nouvelle zone ou un nouveau bloc monétaire de caractère plus ou 
moins autarchique. Il s’agit essentiellement d’instituer le mécanisme d’une 
coopération continue entre les pays membres dans le domaine monétaire. 
Cette coopération doit avoir un caractère durable; il ne saurait être question 
qu’elle prenne fin en même temps que les droits de tirage et l’aide Marshall. Elle 
ne doit nécessiter ni la création d’une institution internationale nouvelle, ni 
le recrutement de nouveaux fonctionnaires internationaux. Les consultations 
et décisions doivent pouvoir être prises au cours de réunions périodiques 
des autorités monétaires des pays membres; l’exécution des opérations qui 
requièrent l’intervention d’un organisme central sera confiée à la Banque des 
Règlements Internationaux agissant comme agent du groupe.
 Dès maintenant, il y à lieu de définir les principes et les objectifs de la 
politique commune que les pays membres entendent suivre et de faire entrer 
dans les faits leur coopération par l’accomplissement d’un certain nombre de 
réalisations immédiates. 
Les experts sont d’accord pour constater que la politique monétaire, budgétaire 
et de crédit de chacun des pays doit en toute hypothèse tendre à maintenir ou à 
réaliser l’équilibre de leur économie.
 Sur la base d’une telle politique, l’action commune des pays devra s’exercer 
d’une part dans le domaine des taux de change de manière à rechercher le taux 
approprié à cet équilibre et, d’autre part, dans celui des mesures à prendre en 
vue de rapprocher leurs monnaies du stade de la convertibilité.
I – Taux de Change:
1. Le retour à l’équilibre de chaque pays dans ses relations économiques 
avec l’extérieur et le développement des échanges internationaux requièrent 
des taux de change appropriés. Dans le cadre des obligations que les pays 
membres ont contractées vis-à-vis du Fonds Monétaire International, les taux 
de change ne doivent pas être considérés comme immuables; des modifications 
peuvent devoir y être apportées s’ils ne permettent pas d’assurer l’équilibre 
envisagé. La recherche de taux appropriés présente dès lors pour l’ensemble 
des membres un grand intérêt et il est utile d’y procéder par une action 
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concertée et l’application de principes communs, même si les méthodes mises 
en œuvre pour y parvenir diffèrent. 
2. Au cas où la modification des taux de change pratiqués par un des pays 
membres est nécessaire, il convient qu’elle soit réalisée avant que ce pays 
n’ait épuisé toutes les ressources dont il dispose dans ses relations avec les 
autres membres, sous peine de voir les échanges subitement entravés. Il est de 
l’intérêt de tous les membres que les ressources communes, en particulier le 
fonds de réserve dont il est question ci-après, ne soient pas absorbées par un 
déséquilibre durable. 
 Si un pays n’arrive pas à réaliser l’équilibre de son économie sur la base 
des cours de change en vigueur, l’adoption d’une parité correspondant à son 
niveau d’équilibre se fera plus aisément et d’une manière plus conforme à 
l’intérêt commun s’il précède à des ajustements modérés et concertés au 
lieu d’attendre le moment où une modification profonde et brutale devient 
inévitable.
3. Pour procéder à la recherche de taux de change appropriés, tout membre 
conserve la liberté, dans le cadre de son statut monétaire, de choisir entre 
le système consistant à déterminer des taux de change fixes pour toutes 
les monnaies et celui consistant à organiser sur son marché, suivant ses 
convenances propres, une cotation libre des changes.
Les accords de paiement entre les membres devront éventuellement être 
adaptes dans la mesure requise par l’adoption de cotations libres per certains 
d’entre eux.
4. En tout état de cause, il est nécessaire de conserver des parités homogènes 
à l’égard de l’ensemble des monnaies.
 Toutefois, par exception à ce principe, et pour se rapprocher du niveau 
d’équilibre désirable, certains pays membres peuvent trouver utile de laisser, 
dans certaines limites et sous certaines réserves, fluctuer leur monnaie par 
rapport aux autres monnaies des pays membres de façon indépendante du 
cours de leur monnaie par rapport au dollar.
 Il est nécessaire, dès lors, que les membres ne refusent pas cette faculté à 
ceux d’entre eux qui voudraient y avoir recours dans les conditions suivantes:
a) Chaque membre qui organise sur son marché la cotation des monnaies de 
tous les autres membres, doit intervenir pour que la dépréciation éventuelle de 
sa monnaie soit égale par rapport aux monnaies de tous les autres membres. 
b) Les divergences ne peuvent avoir qu’un caractère limité dans leur 
amplitude et dans leur durée. Si elles perdaient ce caractère, le pays en cause 
devrait rétablir l’homogénéité des parités à l’égard de l’ensemble des monnaies 
étrangères.
 En tout état de cause, les divergences ne peuvent dépasser 5% des parités 
par rapport au dollar. 
 Au cas où la hausse des autres monnaies par rapport à la parité du dollar 
atteindrait 5% pendant un minimum de 25 jours ouvrables sur une période 
de 35 jours ouvrables consécutifs, le cours officiel du dollar exprimé dans 
la monnaie dépréciée serait ajusté de manière à rétablir l’homogénéité des 
parités à l’égard de l’ensemble des monnaies étrangères.
c) Les autres membres ne peuvent intervenir pour contrecarrer les 
divergences de la monnaie du membre qui à organisé sur son marché la 
cotation libre, lorsque ces divergences de produisent dans les conditions 
indiquées ci-dessus. Il va de soi qu’ils peuvent intervenir sur ce marché pour 
empêcher la dépréciation de leur monnaie par rapport au dollar. 
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d) Aucun pays ne laissera sur son marché s’apprécier par rapport au dollar 
les devises des autres pays membres que pour autant qu’un tel mouvement 
soit justifié par l’évolution défavorable de sa balance des paiements.
5. Il est nécessaire que les pays membres se concertent régulièrement pour 
surveiller le fonctionnement des marchés des changes et examiner en commun 
les adaptions de parités qui seraient requises en vertu des principes adoptés. 
Cette action doit s’exercer à l’occasion des réunions périodiques des autorités 
monétaires des pays membres.
II – Mesures Tendant à La Convertibilité des Monnaies 
A. – Multilatéralisation des paiements
1. Les pays membres accepteront automatiquement entre eux les 
compensations de deuxième catégorie remplissant les conditions suivantes:
a) La compensation est nécessaire pour éviter un dépassement de plafond 
bilatéral.
b) La compensation n’a pas pour effet d’augmenter une créance au delà de 
80% du plafond bilatéral.
c) Le pays débiteur qui évite, grâce à la compensation, un dépassement de 
plafond bilatéral utilise un solde créditeur en monnaie tierce et non pas une 
marge de crédit dans cette monnaie. 
 Cette mesure pourra être mise en vigueur immédiatement sur la base de 
l’accord de paiements et de compensations entre les pays européens, par une 
simple déclaration des pays membres à l’Agent. 
2.  Les Experts reconnaissent l’intérêt que pourrait présenter la 
multilatéralisation des marges de crédit et des droits de tirage dans des 
conditions à déterminer. Cette multilatéralisation pourrait avantageusement 
compléter l’utilisation des ressources du fonds dont il est question ci-après. 
 Ces questions doivent faire l’objet d’une étude technique immédiate qui 
donnera lieu à des propositions concrètes. 
 La mise en application éventuelle des résultats de cette étude pourra 
demander certains délais. La mise en application des autres recommandations 
du présent chapitre ne sera pas retardée pour autant. 
3.  Comme la position d’un pays dans le groupe ne doit pas nécessairement 
correspondre à sa position globale vis-à-vis du monde entier, les pays membres 
examinèrent dans un esprit de coopération les offres de monnaie de pays non 
membres qui pourraient contribuer à la réalisation d’un équilibre entre eux. 
B. – Constitution d’un fonds de réserve commun. 
1. Pour faciliter la libération des échanges commerciaux et des paiements 
entre les pays membres, il est nécessaire d’instituer, avec la coopération de 
l’ECA un fonds de réserve commun alimenté par une aide initiale en dollars. 
2. Le pays membres qui se trouvent dans une position débitrice ne 
pourraient recourir au fonds qu’après avoir utilisé les autres ressources 
prévues pour assures les réglements entre les membres. En toute hypothèse, 
le recours au fonds serait organisé de façon à permettre à celui-ci d’exercer 
une action durable. Notamment tout recours au fonds provoquerait de plein 
droit une consultation immédiate entre les membres, tendant à déterminer les 
mesures à prendre pour rétablir l’équilibre du pays qui fait appel au fonds (y 
compris, le cas échéant, une modification de la parité de sa monnaie) et pour 
prévenir toute utilisation abusive des ressources du fonds. 
3. La gestion du fonds serait confiée à la Banque des Règlements 
Internationaux agissant comme agent des membres du Groupe. Cette gestion 
serait exercée suivant les directives et délégations données à la BRI par les 
34
document 2-3
pays membres réunis en comité, en conformément aux pratiques bancaires. 
4. Les détails de fonctionnement du fonds, et notamment les conditions 
auxquelles sera subordonné le recours à ses ressources, devront faire l’objet 
d’une mise au point immédiate. Dès maintenant, il est possible d’énoncer à ce 
sujet les principes généraux ci-dessous. 
5. Le recours aux ressources du fonds pourrait se faire:
– soit par emprunt à plus ou moins long terme, portant intérêt à des taux 
appropries et éventuellement soumis aux autres conditions jugées 
nécessaires par le comite;
– soit par achat contre versement des monnaies de pays non membres 
considérés comme pouvant entrer dans la réserve commune;
– soit, à titre exceptionnel, par achat contre la monnaie nationale du pays 
acheteur, étant entendu que les sommes en monnaie nationale ainsi versées ne 
pourraient pas être remises sous forme de prêt à la disposition de ce pays;
– soit sous toute autre forme convenable admise par le comité.
6. Sous réserve de conditions à déterminer, tout membre qui recevrait 
un paiement en dollars fait par un autre membre à l’aide des ressources du 
fonds serait tenu si l’autre membre venait à disposer des moyens de paiement 
nécessaires dans un délai raisonnable, de restituer à celui-ci la part des 
ressources du fonds qu’il aurait reçue, de façon à le mettre en mesure de la 
restituer à son tour au fonds. 
C. – Assouplissement de régime des transferts.
I. – Paiements courants.
1. Les paiements courants seront autorisés sans restriction entre les 
pays membres dès lors que les obligations correspondantes auront été 
régulièrement contractées.
2. Des progrès sensibles devront être réalises afin de faciliter et d’accélérer 
ces règlements. A cet effet, les mesures suivantes seront mises en œuvre:
a) Extension et mise en harmonie des listes de paiements courants figurant 
dans les accords en vigueur. 
b) Octroi par les organismes de contrôle dans chaque pays de larges 
délégations aux intermédiaires agréés pour tous les règlements ne soulevant 
aucune difficulté de droit ou de fait, et, en conséquence, limitation au strict 
minimum des cas où une autorisation préalable de l’organisme de contrôle est 
requise.
c) Lorsqu’une autorisation préalable demeure exigée, suppression, s’il y à 
lieu, de tout délai entre la délivrance de l’autorisation et la délivrance effective 
des devises.
d) Organisation de systèmes de transferts supprimant tout retard. 
3. Les organismes de contrôle des pays membres renforceront la coopération 
permanente qu’ils ont déjà établie entre eux afin de régler rapidement les 
difficultés qui peuvent surgir dans la pratique quotidienne et de mettre en 
commun leur expérience en vue de la recherche d’assouplissements nouveaux. 
II. – Mouvements de Capitaux.
1. Le but à atteindre est de libérer le plus tôt possible tous les mouvements de 
capitaux entre les pays membres de façon à arriver à la convertibilité complète 
entre les monnaies de ces pays. Certains des pays membres ont déjà pris des 
mesures en ce sens, d’autres considèrent que la situation actuelle de leur balance 
des paiements ne leur permet pas encore d’envisager une libération totale. 
 Toutefois, la délégation néerlandaise estime qu’il convient de faire 
une distinction entre les mouvements de capitaux qui contribuent au 
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développement de saines relation économiques internationales et ceux qui 
exercent une influence perturbatrice. 
2. Aussi bien, il ne parait pas, techniquement, indispensable que les pays 
membres adoptent dans ce domaine des mesures identiques et accomplissent 
au même moment les mêmes réformes. Néanmoins, les pays membres sont 
d’accord sur le programme minimum suivant, qui fera l’objet d’une application 
immédiate:
a) Les organismes de contrôle, dans chaque pays, autoriseront le libre 
rapatriement des capitaux nouvellement investis par les ressortissants des 
autres pays membres. 
b) En ce qui concerne les avoirs anciens, de larges facilités seront données 
des à présent en vue de permettre leur cession entre résidents d’une même 
pays, leur utilisation à des dépenses diverses, ainsi que le passage d’une forme 
de placement à une autre. 
c) Sous réserve de la situation de sa balance des comptes chacun des 
pays membres autorisera l’exportation des capitaux nationaux à destination 
des autres pays membres, chaque fois qu’il s’agira d’un investissement à but 
économique. 
d) Chacun des pays membres adoptera une attitude libérale pour l’admission 
des investissements nouveaux en provenances des autres pays membres. 
– – –
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In the framework of Marshall aid a first ship with coal arrives on 18 September 
1948 in the harbor of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The coal is to be used by 
the Netherlands Railway Company. 
© National Archives/Spaarnestad Photo/ANP
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 Introduction to document 4
Although the negotiations on the Fritalux/Finebel association continued after 
November 1949, the monetary arrangements proposed in this framework 
appeared to lose relevance after the ECA proposed its plan for a European 
Payments Union. This plan was an attempt to complement the liberalisation 
of trade between European countries with the establishment of convertibility 
and transferability of their currencies.44 To boost trade, the members of the 
OEEC were, with some urgency, asked to consider replacing the network of 
bilateral agreements with a multilateral system. Time was running out: the 
existing intra-European Monetary Agreements, which were still partly of a 
bilateral nature and were in effect already considered outdated, would expire 
formally on 30 June 1950.45 
 Central to the ECA-plan was a multilateral clearing system in which all 
payments between the member countries would be settled automatically 
on a monthly basis. Although they resulted in a successful outcome, the 
negotiations on the payments union were riddled with obstacles. In February 
Britain brought the negotiations in an impasse because of concerns over the 
position of Sterling. Britain demanded large credit margins within the union 
and a reduced obligation to pay debts in gold. For Belgium, the only country 
with an expected surplus in intra-European trade, such a credit formula was 
unfavourable. In June the Belgian government even considered to step out of 
the negotiations altogether. Eventually an agreement was reached on 7 July 
and on 19 September 1950 the agreement to establish the European Payments 
Union (EPU) was signed.46 
 The EPU functioned as a clearing union. For every member state its 
balance of payments position was represented with reference to the other 
members of the union. These positions were settled on a monthly basis, 
expressed in a unit of account defined as 0.88867088 grams of fine gold, 
which was equivalent to one US dollar. Marshal Aid was used to make ad hoc 
credits available to countries with balance of payments problems. The debtor 
countries that made use of these credits became subject to ‘multilateral 
surveillance’ of the management board of EPU.47 
 The Belgian memorandum presented here as document 4 recalls the 
difficulties posed by such negotiations — particularly at a time when European 
states were in an extremely challenging economic and monetary position. The 
Belgian delegation had two prime concerns: to remedy the monetary crisis 
(by combating inflation or deflation) and trading difficulties (by restoring 
an overall balance); and to prevent the EPU from leading to trade barriers 
around Europe. Consequently, the Belgian delegation sought ways of enabling 
44 Horst Ungerer, A Concise History of European Monetary Integration: From EPU to EMU 
(Westport, CT: Quorum, 1997), 26.
45 British memorandum on the future of intra-European payments, 15 December 1949. 
Historical Archives of the European Union (Florence, Villa Il Poggiolo. Dépôts, DEP), 
OECD, EPU/EMA 1. This document is available on the CVCE website: www.cvce.eu.
46 Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1984); Robert Triffin, Europe and the Money Muddle: From 
Bilateralism to Near-Convertibility, 1947-1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1962).
47 Ungerer, A Concise History of European Monetary Integration, 28.
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European states to restore the convertibility of their respective currencies into 
US dollars, enabling the EPU to serve as a means of promoting free trade and 
transatlantic relations. 
 These goals were only partially achieved. In the following years, 
European countries started negotiations on the replacement of the EPU. On 
5 August 1955 the 17 member states of the OEEC signed a treaty establishing 
a European Monetary Agreement (EMA), creating a European Fund for 
credit to member states with temporary balance of payments difficulties. A 
Multilateral System of Settlements that enabled international transactions in 
member currencies by offering interim financing was also set up. The EMA also 
encouraged settlements through foreign exchange markets.48 The Agreement 
replaced the EPU on 27 December 1958.
4.
Memorandum presented by Belgium on the European Payments Union, 8 March 
1950.
Historical Archives of the European Union (Florence, Villa Il Poggiolo. Dépôts, DEP), 
OECD, EPU/EMA 8.© OECD.
A la lumière des échanges de vues qui ont eu lieu précédemment, des 
considérations exposées dans le document TFD/DL/1950/9/3ème Rev. et 
de la décision prise par le Conseil49 en approuvant le chapitre 23 du Rapport 
Intérimaire50 il est possible de dégager les principes qui doivent être à la base 
de la future ‘Union Européenne des Paiements’.
 Avant d’entrer dans le détail des considérations techniques il importe 
de réaliser l’unanimité sur ces principes qui devraient figurer en tête de tout 
accord international ayant pour objet la création d’une telle Union.
 C’est dans ce but que la Délégation belge soumet le présent mémorandum 
et ses annexes afin qu’ils soient examinés et discutés par le Comité des 
Paiements.
 Si l’unanimité peut être réalisée sur les conditions qui y sont mentionnées, 
le travail d’élaboration pourra être facilement poursuivi.
 `Au cas où des divergences de vues profondes apparaîtraient il 
conviendrait sans doute de soumettre celles-ci au Conseil afin qu’il puisse 
décider en connaissance de cause, trancher les points de désaccord éventuels 
entre experts et décider, s’il convient ou non de poursuivre la réalisation d’une 
Union européenne de Paiements entre tous les membres de l’OECE.
 Il est bon de souligner dès à présent qu’il s’agit là d’une entreprise 
extrêmement délicate qui ne peut être poursuivie qu’à condition de réunir 
toutes les chances de succès.
 Il ne s’agit plus de conclure un accord de paiements valable pour quelques 
mois mais de mettre sur pied un organisme durable, ayant une tâche bien 
définie à remplir et auquel des ressources extrêmement importantes aussi 
48 Kenneth Dyson and Lucia Quaglia, European Economic Governance and Policies: 
Volume I: Commentary on Key Historical and Institutional Documents (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 96.
49 Council of the OEEC
50 European Recovery Programme, Second Report of the OEEC (February 1950).
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bien en or et en dollars qu’en monnaies des pays membres seront confiées.
 La rédaction des statuts d’un tel organisme ne peut souffrir de 
malentendus. Ils doivent être mis au point avec précision dans un esprit de 
réelle coopération qui ne peut être véritablement productive que si un accord 
complet est réalisé sur les objectifs aussi bien que sur les moyens à mettre en 
œuvre pour les atteindre.
 Le travail à accomplir est avant tout constructif, ce ne serait pas être 
constructif que de dissimuler les difficultés ou d’essayer de les reculer chaque 
fois qu’elles touchent à des questions qui sont vitales pour l’avenir même de 
l’œuvre entreprise.
Objectifs
Les quatre objectifs principaux sur lesquels il importe d’être d’accord sont les 
suivants:
1. L’objectif fondamental immédiat doit être le rétablissement de l’équilibre 
financier interne et par conséquent externe de chacun des pays participant au 
système. 
 Reconnaître cet objectif c’est admettre que le système doit être conçu 
de telle manière qu’il agisse comme un fonds de stabilisation et contienne en 
lui-même les correctifs nécessaires permettant de lutter également contre 
l’inflation et contre la déflation.
2. Le deuxième objectif doit être de créer en Europe un système de paiement 
tel que loin de s’organiser en zone fermée à l’intérieur de laquelle les pays 
participants se consentiraient des avantages préférentiels, ils fassent au 
contraire individuellement et collectivement de nouveaux pas dans la voie 
de la convertibilité et de la suppression des discriminations à l’égard du 
dollar. Cet objectif peut être atteint par l’élargissement du marché intérieur, 
l’augmentation de la productivité, le maintien de la réalité des taux de change 
et le contrôle du pouvoir d’achat global à la capacité de production réelle.
 La convertibilité sera atteinte progressivement par l’équilibre des 
finances internes qui commande l’équilibre de la balance des paiements.
3. Le troisième objectif doit être de permettre dès que possible une libération 
complète des échanges et des autres transactions courantes. 
 Une telle libération est évidemment fonction de l’équilibre interne qui 
repose sur l’élimination du pouvoir d’achat excédentaire. 
 Il ne sera peut-être pas possible de résorber partout en même temps 
l’excédent de pouvoir d’achat disponible. 
 Le système ne doit naturellement pas être un instrument pour financer 
ces excédents, il manquerait son but, mais il est concevable qu’il puisse servir 
à résorber l’excédent de pouvoir d’achat, là où il peut être résorbé sur la 
base d’un plan d’assainissement interne bien conçu et effectivement mis en 
application. 
 Le système doit aider ceux qui veulent s’aider eux-mêmes, il ne doit en 
aucun cas servir à financer des déficits lorsque rien n’est entrepris pour les 
enrayer.
4. Le quatrième objectif doit être la reconstitution des réserves des 
banques centrales qui sont indispensables pour maintenir la souplesse de 
tout mécanisme de paiement. De telles réserves doivent être défendues; 
aussi la création du nouvel organisme doit permettre non seulement de les 
reconstituer mais aussi de les défendre par les moyens monétaires classiques 
et non plus par la voie des contrôles physiques. Le système en lui-même est 
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une réserve centrale qui doit toujours être reconstituée, il ne peut être conçu 
comme un fonds destiné à s’épuiser.
Conditions à remplir.
Pour atteindre ces objectifs un certain nombre de conditions doivent être 
remplies. 
 Ces conditions peuvent être classées en regard de chacun des objectifs 
qu’elles visent à atteindre.
Premier objectif: Stabilité financière interne.
Conditions:
a) Le déficit structurel des pays membres doit être financé en dehors du 
système, soit par l’aide directe ou indirecte de l’ECA, soit par des transferts de 
capitaux en provenance de pays qui ont du capital exportable et utilisable. 
 La première règle doit donc être que les ressources du nouveau système 
ne peuvent normalement être utilisées pour le financement d’un déficit 
structurel et que dès lors les pays participants doivent s’engager, en agissant, 
s’il y a lieu, sur leur politique interne, à limiter leur déficit structurel aux 
ressources normales ou exceptionnelles dont ils peuvent disposer en dehors 
du système. 
 Ceci ne sera sans doute pas immédiatement possible dans tous les cas 
et par conséquent il est probable que certains pays devront avoir recours au 
système pour financer la partie résiduaire de leur déficit structurel. L’organisme 
doit être armé pour effectuer ce financement mais à condition qu’il ait lieu sous 
forme de prêts de stabilisation consentis à des conditions bien déterminées 
pour des montants limités et en fonction d’un plan de redressement financier 
préalablement accepté et suivi d’exécution.
 L’aide apportée par l’organisme des paiements doit être active et reposer 
sur des mesures concrètes dont il doit être à même de suivre l’exécution et les 
effets, elle ne peut être passive car elle se bornerait alors à un financement 
automatique des déficits et constituerait un encouragement à leur maintien.
 Ceci exclut toute automaticité dans l’octroi des crédits à moyen ou à long 
terme.
b) Pour rendre cette disposition effective et lutter ainsi contre l’inflation, 
sauf exception décidée à l’occasion de cas d’espèce, tout recours au crédit à 
moyen ou à long terme doit donner lieu à un versement en or dont la proportion 
doit aller en augmentant au fur et à mesure que les crédits sont utilisés. 
 De même et afin de constituer un contrepoids à une déflation éventuelle, 
les pays créditeurs ne pouvant être intégralement payés en or, seront appelés 
à fournir sous forme de crédits une proportion de leur excédent net.
c) De manière à permettre dans toute la mesure du possible les politiques 
d’investissement là où elles s’avèrent nécessaires, le système doit faciliter les 
mouvements de capitaux soit directement d’un pays membre à un autre, soit 
indirectement par son canal. 
 Ceci suppose entre autres que les créances dont l’organisme disposera 
sur ses débiteurs soient mobilisables et qu’elles soient consenties à des taux 
d’intérêt tels qu’elles puissent être effectivement réescomptées ou placées sur 
les marchés étrangers. 
 Cette disposition est également essentielle pour s’assurer que les 
interventions de l’organisme se font bien aux conditions réelles des marchés 
sur lesquels des capitaux sont disponibles qu’il est indispensable de respecter 
si on veut revenir aux réalités.
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Deuxième objectif: Eviter l’autarchie – Progresser dans la voie de la convertibilité 
et de la suppression des restrictions à l’égard du dollar.
Conditions:
La suppression des restrictions à l’égard du dollar va de pair avec le retour à la 
convertibilité car il ne peut y avoir de véritable convertibilité qu’accompagnée 
de la suppression de ces restrictions. 
 Ce but sera atteint lorsque chaque pays aura réalisé son équilibre interne 
qui commande également l’équilibre de sa balance des paiements. 
 Sans doute pourra-t-il encore y avoir des difficultés à équilibrer à un 
niveau satisfaisant les besoins européens globaux en dollars, si la valeur des 
marchandises et des services que l’Europe souhaite obtenir de l’hémisphère 
occidental dépasse la valeur des marchandises et des services susceptibles 
d’être reçus par l’hémisphère occidental; mais au moins le problème sera-
t-il ramené à des proportions raisonnables et à ses axes véritables. Il est en 
effet impossible d’y chercher un remède approprié tant que le déficit global 
envers l’hémisphère occidental est artificiellement gonflé à raison des déficits 
structurels qui sont le signe d’un déséquilibre interne dans le chef des pays 
participants, déséquilibre qui se manifeste tout naturellement par une pénurie 
apparente des monnaies fortes et plus particulièrement du dollar.
 Tout en reconnaissant le problème il convient donc de le circonscrire 
afin de pouvoir ultérieurement y apporter les remèdes qui conviennent 
(abaissement des entraves douanières aux Etats-Unis, transferts de capitaux 
en provenance des Etats-Unis, intervention des organismes internationaux 
tels le Fonds Monétaire International et la Banque Internationale pour la 
Reconstruction et le Développement etc...). 
 L’Europe doit faire le premier effort et se mettre en mesure d’acheter 
moins aux Etats-Unis et d’y vendre plus et cela non en recourant aux contrôles 
physiques qui sont toujours inopérants et provoquent une série de réactions 
secondaires qui aboutissent à fausser tout le mécanisme normal des prix et 
des échanges mais en créant des conditions propres à réduire spontanément 
la demande de produits américains et à augmenter naturellement l’offre de 
produits européens sur le marché américain. 
 A cet effet, il faut commencer par rendre les productions européennes 
métropolitaines aussi bien qu’originaires des territoires d’outre-mer et des 
territoires associés plus facilement accessibles au marché européen. 
 Pour cela il faut élargir le marché en supprimant les obstacles artificiels 
et en permettant à la concurrence de jouer pleinement afin que les prix des 
produits européens supportent la concurrence des produits américains.
 L’action sur les prix peut être obtenue non seulement par la suppression 
des entraves (contrôles quantitatifs et tarifs douaniers) qui ont toujours pour 
effet de les hausser mais aussi par une augmentation de la productivité qui 
suppose une concurrence effective, l’abolition des mesures de protection et la 
suppression de toute inflation qui en créant du pouvoir d’achat supplémentaire 
mais fictif provoque une consommation supérieure à la capacité de production 
réelle et par conséquent un déséquilibre fondamental.
 Il est possible et même probable qu’une telle action aura pour effet au 
début tout au moins, de réduire le volume des échanges européens, mais 
ce qu’ils perdront en volume ils le gagneront en qualité et en pouvoir de 
concurrence. 
 Le jour où le marché européen sera ainsi équilibré et aura amélioré 
sa productivité les exportations se dirigeront d’elles-mêmes vers les Etats-
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Unis pour s’y échanger contre les produits américains nécessaires à une 
augmentation de la production et de la consommation européenne.
 Pour arriver à ces résultats il faut avant tout que le nouveau système des 
paiements européens :
a) permette la libre circulation des marchandises, l’échange libre des 
services et la libre migration des populations.
b) permettre à chaque économie de se stabiliser au niveau de change qui est 
le sien, ce qui, dans certains cas, peut exiger une modification des parités de 
change actuellement en vigueur.
c) permettre au pays qui cherche son niveau d’équilibre de l’atteindre 
progressivement dans un régime de liberté avec le minimum possible de 
heurts et d’inconvénients.
Troisième objectif: Libération des échanges et des transactions courantes.
Conditions:
Cet objectif n’est qu’une phase transitoire dans la recherche de l’objectif 
précédent. 
 Elle offre un caractère plus immédiat et plus concret. Pour l’atteindre il 
est essentiel du point de vue des paiements de remplir cinq conditions:
a. Tout pays doit pouvoir utiliser ses créances sur les membres du système 
pour apurer ses dettes à l’égard d’un autre membre.
 Cette transférabilité totale des monnaies européennes entre elles est 
indispensable pour faire jouer la libre concurrence et éviter d’encore diriger 
d’une manière arbitraire les courants commerciaux qui ne doivent être 
dominés que par les besoins à satisfaire dans le chef de l’acheteur individuel et 
la capacité de les satisfaire dans le chef du vendeur individuel.
b. Pour que cette transférabilité soit réelle, toute créance nouvelle doit 
pouvoir être utilisée dans le système. Dès lors, il faut abandonner la pratique 
des accords bilatéraux actuels qui veut qu’un pays créancier conserve inutilisé 
le montant de sa créance sur son débiteur.
 Un créancier doit toujours avoir le droit de faire usage de sa créance pour 
acquitter ses propres dettes envers un autre membre du système.
 Ceci ne veut pas dire que certains accords bilatéraux ne peuvent subsister 
dans la mesure où ils ne vicient pas le système c.à.d. dans la mesure où un 
créditeur net consent un crédit supplémentaire à un débiteur net. Un tel crédit 
revêt alors la forme d’un transfert de capital de créancier net vers débiteur net 
et, loin d’être nuisible, est souhaitable pour autant que le créancier puisse y 
faire face sans mettre sa propre situation en danger. 
 Mais il va de soi que dans ce cas ces transferts de capitaux doivent être 
traités comme tels et ne peuvent, lorsqu’ils se dénouent, venir aggraver la 
situation du débiteur net ou du créditeur net au détriment du système lui-
même.
c. Les dettes existantes doivent être traitées de la même manière, elles 
ne peuvent venir encombrer le système du poids de leur arriéré si elles sont 
importantes. 
 C’est une question de montant, c’est aussi une question de déterminer la 
cadence à laquelle leur remboursement peut être raisonnablement effectué.
d. Il importe que chaque pays renonce à toute méthode inflationniste afin 
de ne pas augmenter artificiellement, à l’abri d’un cours de change fixe, ses 
besoins de consommation courante et de ne pas aspirer les marchandises 
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produites ailleurs qui trouveraient chez lui un marché plus facile et plus 
rémunérateur.
e. De la même manière il faut renoncer à toute politique déflationniste qui 
éloignerait un pays de son point d’équilibre.
Quatrième objectif: Reconstitution des réserves de change.
Conditions:
La reconstitution des réserves est indispensable pour donner à tout mécanisme 
de paiement la souplesse qui permet de corriger sans heurt les écarts par 
rapport à la position d’équilibre.
a. En laissant jouer normalement les mécanismes régulateurs, un pays dont 
les réserves augmentent accroît sa circulation, augmente le pouvoir d’achat 
disponible, agit à la baisse sur son taux d’intérêt, stimule des besoins nouveaux, 
relève les prix, encourage l’importation, éloigne les capitaux étrangers et 
bientôt retrouve une position d’équilibre. 
 Par contre, un pays dont les réserves diminuent retire du pouvoir d’achat, 
voit hausser son taux d’intérêt, provoque une tendance à la baisse des prix, 
encourage ses exportations et attire les capitaux étrangers, ce qui contribue à 
le ramener à sa position d’équilibre. 
 Pour obtenir ces effets il faut tout d’abord éliminer les contrôles 
physiques qui s’opposent aux adaptations, il faut trouver un niveau de change 
naturel, ne faire sciemment ni inflation ni déflation autre que celle qui résulte 
du mécanisme même du jeu des réserves.
b. Il faut une réserve à laquelle on puisse être sûr de pouvoir toujours 
recourir. 
 Elle sera constituée de toutes les monnaies des membres et d’un certain 
montant de dollars fournis par l’ECA. 
 Il est essentiel que les dollars fassent partie intégrante de la réserve car 
chacun doit pouvoir compter qu’ils seront là le jour où l’on pourrait en avoir 
besoin. 
 C’est la garantie des pays qui consentent des crédits et doivent être 
assurés de pouvoir mobiliser ces crédits s’il leur arrive d’en avoir besoin, c’est 
aussi la garantie pour les débiteurs que leurs créanciers pourront les aider et 
que l’organisme lui-même pourra le cas échéant mettre certains de ces dollars 
à leur disposition s’ils se trouvent dans des conditions propres à en justifier le 
besoin. 
 Il est essentiel que ces dollars de même que les crédits des membres 
restent à la disposition de l’organisme et ne doivent pas être dépensés dans un 
délai déterminé. 
 Il va de soi que l’ECA doit avoir un contrôle sur leur usage et à ce titre 
être associée aux décisions qui en détermineront l’emploi, mais ce serait une 
lacune grave dans le système si les dollars n’étaient pas versés à l’organisme 
dont ils constituent la garantie fondamentale.
c. Enfin cette réserve doit avoir une valeur stable et certaine, afin de 
pouvoir être incorporée dans les bilans des banques centrales sous forme 
d’une créance sur l’organisme des paiements; elle doit donc être exprimée en 
or, seul étalon des valeurs.
d. La réserve étant constituée doit être défendue c.à.d. que lorsqu’on y a 
recours elle doit être reconstituée. 
 Il ne peut s’agir de ressources dépensées à fonds perdus, ceux qui 
recourent au crédit de l’organisme doivent rembourser leurs prélèvements. 
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 Les délais de remboursement peuvent varier selon l’objet des 
prélèvements et les conditions attachées à ceux-ci. 
 Des prélèvements effectués pour couvrir des découverts réputés 
saisonniers doivent être remboursés à court terme, tandis que des prélèvements 
effectués dans des conditions déterminées pour couvrir des déficits moins 
passagers ou même des déficits structurels peuvent être consentis pour des 
périodes plus longues. 
 Ce sont là des cas d’espèces pour lesquels l’automatisme ne se 
recommande pas et ne peut donc être érigé en règle.
e. De la même manière que la réserve commune ainsi constituée, pour 
garder son caractère, ne peut être dépensée pour couvrir automatiquement les 
déficits qui se présentent, il serait souhaitable que l’aide américaine donnée 
sous forme directe ou indirecte et non dépensée par les pays qui en bénéficient 
leur soit définitivement acquise sous forme de dollars qui viendraient renforcer 
leurs propres réserves individuelles. 
 Pour que les objectifs décrits ci-dessus soient atteints et que les conditions 
à remplir pour y parvenir puissent être réunies il est indispensable de confier 
la gestion du nouvel organisme à un nombre limité de personnes choisies pour 
leurs qualités propres et non en raison de considérations politiques. 
 Leurs décisions ne seront dictées que par des motifs techniques, elles 
seront prises dans le cadre des objectifs assignés à l’organisme. 
 Pour que ce Conseil dispose d’un pouvoir effectif, ses décisions seront 
sans appel et ne requerront pas l’unanimité.
Partant des considérations qui précèdent la délégation belge soumet ci-joints, 
pour étude et discussion par le Comité des Paiements, un projet de convention 
à intervenir entre tous les pays disposés à participer à une Union européenne 
des Paiements ainsi qu’un schéma des statuts de cette Union.
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 Introduction to document 5
With the debate on how and when to liberalise international payments 
unsettled, the political situation in Europe changed in May 1950 with the oft 
discussed announcement by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman 
to work towards a community of participating nations to cooperate in the 
economic fields of coal and steel production. This initiative was closely 
linked to the area of finances and international transfers, as the plan was 
devised after American pressure for a somewhat spectacular effort, on the 
part of France, to publicly demonstrate its commitment towards economic 
cooperation in Western Europe.51 Such a show of good intentions was linked 
to American promises of continued financial support for the reconstruction of 
the French economy. The German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer heeded the call 
for a European community for the production of coal and steel, anticipating 
that cooperation in this area would open the door to French support for his 
desire to regain full sovereignty over the Ruhr and Saar Areas52 – core regions 
for the German economy that in 1950 remained under the supervision of the 
Allied occupying forces. 
 The story of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is well 
documented and has often been told. Although Schuman’s call initially met 
with (various degrees of) scepticism, the European nations already involved in 
discussions on closer collaboration in the context of the OEEC, France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy, subscribed to Schuman’s initiative 
within a month, as the common good of non-competition between their coal 
and steel industries outweighed national reservations. The British hesitated 
and in the end distanced themselves from the plan, the intentions of which 
were also to test the waters for a close cooperation in a wider scope of areas, 
including finance, trade policy, and the establishment of a European Payments 
Union.53 To lure the participants into the envisaged cooperation, institutional 
and practical issues – the instalment of a High Authority to supervise the 
activities under the plan – were addressed first.54 The delegates then went 
on to tackle economic themes. The remaining political questions, such as the 
seat of the High Authority and its composition, were resolved last. With this, 
the ECSC Treaty was ready for signature on 18 April 1951, taking effect on 10 
August 1952 for a period of fifty years.
 The issues discussed in the context of the ECSC provided an extra 
51 Telegram Henri Bonnet (French ambassador, Washington) to Affaires Etrangères, 
13 September 1949: Archives Diplomatique (Cooperation Economique, 1945-1966, 
CPE), Paris (La Courneuve), inv.no. 577. This document is available on the Huygens ING 
website: www.europadocs.eu.
52 Protocol German cabinet meeting, 12 December 1950: Politisches Archiv Auswärtiges 
Amt (Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), inv.no. B20, 20. This document is available on the 
Huygens ING website: www.europadocs.eu.
53 Note (no. AK/eb) Affaires Etrangères to Jean Filippi (Ministère des Finances), 16 May 
1950: Archives Diplomatique (Cooperation Economique, 1945-1966, CPE), Paris (La 
Courneuve), inv.no. 577. This document is available on the Huygens ING website: www.
europadocs.eu.
54 Document de travail, établi par la délégation française, 24 June 1950: National Archives 
of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1945-1954 




dimension to the matters of international payments and monetary cooperation 
beyond the duration of the Marshall Aid. The EPU was to act as a facilitator, 
but discussions on its institution were marred by differences in the financial 
situations of the participating nations. Belgium, which had emerged from 
the war in relatively better shape than its neighbours, refused to act as 
general creditor,55 while the Netherlands were initially hesitant about the full 
liberalisation of trade that formed the backdrop to the EPU talks as such.56 
Nonetheless, a compromise was hammered out, with all OEEC members 
signing the EPU founding document on 1 July 1950, agreeing that accession to 
the payments union entailed recognition of the need for closer economic and 
financial cooperation. In the summer of 1950 several plans to this effect were 
brought forward. The Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs Dirk Stikker 
proposed to build integration on individual sectors of the economy, facilitated 
by a European Integration Fund. The Italian Budget Minister Giuseppe Pella, 
by contrast, built his plan on a common tariffs structure to boost internal trade 
between participating nations. And in an attempt to combine the sectoral 
approach of the Dutch with the Italian preferences for tariffs, the French 
Minister of Finance Maurice Petsche suggested using Stikker’s fund as a 
European vehicle for investments that would raise its capital on the European 
private market and thus avoid drawing on the meagre foreign exchange 
reserves of the participating governments.57 None of these plans received 
approval, yet discussions on cooperation beyond the area of coal and steel 
continued with proposals for a European Defence Community (EDC) and, as 
an outgrowth of this, a European Political Community (EPC). Both of which 
proved however to be too large inroads into the national sovereignty of the 
nations represented at the negotiating table and neither of which would come 
into being.
 In the end the Benelux countries spearheaded the integration movement, 
by agreeing in 1952 to expand their cooperation to a durable economic union.58 
By the same token, the three nations were in favour of strengthening the EPU 
and its possibilities to establish convertible currencies. During this period 
of intensive European negotiations the German Vice-Chancellor and Federal 
Minister for Marshall Plan Affairs, Franz Blücher, commented on the role of the 
EPU. France had not yet rejected the European Defence Community (EDC) and 
European talks were still under way on agriculture. 
 Although the outlook for European integration appeared particularly 
encouraging, monetary shortcomings were becoming increasingly apparent. 
From the point of view of Blücher the EPU could only be an intermediate 
step, before going further, for these European Communities would only 
55 Letter Dirk Stikker to Willem Drees, 16 June 1950: National Archives of the Netherlands 
(The Hague), Archive of the Council of Ministers (2.02.05.02) inv.no. 458. This document 
is available on the Huygens ING website: www.europadocs.eu.
56 Minutes Council for Economic Affairs (Netherlands Cabinet), 1 July 1950: National 
Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Council of Ministers (2.02.05.02), 
inv.no. 572. This document is available on the Huygens ING website: 
www.europadocs.eu.
57 Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1984), 448-449.
58 Memorandum on Economic Union with Belgium and Luxembourg, 27 December 1951: 
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Council of Ministers 




work properly with a steady flow of currency between member countries. 
Furthermore, Blücher wanted European initiatives to fit into the context 
of world trade and advocated a free-market approach, with an end, above 
all, to national subsidies for transactions in raw materials. He particularly 
emphasised the financial consequences of such subsidies, notably with 
respect to the balance of payments. In this text, represented here as document 
5, Blücher advocates financial and monetary stability, in line with a doctrine 
which was still new at the time: the social market economy.
5.
Speech by the German Federal Minister for Marshall Plan Affairs (Franz Blücher) 
on the European Payments Union, 8 August 1952.
Franz Blücher, Europäische Zahlungsunion eine Übergangslösung, in: Bulletin des 
Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung (Bonn: Deutscher Verlag), 8 
August 1952, No. 108, p. 1035. Translation/ ©: CVCE, Sanem.
The European Coal and Steel Community will soon become operational. The 
European Defence Community is also likely to start work soon. Although the 
negotiations on the creation of a European agricultural union are still at an 
early, preparatory stage, here too there are a number of signs that it is likely to 
come into being in the not too distant future. All these European communities 
can function perfectly in the economic field, however, only if the conditions 
for the smooth settlement of transactions between the contracting parties are 
met.
 The European Payments Union can indeed serve this purpose well, yet 
it remains a transitional and partial solution. Although unfortunately some 
contracting parties could only bring themselves to decide to prolong it by one 
year from 1 July 1952, many nevertheless intend to work tirelessly during 
that one year of prolongation to create the conditions for making European 
currencies convertible.
 Taking the view that certain technical improvements will not necessarily 
suffice to ensure that the Payments Union can function properly, the Council of 
the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in Paris recently 
laid strong emphasis on the fact that safeguarding member countries’ internal 
financial stability is an important precondition for the necessary balance of 
payments equilibrium. To that end, it has set up an international group of 
outstanding scientific and economic experts who have now submitted a report 
on this cardinal question. It is to be welcomed that in their deliberations the 
experts started from the assumption of a constantly growing economy and 
rising production, and that they laid great emphasis on the strong influence 
of the expected US economic trend on European economies — especially on 
member countries’ balance of payments and financial policy.
 Over the past few days, a small group of seven European ministers, 
together with representatives of America and some of these experts, has 
discussed the findings of that report. I joined these experts as representative of 




and the Bank deutscher Länder.60 The experts stressed in particular how 
important a healthy monetary and credit policy is for internal financial stability 
and balance of payments equalisation. Monetary policy and financial policy 
should indeed be coordinated in such a way as to ensure that they supplement 
each other’s stabilising effects. Any undue emphasis on individual, unilateral 
measures must definitely be avoided. What is also needed, however, is very 
close coordination of the objectives that the member countries and associated 
countries want to set for their economic and financial policy. I therefore regard 
it as an important task of the OEEC Council to contribute to achieving this by 
all the means at its disposal. 
 I agree with the experts that one important condition for restoring 
convertibility is to stock up the currency reserve in European countries. In the 
OEEC, every means of building up European currency reserves will have to be 
considered, whether in relation to European or American trade policy issues, 
international capital movements or even closer international cooperation 
among central banks. Prompted by some of the comments set out in the 
reports at hand, I drew particular attention during these Paris talks to the need 
to stabilise raw materials markets and to the matter of subsidies, because in 
my view both questions are closely connected with the return to convertibility.
 Experience since Korea has shown that price movements in raw 
materials markets can have undesirable, disruptive effects on the external 
economic relations of the individual countries. This is a worldwide problem, 
one which extends beyond the geographical competence of the OEEC. Even so, 
we should consider within the OEEC whether we should not endeavour, jointly 
with other organisations, to improve the stability of the raw materials markets 
in order to reduce any undesirable repercussions on balances of payments. 
Subsidies are a burden on national budgets and, as a result, they often impair 
financial stability, distort the price and cost structure and, consequently, also 
affect balances of payments. Regardless of whether the subsidies are designed 
to influence the cost of living or freight rates, or whether they relate to imports 
or exports, a policy of subsidies can often do substantial damage. The subsidies 
system is often applied in international competition and results in individual 
states trying to outdo one another in the granting of subsidies, thereby placing 
an unnecessary burden on their budget and balance of payments. I therefore 
believe that international cooperation to remove unnecessary subsidies is 
desirable, not least in the interest of stabilising balances of payments and 
facilitating the convertibility of currencies.
 In their report, the experts pointed out that currency exchange rate 
changes might be inevitable in individual cases. Here, we should not forget that 
a change in the currency exchange rate is always bound to produce as many 
disagreeable results at home as in external economic relations, that it must 
be considered only as a measure of last resort, in a sense as the keystone of a 
comprehensive stabilisation policy. In this respect, it seems worth pointing out 
that the endeavours of each government to bring about not just stability but an 
internationally fair price and cost level by applying an appropriate economic 
and financial policy deserve priority over any consideration of possible rate 
adjustment and should be given international support.
60  Founded on 1 March 1948 in the British and American occupation zones in Germany. 
On 21 June 1948 the bank introduced the Deutsche Mark in the three Western occupa-
tion zones in Germany. In 1957 the BDL merged with the central banks of the German 
states to the Deutsche Bundesbank.
49
document 5
 It was pleasing to find that both the international experts and the 
ministers who took part in these discussions in Paris broadly agreed on the 
required principles for a healthy monetary and financial policy and the need 
for close international cooperation in this field. In my view, there is hardly any 
other task in the field of international economic cooperation that is as urgent 
and crucial for the future as the common endeavour to create all the necessary 
conditions for restoring genuine convertibility between European currencies. 
This will have a determining influence on relations with the dollar area and 
the entire sterling system. This reform is the only way to achieve genuine 
economic integration.
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 Introduction to document 6-8
On 10 September 1952 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the six ECSC-
countries decided to work towards the realization of a European Political 
Community (EPC) to give the ECSC and the proposed European Defence 
Community (EDC) a constitutional basis. The Ministers decided that an Ad 
Hoc Assembly, composed of members of the ECSC-Assembly, should prepare 
the groundwork for the proposed Political Community. In The Hague, the 
newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Willem Beyen, was one of 
the advocates of integration. Whereas his predecessor Dirk Stikker focused 
on sector by sector economic integration, Beyen favoured a policy that went 
beyond this. He stated that in his opinion general economic integration was 
not possible without political integration.61
 In December 1952 Beyen sent a memorandum to his colleagues to 
consider giving the future EPC a significant economic dimension by setting 
up a non-sectoral single market within which goods could move freely under 
the guarantee of a supranational authority. In February 1953 he launched 
additional proposals and mentioned the realization of a common market as 
one of the main goals of the future Political Community. Beyen’s proposals for 
economic integration and a common market are usually indicated as the Beyen 
Plan. The plan was not received favourably, especially not by France. According 
to the French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault the Dutch free trade plan was 
too ambitious; France didn’t want to proceed along the path of supranational 
cooperation.62 Moreover, the other ECSC members objected to the absence of 
monetary clauses and measures to coordinate economic policy.63 Nonetheless, 
at their conference in Rome on 24 and 25 February, the Ministers decided to 
give experts the instruction to study the Dutch proposals.
 On 9 March 1953 the Ad Hoc Assembly presented a draft treaty of the 
EPC to the Council of Ministers. The proposals included only a few aspects of 
the Dutch plan. Although the realization of a common market was mentioned, 
it didn’t offer a view on a customs union. Prior to the conference of the Council 
of Ministers on 12 and 13 may 1953, Beyen sent a second memorandum 
to his colleagues on the desired economic integration. This time his ideas 
received more support. At his proposal the Ministers decided to organise 
a governmental conference of the six countries in Rome to negotiate a draft 
treaty. During the conference, held from 22 September to 10 October 1953, not 
only pure economic questions were on the agenda. 
 Document 6 contains the Dutch proposals, put forward in the Economic 
Commission of the Conference to insert a measure of coordination of monetary 
policy into the common market for reasons of stability.
 Document 7 then focuses on Belgian proposals, presented after the 
Conference, to give the European Community not only economic but also 
monetary competences to realise a common market for the movement of 
goods and capital on the short term. 
61 Wim H. Weenink, Johan Willem Beyen, 1897-1976: bankier van de wereld, bouwer van 
Europa (Amsterdam/Rotterdam: Prometheus, 2005), 321–322.
62 Ibid., 330.
63 Duco Hellema, Neutraliteit en vrijhandel. De geschiedenis van de Nederlandse 
buitenlandse betrekkingen (Utrecht: Spectrum, 2001), 183.
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 As shown in document 8, the Commission of Experts, assembled in 
Paris in January 1954, affirmed once again the proposals on economic and 
monetary integration, but at that time discussions on the statute of the EPC 
were overshadowed by the uncertainty whether France would ratify the EDC 
treaty.
6.
Declaration by the Netherlands Delegation to the Economic Commission of 
the Conference for the European Political Community (Rome) concerning the 
relation between the common market and the coordination of monetary politics, 
26 September 1953. 
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Cabinet of the 
Prime-Minister (2.03.01), inv.no. 2690.
– – –
La délégation néerlandaise exprime volontiers son point de vue sur la 
définition allemande de la relation entre le marché commun et la coordination 
de la politique monétaire.
 Le marché commun est, par définition, la libre circulation des 
marchandises et des services et – dans son sens le plus complet – des capitaux 
et des personnes. C’est alors l’abolition des frontières économiques. Mais riens 
n’est dit en ce qui concerne les politiques internes. 
 Il est parfaitement possible – du point de vue théorique – qu’un marché 
commun soit établi et maintenu entre deux Etats qui poursuivent des politiques 
financières très différentes.
– – –
A présent, il y a lieu d’examiner la déclaration allemande.64 Elle dit qu’une 
politique coordonnée est ‘eine Voraussetzung’, une présupposition du marché 
commun. Je crois avoir montré que cette déclaration est trop absolue et va trop 
loin. Mais est-ce-que cette coordination est utile? Tous devront être d’accord 
qu’elle est vraiment très utile.
 L’expérience de l’Organisation pour la coopération économique 
européenne nous a montré qu’il y a danger qu’un Etat membre poursuive une 
64 The German delegation declared that the monetary and financial policies of the 
member states have to be harmonized according to the following principles: 1) every 
inflationary policy of the member states should be avoided, particularly budgetary 
measures, 2) one should seek a balance of payments without trade restrictions and 
without discrimination, 3) it is necessary to ensure a system of credits and payments 
that ensures full convertibility among the six countries, at least in the movement 
of goods and services. Furthermore, quantitative restrictions and tariffs have to be 
reduced progressively, and at the end to be abolished, as well as measures should be 
taken to the gradual establishment of a common system of customs and trade to third 
countries, Aide mémoire de la Délégation Allemande sur les mesures à prendre pour 
réaliser le marché commun (CIR/CE/Doc. 5), 26 September 1953. National Archives of 
the Netherlands (The Hague) Archive of the Cabinet of the Prime-Minister (2.03.01), inv. 
no. 2690. This document is available on the Huygens ING website: www.europadocs.eu.
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politique inflationniste, perde des devises en grande quantité, et ne choisisse 
pas une politique consistant à sauvegarder la libéralisation existante, mais 
impose de nouvelles restrictions quantitatives. 
 La faiblesse de l’OECE réside en ce que les Etats membres ont le droit 
de décider en dernier instance eux-mêmes s’ils vont imposer des restrictions 
quantitatives. Alors pour assurer un marché commun, il sera nécessaire d’avoir 
des obligations définitives des Etats membres quant à l’abolition des tarifs et 
des restrictions quantitatives, alors que les clauses de sauvegarde devront être 
administrées par la Communauté.En ce cas, quand un Etat membre éprouve 
des difficultés résultant d’une inflation interne, cet Etat aura à choisir lui-
même entre déflation, dépréciation ou d’autres mesures qui ne perturberont 
pas le marché commun. 
 Il est clair que cela sera facilité par une politique de stabilisation et par 
la coordination des politiques des Six. La délégation néerlandaise a exprimé 
sa conviction sur ce point dans l’article D de son projet de dispositions 
économiques. Elle attache grande importance à cette coordination. Mais elle ne 
peut pas partager l’opinion que c’est une présupposition du marché commun.
Addendum 6a
Minutes of the third session of the Economic Commission held at Friday 25 
September 1953 at 16.30 p.m.
La Commission approuve le procès-verbal de sa deuxième séance(CIR/CE/
PV.2).65
 Elle entame alors l’examen détaillé du problème des attributions 
économiques sur la base du questionnaire préparé par le Président66 (CIR/CE/
Doc. 3) après que celui-ci eut fait observer qu’il ne s’agit que d’un document 
travail qui n’a rien de définitif tant en ce qui concerne sa formulation que son 
contenu. 
I. Objectifs économiques généraux de la Communauté Politique.
Sous les réserves indiquées ci-dessous, les Délégations sont d’accord en 
principe pour définir comme suit les objectifs généraux: 
– ‘promouvoir, en harmonie avec l’économie générale des Etats membres 
l’expansion économique, l’accroissement de la production, le développement 
de l’emploi et le relèvement du niveau de vie et concourir ainsi au progrès des 
œuvres de paix’.
1. Etant donné que les objectifs de la Communauté visent l’intégration, non 
plus seulement d’un secteur économique déterminé, mais de toute l’économie 
des Etats participants, l’opportunité de maintenir dans le texte les mots : ‘…en 
harmonie avec l’économie générale des Etats membres…’ est mise en question 
Certaines Délégations estiment que cette phrase doit être maintenue pour des 
raisons d’ordre psychologique. D’autres délégations estiment, au contraire, 
que la Commission, organe technique, ne peut donner une présentation de 
caractère politique à ses conclusions. 
65 Meeting at Wednesday 24 September 1953 at 16.00 p.m.
66 Eugenio Prato (Italy).
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2. La Délégation françaises estime que le mot ‘promouvoir’ devrait être 
remplacé par un mot tel que ‘faciliter’ ou ‘favoriser’, car il a un sens trop fort et 
risque de préjuger la solution des problèmes institutionnels. 
Au contraire, la délégation belge est d’avis que si les objectifs généraux 
pouvaient avoir une influence sur l’applications du Traité, un terme plus fort, 
tel que ‘réaliser’ devrait être préféré.
 D’autres délégations pensent que le mot ‘promouvoir’ doit être maintenu 
car il correspond à l’idée de progrès qu’implique l’établissement de la 
Communauté Européenne et qu’il y a lieu de s’en tenir aux termes utilisés par 
le projet de l’Assemblée ‘ad hoc’–
II. Moyen pour atteindre ces objectifs: établissement progressif du marché 
commun. 
Les délégations sont d’accord que, pour atteindre les objectifs généraux 
mentionnés ci-dessus, il est nécessaire d’établir progressivement un marché 
commun, tout en évitant par des mesures appropriées, les perturbations qu’une 
telle réalisation pourrait provoquer dans l’économie des Etats membres. (Les 
mesures de sauvegarde feront l’objet d’un examen ultérieur). 
III. Définition du marché commun:
Les délégations prennent position à l’égard du texte soumis par le Président, 
selon lequel le marché commun est fondé ‘sur la libre circulation des 
marchandises, des capitaux et des personnes’. 
1. Il est admis que le texte doit aussi prévoir la libre circulation des ‘services’.
2. La délégation française entend préciser que la libre circulation des 
marchandises ne peut être considérée que comme l’objectif final du marché 
commun, car, dans l’immédiat, il pourrait être nécessaire de protéger contre 
une concurrence trop vive certaines industries non essentielles. 
En ce qui concerne la libre circulation des capitaux, la délégation française, 
tout en reconnaissant que celle-ci pourrait faciliter le fonctionnement du 
marché commun, estime qu’il est possible de concevoir un marché commun où 
une telle liberté de circulation ne serait pas complète.
Quant à la libre circulation de personnes, la délégation française ne croit pas 
que, dans les circonstances actuelles, le problème des excédents de main 
d’œuvre puisse être résolue dans le cadre trop limite de l’Europe des Six. Il s’agit 
là d’un problème commun à résoudre par des solutions étudiées en commun et 
auxquelles d’autres pays devraient concourir. La délégation luxembourgeoise 
rappelle que l’admission sans réserve de ce principe susciterait une vive 
inquiétude dans sons pays, en raison de la faible étendue de son territoire et 
de sa structure économique et sociale. 
3) La délégation allemande considère que le texte présenté devrait être 
complété de la manière suivante :
‘La réalisation de ce but final présuppose une politique économique et 
financière orientée selon des principes analogues, laquelle aurait en particulier 
pour effet d’assurer la stabilité financière interne des Etats membres’.
Il est entendu qui la discussion sur ce point sera reprise au cours de la 




Modifications proposed by the Belgian Ministry of Economic Affairs on the 
articles of the projected statute of the European Political Community regarding 
economic powers, 30 October 1953.
Collection R.T. Griffiths (Leiden University).
– – –
Article 82(ancien article 82 modifié)
1. La Communauté a pour mission de réaliser progressivement, entre 
les Etats membres, un marché commun fondé sur la libre circulation des 
marchandises, des capitaux et des personnes.
2. Pour autant que les objectifs mentionnés au premier alinéa ne soient 
pas atteints par les lois et règlements des Etats membres, la Communauté est 
chargée d’assurer la coordination :
1) de la politique monétaire en matière de:
a) réglementation et taux de l’escompte tels qu’ils sont établis par les 
Banques Centrales,
b) obligations réglementaires ayant une incidence déterminante sur le coût 
du crédit dans les Etats membres, 
c) conditions d’emprunt des pouvoirs publics,
d) plafond des avances des Banques Centrales à leur trésorerie nationale.
2) de la politique de change par: 
a) le contrôle de la modification des taux de change.
b) la création éventuelle d’un fonds commun des réserves de change 
des pays de la Communauté, en vue d’effectuer par son intermédiaire, les 
règlements avec les pays non membres ou avec les organismes de paiements 
dont feraient partie les Etats membres de la Communauté,
c) la détermination des conditions auxquelles doivent s’effectuer les 
paiements d’un pays membre par l’intermédiaire du fonds commun, au cas où 
la situation de ce pays vis-à-vis de ce fonds serait gravement déséquilibré.
d) la fixation des mesures à prendre en vue d’assurer la complète liberté des 
mouvements de capitaux au sein de la Communauté.
3) des finances publiques:
a) en matière de politique fiscale au cas où les mesures fiscales des Etats 
membres faussent gravement le jeu normal de la concurrence à l’intérieur du 
territoire de la Communauté 
b) en matière d’équilibre budgétaire au cas où des déséquilibres raves des 
budgets nationaux ou des budgets des pouvoirs subordonnés troublent les 
rapports économiques entre les Etats membres.
4) de la politique économique:
a) dans la mesure où les dispositions prises par les organes nationaux 
responsables en matière de mode de formation des salaires directs et indirect 
et des prix et en matière de subventions et avantages divers ayant une incidence 
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directe sur les prix, font obstacle au jeu normal de la concurrence à l’intérieur 
du territoire de la Communauté,
b) dans les cas où soit des mesures discriminatoires décidées par des 
entreprises privées ou publiques, soit des pratiques restrictives de celles-ci 
aboutissant à la répartition ou à l’exploitation des marchés, soit , en général, 
des abus de la puissance économique faussent gravement le jeu normal de la 
concurrence à l’intérieur du territoire de la Communauté et sont contraires à 
l’intérêt général de celle-ci,
c) en matière d’accès aux activités économiques des personnes physiques 
et morales de la nationalité des Etats membres de la Communauté, lorsque 
la réglementation en cette matière est contraire à l’intérêt général de la 
Communauté et en particulier entrave l’interpénétration des intérêts privés au 
sein de celle-ci,
d) lorsque les lois ou les règlements des Etats membres régissant les actes 
de commerce ou les statut des sociétés commerciales sont contraires à l’intérêt 
général de la Communauté et en particulier entravent l’interpénétration des 
intérêts privés au sein de celle-ci. 
5) de la politique de libération des échanges :
en vue d’aboutir à:
a) l’abolition, à l’intérieur du territoire de la Communauté, des droits 
d’entrée ou de sortie, ou des mesures ayant un effet équivalent ainsi que des 
restrictions quantitatives,
b) parallèlement, à l’unification des droits, restrictions et mesures susdits, 
applicables aux transactions avec les pays non membres, à l’exclusion de toute 
augmentation des droits extérieurs au delà de la moyenne actuelle.
6) du développement économique de la Communauté, par la promotion 
d’activités publiques ou privées dont le Parlement européen aurait reconnu 
l’importance au point de vue de l’intérêt général de la Communauté.
 La Communauté est compétente pour soit faire les propositions, soit 
émettre les recommandations, soit prendre les mesures nécessaires à cet effet, 
conformément aux conditions fixées aux articles 10, 55, 84, 85 et 86.
– – –
Article 86 (nouveau)
Dans le cadre de la compétence donnée à la Communauté en vertu de l’article 
82, paragraphe 2, alinéa 1, en matière de coordination de la politique monétaire, 
les attributions reconnues au Conseil exécutif européen par l’article 85 sont 
exercées, sur avis conforme du Conseil des Ministres nationaux, par un Conseil 
monétaire européen composé des gouverneurs ou Présidents des Banques 
Centrales des Etats membres, présidé par un membre du Conseil exécutif 
européen, disposant du droit de veto.







Interim report of the Economic Commission to the Executive Committee of the 
Commission for the European Political Community, 22 January 1954. 
Collection R.T. Griffiths (Leiden University).
– – – 
III. Réalisation et maintien du marché commun
– – – 
b. Coordination des politiques économique, financière, sociale et monétaire
21. Toutes les délégations sont d’accord pour confirmer le principe énoncé 
dans le Rapport de Rome67 (page 24): 
‘Les Etats membres se doivent de pratiquer une politique économique, sociale 
et financière (monnaie, budget, crédit) compatible avec les exigences de la 
formation du marché commun et avec son fonctionnement régulier’.
 et pour le compléter de la manière suivante: 
‘Ces politiques doivent faire l’objet d’une coordination.’ 
 Le Comité procèdera ultérieurement à un examen détaillé des domaines 
dans lesquels la coordination devra être opérée.
22. Toutes les délégations considèrent que cette coordination des politiques 
économique, etc. des Gouvernements des Etats membres doit être assurée 
parallèlement à la libération dans les domaines des marchandises, capitaux, 
services et personnes.
23. Il a été constaté qu’un certain degré de coordination découlera 
nécessairement des mesures de libération envisagées, mais que ce degré ne 
pourra suffire. C’est pourquoi toutes les délégations, confirmant les points 
de vues exprimés à Rome (Rapport page 36), sont d’accord pour prévoir des 
consultations qui devraient avoir lieu aussi souvent que nécessaire. Au cas 
où ces consultations seraient inopérantes, les délégations sont d’accord pour 
confier une certaine compétence d’étude, d’avis et d’initiative à la Communauté. 
 Certaines délégations estiment, en outre, indispensable que, dans des 
cas bien délimités dans le Traité, la Communauté intervienne par voie de 
recommandations ou même de décisions.
 La délégation luxembourgeoise considère que toute décision ou 
recommandation à caractère obligatoire devra recueillir l’avis conforme du 
Conseil de Ministres, qui, dans des cas particulièrement importants, devra 
statuer à l’unanimité.
 Le Comité n’a pas épuisé la discussion des aspects institutionnels de 
ce problème. Il se propose d’y revenir à un stade ultérieur. En attendant, 
les délégations allemande, belge et italienne ont rappelé leurs déclarations 
contenues dans le Rapport de Rome (pages 37, 38 et 39 respectivement).
 
67 Conference for the European Political Community, 22 September-9 October 1953, 
Report to the ministers of Foreign Affairs, (9 October 1953), p. 23. National Archives of 
the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Cabinet of the Prime-Minister (2.03.01), inv. 
no. 2689. This document is available on the Huygens ING website: www.europadocs.eu.
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24. Dans le cadre de la discussion sur les questions de coordination, le 
Comité s’est trouvé d’accord pour prévoir la possibilité d’interventions de 
la Communauté en vue d’assurer la réalisation de travaux publics d’intérêt 




 Introduction to document 9-10
From 1950 to 1954, there was a period of euphoria in the building of a united 
Europe. The year 1954 was a dramatic one. In Paris a Commission of Experts 
continued to work on economic and institutional aspects of the EPC. Four 
countries (the Benelux and Western Germany) had ratified the EDC treaty, yet 
it was still uncertain whether France as initiator of the EDC would ratify. The 
unstable internal political situation in France gave power to political forces 
that advocated national interests, sovereignty and protectionism instead of 
free trade. Short lived French governments became more and more dependent 
on political forces, like the Gaullists, who wanted to renegotiate the EDC treaty. 
The French defeat in Indo-China at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 culminated in a 
new political crisis that brought Pierre Mendès-France into power. He wanted 
to adapt the treaty drastically before sending it to the National Assembly. At 
a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the six in Brussels, 19 August 
1954, the other ministers refused to renegotiate. Mendès-France then brought 
the EDC-treaty before the National Assembly, which on 30 August 1954 
decided not to consider it. Developments appeared to come to an abrupt end 
and the EDC as well as the EPC were declared dead.
 This crisis in European integration was to be short-lived, however: 
Germany was incorporated into the Western European defence system a 
few months after the EDC idea was dropped. Several advocates of European 
integration sought ways to relaunch the ideal. The revival led to the opening 
of negotiations on a field which, unlike that covered by the ECSC, was general 
in scope: the aim was no longer integration in a particular sector, but general 
integration through the establishment of a Common Market. While the Belgian 
Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak and the chairman of the High Authority of 
the ECSC Jean Monnet were working on a plan to establish a new community 
institution concerned with the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the Netherlands 
minister Johan Willem Beyen was looking for new ways to reintroduce his 
ideas on establishing a customs union. In April 1955 Beyen and Spaak agreed to 
work on a joint memorandum in cooperation with their Luxembourg colleague 
Joseph Bech. This Benelux Memorandum of 18 May 1955 called for greater 
economic integration in Europe, particularly in the areas of transport, energy, 
and the peaceful use of nuclear power. The memorandum was presented to 
France, Italy and West Germany on the eve of the Conference of Foreign Affairs 
Ministers in Messina, Italy, which was scheduled on 1 and 2 June 1955. At the 
Messina Conference the six ministers decided to give a committee of experts 
under presidency of a leading politician the instruction to draw up a report on 
the feasibility of a common market and a nuclear energy union. Spaak became 
its president.. The Spaak Committee not only discussed the realization of a 
customs union, but also necessary steps towards monetary integration. 
 Document 9 presents a letter to the Netherlands Cabinet in which Beyen 
stressed that control over monetary measures was only conceivable in a fully 
integrated political community. The Spaak report, presented to the Foreign 
Ministers on 21 April 1956, also mentioned the possibility of monetary 
unification.68 This was the first time monetary unification featured at the 
highest political level since the presentation of the Bissell Plan of 1949.
68 This document is available on the CVCE website: www.cvce.eu.
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 During the Venice Conference of 19 May 1956 the Foreign Ministers 
of the ECSC accepted the Spaak report and decided to start negotiations 
concerning the establishment of a European common market and a European 
Atomic Energy Community. During the negotiations at the Val Duchesse Palace 
in Brussels, France proposed the erection of a dedicated Monetary Committee 
in the context of the creation of a common market. The French memorandum 
is represented as document 10. It draws attention to a risk, namely that the 
economic aspects — which would be European — and the monetary aspects — 
which would be national — would pull in different directions. Separating the 
economic from the monetary aspects could lead to price distortions within the 
Common Market, thereby warping the objectives of free movement of goods 
and capital, free trade and healthy competition. Such a risk could impede the 
establishment of the Common Market. What was more, in the Common Market 
any major monetary decision by one country would have consequences for the 
other members. Lastly, too wide a disparity between the balance of payments 
in the various Common Market Member States could make a common 
external tariff unsustainable. The memorandum thus drew attention to the 
close interaction that would take place between the Common Market and the 
Member States’ currencies.
9.
Attachment to the letter of the Netherlands Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Joseph 
Luns and Jan Willem Beyen) to the Netherlands Council of Ministers on the 
report of the Commission on the Common Market, 31 October 1955.
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Council of 
Ministers (2.02.05.02), inv.no. 517. Translation: Huygens ING, The Hague.
– – – 
Title III Concerning the enforcement of balance of payments equilibrium.
The committee asserts that maintaining the balance of payments equilibrium 
is an essential condition for the establishment and proper functioning of 
the common market. The obligation for this must be accepted as a general 
principle. To enable the participating countries to pursue this as best as 
possible, the report suggests a number of facilities of monetary, technical and 
institutional nature. What is proposed is the possibility of short term credit 
to a partner country in trouble, as well as the establishment of a number of 
bodies of permanent consultation.
 These bodies shall, in the final period in which quantitative restrictions 
will according to the majority no longer be permissible on account of balance of 
payments difficulties, provide instructions if necessary, and possibly even take 
decisions with regard to measures aimed at restoring the balance of payments 
equilibrium. With respect to the transition period, there is a consensus that 





The Study Conference in Brussels, 14 October 1955.
– – –
The re-introduction of quantitative restrictions based on balance of payments 
difficulties is, indeed, in itself undesirable, even in the transition period, in 
particular because balance of payments difficulties can be used all too easily as 
a pretext for protectionist restrictions, despite safeguards such as pre-advice 
by the IMF. Meanwhile, a country that gets into acute balance of payments 
difficulties can make the temporary introduction of quantitative restrictions 
difficult – as has already been suggested by us in the scheme of the Beyen-plan69 
– but one cannot prohibit this overture by the community, unless one offers 
the possibility to help the country in question conquer its acute difficulties 
through credit aid. Here the overall rule applies, that the community must not 
have powers to impose or prohibit measures unless the community can share 
in the responsibility for the consequences of the imposition of this ban. This 
rule also applies to the case of persistent balance of payments difficulties or its 
opposite, i.e. persistent balance of payments surpluses.
 The question whether one should and can give the community the 
competence to control its members in the field of monetary policy in the final 
stage, is closely related to this. Full control, extending to specific measures 
that a country should take to bring an end to the undesirable situation, is only 
conceivable in a fully integrated political community. Control over the whole 
range of measures (credit policy, consumption and investment restrictions, 
changes in exchange rates), in other words concerning the tendency and 
the efficacy of a monetary adaptation program is conceivable without full 
political federation, but acceptable only, if the community can use the weapon 
of discriminatory credit granting. In this context it is not be overlooked that 
balance of payments difficulties will still be of a general nature, and that in the 
case of such difficulties quantitative restrictions towards all countries would 
be wielded. This does not apply to the granting of credit within the community, 
but in fact to the provision of additional monetary reserves. The task of the 
community would resemble that of the IMF, rather than that of the EPU or 
the European Fund.70 There is no doubt that, during the transitional period, 
there is no place for such a task (including the use of the inseparable credit 
weapon) next to IMF and EPU. In the final period, the situation is different. 
Once a genuine economic community will be established, the community can 
no longer escape its responsibility for the monetary position of its members 
vis-à-vis countries inside and outside the community. It is of course not yet 
possible to define what this would imply in detail in due course, because the 
degree of amalgamation of the community that will be achieved at the end of 
69 On 11 December 1952, the Netherlands minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Willem 
Beyen, presented to his fellow ministers of Foreign Affairs of the ECSC a plan to give the 
proposed European Policital Community a significant economic dimension by setting up 
a non-sectoral single market within which products would be able to move freely under 
the guarantee of a supranational authority. National Archives of the Netherlands (The 
Hague), Archive of the Council of Ministers (2.02.05.02), inv.no. 485. This document is 
available on the Huygens ING website: www.europadocs.eu.
70 The proposed European Fund is part of the European Monetary Agreement (EMA), 
signed at 5 August 1955, which intended to replace the European Payments Union (EPU).
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the transitional period, cannot be foreseen. Between an actual ‘pooling’ of all 
monetary reserves of the members with a full control of the community over 
monetary policy of the members on one hand, and a system of instructions, 
the compliance to which is a condition for credit aid on the other hand, lie 
intermediate possibilities the acceptability of which depends on the extent to 
which the community is fused together. Neither is the term ‘directive’ clear-
cut, as it may refer to a greater or lesser extent to parts of the adaptation plan. 
Furthermore, one cannot know now which monetary organizations will exist 
in the broader context at that time and how effectively they will work. The 
existence of the best-performing monetary organization in a broader context 
does not remove the responsibility of the community for the monetary health 
of its members in the final phase. Even in a situation of general convertibility 
and with a smoothly operating IMF it remains the responsibility of the 
community that the community – or one of its members – will not get into 
monetary difficulties. Yet operations of other organizations in the monetary 
field do have significance for the measure of help that the community should 
provide to one of its members, since said aid is additional to what that member, 
possibly with moral support from the community, will be able to get from the 
IMF or from any other body.
 In conclusion, the following can therefore be said:
a) Re-introduction of quantitative restrictions on the grounds of acute 
balance of payments problems can, in the transitional period be made difficult, 
but cannot be completely prohibited, or be made completely dependent on 
the consent of the community. As regards fundamental balance of payments 
difficulties in the transitional period, the community can only make 
recommendations, and as a sanction to disregarding these recommendations, 
only work with the admission to the other countries of certain countermeasures, 
to be agreed in consultation with the community.
b) In the final period quantitative restrictions should no longer be needed. 
This presupposes that the country that has acute balance of payments 
difficulties, will have sufficient credit support available, either on the part of 
other bodies, or on the part of the community, to overcome temporary balance 
of payments difficulties. In the final period, the community is responsible for 
the monetary position of its members. It must therefore be in a position to give 
instructions to those members, and following those instructions issue credit 
support, also in currencies other than those of the community, if the reserve 
position of a member (including the possibility to obtain credit from another 
side) is insufficient to bridge the period needed for the appropriate measures 
to take effect. How strict instructions shall need to be, and in connection 
therewith, how extensive the possibility of discriminatory credit aid from the 
community should be, cannot yet be determined.




French memorandum to the Discussion Group for the Common Market of the 
Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom, concerning 
the institution of a monetary committee, 15 october 1956.
Historical Archives of the European Union (Florence, Villa il Poggiolo), European 
Community Institutions Collection. ECSC Special Council of Ministers. Negotiations 
on the Rome Treaties, 1955-1957, CM3/NEGO, inv.no. 142: ECSC Special Council 
of Ministers. Negotiations on the Rome Treaties, 1955-1957. © European Union.
La délégation française a suggéré que, dans le cadre de l’institution du marché 
commun, il soit procédé à la création d’un Comité Monétaire. Le présent 
mémorandum a pour objet d’exposer les motifs de cette suggestion et de 
préciser selon quelles modalités ce Comité pourrait fonctionner.
1.- Exposé des motifs
L’objectif essentiel du Projet de Traité instituant le marché commun est 
d’éliminer les obstacles qui s’opposent à la libre circulation des marchandises 
entre les six pays et de créer, entre les entreprises de la Communauté, les 
conditions d’une véritable concurrence. Dans ce but, le Projet de Traité prévoit 
une action commune des Gouvernements des six pays dans le domaine de la 
réglementation des échanges de marchandises et des services, des mouvements 
de capitaux et de la circulation des travailleurs. Il impose également diverses 
obligations aux Etats, en ce qui concerne d’autres formes de leur intervention 
dans la vie économique. Mais les Gouvernements conservent leur entière 
souveraineté dans de nombreux domaines, et, en particulier, dans un de ceux 
qui ont les incidences les plus marquées sur les données économiques : celui 
de la monnaie.
 Le développement d’une liberté de plus en plus grande dans les échanges 
de marchandises et de services, dans les mouvements de capitaux et dans 
la circulation des hommes à l’intérieur d’une Communauté dans laquelle 
les systèmes monétaires nationaux demeureront autonomes, risquerait 
de soulever de graves difficultés si les politiques monétaires suivies par les 
différents pays membres n’étaient pas étroitement coordonnées.
 Il convient en effet de remarquer, en premier lieu, qu’à l’intérieur d’un 
pays donné, l’évolution de la situation monétaire a une action déterminante 
sur le niveau des prix, et, par conséquent, sur les conditions de la concurrence 
entre les entreprises nationales et les entreprises étrangères; c’est d’elle 
également que dépend pour une part l’évolution de la balance des paiements. 
Des évolutions divergentes dans la situation monétaire interne des différents 
pays membres risqueraient de fausser rapidement le jeu de la concurrence à 
l’intérieur du marché commun et d’entraîner, pour certains d’entre eux, des 
difficultés de balance des paiements. Quelle que soit l’efficacité des mesures 
de compensation, des procédures d’aide mutuelle et des clauses de sauvegarde 
qui seront prévues par le Traité, il se pourrait que les troubles entraînés par de 
telles divergences viennent entraver la réalisation du marché commun.
 En second lieu, l’intercommunication de plus en plus étroite des 
économies des six pays rendra l’évolution de la situation monétaire de chaque 
pays de plus en plus dépendante de l’évolution de celle des cinq autres. Les 
décisions prises par les autorités monétaires de l’un quelconque des membres 
de la Communauté auront des incidences sur la situation monétaire dans les 
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autres pays. Toute mesure importante, qui serait prise par ces autorités sans 
souci des répercussions qu’elle pourrait avoir dans les autres pays, serait 
susceptible d’apporter, dans les échanges de marchandises et les mouvements 
de capitaux, des désordres de nature à compromettre la stabilité monétaire à 
l’intérieur des autres pays.
 Il y a lieu, d’autre part, de rappeler que le marché commun ne sera 
pas isolé du monde extérieur. Le Projet de Traité prévoit, en ce qui concerne 
les rapports avec les pays tiers, l’institution d’un tarif extérieur commun et 
l’harmonisation des politiques commerciales. Mais l’orientation du commerce 
extérieur ne dépend pas seulement de la réglementation douanière et de la 
politique commerciale; le statut externe de la monnaie a également sur cette 
orientation une influence très importante. Les six pays ne pourraient parvenir 
à constituer une véritable unité du point de vue du commerce international si 
leurs régimes de changes étaient trop dissemblables. Les autorités nationales 
auront donc à rapprocher et à harmoniser constamment leurs régimes de 
changes.
 Enfin, il n’est pas contestable que, dans l’œuvre de réalisation du marché 
commun, la libération progressive des mouvements de capitaux doive tenir 
une place importante; il n’est pas douteux non plus que l’harmonisation des 
conditions dans lesquelles les entreprises des six pays pourront recourir 
au crédit constituera un des éléments de la réalisation d’une concurrence 
équitable. Or la réglementation des mouvements de capitaux et celle du 
crédit sont inséparables de la politique monétaire. Les Etats membres ne 
parviendront à atteindre leurs objectifs dans ces deux domaines que s’ils 
réussissent à instaurer une étroite coordination de leurs politiques monétaires.
 Telles sont les principales raisons pour lesquelles, dans le domaine de 
la monnaie, les Etats membres devront, tout en conservant leur souveraineté, 
harmoniser constamment leurs politiques. Les modalités de réalisation de 
cette harmonisation ne sauraient faire l’objet de règles précises fixées à 
l’avance dans le Traité. La politique monétaire est en évolution permanente et 
doit être à chaque instant adaptée aux conditions de la conjoncture. Seule, dans 
ce domaine, une confrontation permanente et réciproque de leurs politiques, 
permettra aux six Etats membres d’instaurer entre eux une coopération 
efficace. C’est afin d’assurer cette confrontation permanente que la délégation 




 Introduction to document 11-13
In its memorandum on a Monetary Committee71, the French delegation 
pointed to a range of currency-related problems raised by the establishment of 
a Common Market. These problems were addressed in the Treaty of Rome that 
established the European Economic Community, as shown in document 11.
 The overall principle was set out in Article 104: Each Member State shall 
pursue the economic policy necessary to ensure the equilibrium of its overall 
balance of payments and to maintain confidence in its currency, while ensuring 
a high level of employment and the stability of the level of prices.
 Echoing this ambitious provision, Article 105 to 109 laid down the 
procedures for monetary cooperation with a view to making compliance 
with Article 104 easier to achieve. These provisions displayed a weakness 
which the EEC subsequently attempted to overcome: although the Common 
Market was established at the European level, with Community institutions 
(the Commission in the first instance) to establish and safeguard it, monetary 
policy remained a national matter. These articles showed a determination to 
establish cooperation between the Member States and their central banks. 
The Commission and the Monetary Committee received an advisory role. 
The establishment of monetary integration was as such not mentioned in the 
treaty. Nonetheless, particularly under Article 108, the Commission and the 
Monetary Committee were able to play an important part. The few articles on 
monetary policy contrasted with the great detail provided on how the Customs 
Union was to be set up, in several stages, from 1 January 1959.
 Presented here as document 12, the address by Walter Hallstein to the 
members of the Monetary Committee was delivered against a background 
of uncertainty on two fronts. Firstly, 1958 was a time when the Community 
institutions were being set up and the balance between the Council of Ministers, 
the Assembly and the Commission had not yet been defined. Secondly, France, 
since two days before under Prime Ministership of Charles de Gaulle, was in a 
state of political crisis. Moreover, De Gaulle was a fierce opponent of integration 
as such. He said very little about the Rome Treaties and deliberately left people 
in the dark as to his intentions. It is probably to this second point that Walter 
Hallstein alluded briefly when mentioning ‘events which we are now seeing 
unfold’ (below).
 Hallstein’s speech was that of a President of the Commission well aware 
that the institution he ran had no power in certain areas, including monetary 
policy. To dispel these doubts, Hallstein relied on political will and optimism, 
convinced as he was that the Member States would realise that the Common 
Market was in their interests and that they would therefore take the necessary 
budgetary and monetary steps to preserve it. It appears likely that although he 
was thinking of all the Member States, Hallstein was implicitly alluding to the 
prevailing doubts as to De Gaulle’s attitude. He closed by reviewing the role 
of the Monetary Committee: its members must be independent experts who 
use their reports as a means of pointing to the best steps to be taken to get 
the Member States to coordinate their monetary policies in such a way as to 
ensure that the Common Market functions properly. Finally, Hallstein surveyed 
 
71 See document 10.
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the provisions of the Treaty which related to the Committee. He urged its 
members to say what they thought, even if it meant uttering ‘unpleasant 
truths’. The Commission, through the voice of its first President, thereby hoped 
that the Monetary Committee would play a major part.
 The EEC treaty was not the only European accord to deal with monetary 
policy. In parallel to the setting up of the fledgling European Community, 
the EMA72 replaced the EPU in 1958. As German minister Franz Blücher had 
announced,73 the EPU was only a transitional solution. With the entry into 
force of the EMA, European currencies — in particular those of the Six and 
the United Kingdom — became convertible, albeit each to a different extent 
depending on the country. In that sense, the application of the gold standard 
stipulated by the Bretton Woods agreements became a reality in a large part 
of non-Communist Europe. It served to make it easier to set up the Common 
Market. 
 A few weeks after the currencies had become externally convertible the 
first annual report of the Monetary Committee was released. It was divided into 
two chapters: one on the activities and role of the Monetary Committee, and 
one on national monetary situations and the consequences of convertibility. 
The report was highly topical, as some of the Member States had drastically 
overhauled their monetary policies in connection with convertibility. France, 
for example, adopted a monetary reform plan and lifted restrictions on 
trade at the end of 1958, once the institutions of the Fifth Republic had been 
established.
 Although the report, shown here as document 13, welcomed the 
move to liberalise monetary policies and bring them closer together, the 
Monetary Committee called for the reduction of the continuing disparities in 
the convertibility. For the committee, the first moves to convertibility were 
excellent news, yet it thought that things should be taken further. It also 
stressed the need for continuous monetary cooperation between the Member 
States: if monetary policies would diverge, the progress achieved with respect 
to currency convertibility and trade liberalisation would be put at serious risk.
72 See introductory text to document 4.




Articles 104 to 109 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
(Treaty of Rome), 25 March 1957.
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and connected documents 
(Luxembourg: Publishing Services of the European Communities) [s.d.].
Article 104
Each Member State shall pursue the economic policy necessary to ensure the 
equilibrium of its overall balance of payments and to maintain confidence in 
its currency, while ensuring a high level of employment and the stability of the 
level of prices.
Article 105
1. In order to facilitate the attainment of the objectives stated in Article 104, 
Member States shall coordinate their economic policies. They shall for this purpose 
institute a collaboration between the competent services of their administrative 
departments and between their central banks. The Commission shall submit to 
the Council recommendations for the bringing into effect of such collaboration. 
2. In order to promote the co-ordination of the policies of Member States 
in monetary matters to the full extent necessary for the functioning of the 
Common Market, a Monetary Committee with consultative status shall hereby 
be established with the following tasks:
— to keep under review the monetary and financial situation of Member 
States and of the Community and also the general payments system of Member 
States and to report regularly thereon to the Council and to the Commission; 
and
— to formulate opinions, at the request of the Council or of the Commission 
or on its own initiative, for submission to the said institutions
The Member States and the Commission shall each appoint two members of 
the Monetary Committee.
Article 106
1. Each Member State undertakes to authorise, in the currency of the 
Member State in which the creditor or the beneficiary resides, any payments 
connected with the exchange of goods, services or capital, and also any transfers 
of capital and wages, to the extent that the movement of goods, services, capital 
and persons is freed as between Member States in application of this Treaty. 
Member States hereby declare their willingness to free payments beyond the 
extent provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, in so far as their economic 
situation in general and the situation of their balance of payments in particular 
so permit.
2. To the extent that exchanges of goods and services and movements of 
capital are limited only by restrictions on payments connected therewith, the 
provisions of the Chapters relating to the abolition of quantitative restrictions, 
to the freeing of services and to the free movement of capital shall, for the 
purposes of the progressive abolition of such restrictions, apply by analogy.
3. Member States undertake not to introduce as between themselves any 
new restrictions on transfers connected with the invisible transactions listed in 
Annex III to this Treaty. The progressive abolition of existing restrictions shall 
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be effected in accordance with the provisions of Articles 63 to 65 inclusive, 
in so far as such abolition is not governed by the provisions contained in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 or by the Chapter relating to the free movement of capital.
4. Member States shall, where necessary, seek agreement concerning the 
measures to be taken in order to enable the payments and transfers mentioned 
in this Article to be effected. These measures shall not adversely affect the 
attainment of the objectives laid down in this Chapter.
Article 107
1. Each Member State shall treat its policy with regard to exchange rates as 
a matter of common interest.
2. If a Member State alters its exchange rate in a manner which is 
incompatible with the objectives laid down in Article 104 and which seriously 
distorts the conditions of competition, the Commission may, after consulting 
the Monetary Committee, authorise other Member States to take for a strictly 
limited period the necessary measures, of which it shall determine the 
conditions and particulars, in order to deal with the consequences of such 
alteration.
Article 108
1. Where a Member State is in difficulties or seriously threatened with 
difficulties as regards its balance of payments as a result either of overall 
disequilibrium of the balance of payments or of the kinds of currency at its 
disposal and where such difficulties are likely, in particular, to prejudice the 
functioning of the Common Market or the progressive establishment of the 
common commercial policy, the Commission shall without delay examine the 
situation of such State and the action which, in making use of all the means at its 
disposal, that State has taken or may take in conformity with the provisions of 
Article 104. The Commission shall indicate the measures which it recommends 
to the State concerned to adopt.
 If the action taken by a Member State and the measures suggested by the 
Commission do not prove sufficient to overcome the difficulties encountered 
or threatening, the Commission shall, after consulting the Monetary 
Committee, recommend to the Council the granting of mutual assistance and 
the appropriate methods therefore.
 The Commission shall keep the Council regularly informed of the 
situation and of its development.
2. The Council, acting by means of a qualified majority vote, shall grant 
mutual assistance; it shall issue directives or decisions laying down the 
conditions and particulars thereof. Mutual assistance may take the form, in 
particular, of:
(a) concerted action in regard to any other international organisations to 
which Member States may have recourse;
(b) any measures necessary to avoid diversions of commercial traffic where 
the State in difficulties maintains or re-establishes quantitative restrictions 
with regard to third countries; or
(c) the granting of limited credits by other Member States, subject to the 
agreement of the latter.
 Furthermore, during the transitional period, mutual assistance may 
also take the form of special reductions in customs duties or enlargements of 
quotas, for the purpose of facilitating the increase of imports from the State 
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in difficulties, subject to the agreement of the States by which such measures 
would have to be taken.
3. If the mutual assistance recommended by the Commission is not granted 
by the Council or if the mutual assistance granted and the measures taken 
are insufficient, the Commission shall authorise the State in difficulties to 
take measures of safeguard of which the Commission shall determine the 
conditions and particulars.
 Such authorisation may be revoked and such conditions and particulars 
may be amended by the Council acting by means of a qualified majority vote.
Article 109
1. Where a sudden crisis in the balance of payments occurs and if a decision, 
within the meaning of Article 108, paragraph 2, is not immediately taken, the 
Member State concerned may provisionally take the necessary measures of 
safeguard. Such measures shall cause the least possible disturbance in the 
functioning of the Common Market and shall not exceed the minimum strictly 
necessary to remedy the sudden difficulties which have arisen.
2. The Commission and the other Member States shall be informed of such 
measures of safeguard not later than at the time of their entry into force. The 
Commission may recommend to the Council mutual assistance under the 
terms of Article 108.
3. On the basis of an opinion of the Commission and after consulting the 
Monetary Committee, the Council, acting by means of a qualified majority 
vote, may decide that the State concerned shall amend, suspend or abolish the 
measures of safeguard referred to above.
12.
Speech by the chairman of the European Commission (Walter Hallstein) to the 
constitutive session of the Monetary Committee, 3 June 1958.
Historical Archives of the European Union (Florence, Villa il Poggiolo), European 
Community Institutions Collection, EC. EEC and Euratom Council of Ministers, CM2 
1958, inv.no. 613: Opening sitting of the Monetary Committee. © European Union.
Messieurs, les paroles de bienvenue que je me permets de vous adresser au 
nom de la Commission de la Communauté Economique Européenne sont plus 
qu’une simple formule de politesse.
 L’intégration européenne ne se fera pas d’une façon mécanique, à la suite 
de quelque processus automatique et mystérieux. Elle ne se fera pas non plus 
par des alignements spontanés et répétés de la politique des divers Etats.
 L’intégration doit se faire plutôt par étapes, elle doit devenir une réalité 
par le détour de notre Union douanière. Aussi pour atteindre cet objectif est-
il nécessaire que la libération du trafic des personnes, des capitaux et des 
services entre nos six pays aille de pair avec la coordination de la politique 
économique et monétaire des Etats membres.
 C’est le Traité qui délimite en l’occurrence les responsabilités. La 
Commission a entre autres pour tâche de veiller à ce que l’abaissement des 
tarifs douaniers intérieurs et l’assouplissement des contingentements soient 
effectués dans les délais prévus. Elle présente au Conseil des propositions en 
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vue d’harmoniser les impôts indirects et les impôts sur le chiffre d’affaires. Tout 
en faisant usage du droit de décision dont elle dispose dans certains domaines, 
ainsi que du droit spécial de proposition dans d’autres cas, la Commission 
recommande au Conseil les méthodes pour l’harmonisation des dispositions 
juridiques et administratives nécessaires à la création du marché commun.
 Il importe toutefois de souligner ici même que la compétence de la 
Commission ne s’étend pas à certains domaines importants que les Etats se 
sont réservés. Les dépenses publiques tout comme les impôts, le système 
des crédits et les investissements demeurent du ressort des Gouvernements 
nationaux.
 En outre, chaque Etat membre fait la politique économique qui lui paraît 
nécessaire pour garantir l’équilibre de sa balance générale des paiements et 
pour maintenir la confiance quant à sa monnaie nationale.
 Au stade de l’intégration que vient d’atteindre aujourd’hui notre 
Communauté, il existe par conséquent une division des compétences entre 
les nouvelles institutions et les Gouvernements nationaux. D’autre part, le 
Traité prévoit diverses liaisons entre nos institutions afin d’éviter le risque de 
mesures contradictoires. Dans le domaine de la politique conjoncturelle, les 
Etats membres se consultent entre eux et consultent la Commission. Afin de 
coordonner leur politique économique, les Etats organisent une collaboration 
entre leurs services administratifs compétents et leurs Banques d’émission. 
Enfin, votre Comité monétaire, Messieurs, est chargé de promouvoir la 
coordination des politiques des Etats membres en matière monétaire dans 
toute la mesure nécessaire au fonctionnement du Marché Commun.
 La santé économique d’une nation se reflète d’une façon très marquante 
dans sa monnaie. De temps à autre l’on peut s’attendre à quelque accès de 
fièvre qu’il s’agit de combattre; ceci exige une vigilance constante tant dans 
le domaine des diagnostics que dans celui de la thérapeutique. Jusqu’à ce 
jour, Messieurs, vous étiez appelés à agir dans vos pays. A présent, votre art 
et votre science feront leurs preuves dans un champ beaucoup plus vaste et à 
des conditions qui ne seront pas toujours faciles, comme les événements dont 
nous sommes les témoins semblent le démontrer.
 Permettez-moi de vous dire que c’est en raison même de l’autonomie 
dont dispose chacun des pays membres dans les domaines les plus importants 
de la vie que le succès de la Communauté dépend de notre volonté politique. 
Les difficultés et les obstacles auxquels nous nous heurterons à l’avenir seront 
surmontés par nous pourvu que nous soyons décidés à parvenir coûte que 
coûte au but. Vous pouvez compter entièrement sur la Commission et sur sa 
volonté inébranlable de remplir la tâche qui lui est assignée.
 La volonté politique de créer l’Europe se fortifiera comme je le crois de 
plus en plus avec le temps. Il n’existe pour aucun de nos 6 pays d’autre solution 
acceptable que celle du Marché Commun. Par un mouvement irréversible 
nous sommes conduits vers de nouvelles formes de la vie économique, 
lesquelles ne manqueront pas de provoquer des changements profonds dans 
le comportement de chaque Etat, même dans les domaines où celui-ci aura 
conservé son autonomie. L’intégration graduelle limitera en fait l’initiative des 
Etats. Pour le domaine de votre compétence, cela signifiera, Messieurs, que 
l’inflation ou la déflation survenant dans un pays deviendra tout autant un 
problème d’intérêt commun que la politique d’un Etat en matière monétaire.
 Il en ressort que chacune des parties du Marché Commun est intéressée à 
ce que la situation financière et économique des autres parties demeure aussi 
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saine que possible. D’autre part, chaque Etat doit plus que jamais prendre 
soin de maintenir l’équilibre de son budget, et une monnaie saine, puisque 
la circulation des capitaux sera rendue libre à l’intérieur de la Communauté. 
Cependant, Messieurs, un budget équilibré n’est pas un but en soi mais il est 
absolument nécessaire pour permettre d’atteindre les objectifs permanents 
de notre Communauté. Le développement harmonieux de la vie économique 
dans l’ensemble de la Communauté, une expansion économique constante 
et bien équilibrée, une stabilité plus grande et un relèvement plus rapide des 
conditions de vie, - tels sont les buts visés par le Traité.
 La vitesse de notre progrès sera conditionnée sans doute, en partie, par 
les moyens financiers dont pourra disposer la Communauté. Sous ce rapport, 
le marché commun ne peut pas accomplir des miracles. Il ne conduira pas 
ceux qui y participent d’un jour à l’autre, et sans grand effort, à une nouvelle 
richesse, facilement acquise. Tout au contraire, il exigera des moyens multiples 
et variés. Les entreprises devront subir des charges financières considérables 
en s’adaptant aux conditions d’une concurrence plus étendue. En outre, les 
Etats devront fournir des capitaux au fonds social européen et à la Banque 
européenne des Investissements.
 De même, devront-ils créer un Fonds de développement pour les pays et 
territoires d’outre-mer.
 En regardant le problème en face, nous ferons preuve d’un sens robuste 
des réalités et d’un optimisme solide. Quoi qu’il en soit, la mise est digne de 
tous vos efforts. Avec l’autorité que vous confèrent vos fonctions importantes et 
votre expérience, vous aussi, Messieurs, contribuerez activement à la réussite 
d’une entreprise comme il n’en existe pas d’autres ni en Europe ni dans le 
monde entier. Abstraction faite de vos rapports avec les deux représentants 
de la Commission de la Communauté Economique Européenne, vous êtes des 
experts indépendants. Vous vous êtes réunis afin de coordonner la politique 
monétaire des Etats membres dans la mesure nécessaire afin de parvenir à 
l’objectif visé, c’est-à-dire, pour déterminer les conditions indispensables pour 
le fonctionnement satisfaisant du marché commun. Rarement un organisme 
consultatif s’est vu investi d’une responsabilité aussi grande. Certes, votre 
Comité ne dispose pas du pouvoir de décision. Cependant, son avis sera d’un 
poids considérable. Aucune initiative ne sera prise en matière de coordination 
des politiques monétaires sans que vous ayez été entendus préalablement, et 
il n’est guère probable que le Conseil ou la Commission s’écarte sur des points 
importants de vos conclusions.
 Je voudrais donner ici un bref aperçu du vaste champ de vos activités: 
Votre tâche est la suivante: vous devez présenter au Conseil et à la Commission 
régulièrement des rapports sur la situation monétaire et financière des Etats 
membres et de la Communauté ainsi que sur le régime général des paiements 
des Etats membres. Vous devez formuler des avis soit à la requête du Conseil 
ou de la Commission soit de votre propre initiative, à l’intention de ces 
Institutions (Art. 105).
 D’autres consultations sont prévues, à savoir:
– la Commission consultera le Comité monétaire lors de la suppression 
progressive de toutes les restrictions aux mouvements des capitaux entre les 
Etats membres (Art. 69).
– la Commission consultera le Comité monétaire en adressant aux Etats 
membres des recommandations en vue de réduire autant que possible les 
restrictions en matière de mouvements de capitaux et des paiements courants 
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afférents à ces mouvements (Art. 71).
– le Comité sera entendu lorsque la Commission devra décider des mesures 
de protection prises par un Etat membre dans le domaine des mouvements des 
capitaux. (art. 73)
– si un Etat membre procède à une modification de son taux de change 
qui ne répond pas aux objectifs de l’art. 104, la Commission peut, après 
consultation du Comité monétaire, autoriser d’autres Etats membres à 
prendre, pour une période strictement limitée, les mesures nécessaires pour 
parer aux conséquences de cette action. (art. 107)
– en cas de difficultés dans la balance des paiements d’un Etat membre, 
la Commission vous consulte avant de recommander au Conseil le concours 
mutuel et les méthodes appropriées, si l’action entreprise par un Etat membre 
ne paraît pas suffisante pour aplanir les difficultés ou menaces de difficultés 
rencontrées. (art. 108)
– enfin, si, en cas de crise soudaine dans la balance des paiements, l’Etat 
membre intéressé a pris, à titre conservatoire, les mesures de sauvegarde 
nécessaires, le Conseil peut sur l’avis de la Commission, et après consultation 
du Comité monétaire, décider, en statuant à la majorité qualifiée, que l’Etat 
intéressé doit modifier, suspendre ou supprimer les mesures de sauvegarde 
susvisées. (art. 109)
 Vous avez le droit, Messieurs, de vous faire entendre chaque fois que 
vous le jugez utile. Je suis persuadé que nous profiterons maintes fois de vos 
considérations judicieuses et que vous aiderez activement à fixer une ligne 
d’orientation qui permettra de joindre aux nécessités urgentes de l’expansion 
économique l’équilibre financier et un degré d’emploi élevé. Il vaut mieux 
prévenir que guérir, dit le proverbe. Dans un monde soumis à une évolution 
rapide, la Communauté se fie à votre vigilance afin de pouvoir éviter les récifs 
que vous verrez de loin. Rarement les choses s’arrangent d’elles-mêmes, 
et si c’est parfois le cas chez l’individu, cela ne se produit jamais dans les 
Communautés, qu’il s’agisse de Nations ou de fédérations de peuples.
 N’hésitez pas, je vous en prie, de parler d’un ton ferme ni de dire, le cas 
échéant, des vérités désagréables. Vous pouvez formuler vos avis sans ambages; 
ceux-ci, en effet, ne sont pas destinés à servir de sujet de commentaires à 
l’opinion publique. Ils ne sont adressés qu’au Conseil exclusivement et à la 
Commission, afin que les deux puissent en faire usage. 
 Votre clarté et votre fermeté seront mises au service d’un idéal commun, 
à savoir de la construction d’une Communauté florissante de peuples qui sont 
décidés à subir entièrement les conséquences de l’intégration.
 C’est aujourd’hui une formule banale que de dire que le Traité qui 
se trouve à l’origine de la Commission de la Communauté Economique 
Européenne est un Traité cadre. Son contenu, c’est-à-dire la substance future 
de notre Communauté, devra être créé constamment par une discipline 
librement acceptée par la certitude que nos pays comportent plus d’éléments 
communs que d’éléments qui les séparent; en un mot, par le désir raisonné 
d’atteindre l’objectif visé.
 Je voudrais terminer, Messieurs, en exprimant l’espoir que votre travail 
deviendra l’un des appuis importants du nouvel édifice européen et en 
formulant le vœu que votre collaboration au service de nos peuples, réunis 
sous le signe d’une Communauté pacifique et fraternelle, obtienne le succès 




First report on the activities of the Monetary Committee of the EEC, 28 February 
1959.
Historical Archives of the European Union (Florence, Villa il Poggiolo), European 
Community Institutions Collection, EC. EEC and Euratom Council of Ministers, 
CM2. 1959, inv.no. 598: Report of the Monetary Committee. © European Union.
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Section II: Conséquences de la convertibilité des monnaies européennes
23. Le 27 décembre 1958, les six Etats membres de la Communauté 
Economique Européenne, de concert avec e Royaume-Uni, ont pris l’initiative 
de réaliser la convertibilité externe de leurs monnaies; en conséquence, 
conformément a la clause spéciale de terminaison de l’accord établissant 
I’UEP, cette dernière, a été mise en liquidation et l’Accord monétaire européen, 
signé au mois d’août 1955 par tous les pays membres de l’OECE, est aussitôt 
entré en vigueur.
24. Au point de vue technique, le passage à la convertibilité externe a pris la 
forme d’une suppression des distinctions qui subsistaient entre les ‘comptes 
transférables’ et les ‘comptes convertibles’. Grâce à l’UEP, les monnaies des pays 
membres étaient transférables dans une large zone, plus étendue que la zone 
OECE. Par ailleurs, les comptes transférables de certains pays pouvaient être 
cédés sur les marchés libres des changes de pays tiers et convertis en dollars, 
avec de très légères différences de taux. Ainsi le passage à la convertibilité 
représente l’aboutissement d’une évolution progressive.
25. Le champ d’application des mesures de convertibilité n’est toutefois pas 
le même pour tous les pays de la Communauté.
 Tout d’abord, l’extension géographique de la zone de convertibilité varie 
selon les pays: certains ont, en effet, conservé d’assez nombreux accords de 
paiements bilatéraux alors que d’autres n’en ont plus qu’un nombre très limité.
 Par ailleurs, en ce qui concerne les résidents des différents pays, les 
réglementations des changes définissent d’une manière plus ou moins large 
les transactions commerciales et financières autorisées.
 C’est ainsi que l’Allemagne, l’Italie et le Benelux avaient déjà un niveau 
élevé de libération de leur commerce avec les pays de l’OECE et la zone dollar; 
la France, en même temps qu’elle établissait la convertibilité externe de sa 
monnaie, a libéré largement ses échanges avec ces deux groupes de pays.
26. De même, les Etats membres avaient déjà progressivement assoupli ou 
supprimé les restrictions aux mouvements de capitaux.
 Ainsi, en Allemagne, tous les contrôles à l’exportation de capitaux avaient 
été supprimés depuis septembre 1957 alors que, pour les importations de 
capitaux, ne subsistent qu’un petit nombre de restrictions, de portée limitée.
 En Union économique belgo-luxembourgeoise, l’existence d’un marché 
libre des changes, sur lequel les transactions financières sont effectuées sans 
contrôle et sans intervention des autorités monétaires, a pratiquement réalisé, 
depuis plusieurs années, la convertibilité du franc belge pour ces transactions.
 En Italie également existe un marché libre des changes pour les 




 Aux Pays-Bas, les mouvements de capitaux restent en principe assujettis 
à des autorisations spéciales, qui sont d’ailleurs libéralement accordées, 
notamment dans le secteur du commerce des titres, dont une très importante 
partie a été libérée moyennant des licences générales.
 En France, les avoirs en capital des non-résidents viennent d’être libérés, 
le régime des valeurs mobilières a été assoupli mais les investissements directs 
à l’étranger des résidents demeurent subordonnés à autorisation.
27. Comme la convertibilité externe n’était pas compatible avec les règles de 
l’UEP, en particulier avec le système de crédits automatiques, les pays membres 
de l’OECE avaient conclu, en 1955, l’Accord monétaire européen, pour définir 
les modalités de la coopération monétaire européenne après le passage à la 
convertibilité.74
 L’AME comporte l’institution d’un fonds européen de 600 millions 
de dollars qui peut accorder des crédits ad hoc, à deux ans d’échéance au 
maximum aux pays membres qui éprouvent des difficultés temporaires dans 
leur balance globale des paiements.
 Par ailleurs, en vertu du nouveau système multilatéral de règlements, les 
créances acquises dans la monnaie des pays membres de l’AME par d’autres 
pays membres, sont désormais susceptibles d’être réglées intégralement en 
dollars dans le cadre de la compensation mensuelle; en fait, la quasi totalité 
des opérations s’effectue au jour le jour sur les marchés des changes. 
28. Dans l’opinion du Comité, les mesures de convertibilité et l’entrée en 
vigueur de l’AME appellent, du point de vue du fonctionnement du Marché 
commun, les commentaires suivants:
a) L’adoption par les pays membres d’une attitude commune à l’égard du 
problème de la convertibilité externe des monnaies aura pour effet de faciliter 
la réalisation des objectifs du Marché commun et les rapports avec les pays 
tiers.
b) L’Accord monétaire européen, comme auparavant l’UEP, permet d’assurer 
la liberté des transferts entre les Etats membres du Marché commun.
c) Les mesures de convertibilité ne sont pas de nature à entrainer, 
du moins dans un proche avenir, de modifications importantes dans les 
courants échanges, aussi bien entre les pays du Marché commun qu’entre la 
Communauté et les pays tiers.
d) Les indications données précédemment sur le degré de convertibilité 
interne auquel sont parvenus les pays du Marché commun montrent que 
des différences subsistent dans les niveaux de libération atteints pour les 
transactions, les services et les capitaux. Le Comité souhaite que ces différences 
soient réduites par l’assouplissement progressif et le rapprochement des 
régimes de changes.
e) L’établissement de la convertibilité externe et la suppression des crédits 
automatiques ne peuvent, de l’avis du Comité, que renforcer la nécessité, pour 
les pays du Marché commun, de maintenir la stabilité financière et monétaire, 
facilitant ainsi la réalisation du Marché commun. Une coopération étroite des 
Etats membres s’impose dans le domaine monétaire. Si les pays adoptaient des 
politiques divergentes, il pourrait en résulter des tensions de nature à mettre 
en danger les progrès réalisés en matière de convertibilité des monnaies et de 
74 Note in text: ‘Les pays de la Communauté, a l’ exception de la France, sent créanciers 
de l’Union au moment de la liquidation de cette dernière. Des négociations bilatérales 
vont intervenir pour fixer les conditions de remboursement des créances et des dettes, 
et notamment leur durée d’amortissement.
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libération des échanges. La coordination des politiques monétaires est donc 
indispensable pour permettre un développement économique régulier des 




On the occasion of the signing of the Rome Treaties on 25 March 1957, Paul 
Henri Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, is pictured in front of a statue of the 
foot of the Roman emperor Constantine the Great.
The Rome Treaties provided a ‘footprint’ for further developments on 
monetary integration in Europe.
© Nationaal Archief/Spaarnestad Photo/Aldo Savina
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 Introduction to document 14
The Treaty of Rome provided for the establishment of a Common Market at 
the end of a transitional phase in three stages (Article 8 of the Treaty). This 
transitional period of a maximum of twelve years was to enable the gradual 
formation of a customs union and a common external tariff for the Six. The 
period was divided into three stages of four years, with a series of actions to 
be completed in each stage. This system of three stages allowed for a gradual 
reduction in customs tariffs, as described in Article 14 of the Treaty.
 In October 1962, the Commission published an Action Plan for stage 
two of the transition. The Action Plan referred to a monetary union to be 
set up in stage two and completed in stage three, though without impinging 
on the sovereignty of the EEC’s Member States. The plan was a response 
to a resolution passed by the EEC Parliamentary Assembly calling for the 
establishment of a ‘federal’ system linking the Member States’ central banks 
with a central institution responsible for a common monetary policy.
 Both the Action Plan and the Assembly resolution came about in a 
particular context: the international monetary system was under scrutiny, 
particularly since the American-Belgian economist Robert Triffin had 
formulated his famous dilemma in 1960. Triffin stated that if the international 
monetary system was to function, the United States had to have a deficit in 
its balance of payments so that the global community could be supplied 
with international means of payment; yet this very deficit would erode 
the confidence of economic agents in the dollar, the international reference 
currency. Therefore the need for reliable international means of payment would 
paradoxically lead to a loss of confidence in the reference currency.75 Indeed, 
the international monetary system had been under pressure for several years. 
In response, a Gold Pool had been set up in 1961. The EEC addressed the issue 
in its own context, preparing for the establishment of a common agricultural 
policy (CAP) which stipulated that agricultural prices should be fixed in a 
common unit of account. This provided a stimulus to increased monetary 
cooperation in the EEC.
 Chapter VIII of the Action Programme, presented here as document 
14, dealt with monetary policy. Its content was heavily influenced by Robert 
Marjolin, the French former Secretary-General of the OEEC and now Vice-
President of the European Commission. The Chapter traced the basic 
arguments for a monetary union: it should protect Europe from currency 
fluctuations, help it free itself from the tutelary guidance of the dollar and 
speed up the process of European unity in general.76
 Reaction from the Council of Ministers to these proposals fell short of the 
aspirations set out in the Action Programme. Even so, the programme led to the 
setting up of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member 
States by the EEC Council on 8 May 1964, at the same time as the Budgetary 
Policy Committee and the Medium-Term Economic Policy Committee.
75 Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960).
76 Pierre Du Bois, Histoire de l’Europe monétaire 1945–2005: Euro qui comme Ulysse... 




Memorandum of the European Commission on the Action Programme of the 
Community for the Second Stage, 24 October 1962.
Brussels: Publishing Services of the European Communities, 1962. © European 
Communities.
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CHAPTER VIII: Monetary policy
127. The two preceding chapters have shown how the Community must 
move towards the establishment of one single centre for economic policy. 
Nevertheless, such a co-ordination of national policies, leading to their being 
eventually merged into one, would be incomplete, and therefore possibly 
ineffective, if no comparable action were undertaken in the field of monetary 
policy, that is to say with regard to the rules which govern the creation and 
movement of money in the member countries. Though monetary policy now no 
longer plays the same almost exclusive leading part as at various times in the 
past, it still has an important contribution to make to the general equilibrium 
– if only to act as a brake on an economy threatened by inflation.
128. But monetary policy is of vital importance to the Common Market 
from another point of view. From the end of the transition period on, if not 
even sooner, economic union will involve fixed rates of exchange between 
Member States with very narrow limits on the variations allowed. Any major 
modification would so much upset the trade of countries no longer protected by 
any customs barrier, and, because of the guaranteed Community intervention 
price for grain and other basic agricultural products, would cause such sudden 
changes in prices of farm products and therefore in farm incomes also, that the 
Common Market itself could be imperilled.
These fixed rates of exchange are the very essence of a monetary union for, 
when they are firmly guaranteed by appropriate institutions and methods, it 
is a matter of indifference to the citizens of any Member State whether they 
hold assets in one particular Community currency or another. The progressive 
merging of the short- and long-term economic policies will certainly help 
considerably in achieving this, but it would not be sufficient if it were 
unsupported by specific action in the monetary field.
129.  Also, the six Community countries are members of a worldwide 
monetary system based on gold and on two major reserve currencies. This is 
not the place to discuss the merits of the system, but it may be said without 
exaggeration that it makes for a certain fragility calling for constant action if 
undue strains are to be avoided. The Community will be all the more able to 
act effectively in this direction as it will function as a single unit; the emergence 
of a European reserve currency would considerably facilitate international 




130. It will be noted in this context that what is at stake here is not only the 
stability of the world monetary system but also the cohesion of the Common 
Market, which would inevitably be deeply affected by serious monetary 
difficulties even if these primarily concerned countries outside the Community. 
The Treaty makes provision for a common commercial policy but not for a 
common monetary policy; this is an obvious gap which needs to be bridged.
131. The programme which the Commission proposes to adopt in this field is 
set out below. The Commission will formulate the necessary proposals and in so 
doing it will constantly draw on the advice of the Monetary Committee which, 
in recent years, has proved itself to be one of the most important Community 
institutions so much so that the Commission would like to see its terms of 
reference and authority extended even further. Clearly, the entry of the United 
Kingdom into the Community will profoundly alter the nature of the monetary 
problem as it presents itself to the Member States and the institutions of the 
Community today. The Commission is nevertheless convinced that the ideas 
expressed above will lose nothing of their cogency and importance.
132. (1) Since the inception of the Community the Commission has derived 
great benefit from numerous consultations with the Governors of the Central 
Banks of the Common Market countries who, moreover, regularly meet 
under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements. Nevertheless 
the Commission believes that it would be useful for all concerned if the 
Community’s specific monetary problems – and general monetary problems 
as seen from the Community angle –were kept under constant review by a 
council composed of the Governors of the Banks of Issue of the Community 
countries in so far as these matters fall within the competence of the Central 
Banks. Provision could be made for a Committee of Deputies.
For questions within the ambit of both Central Banks and Governments, 
meetings would be arranged under the auspices of the EEC Council with the 
Ministers of Finance or Economics and the Governors of the Central Banks in 
attendance. Unofficial meetings of the same group of persons would continue 
to be held, as has been the case since 1959. The Monetary Committee would 
prepare the decisions of the Ministers and Governors.
133. (2) Important monetary decisions would be discussed in advance in one 
of the bodies referred to above. This would apply in particular to any major 
decision affecting the creation of money in one of the Member States; changes 
in Bank Rate or other short-term rates, minimum reserves, rediscount quotas, 
open market policy, and so on. Prior consultation would also apply in cases 
where a Central Bank makes an advance to the State or in case of changes 
in the rate of exchange between one Community currency and the others, a 
contingency which cannot be ruled out altogether during the transition period.
The Commission is fully aware of the delicate nature of this proposal in view 
of the need to observe the strictest secrecy. It nevertheless believes that such 
prior consultation would be possible if – in the most important cases – it 




Flexible procedures can be worked out. In cases to be carefully determined it 
might be sufficient – in order that consultation may be said to have occurred 
– for one country to discuss with its partners and the Commission the general 
direction of its monetary policy and the measures it proposes to take within a 
specified period provided that the information was precise and the time-limit 
relatively short. In other cases, where less important decisions are involved, a 
procedure of prior information might suffice and an exchange of views would 
take place only at the request of another country or the Commission.
134. (3) The system of prior consultation, which could be organized by 
mid-1963, will naturally develop – for the same questions – into a system of 
recommendations which the countries other than the one taking action would 
address to it on their own account whenever they deemed necessary. The 
Monetary Committee has, in fact, already launched out on this road.
135. (4) With regard to external monetary relations the Commission accepts 
the view of the Monetary Committee that recourse by any Member State to 
the facilities offered by the International Monetary Fund must necessarily 
be preceded by consultations within the Community. The Commission 
feels, generally speaking, that a common position should be worked out on 
all important decisions in international institutions whether they concern 
Member States or non-member countries. It also feels that there is need to 
harmonize the policies of the Central Banks on reserve currencies, on which 
the present international monetary system largely rests. Lastly, it is of the 
opinion that the Member States should work out a common position regarding 
the present monetary system and any reforms that might be contemplated.
Of the recommendations set out in the preceding paragraph the first three 
could be immediately applied; the discussion of the last, which has already 
begun in the Monetary Committee, should be terminated before the end of 
1963. The policy of the Central Banks with regard to the reserve currencies 
could be covered by a gradual programme of harmonization which, would also 
be drawn up in 1963.
136. (5) An intergovernmental agreement should lay down now the extent 
of the obligations which each country was prepared to accept with regard 
to mutual aid under the Treaty, without such prior agreement in any way 
prejudging the question of whether the Member State in difficulty fulfils the 
conditions under which aid is to be given. But, if an affirmative decision were 
given on this latter point, the maximum credits which Member States had 
committed themselves to make available would be known in advance. These 
credits should represent a certain proportion of the gold and foreign exchange 
reserves held by each of the Community Central Banks, so as to take into 
account changes which might occur in the international liquidity situation of 
any Member State.
137. (6) As the objectives indicated in this and the preceding chapters are 
attained, the movements of capital still prohibited or restricted will have to be 




Monetary policy measures are closely relevant to public finance policy. The 
confrontation of the budgets of the Member States to which reference is made 
in the chapter on development will provide an opportunity for a review of 
problems arising from the volume of public expenditure, possible deficits and 
methods of financing.
138. This then is the progress which the Commission considers both feasible 
and necessary in the field of monetary policy during the second stage of the 
build-up of the Common Market. It will round off the progress already made in 
budget policy (see above). It will be noted that nothing here proposed detracts 
from the right of the Member States and of the Banks of Issue to take, after 
the consultation provided for, any steps they consider best in the national 
interest. However, the institutions will have been set up and the procedures 
tested which will make it possible to go further and to advance from the co-
ordination to the centralization of decisions.
The establishment of the monetary union could become the objective of the 
third stage towards the Common Market. The Community Ministers of Finance 
or of Economics, meeting in the Council, would decide on the conditions to be 
laid down at the appropriate time: the total volume of the national budgets and 
of the Community budget, and the general conditions for financing them. The 
Council of the Governors of the Banks of Issue would become the central organ 
of a federal type banking system.
– – –
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Through its Action Programme, the European Comission wanted to appeal to 
‘the public arena’.
The public arena became visible during the manifestations taking place in the 
margins of European negotiations. In 1953, during the Conference of Foreign 
Ministers of the ECSC in Baden-Baden a cardboard reads a plea in German 
which can be translated as: ’Unite Europe at last!’
©Bundesarchiv, Bild-00010424, Photographer: Arntz, Prof
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 Introduction to document 15
The European Commission’s memorandum on the Action Programme for the 
second stage of integration called for intergovernmental consultations in the 
first half of 1963. In The Hague several ministries, including Foreign Affairs, 
Finance, Economic Affairs, but also Agriculture, had an interest in European 
integration, including the monetary plans that the Commission proposed.  
 Interdepartmental coordination was therefore necessary in order to 
establish a unitary position on the Action Programme on the basis of which 
to enter negotiations in Brussels. The establishment of interdepartmental 
coordination on European policy in the Netherlands can be characterized by 
a ‘turf battle’ between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, in which each department strove to define its competences as 
broadly as possible.77 After a reorganization in the mid-1950s the coordination 
of the position of the Netherlands concerning European integration issues was 
assigned to the newly established Directorate-General European Cooperation 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This arrangement was to the detriment of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which favoured its own Directorate-General 
Foreign Economic Relations as the central policy making institution.78 Despite 
protests, the new arrangement was approved in the Council of Ministers. 
 Yet Minister of Economic Affairs Jelle Zijlstra received a ‘consolation 
prize’. He became chairman of the interdepartmental Coordination Committee 
for European Integration and Association issues (CCEIA, referred to in The 
Hague as CoCo).79 This Coordination Committee was installed on 20 June, 
1956. 80 It was administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which from the 
early 1970s also took over the chair in the person of the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs.81 CoCo met regularly. Its conclusions were sent as policy 
recommendations to the Council of Ministers for final approval. 
 Document 15 shows that the Action Programme was welcomed by the 
Netherlands and that an early interdepartmental reflection on the Dutch 
position was considered beneficial, both for the discussions in Brussels 
and for justification towards Parliament. The note supported the idea of 
the Commission’s role in consulting national experts. The Commission was 
thus acknowledged as an actor in monetary policy and although the Action 
Programme would not lead directly to monetary union, it did form a step 
towards this goal. In subsequent years three new committees on monetary 
policy were established in which the Commission would take a seat.82
77 Hans Labohm (ed.), De Waterdragers van het Nederlandse Europabeleid: terugblik op 40 
jaar DGES (Den Haag: Sdu, 1997), 2.
78 Ibid., 16.
79 Ibid.
80 Internal memorandum Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 June 1956: National Archives 
of the Netherlands (The Hague), Collection Van der Beugel (2.21.183.08), inv.no. 5. This 
document is available on the Huygens ING website: www.europadocs.eu.
81 Burger, E., Groen, P. L. en Steenhuis, J. Gedane Buitenlandse Zaken: Een Institutioneel 
Onderzoek naar het Beleidsterrein Buitenlands Beleid, Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en het 
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1945-1990 [1994], (The Hague: Rijksarchiefdienst/
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2000), 139.
82 Ivo Maes, ‘The Ascent of the European Commission as an Actor in the Monetary 





Communication of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
Interdepartmental Coordination Committee on European Integration and 
Association Issues on the Action Programme of the Commission, 25 April 1963. 
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Cabinet of the 
Prime-Minister (2.03.01), inv.no. 2894. Translation: Huygens ING, The Hague.
On 25 October 1962 the EEC Commission proposed a working program to the 
Council of Ministers83 that it wishes the Community to implement in the coming 
years. As Mr. Hallstein explains in his introductory letter, the Commission 
composed this memorandum in first instance at the request of the European 
Parliament for its deliberation at the Colloquium of 21 and 22 November 1962 
on the theme ‘the goals of the Community during the phase corresponding to 
the second stage of the transition period of the common market’.
 The Commission offers in its memorandum a more or less developed 
overview of the goals to be pursued; it accentuates the coherence between the 
customs union of the Six that has already been developed significantly, and the 
economic union – with a common policy in several sectors – that is still in its 
infancy. Particularly in the area of common policy the Treaty of Rome almost 
exclusively describes principles. A sketchy elaboration of these principles has 
now been written in the Action Program.
 Because, given the recent experiences, the development of a common 
policy belongs to the hardest tasks of the Community, it can be considered 
as a point of victory that the member states are timely confronted with 
the development of this policy on the basis of some concrete ideas, as the 
Commission sees this. Furthermore, the member countries are offered a 
complete picture of the problems they will face in the further construction of 
the Community.
 On the basis of the above, the initiative of the Commission can in general 
be assessed as useful. Both government and public administration have 
received guidelines in this program towards future proposals to be expected 
from the Commission; they can prepare on these matters, test their own views 
and already decide on the general direction of policy of the Netherlands, which 
will also benefit interdepartmental coordination.
 This ‘pre-message’ of the Commission also means that Parliament has the 
opportunity to interrogate the Government on the basis of this on its general 
ideas concerning the EEC-policy; already the Second Chamber has asked 
questions about the content of the Action Program during the current debate 
on various budget chapters.84 Hence it is also important that the Government 
reflects on its position regarding the main ideas of the document.
 The Netherlands Government has always pursued a strict application of 
the EEC-Treaty and has been willing, where this seemed necessary and fair, to 
bring the necessary sacrifices. In principle the Netherlands will also be willing 
to cooperate in further initiatives of the Commission to carry out the Treaty. 
Furthermore, the Netherlands shall be willing to adopt a positive approach to 
83 See document 14.
84 Handelingen der Staten-Generaal, Tweede Kamer, 1962-1963, add. 6900, ch. V, no. 11, 




activities of Community that are based on an extensive interpretation of the 
EEC-Treaty, as long as they, in the Dutch understanding, benefit the formation 
of the common market and fit Netherlands policy as outlined after the break-
up of negotiations with the British.85
 The Commission-document will thus have to be examined and tested 
to the criteria established by the Government and to the articles that have, 
in part, been included in the EEC Treaty on the insistence of the Netherlands 
(such as for example article 25 EEC).
 Some general remarks and objections can already be explicated. If here 
a critical tone shines through, this by no means suggests a negative judgement 
of the program, which without doubt includes a lot of valuable elements.
1. As already suggested above, it can in general be observed that the 
Commission has given a broad interpretation to the Treaty. Without undue 
attention to its suggestion to expand European integration to fields other than 
socio-economic policy – foreign policy, defence and the cultural cooperation 
are mentioned specifically – the chapters on the economic, social and 
monetary policy may be identified as topics on which ... [line missing]. There 
is no mention in the Treaty of a monetary union as mentioned explicitly by the 
Commission – although possibly necessary as a closing element of the common 
market.
2. Striking is the political character of the Commission document. It has 
clearly been written for the Parliament, for publicity, for the public arena 
and therefore misses on several points the more nuanced approach, which is 
needed with an eye to general agreement of the Council. That this is also not 
the intention of the Commission may be demonstrated further. 
 The over-simplified approach is particularly notable in the following points:
a) The activities, which the Commission plans to undertake in the short run 
and which are to result in Council decisions, are of a quantitative nature to 
the extent that it will be difficult for the Community to complete them. The 
Commission should therefore have set priorities for those problems and 
proposals that are in short term essential for the further extension of the 
common market and that can be dealt with in a swift and orderly fashion 
making use of the manpower available. It should be recalled that the work is 
already likely to become too much for the institutes of the EEC. Moreover it 
should be noted for the record that the Commission document is by no means 
confined to the second stage, despite the title of the program.
b) Another aspect of the ambitious tendency of the document is the 
way in which it insists on the establishment of a common policy and a 
common legislation in a number of areas, while the Treaty only provides 
for coordination and harmonization of the policies in the member states, 
respectively an adjustment of legislation. Here it has to be noted however, that 
although the Commission assumes a common policy in certain areas, it speaks 
of coordination and harmonization in the development of these ideas.
c) As an aside it can be noted that not all chapters in the Commission 
document include original ideas and proposals. The chapter on agriculture 
does not include anything new, while the content of the section on transport is 
also known and even outdated on certain points. 
85 On 9 August 1961 the United Kingdom applied for accession to the EEC. After a year 
of negotiations between the six EEC countries and the UK, the French president Charles 
de Gaulle vetoed the British application during a press conference on 14 January 1963.
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3. A very important issue that deserves special attention, is how the targets 
of this action program are influenced by the possibility that in due course other 
European countries might join the Community. The Commission’s proposals 
regarding the completion of the customs union are apparently conceived in 
light of the current number of members of the Community. It seems likely, 
that this part of the program may be difficult to accept for future accession 
countries. The Community should particularly take this aspect into account.
4. As is known, the opposition between Minister Erhard and Mr. Hallstein 
formed the ‘pièce de résistance’ at the Colloquium of the European Parliament. 
It may perhaps be said that a certain lack of proper appreciation of the concepts 
used has confused the debate and has focused it too much on whether or not the 
plans of the Commission were of a high-handed nature. It is however certain 
that it is an important question in which direction the EEC shall develop itself, 
particularly in those areas where the Treaty does not specifically proposes 
a future common policy. Will the Member States be willing to transfer more 
competences to the supranational body in Brussels – like the Commission 
appears to wish – or shall they only sparsely want to cede their sovereignty 
and confine to coordination of positions and harmonisation of their respective 
national policies? 
 With regard to the procedure to be followed, and by way of conclusion, 
the following may serve. From the part of Commission-officials it was heard 
furtively that the Commission will not discuss the document as such in the 
Council. It is not unlikely that the Commission has acknowledged that such 
a document, written for publicity, is not a suitable basis for discussion in the 
Council. For this reason, it appears not to serve the Dutch interest to provoke 
a discussion on this case in Brussels at this point, although a discussion in the 
Council on the long-term-problems could be helpful.
 Apart from that what happens in Brussels, it would however be 
advantageous for a well coordinated Netherlands’ policy to make a careful 
study of, and decide on a position on, the most important proposals indicated 
in the proposals, as far as these offer sufficient basis for this. 
 To this end, interdepartmental consultation, based on the attached 
outline by the Directorate-General of the BEB86, resulted in a draft in which 
the main ideas of the EEC Commission are addressed per chapter and in most 
cases commented on briefly. In accordance with a decision of the Coordination 
Committee for European Integration and Association Issues, the Council of 
Ministers might further indicate which topics in the present action program 
are eligible for a more in-depth study by working groups of the Coordinating 
Committee.
– – –
VII and VIII. Economic and Monetary Policies
In the introduction it has already been noted that a judgement of these 
chapters in particular will also be affected by the degree of commitment of 
the member states to contribute to the construction of an economic union, 
a commitment which, at least from the Dutch side, will also be decided on 
by the new situation. Such a construction entails also that from the pre-
eminently nationally implemented economic and monetary policies, tasks will 




be coordinated and that it will perhaps also be required to transfer certain 
competences to community institutions.
 When one takes note of the ideas of the Commission, one may 
acknowledge that the Commission’s policy rightly puts consultation between 
competent national experts and the Commission in the foreground. It also 
attaches greater future weight to the existing consultation bodies on economic 
and monetary policies.
 It does not seem fair to accuse the Commission of statism and dirigisme on 
the grounds of its pursuit to make economic policies communal. Mr. Hallstein 
has rightfully pointed out in the European Parliament that the interventions 
of the Community will be quantitatively less than those of the separate states, 
while on the other hand not the economic subjects but the states themselves 
are already limited in their activities because of the Treaty of Rome. These 
limitations do not serve any purpose than to guarantee the freedom that is 
anchored in the Treaty.
 It will therefore be for a large part dependent on the level of common 
intervention in the economic life of the Community, which might justify such an 
accusation. It is however not possible to express an opinion on these matters at 
this point.
 One can easily come to draw an incorrect picture of the plans of the 
Commission if one assumes that these are to be achieved during the second 
phase. In several paragraphs it becomes clear that attaining the end goal of 
the Commission plans is only foreseen after the end of the third phase. The 
Commission also clearly states that the measures of monetary policy are 




Monetary compensatory amounts were for the first time 
introduced in August 1969.
French price levels remained the same despite changes in the exchange rate 
of the franc. For this Italian farmer it meant a loss of income and a reason to 




 Introduction to document 16-18
On 24 June 1963 the European Commission presented to the Council 
proposals87 to strengthen monetary and financial cooperation within the 
EEC. These proposals were a further concretion of the Action Plan of 24 
October 1962.88 This document made clear that in pursuance of article 105 
of the Rome Treaty the Commission should submit recommendations to the 
Council for bringing into effect the collaboration in the economic field.89 The 
proposals resulted on 8 May 1964 in several Council decisions in the monetary 
and financial fields: the establishment of the Committee of Governors of the 
Central Banks, cooperation in the field of international monetary relations and 
extension of the competence of the Monetary Committee, consultations on 
changes in parity between currencies, and the establishment of a Budgetary 
Policy Committee.90 As demonstrated, the Netherlands supported this 
approach, although the Ministry of Finance was doubtful whether the national 
governments would put their draft budgets up for discussion in Brussels or 
adhere to its results.91
 According to the EEC Treaty the common market was to be extended to 
agriculture and trade in agricultural products. The realisation of a common 
agricultural policy(CAP) was the spearhead of the ability of the European 
Commission to organise such a policy. On 30 June 1960 the Commission, 
under president op Walter Hallstein and vice-president Sicco Mansholt, 
who was responsible for agriculture, presented its first proposals to the 
Council of Ministers. These proposals were meant to lead to a market based 
on the free movement of agricultural products within the EEC. This common 
market would be divided by product with prices being progressively 
unified and guaranteed.  On 14 January 1962, following the first marathon 
negotiations on European agriculture, the Council of Ministers approved the 
Commission’s proposals on the organisation of common markets for cereals, 
pork, fruit and vegetables, wine, eggs and poultry. Agreement was also reached 
on the establishment of a schedule to extend the CAP to dairy products, beef, 
veal, sugar and other measures to assist trade within the Community, and the 
establishment of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF) to finance operations of the CAP. Following up on this policy, Mansholt 
presented measures to the Council of Ministers in December 1963 to establish 
a common price level for cereals for 1964 and 1965.
 Document 17 demonstrates how the CAP became intertwined with 
monetary policy. The Dutch Director-General of European Cooperation 
Karel Hartogh points out that there were monetary aspects to the proposals 
for common prices for agricultural products as they will bind the exchange 
rates of the member states closer together. A crucial question was which unit 
of account would be used to fix the common prices. In 1965 the Monetary 
87 Kenneth Dyson and Lucia Quaglia, European Economic Governance and Policies: Volume 
I: Commentary on Key Historical and Institutional Documents (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 138-139. This document is available on http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/emu_history/documentation.htm.
88 See document 14.
89 See document 11.
90 Dyson and Quaglia, European Economic Governance and Policies. Vol. I, 140-143.
91 See document 15.
90
document 16-18
Committee presented two formulas: using the EPU unit of account92 or a unit of 
account based on the weighted average of the currencies of the member states. 
A Dutch working group of senior officials preferred a weighted average but an 
agreement on The Hague’s point of view could not be reached. Document 18 
shows that two years later, the disagreement still existed.
16.
Report by the Directorate for Foreign Monetary Transfers of the Netherlands 
Ministry of Finance on the proposals of the European Commission to strengthen 
monetary and financial cooperation within the EEC, 7 August 1963
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Cabinet of the 
Prime-Minister (2.03.01), inv. no. 2895. Translation: Huygens ING, The Hague.
In a letter dated 24 June, the President of the EEC Commission93 has brought 
proposals to the Council of the EEC to strengthen monetary and financial 
cooperation within the EEC. These proposals present a further concretization 
of the ideas that the Commission has developed in its Action Plan for the 
Second Stage. The proposals comprise the following:
1. Establishment of a Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the 
EEC;
2. Extension of the competence of the Monetary Committee to the monetary 
relations of the members of the Community with third countries and other 
international institutions;
3. Obligatory consultation in case of mutual parity change;
4. Establishment of a budgetary policy committee. 
Regarding these proposals the following may be observed. First and foremost 
it is to be noted that the proposals appear quite acceptable in general.
Ad 1. Founding of a Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the EEC.
Article 105 of the EEC Treaty94 holds that the Member States of the EEC, in 
order to coordinate their economic policy – focused on balance of payments 
equilibrium, high level of employment and a stable price level – establish a 
collaboration between their central banks. In practice, this cooperation has 
so far taken place in the Monetary Committee and on the occasions of the 
scheduled meetings of directors of European central banks in the context of 
the Bank for International Settlements in Basel. In the Monetary Committee 
one of the two members per Member State is nominated by the Central Bank; 
this also applies to his deputy. Both are, however, appointed in their personal 
capacity and are completely independent: in a formal sense they do not 
speak on behalf of the central banks, even if they are, like in the Dutch case, 
vice president and deputy director of the bank. In the Basel framework the 
Governors of the Central Banks act themselves; this assembly is not limited to 
the Six and though separate informal discussions between representatives of 
the Six are of course possible if the need is felt from time to time, the situation is 
92 See introduction to document 4.
93 Walter Hallstein.
94 See document 11.
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not quite satisfactory. For that reason, the Central Bank Governors themselves 
are taken in with the idea to institutionalize these consultations.
 In general, one of the European Commissioners will participate in the 
consultations, while the Chairman of the Monetary Committee may also be 
invited. The European Commission has the right to call for an emergency 
meeting of the Committee of Governors. Its powers are limited to exploratory 
discussions on monetary developments in the Member States and central bank 
policy in connection therewith; the Committee itself therefore has no power to 
decide.
 The Commission proposals do not provide for the possibility to issue 
any advice as a result of the exchange of views in the Committee, either to the 
Commission or to the Council of Ministers. Any proposal for such authority 
would probably meet with French opposition, given the dependency of the 
French central bank on the French Government. Nonetheless it appears 
desirable to allow the Governors to make their views known on certain 
developments and problems. If it would not be possible to establish this right 
as such, then it may be considered to grant them the authority to issue a written 
report to the Council and to the Commission at least once a year, as is also done 
by the Monetary Committee. The phrase ‘at least once a year’ does not rule 
out the possibility that, if the Committee contends that ‘the situation makes 
this necessary’, or if the Commission calls for an emergency meeting when ‘the 
situation requires this according to the Commission’, the Committee reports 
ad hoc on ‘the state’ or ‘the situation’. The term ‘report’ allows, if so desired, 
that some suggestions can be made to cope with ‘the state’, respectively ‘the 
situation’, in other words it includes the possibility of an advice, without 
creating obligations. The release of the report to the Council and to the 
Commission enables these two community agencies as well as individual 
Member States to continue to take the initiative. It is therefore proposed that 
the Netherlands will try to bring about a provision in the decision that the 
Committee of Governors must produce a written report on its activities to the 
Council and the Commission at least once a year.
Ad 2. Extension of the competence of the Monetary Committee.
The Monetary Committee has been established in the EEC Treaty itself (Article 
105, second paragraph) to coordinate the monetary policies of the Member 
States to their full extent, which is required to promote the functioning of the 
common market. Its task is thus effectively limited to the internal problems of 
the Community. In practice this has not proved sufficient, and the Monetary 
Committee has therefore frequently dealt with problems that affect the 
relations of the members of the Community with third countries and other 
international institutions. The proposal of the Commission seeks to legalize 
this activity. This thrust of the proposal can be fully accepted.
 Nonetheless, there are some questions on the draft proposal. The main 
difficulty is that the proposal does not assume competence for consultation, 
but an obligation to do so. This is certainly correct insofar as concerns the 
use by a member country of the EEC of the resources of the International 
Monetary Fund. An appeal to the IMF is indeed in a sense competitive with 
the ‘mutual assistance’ as intended in art. 108 of the EEC Treaty. Compulsory 
prior consultation creates no difficulties with respect to the overall functioning 
of the international monetary system provides, if limited to key decisions and 
positions of the EEC Member States. There is room for doubt regarding the 
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participation of one or more Member States of the EEC in important measures 
to grant aid to third countries, as these cannot be taken (a) directly by the 
national monetary agencies, but also (b) by international bodies. In case (b) 
the competence of the representatives of the EEC countries in the organs is 
likely to be at risk, so a requirement for prior consultation is best avoided. In 
case of direct support by the national monetary authorities this complication 
does not occur and thus no objection against this needs to exist.
 The three cases mentioned just now, were in the proposal of the 
Commission expressly indicated as possibly leading to key decisions and 
opinions. Not quite clear is whether all decisions and positions in these three 
cases mentioned are to be qualified as important, and would thus give rise 
for prior consultation, but this point is not of great importance, since the 
interpretation that leads to broad competency, is also acceptable.
 The listing of the three cases in the Commission proposal is, however, 
not exhaustive, which entails that in principle a consultation requirement 
would also exist for not specifically defined cases. This now seems 
undesirable, especially since non-acceptance of a consultation requirement 
leaves consultation competence without prejudice in cases where this might 
specifically be called for.
 It is therefore concluded that the formal extension of the powers of the 
Monetary Committee, as proposed by the Commission, may be agreed on, 
except for the words ‘in particular ‘ and ‘either directly or through international 
bodies’, which preferably should be deleted. The question arises whether the 
proposed legal form is sufficient and whether the obligations of Member 
States for consultation by the Council in a separate decision should not first be 
adopted unanimously.
Ad. 3. Consultations in case of parity change.
Article 107 of the EEC Treaty stipulates that each Member State treats its 
exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest. The revaluation of the 
German Mark in March 1961 showed how unsatisfactory and fundamentally 
unacceptable it is, when one of the partners in the EEC places the other 
countries of the Six before a fait accompli of a parity change. It therefore 
appears correct that prior consultation is mandatory. This concerns both the 
case in which one or more of the Member States independently initiates a 
parity change, such as Germany in 1961, as well as the case in which a parity 
change in another country, either Member State or third country, is followed 
in whole or partially.
 Another thing is that the achievement of a satisfactory consultation 
procedure with regard to the obvious requirements of secrecy and speed of 
action, presents a particularly difficult case. For now, the Commission does not 
go no beyond the suggestion that, in such a case, the Monetary Committee will 
be consulted for advice on an appropriate procedure; the Monetary Committee 
shall then report to the Council and to the Commission and the Commission 
shall subsequently put further proposals before the Council. Indeed, this 
appears to be the appropriate way to resolve the procedural problem.
Ad. 4. Establishment of a budgetary policy committee
The EEC Commission believes that, in view of the repercussions of budget 
policies of the Member States on the economic development of the Community 
as a whole, it is desirable that a budgetary policy committee studies the 
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outlines of national budgets at the early stage of preparing these. The work of 
this Committee should be coordinated by the Commission and synchronized 
with those of the Monetary Committee and the Short Term Economic Policy 
Committee.
 The formation of a Committee as proposed above can be agreed on. 
Besides the monetary policy in the narrow sense, the size of the budget deficit 
and the method of financing the economy and the balance of payments are 
of great significance. Furthermore, it appears to the Netherlands especially 
important that the spending, tax policy and the loan policy of the governments 
in the other EEC countries will be incorporated into a policy aimed at a 
balance between savings and investment, in such a manner that no serious 
disturbances of the balance of payments or capital markets are caused through 
public finances. Attention must also be paid to the finances of smaller public 
bodies.
 The proposal of the EEC Commission appears to place consultations on 
budget policy in particular in the context of short term economic policy and to 
that end to focus the consultation phase on the adoption of budgets.
 It must be recognized that in the consultation on the economic budgets 
– which will largely take place before the adoption of the national budgets – 
it will be difficult to completely ignore the outlines of future budget policy, 
because of the impact on the overall development in the coming years. It 
appears, however, that the EEC Commission reaches too high, if it considers 
that national governments shall be willing to put draft national budgets up for 
discussion in Brussels and that this debate will have a real impact on the final 
design of these budgets. One can only anticipate that the general economic 
situation, as it may emerge from the discussion on the economic budgets, will 
also be taken into account in the final decision making process at the national 
level.
 To realise the above mentioned improvements in the handling of the 
budget as an instrument of economic and structural policy, this consultation is 
not an indispensable condition. The objective can only be achieved gradually 
and for this the best method is regular exchange of views on the policies in 
individual countries.
 To assess both the economic impulses of the budget as well as the 
structural elements, it will be necessary to deepen the understanding of 
the main components of the budgets. Of course this does not by any means 
entail an equalization of the different expenditure categories. However, the 
budgetary committee might promote comparability by taking the lead in the 
group of technicians who are already dealing with this.
 In the discussion on the structural aspects of the budget the general 
fiscal policy needs to be taken into account too. In this regard, the addition to 
the Committee of an official involved in the formation of fiscal policy appears 
desirable.
 The EEC Commission rightly states that the work must be closely 
coordinated with that of the Monetary Committee and the Short Term Economic 
Policy Committee. After all, the likeliness of duplications cannot be excluded. 
Cooperation might thus be shaped in such a way that if in the opinion of one of 
the afore mentioned committees, the solution of certain specific issues should 
be sought in budgetary practices, the budget committee can further develop 
this solution.
 If the above considerations are taken into account in drafting the tasks of 
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the budgetary policy committee that is to be created, it appears likely that the 
Netherlands will be able to agree to proposal of the EEC Commission.
17.
Memorandum of the deputy-chief of the Directorate for Economic Cooperation 
of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rob van Schaik) on the monetary 
aspects of the agricultural proposals, 17 February 1964. 
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1955-1964, (2.05.118), inv. no. 22014. Translation: Huygens ING, 
The Hague.
At the last meeting of the Coordination Committee, Mr. Hartogh pointed out 
that the agriculture proposals that are currently under discussion also have 
an important monetary aspect that deserves further consideration. Other 
members of the Coordination Committee have scarcely responded to this. 
Perhaps it deserves consideration on your part to raise this issue anew, because 
the monetary implications may prove to be of great political importance in 
themselves. After all, there is a chance that the acceptance of common grain 
prices will accelerate the harmonization of monetary policy – with all due 
political consequences.
 The crux of the problem is that the obligation of common prices for 
agricultural products will bind the exchange rates of the six Member States more 
closely together. Indeed, one must assume that prices should remain common 
in the case of devaluation or revaluation by Member States. If prior agreement 
on these matters were not to not come about, consultation between the six 
Member States would need to take place to establish at what level the common 
price should be set after exchange rate adjustment. Assuming, however, that 
the countries that have not followed the exchange rate adjustment will not be 
prepared to make price adjustments for their agricultural products, it appears 
likely that the country which adjusts its exchange rate must adjust prices 
correspondingly. This implies, for example, that if a country has devaluated, 
prices for agricultural products for which a common price level exists should 
probably be increased.
 As more products will resort under the common agricultural price policy, 
a larger proportion of the farming population will receive an almost automatic 
increase in income resulting from the price increase after a devaluation. It 
has to be considered probable that, once an important part of the agrarian 
population shall enjoy such an automatic augmentation in income, the rest of 
the agrarian population will insist on this too, followed by workers in industry. 
Like an oil spill incomes will swell in a very short time, with the result that 
the effect of devaluation will largely be neutralized. The only way in which the 
monetary authorities of a Member State would be able to pursue an effective 
exchange rate policy under these conditions, would be if the six Member States 
will commonly adapt their exchange rates.
 If nothing would be agreed on this issue in Brussels, one has to assume 
that they will be decided in due course on an ad hoc basis. It is possible that 
the devaluating country will try to get the other Member States to participate 
in the devaluation first, it is also possible that after devaluation negotiations 
will take place in which the country involved will try to achieve a certain price 
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decrease of the other countries, as opposed to its own moderate price increase.
 I wonder whether such an ad hoc approach is actually preferable and 
whether it would not be better to determine now, that changing the exchange 
rate is henceforth a matter of common consultation, and that the country that 
wishes to adjust its exchange rate will be responsible for the price adjustment 
resulting from this. In this way one is able to avoid negotiations on the 
establishment of a new grain price, which appears undesirable in itself given 
the ensuing uncertainty. Moreover, one restrains the country that wishes to 
adjust exchange rates, which, especially when devaluation is at stake, appears 
to be of importance because this provides an extra incentive to prudent 
monetary policy. If exchange rates were to be become riveted together in this 
fashion, this would amount to a first step on the issue of monetary policy, 
which the European Commission initially proposed first to take the end of 
the transitional period, when common agricultural prices will have been 
established (Action Program of the Commission of October 1962).95 Now that 
common grain prices will probably come about sooner, it appears likely that the 
Commission itself will in due course come with a new proposal for accelerated 
introduction of a Community exchange rate policy. Presumably, Mr. Marjolin 
will not put this forward just yet, so as to prevent increasing opposition against 
the grain proposals.
 The consequences of an early common exchange rate policy for monetary 
policy and for common policies in other areas of economic policy are as yet 
difficult to predict. While devaluation and revaluation are tools to be used 
exceptionally, it would nonetheless mean that a new instrument to defend the 
balance of payments escapes national control. As you know, trade protection 
measures to protect the balance of payments can already not be taken any 
longer, while developments in the area of wage and price policy have shown 
that our autonomy in that area actually has in fact also become limited. In 
defence of the balance of payments, national authorities still have access to 
fiscal and monetary instruments such as the discount rate, but one may still 
maintain some doubts about whether we will in all cases be able to ensure that 
the balance of payments can be defended by these means.
 Of course it is possible to play on the ‘seen it coming’ in this still uncertain 
situation. However, given the expected pressure on our balance of payments in 
the future, one wonders whether we would not have an interest to raise these 
aspects too in Brussels on the occasion of the grain price proposals.
 I note that this is obviously not just a balance of payments problem. Even 
if the conclusion would be that in the interest of a sound monetary policy of 
the six Member States and in the interest of the position of our balance of 
payments, we should insist on accelerated harmonization of monetary policy, 
then the political consequences must also be faced. This would, after all, 
present an element of integration entailing that the countries would become 
even more interdependent. The advantage of this is that this occurs as part of 
the Community and not on a strictly intergovernmental basis; the disadvantage 
is that we have to leave England and other European countries outside the EEC 
even further behind.




Interdepartmental note by the Directorate for Foreign Monetary Transfers of 
the Netherlands Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 
agricultural accounting unit, 15 June 1967
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1965-1974, (2.05.313), inv. no. 14304. Translation: Huygens ING, 
The Hague.
A. Commission proposal.
The EEC Commission has put before the Council a proposal concerning the 
establishment of the agricultural accounting unit. The proposal has the 
following characteristics.
a. The value of the unit shall, apart from specified exceptional events in 
monetary matters, remain unchanged; this principle entails that if the currency 
parity of a Member State or of a minority of Member States is changed, the 
agricultural prices expressed in national currencies should only be changed in 
those Member States in which the currency parity is changed. 
b. The value of the unit will automatically be changed:
– in case of simultaneous and uniform change in the currency parity in all 
Member States, in the same direction and to the same extent as the currencies 
of the Member States;
– in case of simultaneous change in the same direction but with currency 
ratios of Member States varying in degrees, in the same direction and to the 
same extent as the least altered currency.
c. If several Member States simultaneously change their currency parity, 
the value of the unit may be changed by the Council, after a proposal from the 
Commission, by unanimous vote.
d. The country that would wish to reduce the impact on farm incomes of 
‘isolated’ devaluation, might do so, with authorization by the Commission, 
through a special tax (not tied to agricultural products) on the additional 
revenue resulting from the devaluation.
 Regarding the effect on the prices, one may rely on subsidy techniques 
that can temporarily and decreasingly reduce the burden for consumers of the 
increase in prices as expressed in national currency. 
B.  Advice of the Monetary Committee
In its opinion of March 5, 1965, the Monetary Committee has proposed two 
formulas to the Council.
a. The ‘EPU’ accounting unit96, in which a change in currency parity in all 
Member States entails a change in the value of the accounting unit to the same 
extent as the least altered currency.
b. The weighted accounting unit, in which each change in the currency parity 
of each Member State can, in principle, entail reassessment of the accounting 
unit according to the accepted weighting procedure.
 An example of weighting given by the Monetary Committee is attached to 
this note as an annex.
96 See introduction to document 4.
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C. Treatment in the Coordinating Commission.
In the meetings of 24 March 1965 and 23 June 1965 the agricultural accounting 
unit has been subject of discussion. In the latter meeting, the following 
conclusion of the Working Group on the definition of the agricultural unit was 
presented to the Coordinating Commission:
– The working group reached agreement on the desirability that, when 
dealing with the issue of the accounting unit for agricultural prices, the Dutch 
take the position in the EEC Council that definition as a weighted average of the 
currencies of six Member States is the most appropriate solution. In principle, 
this system is also adequate if only one of the Member States changes the 
value of its currency’s. The Netherlands can however follow common opinion 
if other countries only wish to adopt the system if at least two member states 
change their parity. 
 This conclusion was not endorsed by the Coordinating Commission.
D. Assessment of the Commission proposal.
The proposal of the Commission is presented as a compromise between on 
the one hand the stability of the ‘EPU’ accounting unit, which might prove too 
rigid, and on the other hand the instability flowing from the automatism of the 
‘weighted’ unit, which could disrupt the functioning of the common agricultural 
policy. The concession to the weighted unit is, however, that the Council will 
be able to change unanimously the value of the unit if several member states 
simultaneously change their currency parity. ‘Several’ is probably to be defined 
as three to five. The national measures in case of isolated parity changes (tax 
on additional income from devaluation, consumer subsidies) are regulations 
that may prove attractive in a weighted unit as well.97 
 An initial discussion of the Commission proposal took place in the 
financial working group in Brussels on 12 June 1967. Here it was found that 
five delegations were willing to accept the proposed system. The Netherlands 
spokesman has expressed a formal reservation, but has made a plea à titre 
personnel for a weighted unit. His statement has not led to positive reactions.
E. Netherlands position.
Interdepartmental consultation at the senior official level has not resulted in 
complete agreement. There is agreement on the following issues:
a. In case of simultaneous and uniform change in the currency parity of all 
Member States, the value of the accounting unit shall be changed in the same 
direction and in the same degree.
b. In case of change of the currency parity of one Member State, the value of 
the accounting unit shall not be changed. 
As to the other cases of change of currency parity the following positions exist. 
Agriculture & Fisheries and Economic Affairs: 
c. In all other cases of change of the currency parity, the Council shall, 
on a proposal of the Commission, in a short term (2 or 3 days after the 
change) determine the value of the accounting unit. In case of simultaneous, 
97 Note in text: If the Benelux countries devaluate by 20%, the price level of agricultural 
products in EPU accounting unit will go up by 25%; in the weighted accounting unit a 




unidirectional but not uniform change in the currency parity of all Member 
States, the value of the accounting unit shall, by decision of the Council, be 
changed to at least the same extent as the least altered currency.
Foreign Affairs: 
c. In all other cases of change of currency parity, it shall be determined by 
Council decision which changes are to be made in the value of the accounting 
unit. In expectation of this decision a situation ought to be created which least 
impedes the freedom of the Council to take a decision. 
Finance: 
c. In all other cases of change of the currency parity, the value of the 
accounting unit is to be determined by weighing. The Council may, on a 
proposal from the Commission, within .... weeks after the change determine 
the value of the accounting unit anew. It should be considered whether a 
change of prices, expressed in the accounting unit, is not preferable above the 
change of the value of the unit itself.
Since agricultural prices will be expressed in accounting units as per 1 July, it 




 Introduction to document 19-20
In 1968 the international monetary system was stretched to its limits and it 
was becoming increasingly difficult for the European currencies to maintain 
parity with the US dollar. In November 1967 the United Kingdom had devalued 
the pound. The future of the international monetary system established at 
Bretton Woods was clearly in doubt. In France, General de Gaulle seemed 
to want a return to the gold standard. Pierre Werner, Prime Minister of 
Luxembourg, advocated a Community action programme to solve monetary 
problems.98 Raymond Barre, then Vice-President of the Commission, was in 
favour of a Community-wide solution, though not as far-reaching as the one 
proposed by Werner, nor indeed like the plan outlined by Robert Marjolin in 
the 1962 Action Programme.99
 In December 1968, a few months after the projected end of the transitional 
phase to the Common Market, the European Commission outlined its views 
on monetary policy. The text, presented here as document 19, was mainly 
drafted by Raymond Barre. It started by emphasising the monetary shock the 
Community had just suffered: a wave of speculation had affected the French 
franc and the German mark, exerting respectively downward and upward 
pressure. This followed the unrest in the spring of 1968, with industrial action 
and demonstrations in Europe and the rest of the world.
 Realising the importance of the economic climate for the development 
of the Common Market, the Commission called for greater cooperation and 
coordination between Member States on economic policy, in particular to 
maintain exchange parity between their currencies. At the same time it 
suggested that states should enhance the coordination of their monetary 
policy via a Community monetary mechanism, given that it was impossible 
for existing international mechanisms to be any more effective than they 
already were. However, the Commission was vague about the content of 
this mechanism, only specifying that it should be part of an international 
framework and not impede enlargement of the Common Market. 
In line with its document of December 1968, the Commission 
submitted a second memorandum on the coordination of economic policies 
and monetary cooperation to the Council of Ministers on 12 February 1969. 
Commonly known as the Barre Plan, this document was adopted by the Council 
of Ministers on 17 July 1969.
The purpose of the memorandum, presented here as document 20, 
was to promote the convergence of the economic policies of the Member 
States and to initiate monetary cooperation by means of a ‘Community 
mechanism’, previously cited but not described in December. The Commission 
proposed a short-term monetary support mechanism, medium-term 
financial assistance, and a change in parity subject to agreement by the other 
Member States. It also suggested the option to discard fluctuation margins 
— set by the International Monetary Fund — between European currencies. 
 
98 Pierre Du Bois, Histoire de l’Europe monétaire 1945–2005: Euro qui comme Ulysse... 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008), 45.




Memorandum by the European Commission on the policy to be pursued in the 
Community to tackle the current economic and monetary problems, 5 December 
1968 
Historical Archives of the European Union (Florence, Villa il Poggiolo). European 
Community Institutions Collection, EC. EEC and Euratom Council of Ministers, 
CM2, 1968, inv.no. 444. © European Union.
Au moment où le Conseil examine les problèmes conjoncturels de la 
Communauté, celle-ci vient de subir un choc d’une grande gravité.
 Alors que l’activité économique y avait retrouvé au cours de l’année 1968, 
après le ralentissement qui avait caractérisé les deux années précédentes, un 
dynamisme nouveau, alors qu’en dépit des pertes importantes de production 
encourues en France à la suite des grèves de mai et de juin, le produit brut 
en termes réels augmentait au taux de 5,5 %, la Communauté a connu des 
bouleversements monétaires qui ont ébranlé une fois de plus l’ordre monétaire 
international. Mais - et cela est nouveau dans les relations internationales 
de paiements - ces bouleversements ont eu pour origine un dérèglement à 
l’intérieur même du Marché Commun, provoqué par une vague de spéculation 
d’une ampleur rare affectant principalement le Deutsche Mark et le Franc 
français.
 Ainsi sont apparus en toute clarté certains problèmes qui commandent le 
développement ultérieur de la Communauté, en même temps que se manifestait 
l’importance que revêtiront au cours de 1969 l’évolution conjoncturelle des 
pays membres et les politiques qu’ils mettront en œuvre.
– – – 
IV. Les enseignements de la crise récente
1. Le premier enseignement de la crise que vient de traverser la Communauté 
est la nécessité absolue d’une meilleure coordination des politiques 
économiques des Etats membres. Cette coordination est essentielle si l’on veut 
que la stabilité des parités de change entre leurs monnaies ne se trouve pas 
directement menacée. Au stade de développement actuel du Marché Commun, 
des modifications de parité comporteraient de graves répercussions sur la 
mise en œuvre des politiques communautaires, en particulier de la politique 
agricole, augmenteraient l’incertitude des agents économiques, affecteraient 
sans doute durablement les perspectives d’expansion économique des pays 
membres et mettraient en péril leur interpénétration progressive. Il convient 
donc de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour prévenir une telle 
éventualité.
 De ce point de vue, un renforcement rapide de la coordination des 
politiques économiques à court et à moyen terme apparaît fondamental. Celle-
ci doit viser à définir en commun, de manière plus précise, les objectifs de 
croissance et de stabilité interne et externe. Elle doit permettre de fixer les 
grandes lignes des orientations à suivre et d’arriver à un accord sur les actions 
à mettre en œuvre tant à l’échelon national que sur le plan communautaire. 
Une telle coordination, nécessaire en toutes circonstances, se justifie plus 
encore dans les périodes difficiles, comme celle que la Communauté traverse 
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actuellement, si l’on veut éviter de mettre en cause les progrès déjà réalisés 
et faire en sorte que les mesures prises dans les divers pays membres ne se 
contrecarrent pas, mais soient au contraire modulées de façon à obtenir un 
résultat optimum. L’absence d’une concertation suffisamment étroite et menée 
en temps opportun conduit inévitablement à des tensions à l’intérieur de la 
Communauté et, par suite d’une orientation trop discordante des politiques 
nationales, à des pertes de croissance; le rétablissement de l’équilibre nécessite 
en effet le plus souvent l’alignement de tous les pays sur la politique nationale 
la plus restrictive.
 Pour obtenir cette meilleure coordination des politiques économiques, 
il importe moins de créer des institutions ou des procédures nouvelles que 
de recourir effectivement aux instances communautaires existantes, d’utiliser 
les procédures déjà établies et de procéder à des consultations préalables sur 
les grandes options de la politique économique des Etats membres ou sur les 
décisions importantes à prendre dans le domaine économique et financier. A cet 
égard, on doit noter que les procédures de consultation existantes n’ont pas été 
suivies avec toute l’efficacité désirable dans la période ayant immédiatement 
précédé la crise récente. Certes, la rapidité des événements a soulevé certaines 
difficultés, mais il est regrettable que les consultations communautaires aient 
eu lieu seulement au moment où la solution aux problèmes posés était déjà 
recherchée dans un cadre international plus large et qu’en particulier le 
Comité Monétaire n’ait pu se réunir comme la Commission l’avait demandé.
 Selon l’article 103 § 1 du Traité de Rome : ‘les Etats membres considèrent 
leur politique de conjoncture comme une question d’intérêt commun. Ils se 
consultent mutuellement et avec la Commission sur les mesures à prendre 
en fonction des circonstances’. Il serait paradoxal qu’au moment où les 
circonstances rendent ces consultations particulièrement nécessaires, 
l’impression soit donnée que cette disposition du Traité est tenue pour désuète 
ou périmée.
2. Si l’efficacité de la coordination des politiques économiques exige en 
premier lieu que les Etats membres aient la volonté de se concerter selon les 
procédures déjà prévues, le succès de cette entreprise repose également sur la 
mise en place d’un mécanisme de coopération monétaire entre ces Etats.
 La Commission considère, depuis quelques années déjà, que les progrès 
effectués dans l’interpénétration des économies des Etats membres rendent 
souhaitable la création d’un tel mécanisme. C’est avec une particulière 
insistance qu’au cours de l’année 1968 elle a attiré l’attention - notamment 
celle du Conseil et du Parlement européen — sur la nécessité de plus en plus 
pressante de tirer des dispositions de l’article 108 du Traité de Rome100 des 
conséquences pratiques conduisant à la mise en place d’un système permanent 
de concours mutuel dans le domaine monétaire. La Commission a même, dans 
les instances plus particulièrement concernées, fait des propositions à cet 
égard. Les développements qui se sont produits au cours de cette année ont 
montré que cette attitude n’était ni déraisonnable ni inopportune.
 Certes, comme par le passé, il a été possible à un Etat membre en difficulté 
de faire appel aux concours nécessaires dans un cadre plus large que celui 
de la Communauté. Mais ni les possibilités offertes par le Fonds Monétaire 
International, ni la mise en œuvre d’accords de swap n’ont permis jusqu’ici 
de prévenir les crises successives du système monétaire international ni la 
crise récente au sein de la Communauté. Toutes les améliorations qui pourront 
100 See document 11.
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être apportées aux mécanismes de la coopération monétaire internationale 
dans un proche avenir, quelque nécessaires et souhaitables qu’elles soient, 
risquent de n’être pas suffisantes en l’absence d’une coordination effective des 
politiques économiques des pays participants.
 Or, une telle coordination peut s’effectuer au sein de la Communauté, 
d’autant plus qu’elle est l’un des objectifs fondamentaux fixés par le 
Traité de Rome. Il s’agit pour la Communauté de prévenir efficacement 
les bouleversements plutôt que d’en corriger les effets après qu’ils se 
soient produits. L’intégration de fait croissante des économies des pays du 
Marché Commun, la rapidité actuelle des communications, l’amélioration 
des techniques de gestion financière et le nombre de plus en plus élevé 
d’entreprises exerçant leur activité au-delà des frontières nationales, 
multiplient les possibilités de voir se développer, pour des motifs divers et 
parfois imprévisibles, des mouvements considérables de capitaux. Ceux-ci ne 
trouvent pas nécessairement leur origine dans la situation économique des 
pays membres ou dans les politiques suivies par eux.
 C’est pourquoi la coordination de ces politiques, au sein d’un ensemble 
tel que la Communauté, ne peut revêtir toute son efficacité que si elle prend 
appui sur un mécanisme propre à cette Communauté, qui soit permanent 
et souple et permette aux Etats membres, après que les grandes options de 
l’action économique auraient été discutées en commun, de poursuivre les 
politiques adéquates sans que des accidents de parcours ne les remettent en 
question.
 Ainsi seulement pourrait-on épargner à la Communauté l’apparition de 
situations dans lesquelles un Etat membre, faisant appel à l’article 109, prend 
des mesures de sauvegarde apportant des perturbations au fonctionnement du 
Marché Commun. Celles-ci, dans la mesure où elles constituent une enfreinte 
durable à la libre circulation au sein de la Communauté, risquent, comme l’a 
déjà souligné le Comité Monétaire, de compromettre gravement la réalisation 
d’une des conditions essentielles du succès de l’entreprise communautaire, 
c’est-à-dire la conviction de la part des agents économiques que les progrès 
accomplis dans ce cadre sont irréversibles.
 La Commission souligne que le mécanisme envisagé ne saurait en aucun 
cas constituer un moyen permettant à un des Etats participants de poursuivre 
une politique de facilité qui s’écarterait de la ligne tracée en commun. Etabli 
pour faire face aux nécessités propres de la Communauté, ce mécanisme ne 
saurait, par ailleurs, constituer un obstacle à l’élargissement de celle-ci : il ne 
préjuge en rien la solution de ce problème. Enfin, il devrait pouvoir s’insérer 
dans les mécanismes plus larges de la coopération internationale.
 Les perturbations intervenues en 1968, les risques accrus qui en résultent 
pour 1969 et qui pourraient compromettre l’avenir même de la Communauté, 
amènent la Commission à attirer une fois de plus l’attention du Conseil sur la 
nécessité de ne plus différer une prise de position claire sur les problèmes qui 
viennent d’être évoqués.
 Telles sont, de l’avis de la Commission, les orientations de politique 
conjoncturelle susceptibles d’être poursuivies au sein de la Communauté pour 
faire face aux problèmes économiques et sociaux qui se posent à elle au cours 
de l’année 1969.
 La Commission souhaite que le Conseil, après en avoir délibéré, les 
approuve et invite les Etats membres à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour 
rendre leur politique économique conforme à ces orientations.
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 La Commission se propose par ailleurs de présenter au Conseil, d’ici le 
15 février 1969, des propositions concrètes au titre des articles 105 et 108 
du Traité de Rome, en vue de la création d’un mécanisme communautaire de 
coopération monétaire. Conformément à l’article 105 du Traité, elle recueillera 
l’avis du Comité Monétaire sur ce point.
20.
Memorandum by the European Commission to the Council on the coordination 
of economic policies and monetary cooperation within the Community, (Barre 
Memorandum), 12 February 1969.
Bulletin of the European Communities, March 1969, supplement 3/69. 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1969). 
© European Union.
On 5 December 1968 the Commission submitted to the Council a Memorandum 
‘on appropriate policy in the Community on current economic and monetary 
problems’.101 In accordance with the conclusions of this Memorandum, the 
Council, at a meeting on 12 December 1968, ‘recognized the need for fuller 
alignment of economic policies in the Community and for an examination of 
the scope for intensifying monetary cooperation’. The object of the present 
Memorandum is to clarify the Commission’s position on these two points.
– – –
III. Measures needed
As recalled in Chapter I, the Commission has on several occasions in the past 
suggested what should be done to strengthen the Community’s economic and 
monetary cohesion. It reaffirms, in particular, the content of its Memorandum 
of February 1968.102 However, in its view, the present situation calls for the 
urgent concerting of the medium-term economic policies, fuller concerting of 
the short-term economic policies, and Community machinery for monetary co-
operation.
– – – 
C. Community machinery for monetary co-operation
24. The machinery which the Commission wishes to see set up should ensure 
short-term monetary support and allow medium-term financial assistance for 
a Member State. For this purpose, an agreement would be concluded between 
the member countries to set up a system which would work as follows:
101 See document 19.
102 Mémorandum sur l’action de la Communauté dans le domaine monétaire (présente 
par Raymond Barre, Vice-président de la Commission des Communautés européennes, 
à la Conférence des Ministres des Finances des 26 et 27 février 1968). An excerpt of 
this document is published in: Kenneth Dyson and Lucia Quaglia, European Economic 
Governance and Policies: Volume I: Commentary on Key Historical and Institutional 
Documents (Oxford University Press, 2010), 151.
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25. Short-term monetary support
(i) Each participant country would undertake to make available to the 
others funds not exceeding a given ceiling;
(ii) An agent could be appointed for the technical implementation of the 
provisions of the agreement;103
(iii) Any participant country could activate the system by simply applying 
to the other countries taking part in the agreement; the amount of each 
participant’s debt to the others following the application of the system would 
not be allowed to exceed a certain ceiling;
(iv) The ceilings for amounts committed and borrowed would be fixed by 
agreement between the participants;
(v) Any sum applied for by a participant country would be financed by the 
others in proportion to each country’s share in the total amount committed 
or still available, less the ceiling of the commitments of the deficit country. 
However, at the request of one of the participant countries, the agent, with 
the agreement of the others and within the limits of each one’s commitment 
ceiling, could alter the proportions fixed;
(vi) A participant country could not be obliged to contribute to a financing 
operation within the system if he were himself in debt with the system;
(vii) Any use of the system by a participant country should be followed as soon 
as possible by consultation in the appropriate Community bodies. The purpose 
of this consultation would be to determine, in the light of an examination of 
the situation in the country aided, the measures called for by this situation 
from both the country concerned and the other member countries. Failing an 
agreement on the steps to be taken by the deficit country, this country may 
not be indebted to the system for more than three months. If agreement is 
reached, the short-term aid could be renewed for a fixed period or medium-
term financial assistance could be granted, according to the situation in the 
deficit country.
26. Medium-term financial assistance
(i) If the examination procedure set in motion by use of the system under 
the conditions set out in Paragraph 25 above were to lead subsequently to the 
conclusion that the situation in the country in question required a medium-
term loan, the Commission would recommend the Council, after consulting the 
Monetary Committee, to grant such a loan.
(ii) The conditions under which this medium-term assistance would be 
granted would be determined by the resources which could be mobilized in 
the medium term from more extensive sources than the EEC, and by other 
circumstances.
(iii) Considering among other things the terms of sub-paragraph b) above, it 
is not necessary to stipulate ceilings for borrowing, as it is for the machinery 
described in Paragraph 25. It would, however, be advisable to establish ceilings 
for commitments contributed to the operation of this machinery, and these 
ceilings would be valid for a limited period and subject to revision.
27. The general outlines of this machinery, which have just been described, 
are in accordance with the principles which the Commission fellows in the 
monetary field:
103 Note in text: An ad hoc agreement could be concluded for this purpose with the BIS.
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1) A close link should be established between a stronger co-ordination of 
the economic policies and the implementation of Community machinery for 
monetary co-operation.
2) At the Community’s present stage of development, monetary co-
operation between Member States needs to be consolidated on the lines 
indicated in the Treaty of Rome.
3) The machinery for Community monetary co-operation is not a substitute 
for machinery for international monetary co-operation, but, in the form 
in which it is designed, it can fit into the international machinery without 
difficulty. In particular, it in no way affects the member countries’ obligations 
to international monetary institutes.
28. Finally, the Commission points out that in studying the problems facing 
the Community in the economic and monetary fields, and in seeking solutions 
to these problems, it has taken into consideration the possibilities of the 
Community being enlarged.
 The proposals submitted by the Commission would not impede on 
enlargement of the Community, and therefore could not be considered 
undesirable in this respect. The concerting of the economic policies, 
consultation procedures, and machinery for monetary co-operation can 
be very useful ‘welcoming structures’, and would in any case be even more 
necessary to an enlarged Community than to a Community of Six.
Conclusion
The Commission asks the Council to:
(i) Hold a discussion at the beginning of autumn 1969 on the prospects 
in the member countries in the next few years for the trend of production, 
employment, prices, the equilibrium of the balance of current payments and 
the equilibrium of the overall balance of payments.
(ii) Adopt a decision, the draft of which is annexed to this memorandum, on 
consultations over short-term economic policy.
(iii) Decide before the end of the transitional period to set up machinery for 
monetary co-operation in the EEC along the lines indicated above.
 The Commission hopes that when the Council examines these proposals 
it will bear in mind the lessons learnt from recent events, and the ever-more 
inexorable progress of the Community.
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In this cartoon Ernst Maria Lang illustrates the monetary instability that was the 
result of the exchange rate fluctuations within the EEC at the end of the 1960s.
 On 10 August 1969, the French franc was devaluated and on 24 October the 
German mark was re-valued by 9.29 %, this disparity especially had its effect on 
the price levels of the agricultural products that were part of 
the Common Market.
© Ernst Maria Lang
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 Introduction to document 21-23
The summer of 1969 brought further disorder in the international money 
markets. Although the Barre Plan104 was adopted in July 1969, with support 
from figures such as Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, serious questions had yet to be 
settled.105 The leaders of the Six did not see eye to eye on the goals of economic 
and monetary policies, and the practical modalities of the mechanism had not 
been defined. 
 The Dutch position on the Barre Plan was mixed. While the proposals 
on harmonization and coordination of economic policies received support, the 
Ministry of Finance was negative in its opinion on the short term and medium 
term support mechanisms. As a compromise, a short term support mechanism, 
to be maintained by the central banks, appeared acceptable. 
 Nonetheless debate ran high, with plans floated by Belgium and 
Germany, and discussion papers by Jean Monnet and Robert Triffin who 
inspired the German plan and promoted the idea of a European reserve fund. 
With devaluation of the French franc without prior consultation in August, 
and revaluation of the German mark a few months later, matters became 
increasingly complicated.
 It was hoped that the Hague Summit, scheduled for 1 and 2 December 
1969, would herald a new departure in European integration. The agenda 
included the common agricultural policy, enlargement of the Communities 
and the prospects of further progress for the Common Market. On the second 
day the Heads of State or Government addressed monetary issues. Thanks to a 
compromise between France and Germany, the final declaration of the summit 
noted that the Six would investigate the possibility of setting up a European 
reserve fund, supported by Germany, and above all convened a committee that 
was to develop a plan by stages to create an economic and monetary union. 
Document 22 includes the text of the final communiqué of the Hague Summit. 
A month later, on 2 January 1970 the central banks of the EEC members 
decided to establish a short term support mechanism. 
 Documents 21 and 23 exemplify the lines of thinking at the Netherlands 
Ministry of Finance in 1969 and 1970 regarding the proposals of the European 
Commission on the coordination of economic policy and monetary cooperation 
within the EEC. In the Dutch view there was little or no need for a medium 
term support mechanism and an EEC mechanism would have to be additional 
to the existing IMF facilities.
104 See document 20.
105 Pierre Du Bois, Histoire de l’Europe monétaire 1945–2005: Euro qui comme Ulysse... 




Note by the Directorate for Foreign Monetary Transfers of the Netherlands 
Ministry of Finance concerning the memorandum of the European Commission 
on the coordination of economic policies and monetary cooperation in the 
Community, 25 June 1969
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Ministry of 




The first part of the memorandum can broadly be accepted, namely the 
proposals for closer harmonization of policy in the medium term and closer 
coordination of short term economic policies. Some questions however 
remain open, a.o. with regard to the desirability and possibility of greater 
coordination of budget policy and regarding the legally binding obligation of 
prior consultations as set out in a Council decision.
 The judgment on the second part, namely the proposals for a mechanism 
for monetary cooperation, has to be considerably less favourable; this 
unfavourable opinion applies more to the support mechanism for the short 
term than that for the medium term. The conclusion cannot be other than that 
the Commission, with its proposal for a mechanism and given the existing 
facilities and channels, has launched a largely redundant plan, the purpose of 
which, as far as it is to prevent monetary crises, cannot be achieved through 
financial means and, as far as this is to avoid safeguard measures ex art. 109,106 
is not under all circumstances healthy from the point of view of policy. The 
proposal can in fact hamper accession issues. It should be seen as a forced 
attempt, after the political and economic-monetary friction within the EEC 
during the past year, to revitalize the European integration process. Against 
the background of the general political objectives to be pursued by the EEC, 
the proposal is in this sense objectionable since it seeks regional isolation in 
an area – the international monetary relations – which is of a global nature and 
for which there are international operating institutions in place (IMF). These 
institutions engage in competition without gaining a certain progress from 
which the region benefits directly and the world indirectly, as is the case with 
European economic integration as a whole. 
 For the above reasons, the Commission’s proposal for a ‘mechanism’ 
should in first instance be approached very cautiously from the Dutch side. It 
is known that the EEC partners, except France, are cautious too; they will show 
this forthright, or will possibly give a somewhat neutral opinion with a number 
of unattainable conditions attached.
 In the spirit of the compromise a common declaration of intent by the 
central banks of the EEC-countries might be envisaged to (continue to) assist 
each other in case of difficulties with short term credit, instead of a system 
of short term support facilities between the states. As regards medium term 
 
106 See document 11.
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 facilities, a Council decision needs to be aspired on credit ceilings for ‘concours 
mutuel’ that are provided in the framework of art. 108.107 These ceilings should 
be ratified by the Parliaments in order to provide the governments with a more 
effective decision making power in every case art. 108 is invoked. It should 
however be put on record in this Council decision that this internal EEC facility 
cannot be drawn upon before recourse has been made to the IMF; the EEC 
credits should only be used in case of additional needs, after the IMF facilities 
have been used, or possibly parri passu with the IMF. The conditions should 
not interfere with those of the IMF. In this context, the ceilings should be low.
 A call should be made for a further elaboration and concretization of the 
various proposals by the Commission. Moreover, the various Committees shall 
be required to give further advice on certain parts of the memorandum: in 
particular the Committee of Governors on the short term mechanism and the 
Medium-Term Economic Policy Committee on the policy objectives.
 Finally, it appears undesirable for the Council to approve the draft Council 
decision on 17 July. Neither should the memorandum as a whole be approved; 
although certain parts are broadly acceptable, serious objections continue to 
exist on other issues.
22.
Final communiqué of the Summit of Heads of State and Governments in The 
Hague, 2 December 1969.
Membership of the European Communities: Implications for lreland, Laid by 
the Government before each House of the Oireachtas, April 1970. (Dublin: The 
Stationery Office, 1970). © The Stationary Office.
1. On the initiative of the Government of the French Republic and at the 
invitation of the Netherlands Government, the Heads of State or Government 
and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the European 
Communities met at The Hague on 1 and 2 December 1969. The Commission 
of the European Communities was invited to participate in the work of the 
Conference on the second day.
– – –
3. Looking back on the road that has been traversed, and finding that 
never before have independent States pushed their co-operation further, 
they were unanimous in their opinion that by reason of the progress made 
the Community has now arrived at a turning point in its history. Over and 
above the technical and legal sides of the problems involved, the expiry of 
the transitional period at the end of the year has therefore acquired major 
political significance. Entry upon the final stage of the Common Market not 
only means confirming the irreversible nature of the work accomplished by 
the Communities, but also means paving the way for a united Europe capable 
of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a 




4. The Heads of State or Government therefore wish to reaffirm their belief 
in the political objectives which give the Community its meaning and purport, 
their determination to carry their undertaking through to the end, and their 
confidence in the final success of their efforts. Indeed, they have a common 
conviction that a Europe composed of States which, in spite of their different 
national characteristics, are united in their essential interests, assured of 
its internal cohesion, true to its friendly relations with outside countries, 
conscious of the role it has to play in promoting the relaxation of international 
tension and the rapprochement among all peoples, and first and foremost 
among those of the entire European continent, is indispensable if a mainspring 
of development, progress and culture, world equilibrium and peace is to be 
preserved.
 The European Communities remain the original nucleus from which 
European unity has been developed and intensified. The entry of other 
countries of this continent to the Communities – in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaties of Rome – would undoubtedly help the Communities 
to grow to dimensions more in conformity with the present state of world 
economy and technology.
 The creation of a special relationship with other European States 
which have expressed a desire to that effect would also contribute to this 
end. A development such as this would enable Europe to remain faithful to 
its traditions of being open to the world and increase its efforts in behalf of 
developing countries.
– – –
8. They reaffirmed their readiness to further the more rapid progress of 
the later development needed to strengthen the Community and promote 
its development into an economic union. They are of the opinion that the 
integration process should result in a Community of stability and growth. To 
this end they agreed that within the Council, on the basis of the Memorandum 
presented by the Commission on 12 February 1969108 and in close collaboration 
with the latter, a plan in stages should be worked out during 1970 with a 
view to the creation of an economic and monetary union. The development 
of monetary co-operation should depend on the harmonisation of economic 
policies.
 They agreed to arrange for the investigation of the possibility of setting 
up a European reserve fund in which a joint economic and monetary policy 












Position paper by the Directorate for Foreign Payments of the Netherlands 
Ministry of Finance on the medium term EEC-support mechanism according to 
the Barre Plan, 15 January 1970.
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, part 3, 1965-1974 (2.05.313), inv.no. 14314. Translation: Huygens 
ING, The Hague.
1. Introduction.
One of the four components of the proposals by the European Commission 
dated 12 February 1969 (Barre Plan)109 concerns the establishment of a 
medium term support mechanism. On 10 May 1969, the Monetary Committee 
issued an opinion on this.110 On the part of the Ministry of Finance a note on 
the Barre Plan was issued on 25 June 1969 regarding the preparation of the 
Dutch position.111 For more general considerations on the Barre Plan and on 
the medium term mechanism in particular reference is made to this note. On 
17 July 1969 the EEC Council has issued the following conclusions: ‘Le Conseil 
a donné mandat au Comité monétaire de faire rapport au Conseil et à la 
Commission sur les modalités d’exécution d’un système de concours financier 
à moyen terme, compte tenu de l’avis du Comité monétaire lui-même et des 
observations présentées à ce sujet par le Comité des Gouverneurs des Banques 
centrales’.112
With emphasis it should be pointed out that the Council at that point did not 
speak out in favour of the introduction of a medium term mechanism. The 
Council has not taken any decision in this regard.
In the following, the most important aspects of this medium term mechanism 
will be discussed; particular attention will be paid to those points on which 
differences of opinion exist or may arise and for which proposals have been 
made that differ from the Dutch opinions on the matter. It is desirable that the 
Netherlands will maintain the positions regarding these essential points that 
are advocated in this note at the Council meeting of 26 January.113 
109 See document 20.
110 ‘The Committee welcomes the Commission’s initiative, which should make a valuable 
contribution to the development of economic and monetary co-operation and therefore 
to the more harmonious development of the Community.’ Annex 1 of the Eleventh Report 
on the Activities of the Monetary Committee, Brussels, 15 May 1969, see: http://aei.pitt.
edu/1299/1/11th_monetary.pdf [accessed December 2011].
111 See document 21.
112 Council Decision of 17 July 1969 on co-ordination of the short-term economic policies 
of the Member States (69/227/EEC).
113 For the Netherlands, a mechanism to the amount of one billion dollars was acceptable, 
with a Dutch participation of one hundred million dollars. France and Italy, possible 
debtors, as well as the Commission suggested an amount of around three billion dollars. 




2. Need for an internal EEC-mechanism?
The Commission holds that there is great need for such a medium term EEC 
mechanism. Yet the economic need for this has not been proven by anyone. 
Whereas the EEC countries must have sufficient credit facilities as well, 
these are already available in a wider context (IMF). The IMF facilities are 
efficient and comprehensive. This means that the introduction of an internal 
EEC mechanism would mainly be based on non-economic, meaning political, 
considerations. Furthermore, it follows, that if introduction were decided, the 
size can be relatively small (see also paragraph 10).
Nonetheless it is correct to base a possible medium term EEC mechanism on 
art. 108 of the Treaty.114 This article mentions a ‘concours mutuel’ between 
states, not between the central banks. The Commission believes that art. 108 is 
at present not effective because for each loan a time-consuming parliamentary 
approval must be obtained ad hoc in the Member States; instead of this the 
Commission rightly seeks a kind of permanent authorization – to certain limits 
– for national governments to cooperate in the Council to a concours mutuel 
in the form of loans.
3. Relationship with policy coordination
From the Netherlands side it must again be stressed that the second part of 
the Barre Plan (including the medium term mechanism) should be based on 
the first part (harmonization of the policy objectives in the medium term, and 
coordination of economic policies in the short term). Achievement of this first 
part is thus a prerequisite for the introduction of support mechanisms. On the 
other hand it cannot be maintained that the support mechanisms would be 
necessary to achieve sufficient policy coordination.
– – –
12. Conclusion.
For an internal medium term EEC mechanism there is little or no need from 
an economic-financial point of view. Were this to be established nonetheless, 
then the Netherlands should only agree in the Council after an acceptable 
settlement will have been reached on a number of contentious issues. This 
mainly concerns the following. The IMF facilities are to remain untouched. 
The right of ad hoc withdrawal from participating as a creditor (Art. 108, 2, 
c: ‘opting out’) must be maintained. The EEC mechanism should, if it wants 
to be of any significance, be additional towards existing facilities (IMF). An 
obligation to give priority to the EEC mechanism (first drawing on the EEC, 
then possibly on the IMF) is unacceptable; priority has to be sought for the IMF 
(EEC mechanism complementary) or a mandatory parallelism (simultaneously 
drawing on EEG and on IMF); if necessary, a formula is acceptable that at this 
point no general obligation will be established but that this is to be decided ad 
hoc. The policy requirements of EEC drawings should not be more flexible than 
114 See document 11.
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those the IMF. The liquidity of the claims should be assured (right of transfer 
by the creditor who gets in trouble himself and also the creation of practical 
opportunities to do so); nonetheless, due to the limited nature, an internal 
EEC mechanism can never give a guarantee of sufficient liquidity as well as 
supplementarity. The size of the mechanism should be relatively small.
If the central banks do not want and cannot finance the claims on the system 
which their own member states obtain, due to insufficient liquidity, credits 
should in effect also be funded from the treasuries. In light of the budgetary 
difficulties in most Member States the practical possibilities of a functioning 
EEC mechanism of some size, would be very low in such a case.
114
During the summit in The Hague on 1 and 2 December 1969 more than 2000 
young people from all kinds of associations and countries gathered around 
the governmental buildings where the meetings of the European leaders were 
scheduled. A Dutch newspaper, De Volkskrant of 2 December 1969, described 
the sphere in The Hague at the time of the summit as a chaotic and noisy 
‘European party’. 
Before they could enter the negotiations, the European Ministers were over-
thrown with ‘a shower of European idealism’ that most certainly made their 
ears beep. Moreover, radical German students laid themselves down on the 
square in The Hague to keep the politicians from entering the building. The 




 Introduction to document 24-25
At the Hague Summit of December 1969115 the decision was taken to work out 
a plan for the realisation of an economic and monetary union in phases. In one 
of the subsequent meetings the Council of the EEC had to take a decision on 
how to proceed. Apart from the Barre Plan,116 there were plans of the Belgian 
minister Jean-Charles Snoy et d’Oppuers, the German minister Karl Schiller 
and the Luxembourg minister Pierre Werner.117
 Document 24 allows the reader at a glance the points of view on the 
four plans on economic and monetary integration as presented in Paris by 
the Finance Ministers on 23 and 24 February 1970. They agreed that an ad 
hoc group, consisting of the chairmen of five committees in the economic-
monetary sector, together with a representative of Luxembourg and the 
European Commission, should report back to them. 
 Document 25 exemplifies that in the view of the Netherlands Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs the achievement of monetary union implied a clear 
strengthening of the supranational element in European cooperation. The 
work of the ad hoc group should therefore take place under supervision of 
the Council and not within any intergovernmental circle. The realisation of an 
economic and monetary union could only be possible with adequate allocation 
of powers to Community bodies.
24.
Report of the 34th meeting of the Ministers of Finance of the European 
Communities in Paris, 23 and 24 February 1970 by Jan Willem Vredenberg van 
der Horst, Netherlands Ministry of Finance.
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Council of 
Ministers (2.02.05.02), inv.no. 990. Translation: Huygens ING, The Hague.
– – – 
5. Prospects for European monetary cooperation.
The starting point of the considerations was paragraph 8 of the communiqué 
of the Hague Summit (1 and 2 December 1969)118 which states that the 
Council, in close cooperation with the Commission, shall elaborate a plan 
in 1970, with the aim to implement an economic and monetary union in 
phases. About the content and scope of such a plan several concepts119 exist 
already, namely on the part of West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
European Commission. During the discussions on the plan it became clear 
that there is general agreement on the goal of a monetary union. However, 
opinions divergeon the pace of implementation and about the priorities that 
should apply to each separate phase. At the meeting two tendencies emerged, 
115 See document 22.
112 See document 20.
117 A summary of the four plans can be found in document 26.
118 See document 22.
119 See document 26.
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described by Minister Giscard d’Estaing as careful and constructive (the German 
and Dutch ministers), respectively courageous and constructive (the Belgian 
and Luxembourg ministers). In the view of the former monetary union shall 
be the final piece of full coordination of economic policies and can therefore 
be realized only in a later phase of the integration process. According to the 
second group, the monetary integration process will have to begin already 
during the first phases. The French minister joined this view. The view of the 
Commission, though not yet put into writing, is that monetary cooperation 
should take place parallel to the coordination of economic policy.
 Minister Snoy et d’Oppuers gave a brief explanation of the Belgian ‘Plan 
de solidarité monétaire européenne en trois étapes 1971-1978’.120 He stated 
that in the current situation divergences in economic development of Member 
States may occur from which monetary tensions may arise that may frustrate 
the functioning of the common (especially agricultural) market. In addition, 
the international monetary cooperation has thus far developed outside the 
Community around three nuclei: the IMF, the major reserve currencies, and 
the Euro-dollar market. A requirement for further European integration 
is therefore a strengthening of monetary solidarity within the EC. This is 
not conceivable without an extensive convergence of economic policies and 
without homogeneity in the functioning of the economies of the Member 
States.
 This will entail significant changes in the institutional relationships, such 
as the creation of community agencies with the necessary powers in the field of 
economic policy (especially the budget and income policy), the establishment 
of a Community monetary system (by analogy with the Federal Reserve 
System) with its own executive, having the Community act as an autonomous 
(monetary) unit in its relations with the outside world. For the realization of 
the plan three phases are provided in which mutual cooperation in various 
areas will become progressively more obligatory. As regards the monetary 
relations between the Member States, it is proposed that in the first phase the 
margins for exchange rate fluctuations will be reduced and in the second phase 
will be eliminated completely; a fixed mutual parity shall exist and a uniform 
rate against the U.S. dollar. Next follows the third stage with joint management 
of the common foreign exchange reserves. Yet the Belgian plan is not a tight 
schedule, but is open to changes, such as the number of phases concerned.
 The German ‘Stufenplan zur Verwirklichung der Wirtschaft und 
Währungsunion in der EWG‘121 is also based on the decision of the Hague 
summit. Minister Schiller noted that the formulation of the plan was mainly 
motivated by the idea in paragraph 8 of the Hague communiqué that ‘the 
development of monetary cooperation should be based on the harmonization 
of economic policies’. The plan therefore lays emphasis on coordination of 
economic and counter cyclical policy as a condition for a harmonized monetary 
policy. An important pragmatic principle that gives a high degree of flexibility 
to the plan is that the transition to the next stage will occur only when the 
120 The Belgian Plan was published on 27 January 1970.This document is available on 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation.htm. Document 26 
contains a summary.
121 The German Plan was published on 12 February 1970 in: Tagesnachrichten des 
Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft, 27 February 1970, no. 6122. This document is 
available on http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation.htm. 
Document 26 contains a summary.
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essential conditions for the previous phase have been met. This is to be agreed 
in the Council. According to the German plan, the conditions for a greater 
convergence of the objectives of economic policy over the medium term and 
for harmonization of the short term economic and financial policies have to 
be created in the first phase. At the end of the phase the moment of take-off is 
achieved for realization of indicated common objectives in a second phase, in 
which the support mechanism for the mid-term proposed by Commissioner 
Barre may also become operational. At the end of this period (about 1974-
1975), the harmonization of economic policies must be advanced to such a 
degree that fundamental imbalances between Member States can no longer 
occur. The third phase is the transition to an economic and monetary union and 
is characterized by a progressive gradual institutionalization of Community 
elements built into the economic policy and the monetary and credit policy. In 
this phase the monetary system should be transformed into a kind of Federal 
Reserve System, the exchange rate margins be reduced and the mechanism for 
mutual assistance in the medium term be developed into a common reserve 
fund. In the fourth (‘Elyseeian’) phase, the beginning of which is thought to 
be around 1978, the economic and monetary union should be completed by 
the transfer of all ‘notwendige’ powers to community agencies, by allocating 
the Committee of Governors of central banks the status of a European central 
bank council, by the introduction of fixed and guaranteed rates between 
Member States and by the creation of a European currency. Minister Schiller 
argued that the development of a ‘Stufenplan’ ought to be entrusted to an ad 
hoc Committee appointed by the Council, which could consist, for example, of 
the chairmen of the five EC committees,122 an expert from the Commission and 
a representative of Luxembourg. He urged at a speedy decision by the Council 
so that the committee will be able to present the results of his research before 
the Council debate on the economic situation in the summer of this year.
 Minister Colombo also saw the harmonization of economic policies as a 
necessary condition for the strengthening of the monetary cooperation. Such 
requires a political unification of Europe, a development that will lead to major 
institutional changes. Emphatically, he argued that a reduction of the exchange 
rate margins is possible only if the objectives of economic policy over the 
medium term are sufficiently harmonized. He was able to imagine that it may 
be effective to maintain the flexibility of exchange rates in a transition phase. 
The problem of reducing the so-called band width between the currencies of 
the EC countries and the relationship to the U.S. dollar should in his opinion be 
more closely examined.
 During the meeting, Minister Werner handed his colleagues the text of a 
study on the prospects of a monetary union (‘l’Europe on route vers l’Union 
Monétaire’).123 The main idea here is that monetary integration could take 
place in seven phases, in conjunction with the development of coordination 
and harmonization of economic and counter-cyclical policy. Characteristic of 
these proposals is that already in the first stage there is a strong emphasis 
on monetary cooperation. Thus, even before the first phase deployment of 
122 Note in text: ‘Monetary Committee, Short Term Economic Policy Committee, Budgetary 
Policy Committee, Medium-term Economic Policy Committee, Committee of Governors 
of Central Banks.’
123 The Luxembourg Plan was published on 23 February 1970.This document is available 
on http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation.htm. Document 
26 contains a summary.
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special drawing rights124 within the mechanism for mutual assistance in the 
medium term is to be considered; in the second phase, the exchange rate 
margins between the EC countries should be reduced, and in the third stage a 
European accounting unit be entered. By a further gradual institutionalization 
a European reserve fund could emerge in the seventh stage. To realize these 
plans a period of 7 to 10 years is considered. Minister Werner believed that 
a phase plan should be sufficiently flexible to allow possibly new acceding 
candidate members to participate without any major difficulties.
 Minister Witteveen deemed it necessary that apart from the technical 
aspects the political implications of the plans, inspiring in themselves, be 
considered further. Otherwise there is a danger that the ambitious targets 
will not be achieved. He pointed out that the divergence of economic variables 
between the Member States must give way to a convergence, if progress in 
monetary integration is to be made. He furthermore thought it advisable to 
indicate modest objectives for each stage and in coordinating policy to determine 
to what is necessary to achieve this. The proposals on budgetary policy in the 
Belgian plan for the first phase go beyond necessity. For a union it is essential 
to have a certain degree of consensus on the size of the budget deficit and on 
financing arrangements, with a view to the effect on the aggregate demand. Yet 
other aspects of budget policy, such as the relationship between consumption 
and investment expenditure and the ratio between direct and indirect taxes 
do not require a similar approach. Political decisions regarding credit policy 
and the appeal of public bodies to the capital market should ultimately be 
made by community agencies. The centralization of the responsibility for the 
European currency requires political unification and institutional extension 
of the Community, while the function of the European Parliament must also 
be addressed. All these issues require further consideration. The German 
Stufenplan appealed to minister Witteveen particularly because of its realistic 
nature, especially the principle that the transition to a next stage is conditional 
on the achievement of the objectives in the previous stage. He then pointed to 
the relationship between the gradual liberalization of the money and capital 
markets advocated in the plan for the first Stufe, and the coordination of budget 
policy. A balanced development of capital markets also depends on public 
savings, the size of which hitherto varies in the Member States. In the second 
phase the plan provides for a coordination of interest rates and of credit policy 
of the Member States. It should also be studied to what extent the interest 
rate policy is aimed at the balance of payments equilibrium or on achieving 
national objectives. The relationship between governments and central 
banks (the degree of independence of the latter) is also an issue that requires 
further study. Minister Witteveen agreed to the procedure for consultations 
to continue in an ad hoc committee, in which he wishes to include the vice-
chairmen of these committees. This committee might on occasion instruct the 
EC committees to study possible sub-problems.
 
124 The special drawing rights (SDR’s) were created at the annual meeting of IMF in 
Rio de Janeiro in September 1967 with the purpose to provide in the growing need 
of international liquidities besides the U.S. dollar. The original value of a SDR was 
initially defined as equivalent to 0.888671 grams of fine gold—which, at the time, was 
also equivalent to one U.S. dollar. After the devaluation of the dollar in 1971 and the 
abolishment of the convertibility of the dollar in gold, the value of the SDR was redefined 
as a basket of the 16 most important currencies in the world (nowadays 5).
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 Minister Giscard d’Estaing regarded monetary integration as a guide 
for the further development of the common market. He was aware that this 
should be accompanied by a greater coordination of economic policies. In 
his view monetary integration leads to an identity of the Community itself 
which may have significance for monetary cooperation in a global context. 
Like the Belgian and Luxembourg ministers he gave a high degree of priority 
to the creation of mechanisms for common monetary policy. In particular, he 
advocated the creation in the first phase of a system of mutual assistance in 
the medium term. To ensure sufficient liquidity of the claims on this support 
mechanism, he recommended the deployment of special drawing rights of the 
Member States. Furthermore, the French minister declared himself in favour of 
a reduction, respectively elimination, of the band width for fluctuations in the 
communal exchange rates, even if the widening of exchange rate margins are 
considered in relations with third countries.
 The EC Commission will soon inform the Council about her thoughts 
regarding the strengthening of monetary cooperation within the Community. 
In anticipation, Mr. Barre reported that the formation of an economic and 
monetary union is expected to take a period of 8 to 10 years. In his opinion, a 
phase plan should not have a rigid character and should not too incorporate 
too much detail. Also, a transition from one phase to another should not to be 
tied to too formal requirements. The development of an economic union will 
have to proceed symmetrical to that of a monetary union; both can be mutually 
stimulating. The thoughts of the Commission go towards an integration 
process in three-stages. In the first phase (1970-1971), the Council Decisions 
of 26 January125 should be put into practice. In particular, the proposed 
mechanism for mutual financial assistance could play a role, possibly involving 
special drawing rights. Furthermore, it should be examined what measures 
are necessary for further liberalization of payments and capital movements. 
In this phase coordination within the Monetary Committee and the Committee 
of Governors might be enhanced. In the second phase (1972-1975), the 
cooperation in various fields (including tax harmonization) could be developed 
in parallel. Moreover, a reduction of exchange rate margins (e.g. by 50%) might 
be invoked and a European accounting unit for financial transactions within 
the Community introduced. After 1976 it should be considered whether there 
exists a sufficiently solid basis to complete the monetary union. At that point 
a Community monetary authority should be created, the remaining exchange 
rate margins be eliminated, a common reserve fund be formed, and a solution 
be found to a division of the powers of the national and Community bodies.
 Minister Schiller observed differences of opinion between the Commission 
and the German Stufenplan. He objected to the Commission fixing certain 
periods. The pragmatic approach of the German plan is more flexible, in this 
the Stufen are indicated qualitatively, but not bound to time periods. Another 
objection is that the Commission introduces monetary elements at a (too) early 
stage. Especially with regard the support mechanism for the medium term the 
danger of ‘überstrapazieren’ [overloading] exists. Objectionable is also that 
the Commission proposal already presents a European accounting unit in the 
second phase. The German plan gives priority to convergence in the real sector 
and takes up harmonization in the monetary field only at a later stage. The 
125 On 26 January 1970 the Council agreed on a draft decision concerning the special 
consultation procedure which formed an integral part of the short-term monetary 
support system to be implemented by the Central Banks of the Community.
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German minister advised not to make the phase plan too complicated by also 
involving tax harmonization – like the Commission proposes – which he felt 
unnecessary for a monetary union.
 Minister Witteveen seconded the statement made by Minister Schiller 
and defended a cautious, realistic, but constructive approach to the plans that 
have been submitted. Against the idea of the Commission to link the special 
drawing rights in the first phase to the financial assistance mechanism, he 
submitted that in such a case the Member States might block part of their 
reserves in advance in order to possibly make their claims on the mechanism 
liquid later on. Furthermore, any amalgamation of foreign exchange reserves, 
which can only take place in the final stage, should not be restricted to the 
special drawing rights, but apply to all components of the foreign exchange 
reserves to avoid the impression that the SDR’s were a reserve asset of a lesser 
sort. The Minister challenged the statement of his French colleague that in 
the Council meeting of July 1969126 a decision has already been taken on the 
medium term support mechanism. At that point only an instruction for further 
consideration was issued to the Monetary Committee, while the time of entry 
into force was left open entirely.
 All ministers appeared to be able to agree on the procedure that the 
Council will be advised to convene an ad hoc committee for a closer examination 
of the various proposals and ideas on the creation of a monetary union. This 
committee will report to the Council before this will convene for its summer 
meeting for its usual short term economic policy debate.
126 See document 23: ‘On 17 July 1969 the EEC Council has issued the following 
conclusions: (...). With emphasis it should be pointed out that the Council at that point 




Position paper by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the 
Interdepartmental Coordination Committee on European Integration and 
Association Issues on the procedure for the development of a plan for an 
economic and monetary union, 26 February 1970.
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1965-1974 (2.05.313), inv.no. 14315. Translation: Huygens ING, 
The Hague.
– – –
The Netherlands position on this matter may be based on the following 
considerations.
1. In accordance with the decision of the Summit,127 the work should 
be undertaken within the framework of the Council and not in any 
intergovernmental set-up. Given the French plea on the Summit for 
intergovernmental cooperation in the economic and monetary field, there is 
reason to emphasize this point. Intergovernmental cooperation is divergent 
to the final goal of economic and monetary union. It would therefore 
also be incorrect to place the elaboration of a plan for such a union in an 
intergovernmental perspective.
2. As formulated at the Summit, the development of monetary cooperation 
has to be based on the harmonization of economic policies. The required study 
will therefore not be limited to monetary integration, but will also relate to the 
entire field of social-economic policy.
3. The achievement of an economic and monetary union is only possible 
with allocation of adequate powers to Community bodies. Against the loss of 
national control over economic and monetary policy instruments, is to be put 
the creation of Community competences and instruments to enable a decisive 
policy. This implies a clear strengthening of the supranational element in 
European cooperation, which will have to be linked to a strengthening of the 
powers of the European Parliament as well. These essential political aspects 
shall require the necessary attention in the study that is to be conducted.
Based on the above considerations, the following can be said about the 
procedure proposed by the Ministers of Finance of the Six. 
The required community nature of the study implies that the Council 
commissions to undertake the study and that the result, after the usual 
preparations, shall be submitted to the Council. A prior amendment by the 
Ministers of Finance does not fit into this arrangement. If the Ministers of 
Finance want to provide comments on the concept, there should be no objection 
to that. These comments may then be incorporated into the evaluation by the 
Council.  
127 The Hague Summit, 1-2 December 1969, see document 22 for the final communiqué.
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 As regards the proposed composition of the group that will be 
commissioned to develop the plan, this meets the desideratum of a composition 
that can give sufficient weight to the various elements of economic policy. The 
political elements mentioned above under 3, will get special attention of the 
Permanent Representatives. 
 Given the construction proposed by the Ministers of Finance in which 
the representatives of the member states are linked to the presidencies of 
the various committees, it will, however, not be easy to ensure that the views 
of Member States on all relevant aspects, including the political, of the very 
complex material will be fully taken into account. In addition, it will be intricate 
to effect major amendments after the group has released its study. If the Council 
will adopt the proposal, special care needs to be taken to ensure representative 




 Introduction to document 26
Between the Hague Summit128 and the beginning of the Werner Committee’s 
work, the Belgian129, German130 and Luxembourg131 Governments published 
their proposals for the implementation of an economic and monetary union. 
The three documents, named after the figures behind them — the Snoy Plan, 
the Schiller Plan, and the Werner Plan (also known as the Luxembourg Plan) 
— were debated at the Council of Finance Ministers meeting in Paris on 24 
February 1970.132
 On 18 March 1970 the EC Commission published a comparative table 
summarising the three government proposals as well as the plan put forward 
by the EC Commission.133 There were four areas of interest: the coordination 
of economic policies, the capital market, fiscal matters and monetary matters. 
The institutional aspect, referred to in only vague terms in these plans, was not 
analysed.
 These four plans set the timeframe for the full achievement of an 
economic and monetary union at 8 to 10 years. Although the plans differed 
as to the number of steps required, the length of these steps and the order in 
which they should be carried out, two fundamental stages figured in all the 
plans. After a preparatory phase, to last up to 1975, the plans delineated a 
final phase, during which the Community structures required for the smooth 
operation of an economic and monetary union were to be set up. 
 The EC Commission identified two main positions: firstly the Luxembourg 
Plan, which represented the most purely ‘monetary’ approach.134 As its chief 
alternative, the Commission indicated the Schiller Plan, which emphasised 
more strongly the role of the action to be taken in the various fields of economic 
policy and did not provide for automatic transition from one stage to the next, 
requiring instead a Council decision each time. The other plans fell somewhere 
in between.
 Although his personal view tended towards the monetarist perspective, 
Pierre Werner carried out his mission as chairman of the ad hoc group, 
managing to secure agreement on an approach that incorporated both 
economic cooperation and monetary cooperation, as crystallised in the final 
text of the Werner Plan.
128 See document 22.
129 The Belgian Plan was published on 27 January 1970. This document is available on 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation.htm.
130 The German Plan was published on 12 February 1970 in: Tagesnachrichten des 
Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft, 27 February 1970, no. 6122. This document is 
available on http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation.htm.
131 The Luxembourg Plan was published on 23 February 1970. This document is available 
on http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation.htm.
132 See document 24.
133 Commission Memorandum to the Council in the Preparation of a Plan for the Phased 
Establishment of an Economic and Monetary Union, 4 March 1970. Bulletin of the 
European Communities, Supplement no. 3 (1970). This document is available on http://
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation.htm.
134 For a short statement on the differences between the monetarist and economist 




European commission, comparative tables concerning the four plans for the 
achievement by stages of an economic and monetary union, 18 March 1970. 
Family Archives Pierre Werner. © European Union.
I. Coordination des politiques économiques
Plan Werner
1ère phase, 1970-1975, 1ère étape
Celle-ci est déjà en cours de réalisation. Son premier aspect est la consultation 
réciproque et obligatoire sur certaines opérations à caractère monétaire ou 
d’économie générale. Cependant il faut tendre vers des actions concertées, 
conçues à titre préventif. L’Exécutif du Marché Commun a proposé des 
procédures plus développées dans le Plan Barre qui comporte deux volets de 
coordination économique.
a) En tout premier lieu il propose de renforcer la coopération des politiques 
économiques courantes grâce à des consultations préalables.
b) En second lieu, il s’agit de renforcer la coordination des politiques 
économiques à moyen terme, c’est-à-dire de rendre les objectifs compatibles 
entre eux en matière de production, d’emploi, de salaires, de balance de 
paiements pour ne citer que les plus importants. Ces objectifs devraient 
permettre de préciser le programme de développement économique des pays 
membres au cours de la prochaine période quinquennale.
2ème étape
Corrélativement il faudra perfectionner les programmes économiques globaux 




135 On 26 January 1970 the Council agreed on a draft decision concerning the special 
consultation procedure which formed an integral part of the short-term monetary 




1ère phase, 1970-1975, 1ère étape
Au cours de la première étape, la collaboration reste volontaire. Le Conseil des 
Ministres qui définirait les objectifs généraux de politique économique serait 
habilité à adresser des recommandations aux gouvernements nationaux. Ces 
recommandations porteraient notamment sur les différents aspects de la 
politique budgétaire: volume global du budget et rythme de son augmentation, 
répartition des dépenses publiques entre investissements et consommation, 
rapport entre le financement par l’impôt, le recours à l’emprunt – dont le 
financement monétaire –, importance respective des impôts directs et des taxes 
indirectes – harmonisation des législations fiscales et parafiscales. La politique 
des revenus serait progressivement harmonisée. Le budget supranational 
comprendrait les recettes et les dépenses afférentes aux activités déjà mises 
en commun.
2ème étape
Dans la deuxième étape, les recommandations seraient remplacées par 
des directives. La collaboration volontaire ferait place à une coopération 
obligatoire et l’exécution des directives serait contrôlée par les institutions 
communautaires. Le budget supranational serait progressivement étendu.
[Sans spécification d’étape: Instauration au niveau de la Communauté de 
mécanismes fonctionnant comme des stabilisateurs économiques, ou de façon 
discrétionnaire, qui corrigent les défauts de la répartition spontanée des 
revenus et des capitaux]
2ème phase, 1976-1980, 3ème étape
Mise en place d’organes communautaires dotés de pouvoirs requis pour la 
poursuite d’une politique économique unique. Ces organes définiraient les 
objectifs communs et seraient habilités à prendre des mesures nécessaires 
pour les atteindre. La politique économique devrait s’appuyer notamment 
sur une action budgétaire et une politique de revenus définies au niveau 
communautaire. Les organes communautaires seraient habilités à arrêter 
et à exécuter le budget de la Communauté, et ce dernier serait élargi 
progressivement. Les organes communautaires seraient habilités à établir le 
cadre général à l’intérieur duquel les Etats membres devraient administrer 
leur propre budget.
Plan Schiller
1ère phase, 1970-1975, 1ère étape
1. Poursuite de la concrétisation et de l’harmonie des objectifs de politique 
économique à moyen terme sur la base du Mémorandum de la Commission 
sur les orientations globales à moyen terme de la politique économique dans 
la Communauté du 15 décembre 1969136 et de l’avis du Conseil des Ministres 
du 26 janvier 1970. Les objectifs à moyen terme devraient être examinés 
annuellement par le Comité de politique économique à moyen terme.
136 Supplément au Bulletin des Communautés Européennes, no. 2, 1970.
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2. Pour la réalisation de ces objectifs harmonisés, il faudrait recourir à:
2.1. Application renforcée du processus de consultations décidé le 17 juillet 
1969137 en ce qui concerne des mesures importantes de politique économique 
à court terme.
2.2. Elaboration par la Commission d’un rapport économique annuel à 
présenter au début de chaque année. Le rapport devrait rendre compte de 
l’état de la coordination et de l’harmonisation, des divergences existantes 
ou qui risquent de surgir par rapport aux objectifs à moyen terme. Il devrait 
contenir en outre des propositions concernant des recommandations au sujet 
de la politique économique, monétaire et budgétaire des Etats partenaires pour 
l’année courante (au regard de la régulation globale de la demande). A la base 
des recommandations, il faudrait présenter en outre des objectifs quantitatifs 
que la Communauté chercherait à réaliser au cours de l’année. Les mesures 
proposées dans le rapport économique de la Commission devraient constituer 
une base pour les recommandations du Conseil aux Etats membres. Le Conseil 
devrait également faire usage des compétences qui lui sont conférées par 
l’art. 103 du Traité CEE
2.3. Examen et amélioration de l’ensemble des instruments de politique 
conjoncturelle et budgétaire dans la Communauté. L’objectif devrait être 
de donner à l’ensemble des instruments nationaux – en les complétant 
éventuellement – une forme telle qu’ils atteignent un degré d’efficacité 
comparable.
2.4. Harmonisation renforcée des politiques nationales de structure sur base 
du 2e programme de politique économique à moyen terme.
3. Les conditions nécessaires et les fondements techniques pour le 
diagnostic à court et moyen terme des évolutions économiques dans la 
Communauté devraient être améliorées par:
3.1.  la poursuite énergique des travaux en vue d’harmoniser et d’améliorer 
les statistiques conjoncturelles dans la Communauté.
3.2. le développement du système d’indicateurs d’alerte.
3.3. Une meilleure harmonisation des projections nationales grâce aux 
informations de base plus riches destinées à remplir le système de comptes 
macroéconomique uniforme de la Communauté et grâce à l’uniformisation des 
périodes prévisionnelles mises à jour annuellement.
2ème étape
1. Pour soutenir les efforts en vue d’aligner la politique économique de 
façon accrue aux objectifs communs à moyen terme les mesures suivantes 
pourraient être prévues:
1.1. Recommandations du Conseil relatives à l’orientation macroéconomique 
des budgets nationaux.
1.2. Décisions de politique conjoncturelle plus nombreuses et plus étendues 
suivant l’article 103 du Traité CEE.
1.3. Introduction de consultations relatives aux plans de financement à 
moyen terme des Etats de la CEE.
2ème phase, 1976-1980, 3ème étape
1. La collaboration en matière politique économique et budgétaire devrait 
être intensifiée et complétée par l’incorporation d’éléments communautaires. 
137 Council Decision of 17 July 1969 on co-ordination of the short-term economic 
policies of the member states (69/227/EEC). See also document 23.
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Il s’agirait notamment de:
1.1. L’harmonisation des objectifs à moyen terme devrait être complétée et 
approfondie sur base des expériences acquises à ce moment afin d’arriver à un 
rapprochement encore plus poussé des priorités nationales.
1.2. Parallèlement, il faudrait dans le domaine de la politique structurelle, 
contribuer par des mesures adéquates à ce que la structure économique soit 
améliorée dans la Communauté et ainsi son rendement s’en trouvera accru.
1.3. Pour la réalisation des politiques économiques dans la Communauté, les 
compétences encore manquantes devraient être accordées à la Communauté. 
En même temps, on pourrait passer aux décisions de la majorité dans des 
domaines importants de la politique économique, budgétaire et monétaire 
(par ex. pour les lignes d’action pour les plans de financement à moyen terme 
et pour les postes des budgets nationaux importants pour la conjoncture).
4ème étape
1. Transfert de toutes les compétences nécessaires dans le domaine de 
politique conjoncturelle, budgétaire et monétaire aux organes communautaires.
Plan de la CEE
1ère phase, 1970-1975, 1ère étape
a) Adoption, à la fin de 1970, du 3ème programme économique à moyen 
terme, comportant des orientations chiffrées et des actions structurelles, ainsi 
que des procédures permettant sa mise en œuvre, en liaison avec la politique 
conjoncturelle.
b) Coordination plus efficace des politiques conjoncturelles, grâce 
notamment à la mise en œuvre d’un système d’indicateurs d’alertes.
c) A partir de 1971, confrontation annuelle au niveau des ministres des 
finances, des projets de budgets nationaux.
d) Elaboration d’orientations à moyen terme en matière de politique 
budgétaire.
2ème étape
a) Définition en commun des lignes directrices de la politique économique 
globale en vue d’orienter les décisions à prendre dans les divers domaines.
b) Examen de l’évolution économique de la Communauté par référence aux 
orientations chiffrées à moyen terme et recours à ‘des projections glissantes’ 
pour la mise à jour de ces orientations.
c) Mise en œuvre des actions structurelles prévues au 3e Programme de 
politique économique à moyen terme.
d) Fixation en commun des orientations de la politique conjoncturelle en 
vue notamment d’assurer leur conformité aux orientations à moyen terme de 
la Communauté.
e) Définition en commun des orientations de politique budgétaire en ce qui 
concerne les grandes masses budgétaires et les modalités de financement du 
solde des budgets.
f) Recours par les Etats membres à des instruments homologues de politique 
budgétaire en vue de favoriser une meilleure régulation conjoncturelle de 
l’économie de la Communauté.
g) Examen régulier, dans le cadre d’une procédure de concertation avec 
les partenaires sociaux et les autres organisations représentatives de la vie 
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économique et sociale des grandes orientations économiques, fiscales et 
monétaires et des décisions auxquelles ils sont plus particulièrement intéressés.
2ème phase, 1976-1980, 3ème étape
1) Attribution aux institutions communautaires des pouvoirs nécessaires 
pour assurer le bon fonctionnement de l’union économique et monétaire.
II. Marche des capitaux
Plan Werner
Devraient être réexaminés à ce dernier égard et harmonisés dans la mesure 
du nécessaire:
– Les régimes fiscaux des placements internes et des placements à 
destination ou en provenance des autres pays membres, de même que les 
différences dans le traitement fiscal des divers types de placements.
– Le régime particulier de certains circuits de financement, afin que 
s’atténue la rigidité actuelle des cloisonnements internes des marchés.
– Les réglementations qui limitent les placements ouverts aux investisseurs 
institutionnels.
– La réglementation des changes portant sur les mouvements de capitaux.
Le marché des euro-devises
Pour ce qui est de l’évolution spontanée, il faut relever qu’au cours des dernières 
années s’est formé au sein des pays de la Communauté un réseau de transactions 
que l’on peut légitimement qualifier de marché des capitaux européen. Il s’agit 
des relations qui se sont nouées à la faveur du développement des émissions 
d’emprunt en euro-devises. Ce marché a ses caractéristiques propres et n’a 
pas manqué d’évoluer à la suite de la suppression de l’apport de capitaux frais 
en provenance des Etats-Unis. Il a tendance à s’européiser davantage, tout en 
restant trop dépendant des Etats-Unis quant aux taux d’intérêt.
 En ce moment il importe d’en retenir les techniques et les enseignements. 
En effet, ce marché résulte d’une collaboration étroite d’institutions financières 
de diverses nations, utilisant au mieux de l’intérêt de leurs mandants les 
instruments et les cadres juridiques offerts par les pays de la Communauté. 
Par ailleurs, il n’est pas irrélevant de constater que le succès de cette première 
forme de marché européen est dû en partie à l’utilisation d’une devise qui, par 
rapport aux monnaies nationales, faisait fonction en fait de monnaie de compte. 
En ce sens l’Euro-dollar138 nous montre la voie à suivre. Les investisseurs 
internationaux recherchent le dénominateur européen commun, qui pourrait 
être l’unité de compte enfin consacrée.
Les exigences d’un marché européen des capitaux
L’harmonisation des dispositions fiscales relatives aux sociétés de capitaux 
et aux valeurs mobilières joue également un rôle dans le développement 
équilibré du marché commun. Il ne faut cependant pas méconnaître les 
implications parfois fort complexes d’une action de rapprochement qui doit 
rester conforme à l’objectif d’interpénétration du marché européen, ainsi 
qu’au principe d’ouverture et de liberté qui sont à sa base. Sa structure doit 
138 Time deposits denominated in U.S. Dollars in European banks.
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aussi éviter de favoriser la fuite des capitaux en dehors de la Communauté. 
L’élimination des causes de double imposition doit être poursuivie.
 Sans doute faut-il envisager également une coopération plus étroite entre 
les autorités de tutelle des marchés de capitaux des pays membres aux fins 
d’assurer de meilleures conditions d’équilibre entre les marchés nationaux 
subsistants.
Plan Belge
1ère phase, 1970-1975, 1ère étape
Les législations et réglementations nationales régissant les statuts des 
intermédiaires financiers, le fonctionnement des marchés de fonds et les 
organes de contrôle seraient rapprochées.
2ème étape
De même seraient unifiées les règlementations régissant le statut des 
intermédiaires financiers, le fonctionnement des marchés de fonds et les 
organes de contrôle.
2ème phase, 1976-1980, 3ème étape
La circulation des capitaux ne pourrait se heurter à aucun obstacle.
Plan Schiller
1ère phase, 1970-1975, 1ère étape
Parallèlement, le marché des capitaux et le marché monétaire de la 
Communauté devraient être progressivement libéralisés. Depuis 1962, aucun 
progrès n’a été réalisé dans ce domaine. En effet, c’est justement un marché 
des capitaux libéralisé et efficace qui exercerait des effets particulièrement 
positifs sur le processus d’intégration. Le Conseil devrait recevoir aussi vite 
que possible des propositions de la Commission, pour une libéralisation 
effective au sens de l’article 67 du Traité CEE139 L’accent devrait d’abord être 
mis sur la libéralisation dans le domaine des effets négociables.
Plan de la CEE
1ère phase, 1970-1975, 1ère étape
a) Adoption d’une 3ème directive tendant à accroître l’interpénétration des 
marchés financiers des Etats membres.
b) Création auprès du Comité monétaire d’un groupe ad hoc chargé de 
consultations régulières sur les mouvements de capitaux à l’intérieur de la 
Communauté.
c) Adoption de mesures d’harmonisation fiscales portant sur les intérêts, 
les dividendes et la structure des impôts sur les sociétés.
139 ‘1. Member States shall, in the course of the transitional period and to the extent 
necessary for the proper functioning of the Common Market, progressively abolish 
as between themselves restrictions on the movement of capital belonging to persons 
resident in Member States and also any discriminatory treatment based on the 
nationality or place of residence of the parties or on the place in which such capital is 
invested. 2. Current payments connected with movements of capital between Member 




a) Elargissement progressif de l’accès des pays membres aux marchés des 
capitaux de leurs partenaires.
b) Harmonisation des règlementations régissant le statut des intermédiaires 
financiers, et notamment des investisseurs institutionnels, ainsi que le 
fonctionnement des Bourses de valeurs.
c) Recours, dans des conditions à déterminer, à une unité de compte 
communautaire pour l’émission et la circulation de titres de crédit utilisables 
sur les marchés monétaires et financiers de la Communauté.
2ème phase, 1976-1980, 3ème étape




Devraient être réexaminés à ce dernier égard et harmonisés dans la mesure 
du nécessaire:
– les régimes fiscaux des placements internes et des placements à 
destination ou en provenance des autres pays membres, de même que les 
différences dans le traitement fiscal des divers types de placement.
 Harmonisation des dispositions fiscales relatives aux sociétés de capitaux 
et aux valeurs mobilières
Plan Belge
cf. Tabl. I
1e étape, 2e al: 
 ‘Importance respective des impôts directs et des taxes indirectes – 
harmonisation des législations fiscales et parafiscales’
cf. Tabl. I
2e étape : 
‘les recommandations seraient remplacées par des directives’
cf. Tabl. I
3e étape, 5e al. : 
‘des organes seraient habilités à établir le cadre général à l’intérieur duquel les 
Etats membres devraient administrer leur propre budget’
Plan Schiller
cf. Tabl. I
1 étape §2.2 et 2.3





Plan de la CEE
1ère phase, 1970-1975, 1ère étape
a) TVA: généralisation de cet impôt et adoption d’un programme pour le 
rapprochement de ses taux.
b) Adoption d’un programme d’harmonisation en matière d’accises.
2ème étape
a) Harmonisation progressive des taux de la taxe à la valeur ajoutée.
b) Harmonisation progressive des accises.
c) Harmonisation du régime fiscal visant à promouvoir certaines espèces 
de placement.
d) Harmonisation de l’impôt sur les sociétés en ce qui concerne la structure 
et l’assiette.
2ème phase, 1976-1980, 3ème étape
5) Abolition des frontières fiscales.
IV. Domaine Monétaire
Plan Werner
1ère phase, 1970-1975, 1ère étape
L’un des problèmes ardus soulevés par le concours financier à moyen terme, est 
celui de la liquidité des créances constituées au sein du système communautaire. 
Peut-on entrevoir que ces créances ne sont qu’un prolongement de crédits 
monétaires, qu’ils garderont, grâce à des procédés appropriés de réversibilité, 
leur caractère de facilités monétaires ou de trésorerie? Ou bien s’agit-il de prêts 
d’Etat à Etat, de créances relativement immobilisées, ce qui leur conférerait 
un caractère budgétaire? La réponse à cette question est importante, non 
seulement quant à la nature des moyens à mettre en œuvre, mais aussi quant à 
la clef de répartition à appliquer entre les partenaires.
 Grâce à un système de réversibilité et de garantie de liquidité, il serait 
souhaitable d’incorporer le concours mutuel au système des relations 
monétaires internationales.
 Cela pourrait se concevoir au cours de cette première étape par 
une affectation partiellement communautaire des DTS (Droits de Tirage 
Spéciaux)140 sur le Fonds Monétaire International.
 Cette affectation pourrait avoir lieu soit à titre de garantie de liquidité, 
attachée aux créances résultant du concours à moyen terme, garantie soit 
directe (par un nantissement formel), soit indirecte (par une renonciation 
aux tirages pendant la durée du prêt). De telles formules préluderaient à une 
gestion ou une mise en commun des DTS. On se rend compte de l’importance 
de ce premier pas en vue de la création d’un futur Fonds de réserve.
140 The special drawing rights (SDR’s) were created at the annual meeting of IMF in 
Rio de Janeiro in September 1967 with the purpose to provide in the growing need 
of international liquidities besides the U.S. dollar. The original value of a SDR was 
initially defined as equivalent to 0.888671 grams of fine gold—which, at the time, was 
also equivalent to one U.S. dollar. After the devaluation of the dollar in 1971 and the 
abolishment of the convertibility of the dollar in gold, the value of the SDR was redefined 




Au cours de la seconde étape, les Six devraient s’accorder sur la mise sur 
pied d’un mécanisme ou d’un arrangement réduisant les fluctuations des 
taux de change entre partenaires, en assurant une évolution de plus en plus 
synchronisée des cours des monnaies des Six par rapport au dollar.
 Par ailleurs, on devrait procéder à une confrontation des instruments de 
création et de circulation monétaires, c’est-à-dire des instruments de crédits 
admis ou utilisés par les banques centrales. Une concertation des volumes et 
des procédés de crédit des banques centrales devrait être recherchée dans 
la mesure seulement où l’exigent les impératifs coordonnés de la politique 
économique à moyen terme, de la maîtrise de la conjoncture, ainsi que de 
l’orientation générale des politiques budgétaires.
3ème étape
Cette troisième étape serait caractérisée par la définition d’une unité de 
compte européenne, dont l’usage resterait d’abord facultatif et pragmatique.
 Le mérite de cette proposition est qu’elle permettrait de promouvoir la 
fixité des parités des monnaies nationales. Ensuite elle permettrait de favoriser 
une plus grande interpénétration des marchés des capitaux européens et le 
développement d’un marché financier européen autonome. La monnaie de 
compte commune a l’avantage de rendre possible le placement simultané 
d’emprunts sur plusieurs marchés financiers en éliminant les principaux 
risques de change. A cet effet, il faudrait supprimer les restrictions juridiques 
à l’usage de la clause d’unité de compte dans les contrats.
 Un titre de voyage européen libellé en unités de compte et créé 
éventuellement par un accord interbancaire mettrait l’homme de la rue en 
présence d’un instrument pour effectuer des paiements directs dans les hôtels, 
les restaurants ou les magasins dans tous les pays membres, ce qui ne sera pas 
sans retentir favorablement sur la mentalité européenne.
4ème étape
Dans une quatrième étape, il faudrait prévoir que les changements de 
parité fussent soumis, non plus à des consultations, mais à des procédures 
d’approbation communautaire, suivant des modes de vote à définir.
2ème phase, 1976-1980, 5ème étape
Au cours d’une cinquième étape, les partenaires des Communautés 
Européennes devraient unifier les concours financiers à court et à moyen terme 
entre eux en créant un organisme communautaire, le Fonds de coopération 
monétaire européen géré par un organe directeur à définir. Les modalités de 
fonctionnement de cet organisme, de concours monétaire seraient élaborées 
par la Commission sur proposition des instances compétentes (banques 
centrales, comité monétaire). Les comptes de cet organisme communautaire 
seraient tenus dans l’unité de compte européenne.
6ème étape
Lors de la sixième étape, l’action du Fonds de coopération monétaire européen 
serait étendue à certaines catégories de crédits à court terme consenties par 





 Le Fonds de coopération monétaire européen permettrait d’accélérer 
l’harmonisation des politiques économiques et donnerait aux Six un poids 
accru dans les négociations monétaires internationales. Une de ses sections 
pourrait se concevoir également comme instrument de financement dans le 
cadre d’accords commerciaux communautaires.
 Pour faciliter ces opérations, les banques centrales des six pays membres 
confieraient la gestion d’une partie de leurs réserves en or et en devises à ce 
fonds dans l’ordre suivant : DTS en leur totalité : 100 %; devises et or jusqu’à 
des pourcentages à définir (par exemple 25 % et 15 %).
7ème étape
Dans une dernière étape à plus ou moins long terme, le Fonds de coopération 
monétaire européen serait transformé en un Fonds de réserve européen, en 
étendant largement ses compétences. Ce Fonds de réserve pourrait accepter 
sous des conditions restant encore à définir, des dépôts libellés en unités 
de compte de tiers et accorder des crédits à court terme en dehors de la 
Communauté.
 Conformément au plan du professeur Triffin, patronné par le comité 
Monnet,141 les banques centrales détiendraient sous forme de dépôts une 
proportion déterminée de leurs réserves monétaires globales. Les dépôts 
seraient libellés en unités de compte.
 Les dépôts seraient entièrement liquides et convertibles pour le 
règlement de tous déficits éventuels à l’extérieur comme à l’intérieur de la 
Communauté.
 Centralisation définitive de la politique monétaire et substitution d’une 
monnaie européenne, de compte et de circulation, aux monnaies nationales.
Plan Belge
1ère phase, 1970-1975, 1ère étape
Les autorités monétaires nationales ne pourraient prendre les décisions 
importantes qui sont de leur compétence, qu’après avoir consulté le Comité des 
Gouverneurs des Banques centrales, qui lui-même pourrait se voir adresser 
par le Conseil des Ministres, des recommandations portant sur l’orientation 
générale de la politique de la monnaie, du crédit et des changes.
 Les marges de fluctuation actuelles seraient progressivement réduites, et 
aucune variation de la parité monétaire officielle vis-à-vis des pays membres 
de la Communauté ne serait admise que de commun accord, sur la base d’une 
déclaration du Conseil.
 Dans les organisations monétaires internationales, les pays de la 
Communauté adopteraient une attitude commune, définie par le Conseil, sur 
proposition du Comité monétaire.
 Développement progressif des concours mutuels.
2ème étape
Le Comité des Gouverneurs devrait approuver au préalable les principales 
141 Comité d’Action pour les États-Unis d’Europe. Established in 1955 in Paris by Jean 
Monnet as a lobby organisation for further international cooperation within Europe. 
Members of the Committee were representatives of the larger political parties and non-
communist trade unions in the member countries of the EEC. The Action Committee was 
dissolved in May 1975.
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décisions prises au niveau national et son action se développerait dans le cadre 
des directives qui lui seraient données par le Conseil des Ministres.
 Les marges de fluctuation entre les monnaies européennes seraient 
supprimées; une parité absolue au comptant serait établie et la cotation vis-à-
vis du dollar serait uniformisée.
 Pendant cette étape, une unité de compte communautaire serait définie 
et, pendant une période transitoire, les prix, les revenus, les actifs financiers, 
les contrats seraient exprimés à la fois en monnaie nationale et en cette unité 
de compte communautaire.
 Développement progressif des concours mutuels.
2ème phase, 1976-1980, 3ème étape
La troisième étape serait caractérisée par la suppression définitive de toute 
possibilité de modification de parité entre les devises des pays membres et, en 
fin de compte, par leur remplacement par une monnaie commune.
 Les concours mutuels feraient place à la gestion commune de l’ensemble 
des réserves de change.
 La mise en place d’un système monétaire communautaire analogue au 
système fédéral de réserve. Celui-ci grouperait les banques centrales actuelles, 
dont l’action serait orientée et surveillée par un exécutif monétaire européen. 
Ce dernier approuverait le maniement des instruments monétaires habituels, 
comme le taux d’escompte, l’open market, la fixation de coefficients de structure, 
l’encadrement du crédit, les modes de mobilisation et d’autres encore. Il 
gérerait les réserves de change de la communauté, établirait la réglementation 
de change commune, interviendrait sur le marchés des devises et assurerait 
la liaison avec les organismes internationaux. Il serait aussi compétent pour 
l’octroi de crédits aux Etats nationaux. Ce système monétaire mènerait son 
action dans le cadre de directives émises par les organes communautaires 
compétents et serait contrôlé par ceux-ci.
 La constitution de la CEE en entité autonome vis-à-vis du reste du 
monde. La Communauté adhérerait en tant que telle aux diverses institutions 
internationales, dont l’action se meut sur le plan monétaire et financier. Les 
relations entre les Etats membres de la Communauté seraient soustraites 
au jeu des mécanismes internationaux. Elles constitueraient désormais des 
rapports inter-régionaux semblables à ceux qui existent à l’intérieur d’un 
même pays.
Plan Schiller
1ère phase, 1970-1975, 1ère étape
4. Dans le domaine de la politique monétaire, on pourrait prévoir:
4.1. Application du mécanisme de soutien à court terme par les banques 
nationales pour des difficultés temporaires des balances de paiements. Une 
procédure de consultations devrait être appliquée en cas d’utilisation des 
crédits.
4.2.  Décision quant au mécanisme de soutien à moyen terme, en cas de 
déséquilibre de balance des paiements en vue de la création ultérieure d’un 
fonds européen de réserve. L’octroi de crédits devrait être lié aux engagements 
en matière de politique économique. Avec de tels engagements, ce mécanisme 
de soutien à moyen terme pourrait contribuer à l’harmonisation effective des 
objectifs à moyen terme.
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4.3. Renforcement de l’harmonisation et des consultations dans les domaines 
de la politique monétaire et du crédit qui sont d’un intérêt commun pour les 
pays de la Communauté. A cet égard, on devrait arriver à une collaboration 
aussi étroite que possible entre les Gouverneurs des banques centrales et le 
Conseil. En particulier on devrait chercher à atteindre:
– des mesures concertées des Etats membres dans les organismes 
monétaires internationaux sur la base de la déclaration du Conseil du 8 mai 
1964.142
– utilisation de crédits internationaux à moyen terme en cas de difficultés 
de la balance de paiements, uniquement après des préconsultations à 
l’intérieur de la Communauté.
–  renforcement des consultations en matière de politiques nationales 
des taux d’intérêt et du crédit au sein du Comité monétaire et du Comité des 
Gouverneurs des Banques centrales.
2ème étape
2.  Dans le domaine de la politique monétaire, on devrait prévoir :
2.1. intensification de l’harmonisation réciproque au sein du Comité 
des Gouverneurs des Banques centrales et du Comité monétaire en vue 
d’harmoniser les politiques nationales des taux d’intérêt et de crédits.
2.2. mise en vigueur du système de soutien à moyen terme en cas de 
déséquilibre des balances de paiements.
2ème phase, 1976-1980, 3ème étape
2. Dans le domaine de la politique monétaire, on pourrait établir ce qui 
suit :
2.1. Passage progressif à une sorte de ‘Federal-Reserve-System’.
2.2. Diminution des marges de fluctuation entre les monnaies des pays de la 
Communauté en vue de leur suppression.
2.3. Les parités monétaires ne peuvent être modifiées qu’avec l’accord 
(éventuellement qualifiée) des partenaires de la Communauté.
2.4. Développement du mécanisme de soutien à moyen terme en cas 
de difficultés des balances de paiements vers un fond de réserve pour la 
Communauté. Progressivement, une partie des réserves monétaires devrait 
être transférée à ce Fonds de réserve.
4ème étape
Dans cette étape, l’union économique et monétaire pourrait être achevée en 
liaison avec un développement correspondant des instances communautaires. 
A cet égard, le principe de subsidiarité devrait prévaloir.
1. transfert de toutes les compétences nécessaires dans le domaine de 
politique conjoncturelle, budgétaire et monétaire aux organes communautaires.
2. développement du Comité des Gouverneurs des Banques centrales vers 
un Conseil européen de Banque centrale, qui déciderait à la majorité
3. instauration des taux de change fixes et garantis entre les Etats 
partenaires de la Communauté.
4. instauration d’une unité monétaire européenne.
142 Council Decision of 8 May 1964 on co-operation between Member States in the field 




Plan de la CEE
1ère phase, 1970-1975, 1ère étape
a) Mise en place du mécanisme de concours financier à moyen terme, 
comportant une utilisation des DTS.
b) Concertation au sein du Comité des Gouverneurs des Banques centrales 
sur les politiques de crédit des Etats membres.
c) Application systématique des procédures permettant une prise de 
position commune des Etats membres au sein des organismes monétaires 
internationaux.
d) Au cas de modifications éventuelles du système des changes sur le plan 
international, établissement de règles uniformes pour la communauté en tant 
que groupe et maintien des marges actuelles de fluctuation des monnaies des 
pays membres.
2ème étape
a) Au début de 1972, limitation à 1% des écarts de cours au comptant 
entre les monnaies ‘des pays membres et mise en œuvre d’une politique 
d’intervention concertée des Banques centrales sur le marché des changes.
b) Elaboration par le Comité des Gouverneurs des Banques centrales des 
lignes directrices de la politique du crédit en conformité avec les orientations 
de la politique économique générale au niveau de la Communauté.
c) A partir de la nouvelle allocation des Droits de tirages spéciaux (1973), 
mise en place d’une gestion commune des DTS alloués aux Etats membres.
 Les changements de parité ne pourraient être exclus, mais devraient être 
considérés comme un moyen ultime décidé en commun.
2ème phase, 1976-1980, 3ème étape
Création d’un Conseil des Gouverneurs des Banques Centrales en vue de la 
mise en place d’un système communautaire des Banques Centrales.
 Mise en place d’un Fonds Européen de Réserve, alimenté par une fraction 
croissante des réserves des pays membres, et soumis à l’autorité du Conseil 
des Gouverneurs.
 Elimination en deux étapes des marges de fluctuation des monnaies des 










Mise en œuvre du 
mémorandum de la 
Commission du 12 février 
1969.
Recommandations puis 
directives par le Conseil 
sur les grandes masses de 
budget et sur les méthodes de 
financement.
Budget supranational pour 
activités mises en commun, 





du Marché de capitaux; 
harmonisation fiscale 
nécessaire dans ce but. 
Coopération plus étroite entre 
les autorités de tutelle du 
marché de capitaux.
Rapprochement, puis 
unification des réglementations 
régissant le statut des 
intermédiaires financiers, le 
fonctionnement des marchés 





dispositions fiscales relatives 
aux sociétés de capitaux et 
aux valeurs mobilières.




Attitude commune et action 
concertée dans le domaine 
monétaire international. 
Application des mécanismes 
de coopération monétaire. 
Affectation partiellement 
communautaire, puis gestion 
ou mise en commun des DTS. 
Réduction des marges de 
fluctuation entre les six Etats 
membres. Concertation dans 
le domaine de la politique du 
crédit. Définition d’une unité 
de compte pour utilisation 
progressive, notamment 
en matière de marché des 
capitaux. Titre de voyage 
libellé en unité de compte. 
Modification des parités 
soumises à l’approbation des 
autorités communautaires.
Consultations préalables, puis 
approbation préalable au sein 
du Comité des Gouverneurs en 
ce qui concerne la politique de 
la monnaie, du crédit et des 
changes.
Réduction progressive pour 
arriver à l’annulation des 
marges de fluctuation entre 
les monnaies des pays neutres. 
Décision de commun accord en 
matière de taux de change.
Adoption d’une attitude 
commune dans les 
organisations internationales. 





Plan Schiller Plan de la CEE
Mémorandum du 12 février 1969
Rapport économique annuel de la 
Commission sur la politique économique 
à suivre. Amélioration des instruments et 
des statistiques. Puis, recommandations sur 
l’orientation globale des budgets nationaux. 
Activation de l’article 103, consultations sur 
les budgets pluriannuels.
Mémorandum du 12 février 1969
Coordination, puis définition en 
commun des lignes directrices de 
la poli-tique économique globale 
à court et à moyen terme, avec 
une application par-ticulière dans 
le domaine budgétaire en ce qui 
concerne les grandes masses et 
les modalités de financement. 
Examen annuel de l’évolution 
de la Communauté Instruments 
homologués dans le domaine 
budgétaire. Concertation avec les 
partenaires sociaux.
Libéralisation progressive du marché de 
capitaux, en commençant par les effets 
négociables.
Ouverture progressive du marché 
des capitaux. Harmonisation 
fiscale nécessaire dans ce but. 
Création d’un groupe ad hoc pour 
assurer une consultation sur les 
mouvements de capitaux.
Harmonisation implicitement visée dans 
le cadre de la concertation de la politique 
budgétaire.
Généralisation de la TVA, puis 
rapprochement des taux. 
Harmonisation de l’impôt sur 
les sociétés pour l’assiette et 
la structure. Harmonisation 
progressive des accises.
Application des mécanismes de coopération 
monétaire.
Renforcement des consultations en matière 
de politique de crédit et des taux d’intérêt.
Action concertée au sein des organismes 
monétaires internationaux, utilisation 
de crédits internationaux soumise à 
préconsultation.
Application de mécanismes de 
coopération monétaire avec une 
utilisation des DTS.
Consultation puis définition des 
lignes directrices en matière 
de politique du crédit au sein 
du Comité des Gouverneurs. 
Application systématique de 
procédures permettant une 
prise de position commune au 
sein des organismes monétaires 
internationaux.
Maintien dans l’immédiat, puis 
première réduction de marge de 
fluctuation entre les monnaies 
des Etats membres. Mise en place 
d’une gestion commune des D.T.S. 
alloués (1973).











Mise en place d’organes 
communautaires dotés 
des pouvoirs requis pour la 









Centralisation définitive de 
la politique monétaire.
Création du Fonds de 
coopération monétaire 
européen dont les 
compétences seraient 
progressivement élargies 
pour arriver à un Fonds 
européen de réserves.
Suppression définitive des 
modifications du rapport de 
parité entre les monnaies des 
pays membres.
Gestion commune de 
l’ensemble des réserves de 
chances.
Mise en place d’un système 
monétaire communautaire 
analogue au système fédéral 
de réserve.
Constitution de la CEE en 
entité autonome monétaire 
vis-à-vis du reste du monde.
Substitution d’une monnaie 
européenne de compte et 






Plan Schiller Plan de la CEE
Rapprochement plus poussé des 
objectifs de politique économique.
Décision à la majorité dans 
les domaines de la politique 
économique, budgétaire et 
monétaire, puis transfert de toutes 
les compétences nécessaires 
dans ces domaines aux organes 
communautaires.
Attribution aux instances 
communautaires de pouvoirs 
nécessaires pour le bon 
fonctionement de l’union économique 
et monétaire.
Réalisation de la libre circulation de 
capitaux au sein de la Communauté
Abolition des frontières fiscales
Passage progressif à une sorte de 
Federal Reserve System. Elimination 
progressive des marges de 
fluctuation.
Modification des parités d’abord 
soumises à l’accord des pays 
partenaires, puis instauration des 
taux de change fixes.
Développement du mécanisme 
à moyen terme vers un fonds 
de réserve auquel serait 
progressivement transféré les 
réserves monétaires nationales.
Développement du Comité des 
Gouverneurs vers un Conseil 
européen de Banque Centrale.
Création d’un Conseil des 
Gouverneurs des Banques Centrales.
Mise en place d’un fonds de réserve 
alimenté par une fraction croissante 
des réserves nationales.
Elimination des marges de fluctuation 
restantes entre les monnaies des pays 
membres et fixation irrévocable des 
parités.
Instauration d’une unité monétaire 
européenne.
Les conditions seront remplies pour 




Pierre Werner, principal architect of the plan that bore his name, was one of 
Luxembourg’s prominent politicians of the postwar era. He is pictured here on 
the left, together with Rolf Dahlgrün and Johan Witteveen at a meeting of the 
European Finance Ministers on 25 January 1965.
Born to Luxembourgish parents on 29 December 1913 in Saint-André, France, 
he completed studies in Law and Political Science in Paris (1934–1937) and 
was awarded a PhD in Law in Luxembourg in 1938. He started his professional 
career as a lawyer in Luxembourg in 1938 before joining the Banque Générale 
du Luxembourg in 1939. That year he married Henriette Pescatore († 1984), 
with whom he had five children: three sons and two daughters. In 1945, he 
entered the Ministry of Finance and was appointed as Banking Supervisory 
Commissioner and Government Adviser, posts he held until 1949. Werner’s 
tasks also included international financial cooperation within the framework 
of the Benelux, the IMF, and the World Bank. In 1953, he became Minister for 
Finance and the Armed Forces in the government of Joseph Bech. After the 
elections in 1959, Werner was appointed Prime Minister and Finance Minister, a 
post he held until 1974. 
Werner served four times as Prime Minister, withdrawing from politics in 1984 
to be awarded the title of Honorary Prime Minister. He died in Luxembourg on 
24 June 2002.
© Family Archives Pierre Werner
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 Introduction to document 27
Immediately after the inaugural meeting held on 20 March 1970 in Luxembourg, 
the members of the ad hoc group were invited to draft a note, each according 
to his particular area of expertise and in his capacity as chairman of one of 
the EEC committees, describing the measures envisaged to achieve economic 
and monetary union. The group agreed that when drafting these contributions, 
to be discussed at the second committee meeting scheduled for 7 April 1970 
in Brussels, the chairmen would not be obliged to consult their respective 
committees. 
 On 3 April 1970, Gerard Brouwers, Chairman of the EEC’s Short-term 
Economic Policy Committee, drafted a confidential document entitled ‘La 
méthode de réalisation d’une union économique et monétaire, vue dans 
l’optique de la politique conjoncturelle’, which he submitted to the other 
members of the Werner Committee. This document, presented here as 
document 27, indicated the main priorities with regard to the establishment of 
a homogeneous common market for which short-term economic policy would 
serve as an instrument for optimum, balanced growth.143 
 As progress continued to be achieved in policy harmonisation (budgetary 
policy, fiscal policy and structural policy), the possibility that Community 
policy might be exercised by a central authority would have to be examined. At 
this stage national responsibilities in the area of short-term economic policy 
would need to be transferred to the Community. This would have considerable 
repercussions at the institutional level, as well as for monetary and income 
policy.
 If a Community of growth and stability were to be established, it was 
vital for the Community’s objectives to be clearly defined. A prior consultation 
procedure was to be organised to this end. This would also contain a ‘system 
of indicators’ that would be able to identify points of divergence, delays 
and exceptions and would be accompanied by appropriate instruments for 
analysis, notably in the areas of statistics and forecasting. The countries would 
be able to agree on the creation of political instruments for direct action by 
means of specific legislation on stability144 (aiming for price level stability, a 
high level of employment, a reasonable external economic balance and steady 
economic growth) or practices directly linked to the economic climate as 
part of a comprehensive structural policy.145 All short-term economic policy 
instruments had to be harmonised, including budgetary and monetary 
policy instruments. With regard to budgetary policy, the main matter at 
hand was the short-term economic impact of the volume of deficits and their 
financing. Freeing up the circulation of capital could only really progress once 
143 The common aims in the area of growth and development were specifically mentioned 
in the Proposals from the Commission to the Council concerning the third programme for 
medium-term economic policy, Commission of the European Communities, COM 189/70. 
144 Inspired by the German ‘Stabilitätgesetz’ (‘Gesetz zur Förderung der Stabilität und 
des Wachstums der Wirtschaft’ – Law to Promote Stability and Growth of the Economy) 
of 8 June 1967.
145 Based on the budgetary philosophy in the Netherlands, whereby action in the fields 
of both expenditure and taxation would serve either to moderate or to incentivise, 




harmonisation had reached a sufficiently advanced stage.
 Once the process of harmonisation had been concluded, the economic 
union could be completed by a monetary union, involving a further transfer to 
Community level of responsibilities in the area of short-term economic policy. 
Should the monetary aspect be implemented more quickly, ‘or even imposed 
as a matter of course’, the transfer of some monetary responsibilities to the 
Community could occur more rapidly. Measures to be considered in this field 
were a narrowing of the current exchange margins, the adoption of fixed 
exchange rates and/or the creation of a Community reserve fund. Given the 
fact that the narrowing of exchange margins would not improve the possibility 
of harmonising short-term economic policies, the early adoption of completely 
fixed exchange rates would be reasonable.146 
 Regarding the early creation of a Community reserve fund, Brouwers 
believed that this measure ‘would reduce the room for manoeuvre of an 
effective national policy. The main question that we need to address is whether, 
and in what conditions, the Community can make up for this loss of freedom to 
act.’
 In conclusion Brouwers adopted a nuanced economist position, 
emphasising that monetary integration without effective economic 
harmonisation beforehand was inconceivable. Monetary integration could 
only make progress if it were able to contribute to the successful realisation of 
economic union, and must take into account relations between the Community, 
third countries and the IMF in the monetary field.
 Brouwers maintained this approach for the duration of the ad hoc group’s 
work, insisting on the need for a prior coordination of economic policies, but he 
eventually agreed to the consensus on an approach that incorporated both the 
coordination of economic policies and monetary integration, a fundamental 
principle of the Werner Plan.
27.
Note by the President of the Short-Term Economic Policy Committee of the EEC 
(Gerard Brouwers) to the Werner Group on the method for the realization of an 
economic and monetary union, 3 April 1970. 
© Family Archives Pierre Werner.
1. L’instauration d’une union économique et monétaire est étudiée ci-
après essentiellement du point de vue de la politique conjoncturelle, ce qui ne 
permet évidemment pas de faire justice à tous les aspects du problème, mais il 
paraît utile d’établir de la sorte une certaine classification.
2. La Communauté a pour objectif la constitution d’un marché homogène 
qui offrirait les conditions nécessaires à une croissance optimum équilibrée. 
Le rôle spécifique de la politique conjoncturelle consiste à veiller à l’équilibre 
interne et externe de ce Marché commune.
 Au stade actuel, qui est celui de l’achèvement de l’union douanière et de la 
naissance de l’union économique, cette politique consiste à réaliser l’équilibre 
146 Brouwers also warned against the adoption of fixed exchange rates, given that, 
in the event of fundamental imbalances of payments, the forced acceleration of the 
integration process may result in a movement of disintegration.
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interne et externe des Etats membres. La somme des équilibres des pays 
partenaires signifie aussi l’équilibre de la Communauté dans son ensemble.
 Vu l’état de dépendance croissante où se trouvent les économies 
nationales par suite des progrès de l’intégration dans la Communauté, il y a 
lieu de coordonner étroitement l’application des politiques conjoncturelles 
centrées sur l’équilibre nationale. Les décisions de juillet 1969 et de janvier 
1970147 concernant la fixation au niveau communautaire des objectifs à moyen 
terme, ont déjà contribué dans un domaine important à orienter le schéma 
fondamental vers la coordination. Quelle que soit toutefois son importance, 
celle-ci ne représente qu’un premier pas. En effets l’instauration d’une 
politique conjoncturelle optimum dans la Communauté ne demande pas 
seulement une coordination et un réajustement constants des instruments 
nationaux de la politique conjoncturelle mais exige aussi que les instruments 
employés soient aussi homogènes et efficaces que possible. C’est la seule 
manière d’assurer que la politique conjoncturelle de la Communauté soit mise 
en œuvre au rythme requis et avec toute l’efficacité souhaitable. Ce but peut 
être atteint grâce à l’harmonisation de la politique économique ou, autrement 
dit, par l’instauration de l’union économique, étape qui ferait suite à celle de 
l’union douanière. L’harmonisation des politiques économique ne favorise 
pas seulement d’une manière générale l’intégration et, partant, la création du 
Marché commun homogène, mais en conduisant à l’uniformité des instruments 
de politique conjoncturelle, elle permet l’application d’un politique de 
conjoncture harmonisée qui, par l’ajustement précis des équilibres nationaux, 
assure aussi efficacement que possible l’équilibre de la Communauté dans son 
ensemble.
 Il n’y a pas lieu de faire une distinction rigoureuse entre la phase de la 
coordination et celle de l’harmonisation puisque celles-ci peuvent largement 
coïncider. L’élaboration d’une politique harmonisée (politique budgétaire, 
politique fiscale et politique de structure, par exemple) demandera 
vraisemblablement beaucoup de temps. Si cette harmonisation doit être 
entreprise sans retard, elle ne pourra toutefois être réalisée que graduellement, 
si bien que, du point de vue des étapes, elle fera suite à la coordination des 
politiques.
3. A mesure que progressera l’harmonisations, on pourra examiner l’utilité 
et la possibilité de l’exercice de la politique communautaire par une autorité 
centrale. C’est à ce stade que se situe le transfert des compétences nationales 
en matière de politique conjoncturelle à la Communauté. Ce transfert de 
compétences aura toutefois des répercussions appréciables sur le plan 
institutionnel. Cela ne signifie pas nécessairement que tout doit être centralisé 
et appliqué uniformément, mais ce devra être le cas pour les éléments 
essentiels de là politique budgétaire etc.
 Un tel transfert de compétences ne doit à aucun prix avoir pour effet 
d’affaiblir l’efficacité de la politique suivie par les partenaires associés dans le 
Marché commune. Cette efficacité doit au contraire en être renforcée ou tout au 
moins être préservée dans sa totalité.
4. D’importantes étapes peuvent encore être franchise sur la voie de la 
coordination et de l’harmonisation. Les moyens de le faire consistent, d’abord, 
à définir de façon plus précise les objectifs communautaires, et ensuite, à 
147 Council of the EEC on 22/23 July 1969 and on 19/20 January 1970.
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ménager une place plus importante au système des clignotants y rattachant la 
procédure de consultation préalable. En troisième lieu, il convient de conférer 
une plus grande signification à la procédure de consultation préalable et à la 
responsabilité réciproque. Enfin, il importe de poursuivre l’affinement des 
instruments d’analyse par les mesures appropriées en matière de statistiques 
et de prévisions.
 Les pays pourraient peut être s’entendre sur la création d’instruments 
politiques permettant une action plus directe. Plusieurs pays se sont dotés 
dans ce but d’une législation spéciale, dont le ‘Stabilitätsgesetz’ en Allemagne 
occidentale constitue un exemple.
Il s’agit essentiellement de pouvoir exercer, aussi bien dans le domaine des 
dépenses que dans celui de la fiscalité, une action qui, selon l’évolution de la 
conjoncture, serait tantôt modératrice tantôt incitative, et qui s’inscrirait dans 
une politique structurelle globale (à l’instar de la philosophie budgétaire des 
Pays-Bas).
 Ainsi que nous l’avons dit, il faudra recourir de plus en plus à 
l’application uniforme des instruments en vue de la réalisation des objectifs 
communautaires. Cette uniformisation doit en principe porter sur l’ensemble 
des instruments de la politique conjoncturelle, et donc aussi sur ceux des 
politiques budgétaires, monétaires et des revenus. Dans le cas de la politique 
budgétaire, il s’agit avant tout des incidences conjoncturelles du volume 
des déficits et de leur financement. Le problème de la structure fiscale et du 
volume des ressources budgétaires ne peut être entièrement résolu qu’au 
terme de la phase d’harmonisation. La libération de la circulation des capitaux 
ne pourra véritablement progresser qu’au moment où l’harmonisation sera 
suffisamment avancée.
5.  Une fois l’harmonisation terminée, l’union économique pourrait être 
complétée par une union monétaire. Cela implique un nouveau transfert des 
compétences relatives aux éléments essentiels de la politique conjoncturelle à 
la Communauté.
 Les avis diffèrent lorsqu’il s’agit d’établir si la meilleure manière 
d’achever l’union économique consiste à suivre le schéma esquissé ci-dessus, 
ou si ce but est atteint plus rapidement ou encore imposé d’office lorsqu’il y a 
eu déjà transfert préalable à la Communauté de certaines compétences d’ordre 
monétaire. Quelles sont les mesures concrètes dont il s’agit? On peut imaginer 
une rétrécissement des marges de change actuelles, l’adoption de taux de 
change fixes et/ou la création d’un fonds de réserves communautaire.
 S’agissant des taux de change, il convient de noter qu’en soi, le 
rétrécissement de la marge des taux de change réduit aussi les possibilités 
d’appliquer une politique conjoncturelle propre. Tant qu’il subsistera des 
différences de structure essentielles et que les conjonctures nationales 
ne suivront pas une évolution parfaitement synchrone, le maintien d’une 
marge de change reste indispensable et sa limitation ne favoriserait en rien 
la mise en place d’une politique de conjoncture communautaire. Au niveau 
de la Communauté en effet, le rétrécissement des marges de change ne crée 
pas, en compensation, de meilleures possibilités d’harmoniser les politiques 
conjoncturelles.
 Cela vaut à plus forte raison pour l’adoption précoce de cours de change 
entièrement fixes. Tant qu’il peut encore se produire des déséquilibres 
fondamentaux de balance des paiements, cette accélération forcée du processus 
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d’intégration risque de provoquer des mouvements de désintégration. Dans 
l’hypothèse d’un rétrécissement concerté des marges de change, il importerait 
aussi d’étudier plus en détail les problèmes posés par les relations avec les 
pays tiers et, en particulier, avec les Etats-Unis.
 En ce qui concerne la création précoce d’un fonds de réserves 
communautaire, – plus ou moins important – il convient de souligner que cette 
mesure réduirait également le volant de manœuvre d’une politique nationale 
efficace. Le problème décisif qui se pose alors est de savoir si, et dans quelles 
conditions, la Communauté peut compenser cette perte de liberté d’action. 
Un système de crédit à moyen terme implique l’extension des possibilités de 
financement ce qui, à défaut d’une harmonisation suffisante, n’irait pas sans 
périls. 
 L’accord s’est déjà fait sur le système de crédit communautaire à court 
terme. L’instauration d’un système restreint à moyen terme doit dépendre des 
progrès de la coordination et de l’harmonisation. Les rapports qui s’établiront 
entre un tel système de crédit à l’intérieur de la CEE et le monde extérieur, (FMI, 
opérations-swap) constituera un facteur décisif. De ces rapports dépendra 
la contribution qu’un tel mécanisme communautaire pourrait apporter à la 
coordination et à l’harmonisation des politiques.
6. Il suit nécessairement de ces réflexions que la mise en œuvre d’une 
politique économique harmonisée constitue le moyen approprié pour aboutir 
à l’achèvement de la Communauté. Lorsque des progrès suffisants auront été 
accomplis dans cette voie, il deviendra possible d’envisager l’union monétaire, 
sans perdre de vue ses implications institutionnelles. Si l’auteur de la présente 
étude écarte la solution d’une intégration monétaire précoce, il n’implique pas 
pour autant que l’harmonisation économique doit être parfaitement au point 
avant que l’on puisse progresser sur la voie de l’union monétaire. On peut 
toutefois exiger que, si l’on envisageait d’accélérer l’intégration monétaire, l’on 
précise de quelle manière et dans quelle mesure celle-ci peut contribuer à une 
réalisation plus harmonieuse de l’union économique, non sans tenir compte des 
relations entre la Communauté, l’étranger et le FMI dans le domaine monétaire.
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On 23 March 1948 the Luxembourg daily newspaper Tageblatt published a 
cartoon by Simon illustrating the entry into force of the Benelux Customs 
Union and a shared spirit between the countries.
The discussions on monetary integration show however that in the framework 





 Introduction to document 28
At a preliminary consultation in Luxembourg on 11 March 1970 the Werner 
Committee decided that its meetings would be held ‘at a frequency that 
would allow an initial report to be submitted to the Council before the end of 
May and the conclusion of its discussions, if possible, before the end of July’. 
Werner set out what he believed to be the priorities for the work, namely 
to provide practical ideas and methods to achieve the short-, medium- and 
long-term objectives. He raised various topics for reflection including the 
United Kingdom’s accession to the EC, the creation of a European Reserve 
Fund, and the adoption of coordinated or common positions by the Six within 
international financial organisations.148
 At the inaugural meeting, held on 20 March 1970 in Luxembourg the 
Commission representative Ugo Mosca was asked to draft a note ‘to describe 
the final stage of the process of economic and monetary integration, with a 
reference to the role that should be played, at that stage, by common reserves 
and potentially a Community central bank’.149 In a bid for efficiency and in 
order to progress at the required rate, the Werner Committee set the principle 
of consistently adopting decisions reflecting the consensus on the issues 
discussed. This meeting revealed a twofold conclusion: first, that there was 
unanimity on some priority issues such as the pooling of the Six’s reserves and 
the establishment of a Community central bank; and second, that there was 
disagreement on the methods to be adopted and the order in which they should 
be implemented. The latter debates between ‘economists’ and ‘monetarists’, 
which became increasingly bitter, were a constant backdrop to the discussions 
of the ad hoc group and hindered reaching any joint decisions. It was with this 
bleak outlook that the third meeting was scheduled to take place on 7 April 
1970 in Brussels.
 To prepare the ground and soothe various fundamental differences 
of opinion, Werner suggested that discussions be held to reach a common 
Benelux stance. This Benelux meeting was only partially successful.150 
Witteveen, the Dutch Minister, was concerned about the proposal of decisions 
by majority vote in a monetary organisation, which would affect the Member 
States’ credit policy. But the Belgians supported the creation of an exchange 
equalisation fund in response to the growing practice of floating rates. Zijlstra, 
Governor of the Bank, recognised that a fund of this kind would entail making 
the currencies of the Six more independent from the dollar.151 
 The Finance Ministers and the Governors of the Central Banks of the 
three countries met in Brussels on 2 April 1970. Document 28 contains the 
report on the meeting, as presented in The Hague by the Chief Treasurer of 
the Netherlands Ministry of Finance, Willem Drees jr. Discussions focused on 
defining the ultimate aim of economic and monetary union and how this should 
be achieved, particularly in terms of monetary and credit policy, budgetary 
148 Family Archives Pierre Werner 
149 European Communities, Secretariat of the ‘plan by stages’ Group, Projet de compte-
rendu de la première réunion du groupe ad-hoc Plan par étapes. 20 mars 1970, Brussels, 
31 March 1970, ORII/22/70-F. Family Archives Pierre Werner.
150 See document 28
151 Pierre Werner, Itinéraires luxembourgeois et européens. Évolutions et souvenirs: 1945–
1985, Volume 2 (Luxembourg: Éditions Saint-Paul, 1992), 124.
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and fiscal policy, the integration of capital markets and in the institutional 
field. Despite the efforts invested, the aim of the discussions, i.e. to develop 
a joint approach, was only partly achieved. Belgium and Luxembourg tended 
to share the monetarist views of France, whereas the Netherlands clearly 
sided with the economist approach advocated by Germany. It therefore proved 
impossible to reach agreement. However, the meeting enabled Belgium to 
confirm its stance in favour of the creation of an exchange equalisation fund 
to compensate for the floating rates that were increasingly being applied. The 
discussions between the Benelux countries also focused on the broad lines 
of a study requested by the Werner Committee on the implications of British 
accession for the coordination of economic policies, the capital market and the 
field of taxation.152 Subjects covered included the strengthening of monetary 
solidarity, the consequences of the United Kingdom’s possible participation in 
the mechanisms of monetary cooperation and the impact of the pound sterling 
on the European Reserve Fund.
 The agenda for the next three meetings of the Werner Committee, 
scheduled for 30 April 1970 in Rome and 14 and 20 May 1970 in Luxembourg, 
focused on this question and the clashes between ‘economists’ and ‘monetarists’ 
continued. The efforts of the committee focused on achieving a consensus on a 
joint position laid down in the interim report that the group of experts would 
submit on 22 May 1970 to the Finance Ministers and to the Presidents of the 
Council and the Commission.
28.
Report of the Treasurer of the Netherlands Ministry of Finance (Willem Drees jr.) 
on the conversations with Belgium and Luxembourg on monetary union in the 
EEC, 7 April 1970.
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Cabinet of the 
Prime-Minister (2.03.01), inv.no. 8864. Translation: Huygens ING, The Hague.
– – –
Baron Snoy et d’Oppuers welcomed his guests. He recalled that the discussion 
in the EEC was now concentrated in the ad hoc committee chaired by Minister 
Werner. The members of this Committee were (apart from Mr. Mosca), 
chairmen of one of the committees and would from the viewpoint of their 
committees submit a memorandum for the second meeting on 7 April. Mr. 
Mosca was to write on institutional aspects in particular in the final stage. The 
document from Mr. Brouwers153 as chairman of the Short-term Economic Policy 
Committee had only just been received. It had however not yet been translated 
into French. He suggested discussion on the basis of the memorandum of 
Baron H. Ansiaux dated 26 March.
 
152 Note on La réalisation de l’Union économique et monétaire dans la perspective de 
l’élargissement de la Communauté, drafted by the EC Commission interdepartmental 
working party and submitted to the ad hoc committee on 28 April 1970. Family Archives 
Pierre Werner. 
153 See document 27.
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 Baron Ansiaux elaborated on his memorandum. In the annexes three 
columns, monnaie, budget et fiscalité, and politique économique, summed up 
the measures to be taken. The first column was the essential one from his point 
of view, the other two had a more accompanying character. One needed to start 
with coordination and this then needed to gradually become more compelling 
in nature, progressing from consultation via recommendations and directives 
to decisions.
 He realized that credit policy had consequences in other areas as well as 
domestic policy has consequences for foreign policy.
 He wondered if the Commission Werner was to develop a concrete plan 
in stages with dates etc., or limit itself to a ‘serie d’actions qui doivent mener à 
l’union complète.’
 He casually raised the liberalization of the banking sector. This is an 
example of the need for community management of the consequences. It is 
also necessary to obtain more uniformity in the instruments at the disposal of 
each country.
 On the relations between the Member States baron Ansiaux noted that 
small deviations from parity cannot be entirely avoided. Nonetheless, it is 
necessary to proceed to community control over parity changes and finally to 
irrevocable fixing.
 On the relation to third countries, he advocated the establishment of a 
common attitude. This was thus far non-existent. Recently the Netherlands 
representative in the Executive Board of the IMF had called for a broadening 
of the band width (of exchange rates), just as the German and, even more 
forcefully, the Italian, contrary to the French and Belgians. He realized that for 
Germany political factors with respect to the dollar also played a role. That may 
later also apply to the EEC Council. An increase of the permissible band width 
to 2% on either side of parity means that a currency may vary over an interval 
of 4%, so that the maximum difference relative to another EEC currency may 
even be 8%. The underdeveloped countries support the United States. It is not 
unlikely that this plan will be accepted in September.
 Baron Snoy et d’Oppeurs noted that England has strong interest. Minister 
Jenkins has had a talk with his French colleague. We must fully recognize the 
political aspects. ‘l’Intégration monétair mene vers l’intégration politique’
 Minister Witteveen joins the argument of Mr. Ansiaux on the progress of 
coordination through harmonization to supranational decisions. It is essential 
to determine what must be achieved in one area to be able to proceed in 
another area. 
 His Belgian colleague Snoy had rightly said that monetary integration 
also means political integration. Absolute convertibility of the currencies of 
the EEC countries and absolute fixation of exchange rates in effect mean a 
transition to one currency, and therefore one monetary authority, that should 
be responsible towards a single parliament. Then foreign monetary policy will 
be unified as well. This is a political matter. Thus unification of positions on 
monetary issues with regard to third countries implies the development of a 
common political policy, e.g. also a common foreign policy generally. 
 As an example of a real problem and of the need for common decision-
making the speaker chooses the budgetary policy of the Ansiaux-scheme. 
Essential here is in the first place the volume of money creation on behalf of 
the government. From the need for a common policy on credit results that 
the creation of money for the government also has to fall under Community 
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control. This is inconceivable without control over the main areas of 
budgetary policy. Furthermore not only the finances for the banking sector 
are of common interest but also the public finances on the capital market. 
Otherwise, the member states, in creating a monetary union, will see that their 
own capital market can be severely drained by a generous deficit-policy of 
other member states. Therefore norms have to be applied to the budgets of 
countries, including budgets of local authorities such as the municipalities in 
the Netherlands (and this includes not only the budgeted expenditures that 
are of interest, but also guarantees of public authorities, besides this does not 
primarily refer to on the budget, but also to realization).
 The Werner Committee should examine for which sectors it is essential 
to agree to norms and arrive at a common behaviour, yet it is not necessary 
to regulate parts of the budget, for example the amount that is to be spent on 
education. Control of credit implies managing the financing of the budget. As 
regards the procedure the Minister points to the proposal by Mr. Ansiaux that 
the Comité des Gouverneurs (des banques centrales) shall take decisions. That 
seems wrong. These are important decisions regarding the economic policies 
of countries that cannot be entirely controlled by the Committee of Governors 
– governments will have to play a role in this.
Minister Werner said that the committee, which he chairs, has asked the 
chairmen of the standing committees of the EEC who take a seat in this, for 
an discussion on the issues from their perspective. Such a document was 
distributed by Mr. Ansiaux. Interesting will be what Mr. Mosca will write on the 
necessary facilities for the final phase.
 The task of his committee is to formulate a plan in stages. Does this goal 
of a monetary union mean that a single EEC currency will be generated, or is 
it possible to create a union with five or six different currencies? Perhaps the 
later is also a possible interpretation, yet this will then possibly have different 
political implications. Is the U.S. Federal Reserve System with the Federal 
Reserve Board a good model for a European cooperation of central banks? It 
seems possible that there remains a margin for national economic policy.
 One has to agree on some things in order to make progress, for example 
on the chronological order of various measures, the relationship between the 
goal of economic union and the ‘mise en place des méchanismes monétaires’. 
The German Minister Schiller made a perfectionist impression, he wanted 
the economic union even before the monetary mechanisms that serve this 
union would come into effect. Secretary of state Schöllhorn made a more 
flexible impression. That was important. ‘La mise en place des méchanismes 
monétaires peut stimuler la convergence des politiques économiques’. 
 Remarkably one always ran into similar kinds of problems. He agrees 
with his Dutch colleague Witteveen and with Mr. Ansiaux on progressing from 
recommendations via directives to decisions. He also recognizes the political 
implications. The monetary domain is controlled by the political attitude. What 
kind of institutions (European government, parliament) must be developed to 
take over the current national competences? We now have an EEC structure 
that is too weak. In any case a qualified majority has to be installed soon and 
the so-called Luxembourg Agreement (actually the maintenance of the option 
to veto) has to expire. What else needs to happen? Perhaps it is sufficient if the 





 Minister Witteveen interrupts: the parliaments do have an effect on 
budgetary policy, the size of the deficit and thus on monetary developments.
 Minister Werner proceeds by noting that in the first stage of the transition 
to a monetary union, the political decisions do not have to be of such a serious 
nature, not more than for example the Kennedy round.154 On budgetary 
policy men has to arrive at confrontation and coordination of the ‘methodes 
de création monetaire’, but ‘on ne peut pas unifier tout’. The EEC should not 
address the composition of expenditures of the Member States, yet should 
address the budget deficit and the financing of investments. (This issue came 
up more than once, also in explanations from the side of Belgium; from the 
Dutch side it was then answered that there is no monetary difference between 
government spending on consumption and investment.).155 One should not 
follow each other’s policies from too far though not from too close either.
 A formula has to be found for the creation of new bodies, for example to 
take away responsibility from the Comité des Gouverneurs. These institutional 
implications will appear automatically as we work on the stages of the plan.
 Mr. Ansiaux states ‘la politique de crédit est un instrument pour 
atteindre les objectifs – les buts à moyen terme, en particulier le budget 
des investissements’. The short term economic policy affects what actually 
happens in the short term in one country and in the other. This may vary. 
His conclusion is that one should agree on the medium-term policy first, yet 
that coordination should already take place. The transition to directives and 
decisions on budget policy should however only take place when there is 
agreement on medium-term objectives and on short term economic policy. 
 The independent position that the central banks of Belgium and 
the Netherlands have is a factor of strength that must be maintained. The 
governments should not be empowered to issue directives, ‘il faut le contact’ 
(between governments and central banks) but no veto power of governments.
 Then he raises the issue of the problem that is topical now, which is 
discussed in the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund, on a 
larger band width of the exchange rates.
 He acknowledges the position of Minister Witteveen that there should be 
a close link between monetary and budgetary policy.
 Baron Snoy et d’Oppuers welcomes the ‘Relance de la Haye’. Deeply 
etched into the Belgian memory is that the first attempt to come at a European 
Political Community (1952) ran aground when the French parliament in 
1954 rejected the plan for a European Defence Community. The ambitions of 
Schuman and Pleven had failed. Therefore, the Belgian strategy has since then 
been to arrive at a political federal union via a detour. The Treaty of Rome has 
to be seen in this light. He is pleased with Art. 235 of that treaty,156 which is so 
subtle that new instruments can be created by unanimity. The Customs Union 
150 In 1962, the American president John F. Kennedy launched new multilateral 
negotiations for the liberalization of world trade. The Kennedy Round, which started in 
Geneva on 4 may 1964, led to the signing of the final act on 30 June 1967. This agreement 
provided a reduction of tariffs on industrial products with 30 to 35%, and the increase of 
the minimum prices of cereals.
151 Personal opinion inserted by Willem Drees jr.
152 ‘If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on 




has been achieved. The monetary shocks of the past two years have increased 
understanding of, and interest in, monetary cooperation.
 It is the Belgium position to proceed in an empirical fashion. To begin 
with, the EEC Council must come to decide by majority vote, and will have to 
work closely with the Comité des Gouverneurs.
 He agrees with his colleague Witteveen that monetary and budgetary 
politics are closely linked. Both the size of the deficit and the way it is financed 
are of essential importance.
 The issue of band width raised by Mr. Ansiaux is a separate matter. It is 
however important and extensive. The United States want a larger margin as 
regards the official parity, e.g. two percent on either side. This means that a 
currency has 4% variation between minimum and maximum rate. Relative to 
another currency the possible (maximum) deviation from one point in time 
to another amounts even eight percent. Within the EEC that would be way 
too much. Therefore, we have to ‘organiser notre cohérence envers le monde 
extérieur’.
 If one would argue that economic policy should be coordinated 
first before further monetary steps can be taken, we will never arrive; 
there will always be imperfections on the economic side, accidents. 
He accepts parallelism but warns against agreeing on ‘preliminary’. 
 The French attach great value to the establishment of a credit mechanism 
in the medium term and on reaching a common position in international 
monetary negotiations. This should be used to persuade them to a sensible 
economic policy. The position of Minister Schiller is another extreme.
 Nous avons un jeu à jouer: obtenir qu’on avance en étapes avec dosages 
suffisante en volets économiques, budgetaires et monétaires pour faire progrès 
en dix années vers le but final. Consideration should be given to involving the 
British and other candidate countries.
 Minister Witteveen surmises that the attendees agree on the need for the 
EEC Council to reach majority decisions and on the need to coordinate budget 
(deficit) policy – namely the scope and financing of the deficit – with monetary 
policy. However, unlike the ideas of Mr. Ansiaux, there is no need to agree on 
the growth rate of spending or on the amount of expenditure for investments.
 Coordination is important in the medium term; one has to agree on the 
objectives. It is necessary to design a clear regulation with regard to the relation 
between the European Central Bank and the EEC political authority, otherwise 
there will be confusion and conflict much earlier. It has proven to be of great 
value in the Netherlands that the relationship between the Nederlandsche 
Bank and the central government is clearly settled in the Bank Act.
 His Belgian colleague believes that Minister Schiller wants to progress 
too slowly in the monetary field, and sets too many preliminary conditions in 
the economic area. Speaker however believes that the relationship between 
the two has to be understood correctly. Only when the instruments of economic 
policy are powerful and can be properly used one can pave the way to a closer 
monetary collaboration.
 The first practical question is when to start putting the medium-term credit 
mechanism in operation. This does not have to wait for perfect coordination but 
does require greater coordination than is presently the case. An entirely different 
case is that of the band width. This is beyond the task of the Werner Committee.
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 Introduction to document 29
The meeting of the three Benelux countries in Brussels to try and secure a 
common Benelux position was only partially successful.157 In the Werner 
Committee meetings held in April and May 1970, the economist viewpoint, 
supported by the Germans and the Dutch, took the lead. Pierre Werner, still 
seeking to maintain a balance between economic and monetary coordination, 
guided the debates towards the exchange stabilisation fund. The idea of this 
fund, based on proposals from Hubert Ansiaux, was to implement a policy to 
reduce fluctuations between the currencies of the Six.
 As the disagreements became more and more acrimonious and a 
consensus on a common position seemed a distant prospect, the Belgians 
– Belgium held the Presidency of the EC Council of Ministers in this first 
semester of 1970 – decided to support the mediation efforts orchestrated by 
Werner. In this context Snoy et d’Oppuers, the Belgian Finance Minister, wrote 
the letter presented as document 29 to his Dutch counterpart Witteveen on 15 
May 1970.
 In his letter, Snoy et d’Oppuers emphasised the relevance of an exchange 
stabilisation fund, to be established during the first stage of creation of 
an economic and monetary union. To demonstrate the virtues of the plan, 
he employed arguments to which the economist camp could not remain 
impervious. One of the main effects of the fund would be to stimulate greater 
convergence between economic policies while harmonising the policies of the 
central banks on the foreign exchange markets. Five of the seven members of 
the Werner Committee came around to this viewpoint. While Brouwers had 
reservations, the German member Schöllhorn was the only one to openly 
oppose it. Some fears that he expressed concerning the overly complicated 
arrangements for this mechanism or its consequences on the fluctuation 
margins of the currencies of the Six appeared to be technical difficulties that 
could be corrected. These minor obstacles were not deemed to be so important 
that they should hinder the establishment of this body that would confirm the 
monetary independence of the Community. 
 Emphasising the political importance of unanimity for the very future 
of European integration, the Belgian minister pressed his counterpart to offer 
the support of the Netherlands for the project. The Netherlands and Germany 
eventually withdrew their reservations.




Letter by the Belgian Minister of Finance (Jean-Charles Snoy et d’Oppuers) to the 
Netherlands Minister of Finance (Johan Witteveen), 15 May 1970.
© Family Archives Pierre Werner.
Ainsi que vous le savez, les travaux du Comité, présidé par M. Pierre Werner et 
qui a pour tâche de définir les mesures à prendre en vue d’arriver par étapes 
à une Union Economique et Monétaire complète, progressent d’une manière 
très satisfaisante. 
 Ce n’est cependant pas le cas sur un point qui revêt à mes yeux une 
importance politique, technique et psychologique particulière. 
 Il s’agit de l’établissement au cours de la première étape d’un ‘Fonds 
Européen d’Egalisation des Changes’ qui stimulerait une plus grande 
convergence des politiques économiques tout en harmonisant les politiques 
d’intervention des banques centrales sur les marchés des changes. 
 Les avantages découlant de l’instauration de ce Fonds sont nombreux et 
peuvent se résumer comme suit:
– Première mesure concrète affirmant l’indépendance monétaire de la CEE 
à l’égard du dollar des Etats-Unis;
– Mise en place d’un mécanisme permettant de suivre d’une manière 
permanente la cohésion des politiques économiques des pays membres;
– Surveillance étroite du fonctionnement des processus d’ajustement ;
– Création de ‘l’unité de compte’ monétaire préfiguration de la monnaie 
commune; 
– Concentration au sein du Fonds des créances des pays membres 
sur les Etats-Unis amenant ainsi la Communauté et non plus chaque pays 
individuellement à négocier avec les Etats-Unis le sort de ces créances ;
– Elimination du dollar U. S. dans les transactions de change entre pays 
communautaires ; 
– Mise en place d’un mécanisme qui favorisera une collaboration plus 
étroite entre Banques centrales et permettra ultérieurement de supprimer les 
marges de fluctuation existant entre les monnaies de la Communauté.
 Le membre allemand du Comité Werner, M. le Secrétaire d’Etat Schölhorn 
n’a pu se rallier à cette proposition présentée par le Baron Ansiaux, Gouverneur 
de la Banque Nationale de Belgique, et M. Clappier, Sous-Gouverneur de 
la Banque de France, respectivement membre belge et français du Comité 
Werner. 
 Les arguments de M. le Secrétaire d’Etat Schölhorn dérivent de la 
crainte qu’il éprouve que le système soit trop compliqué, qu’il entraine une 
réduction trop rapide des marges de fluctuation existantes entre monnaies de 
la Communauté et offre de nouvelles facilités de crédit aux pays en déficit. 
 Sans nier la pertinence, en principe, de certains de ces arguments il ne 
faut pas en exagérer l’importance, les inconvénients auxquels ils se réfèrent 
peuvent être éliminés ou à tout le moins réduits. 
 D’autre part, j’estime qu’il n’y a pas de commune mesure et que 
ne peuvent être pesés sur la même balance ni avec les mêmes poids des 
difficultés techniques mineures, d’une part, et les grands avantages politiques 
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et psychologiques, d’autre part, qui s’attachent à. la création d’un organe 
qui affirme l’indépendance monétaire de la Communauté, constitue une 
réalisation tangible des principes adoptés à La Haye158 et sera la démonstration 
de la volonté des Gouvernements de progresser résolument dans la voie de la 
création d’une Union Economique et Monétaire complète. 
 Tous les autres membres du Comité Werner ne sont ralliés et appuient la 
création de ce Fonds dès la première étape dans la voie de l’Union Economique 
et Monétaire à l’exception de M. le Professeur Brouwers qui a exprimé certaines 
réserves mais ne s’est pas jusqu’à présent prononcé nettement contre l’idée. 
 Celle-ci est également soutenue par le représentant de la Commission; 
elle dispose donc de l’appui formel de cinq sur sept des membres de la 
Commission Werner, d’une attitude encore réservée d’un sixième cependant 
que le membre allemand est le seul à ne pouvoir s’y rallier.
 Dois-je vous dire tout l’intérêt politique que je vois pour l’avenir même 
de la Communauté à ce que l’unanimité puisse se faire.
 C’est la raison pour laquelle M.G. Eyskens, Premier Ministre, prend 
aujourd’hui l’initiative d’écrire au Chancelier Brandt pour attirer son attention 
sur le grand intérêt politique et psychologique qui s’attache à l’idée développée 
ci-dessus.
 Je crois utile de mon côté d’insister auprès de vous pour que le 
Gouvernement néerlandais apporte lui aussi son adhésion au projet. 
 Nous avons une occasion de faire un pas important et décisif dans la voie 
que nous avons tracée à La Haye, il serait dommage d’y renoncer. 
 En accomplissant ce pas, nous renforcerons la confiance tout en affirmant 
notre résolution. En ne l’accomplissant pas, nous risquons de faire douter de la 
volonté politique d’aboutir. 
 Veuillez agréer, mon cher Collègue, l’expression de mes sentiments les 
meilleurs. 
158 See document 22.
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 First page of the handwritten note Pierre Werner prepared for the preliminary 
meeting of 20 May 1970.
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 Introduction to document 30
The ad hoc group installed by the Finance Ministers on 23 and 24 February 
1970 to draw up a plan for economic and monetary union was chaired 
by Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Pierre Werner. Alongside his work in 
coordinating the ad hoc group, Pierre Werner made a considerable personal 
contribution to the substance of the report. Werner proposed the method for 
the plan comprising a starting point, a desired final objective and alternative 
paths linking the two points together in order to attain the objective of 
establishing economic and monetary union.159 
 Although the fundamental objective was clear and won consensus, 
defining what it entailed triggered fierce confrontations between economists 
and monetarists. Werner later summarized:
The German representative, J.B. Schöllhorn, Chairman of the Medium-
Term Economic Policy Committee, assisted by H. Tietmeyer, immediately 
defended Minister Schiller’s idea of a chronological run-up as regards 
economic policy convergence. The Chairman of the Committee of 
Governors of the Central Banks, Baron Ansiaux (National Bank of 
Belgium), defended the monetarist position with a fervour which 
surprised me at the time. B. Clappier, the Chairman of the Monetary 
Committee, assisted by J.M. Bloch- Lainé, swung round to the Ansiaux 
position, as did G. Stammati, the Chairman of the Budgetary Committee. 
Brouwers, the Chairman of the Conjunctural Policy Committee, was closer 
to Schöllhorn. Although the members of the group had been appointed 
on the basis of the posts they held in the Community, their arguments 
increasingly began to betray the concerns of their governments.’160
This being so, the group decided at its second meeting on 30 April to instruct 
its deputies to draw up a draft report, under the chairmanship of Jacques 
Mertens de Wilmars. Ten days later, a draft report was submitted to the 
Werner Committee.161 The deputies drew up a cautious, neutral paper pointing 
out the sensitive problems still pending, but without going so far as to make 
proposals or put forward practical solutions. The sensitive issues included 
transferring responsibility from the national to the Community level without 
creating lasting tension, medium-term economic policy, joint taking of the 
principal decisions on monetary and credit policy, and the actual decision-
making power to be vested in the Community bodies. The exchange of views 
at the fourth meeting of the group, in Luxembourg on 14 May, was particularly 
stormy and showed that there were deep-rooted differences of opinion.
 For the next meeting, scheduled for 20 May 1970, Werner, concerned to 
achieve a consensus on a common position while keeping to the deadlines set 
159 It was in fact the approach contained in the Plan luxembourgeois en cinq points pour 
une union monétaire (Five-point Luxembourg plan for a monetary union) drafted by 
Pierre Werner and presented on 26 January 1968 at the Europaforum in Saarbrücken, to 
which he was invited together with Jean Monnet and Walter Hallstein.
160 Pierre Werner, Itinéraires luxembourgeois et européens. Évolutions et souvenirs: 
1945–1985, Volume 2 (Luxembourg: Éditions Saint-Paul, 1992), 126 [translation by the 
editors] and 124.
161 Family Archives Pierre Werner. 
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when the group started its work,162 again played a decisive mediating role. He 
personally wrote the note, presented here as document 30, summarising the 
points on which the various delegates agreed and adding proposals of his own.163 
These included irrevocably fixing the exchange rates between the European 
currencies, which in substance was equivalent to a single currency system for 
the Community with slight differences as regards external monetary policy. 
After a long day of discussion, Werner managed to secure an agreement. On 22 
May 1970 the document was sent to the Finance Ministers of the Six and the 
Presidents of the Council and the Commission. He noted in his memoirs:
‘At the end of the five working meetings, studded with arguments, not 
to mention incidents of various kinds, we nevertheless managed to put 
forward a summary view of the problems raised, in the form of an interim 
report to the Governments. […] The interim report already sketched out 
the final concept as regards the aim to be achieved. [… It] took care to 
stress that economic and monetary union meant that the main economic 
policy decisions had to be taken at the Community level and the requisite 
powers had to be transferred from the national level to the Community 
level. The culmination of it could be the adoption of a single currency. 
In the end the report left no doubt as to the constraints and disciplines 
which the plan for economic and monetary union entailed.’164
The meeting of Finance Ministers held in Venice on 8 and 9 June 1970 did not 
come down definitively in favour of any of the solutions discussed. It mandated 
the ad hoc group to give further thought to the matter and it was Pierre 
Werner who, on that basis, made proposals for the lines to follow in taking the 
discussions further.
30. 
Handwritten note by Pierre Werner on the establishment of an economic and 
monetary union, in preparation for the preliminary meeting of 20 May 1970.
© Family Archives Pierre Werner.
L’Union économique et monétaire.
I. Définir l’objectif à atteindre. Décrire le genre d’union écon. et mon. que 
nous poursuivons. Expliquer ce qui est nécessaire et ce qui est suffisant pour 
atteindre le degré d’intégration écon. et mon. recherchée.
162 A stage-by-stage plan was to be drawn up and put forward by the ad hoc group by 
July 1970.
163 At the opening meeting of the Werner Committee (20 March 1970) it was agreed 
that summarising the group’s discussions would be the responsibility of the Commission 
representative (Ugo Mosca, acting as secretary-general) and that the other members of 
the Group, ‘each according to his particular area of expertise in his capacity as chairman 
of one of the EEC Committees’, should draw up a note describing the measures planned 
to be taken for the purpose of attaining the final objective. The names of the various 
authors (e.g. J. B. Schöllhorn, G. Stammati, etc.) in Pierre Werner’s handwritten note. 
Family Archives Pierre Werner.
164 Werner, Itinéraires luxembourgeois et européens. Volume 2, 125 and 127.
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Faire le partage des objectifs communautaires et des objectifs restant dans 
l’orbite nationale.
 L’absorption des monnaies nationales par la création d’une monnaie 
européenne est le but ultime qui suppose une évolution plus poussée des 
institutions politiques.
 L’objectif prévisible pour la décennie165 est l’union monétaire au service 
de l’union économique par l’harmonisation des politiques, la gestion et la 
mise en commun de réserves monétaires en vue d’une action stabilisatrice à 
l’intérieur et une affirmation de la personnalité monétaire de la communauté 
vers l’extérieur.
Voir les objectifs définis dans le Traité. Principal: le marché commun libre et 
sans entraves.
art. 3 
f) éviter que concurrence ne soit pas faussée dans le marché commun.
g) coordonner les politiques écon. des états membres et parer aux 
déséquilibres dans leurs balances de paiement.
h) rapprocher les législations nationales dans la mesure nécessaire au 
fonctionnement du marché commun.
art. 67 suppressions des restrictions aux mouvements des capitaux dans 
la mesure nécessaire au bon fonctionnement du marché commun. Paiements 
courants entièrement libres. voir aussi art-73
art. 103 politiques conjoncturelles d’intérêt commun.
art. 104 chaque Etat membre pratique la politique écon. nécessaire en vue 
d’assurer l’équilibre de sa balance globale des paiements et de maintenir la 
confiance dans sa monnaie.
art-105 coordination des politiques écon.
art-107 chacun traite sa politique en matière de taux de change comme un 
problème d’intérêt commun.
art-113 politique commerciale commune.
Procédures de rapprochement des législations: art.100-102
art-235 –
II. Etat de l’union à l’issue du plan par étapes.
Point d’aboutissement. Voir ci-avant idée générale.166
à l’intérieur.
Espace économique sans frontières. Circulation libre des biens, des services, 
des personnes et des capitaux. Opérations monétaires effectuées par les agents 
écon. ne sont soumises à aucune entrave ni à des risques de change167 
à l’extérieur.
Ensemble écon. et mon. individualisé et organisé effet constitué des forces du 
marché et de politiques consciemment mises en œuvre au niveau national et 
communautaire.
a) une monnaie commune unique.168
165 Margin note: ‘Création d’un système monétaire européen intégré. (voir papier Snoy)’.
166 Margin note: ‘Sources: Note Mosca du 3.4. Doc. Barre du 4.3’.
167 Margin note: ‘[2 étapes]’. Figure difficult to read.
168 Margin note: ‘Voir note Stammati 7.4’.
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b) une monnaie commune (de compte) coexistant avec des monnaies 
nationales.
variantes et étapes: fixité des parités irrévocable.
fixité des parités avec rapports restant en principe susceptibles d’ajustement 
avec procédure communautaire
Relations entre l’union écon. et mon.169
Questions essentielles:
1 Qu’est-ce qui doit être harmonisé et concerté? 
2) Degré ou intensité de l’harmonisation et de la concertation
3) Aspect institutionnels.
ad 1) Politique gén. du crédit. Ordre politique basé sur la libre concurrence. 
Politique moyen terme, p. conjoncturelle, structures fiscales et instruments 
anticycliques, subventions écon. marché des cap. Polit. des revenus.
ad 2) Appliquer le principe de la subsidiarité. Ne transférer à l’organe 
communautaire que les pouvoirs essentiels. Quid de l’ingérence des organes 
confédéraux?




III. Description de l’état actuel. Voir document Ansiaux annexe 2.
et Stammati annexe 1 (pour la partie budgétaire)
IV. Méthode et approche pour le rythme des étapes.
169 Margin note: ‘Note [6.4, Schöllhorn’.
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 Introduction to document 31
While the Committee carried out its work, Pierre Werner also played an 
active role in the Action Committee for the United States of Europe (ACUSE)170 
chaired by Jean Monnet. The two men held regular discussions in public and in 
private, particularly when the interim report began to take shape in May 1970. 
These discussions concerned the differences of opinion between the members 
of the ad hoc group and the political influences that needed to be harnessed 
— particularly with the Germans and the Dutch, who were more reluctant to 
adhere to the common positions — if the work of the Werner Committee was 
to be carried through to a successful conclusion. 
 Shortly after drafting the interim report, as the need for the committee 
to deepen its work became clear, Jean Monnet sent a letter to Pierre Werner on 
26 May 1970 – document 31 in this selection. This document was part of the 
strategic consultation initiated between the two men and concerned both the 
main lines for the pursuit of the Werner Committee’s work and the political 
mandate that would need to be issued by the Council of the Ministers of the 
Community in order for this work to be carried out. In order to settle the 
‘deep differences of opinion’ and reconcile the views of the economists and 
the monetarists, Werner and Monnet approached the German Chancellor Willy 
Brandt on a confidential basis, a strategy that proved successful. 
 Other members of the Werner Committee worked to achieve a consensus 
on both the interim report and the final report. Snoy et d’Oppuers engaged 
with his Dutch counterpart Witteveen on several occasions. Given the close and 
cooperative relationship with the Belgian and French members of his group, 
Werner approached Ansiaux, Chairman of the Committee of Governors of the 
Central Banks, and the French member Clappier, Chairman of the Monetary 
Committee, giving the two men various confidential mediation missions with 
the aim of securing a consensus on the final report.
31.
Letter by Jean Monnet to the Luxembourg Prime Minister and Minister of Finance 
(Pierre Werner), 26 May 1970.
© Family Archives Pierre Werner.
Je souhaite revenir sur notre conversation au sujet du rapport de votre Comité. 
J’en ai pris connaissance et ai discuté avec M. Clappier.
 Je vous envoie ces quelques réflexions avant que nous parlions au 
téléphone mercredi après-midi.
 Le rapport de votre Comité montre clairement une différence entre ceux qui 
veulent commencer une action monétaire de suite et ceux qui veulent reporter 
cette action monétaire après que l’union économique aurait été réalisée.
170 Comité d’Action pour les États-Unis d’Europe. Established in 1955 in Paris by Jean 
Monnet as a lobby organisation for further international cooperation within Europe. 
Members of the Committee were representatives of the larger political parties and non-
communist trade unions in the member countries of the EEC. The Action Committee was 
dissolved in May 1975.
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 Le fait d’indiquer ces divergences profondes est très utile. Mais en même 
temps, je pense que pour surmonter cette différence il ne faut pas brusquer la 
discussion.
 La suggestion que vous me faisiez l’autre jour de rendre visite au 
Chancelier Brandt est bonne. Vous devriez aller le voir le plus tôt possible et 
avoir une conversation avec lui avant le Conseil des Ministres les 8 et 9 juin.
 Je pense que le mieux serait d’obtenir alors du Conseil des Ministres de 
la Communauté un nouveau mandat au Comité que vous présidez. Le Conseil 
demanderait à votre Comité des études plus complètes de la première étape 
tendant à préciser:
– les implications économiques et les modalités techniques d’un régime 
spécifique de change pour les pays de la CEE appuyé sur un Fonds européen de 
stabilisation des changes;
– les méthodes par lesquelles des progrès réels pourraient être faits dans 
la voie de l’harmonisation économique.
 De cette manière, le nouveau rapport demandé à votre Comité 
pourrait concilier les deux points de vue qui s’expriment dans votre rapport 
préliminaire.
 J’ai pleine confiance que vous pourriez ainsi dégager une solution 
unanime au sein de votre Comité.
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 Introduction to document 32
Having been endorsed at the meeting of Finance Ministers on 29 May 1970 in 
Venice, the interim report and the debates on economic and monetary union 
were at the top of the agenda for the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 8 
and 9 June in Luxembourg City. 
 According to Werner, ‘The discussion as such did not throw up any new 
elements, except that the Dutch Minister Witteveen, building on Mr. Schiller’s 
position, increased the demands concerning the institutional aspect.’171 In 
agreement on the main objective that economic and monetary union should 
be achieved within ten years, with the first step to start on 1 January 1971, the 
Council of Ministers invited the Werner Committee to continue and deepen 
its work. The aim was to elaborate the institutional and technical aspects of 
the agreements reached, the priority being to set out the specific practical 
arrangements for the first stage.
 Werner proposed that a technical opinion should be sought from the 
Committee of Governors for the involvement of the central banks in a common 
monetary policy, a suggestion that the Council went on to adopt. He was able 
to put this into practice largely because of his good relations with Ansiaux. 
The monetary union between Luxembourg and Belgium meant that the two 
men had worked closely together for many years and shared similar views, 
particularly on the question of economic and monetary union. Their close 
working relationship had already set the general tone for the debates in the 
group of experts: in April 1970, at the request of Pierre Werner, Ansiaux 
had already submitted his considerations on the operation of an exchange 
adjustment fund and on special drawing rights.172 
 Werner and Ansiaux developed a common strategy, convinced of the 
importance of an exchange stabilisation fund and confident of the vital role 
that could be played by the Committee of Governors in the introduction of 
such a fund. Their strategy involved a series of questions by means of which 
the Committee of Governors was asked to give its opinion on several matters, 
including the exchange rate regime between the currencies of the Common 
Market countries, the advantages and drawbacks of an exchange stabilisation 
fund during the first stage of the stage-by-stage plan, and the tightening of 
monetary policies in the first stage. 
 Given that the Council decision of 9 June 1970 recommended obtaining 
the opinion of the Committee of the Governors of the Central Banks, Werner 
sent a letter to Ansiaux – document 32 here – asking for an a point of view 
on various technical and economic aspects of the introduction of a specific 
exchange rate regime for the Community. 
 In his reply of 16 June Ansiaux promised this by 15 July, based on the 
appropriateness of harmonising monetary policy instruments and effectively 
tightening the monetary policies of the member countries.173 All the same, 
171 Pierre Werner, Itinéraires luxembourgeois et européens. Évolutions et souvenirs: 1945–
1985, Volume 2 (Luxembourg : Éditions Saint-Paul, 1992), 128.
172 Considerations by Hubert Ansiaux ‘setting out the modus operandi and the merits of 
a European exchange equalisation fund’ (confidential technical note of 24 April 1970). 
Family Archives Pierre Werner
173 Letter of the chairman of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks (Hubert 
Ansiaux) to Pierre Werner, Brussels, 16 June 1970. Family Archives Pierre Werner.
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the detailed analysis of the measures to be taken was postponed to the third 
quarter of the year, as the information that would enable specific conclusions to 
be drawn only gradually became available. The technical opinion of the central 
bankers was to be included in the final report. This opinion emphasised both 
the gradual approach and the irreversibility of economic and monetary union, 
thereby supporting the backbone of the Werner Report. 
32. 
Letter by the Luxembourg Prime Minister and Minister of Finance (Pierre Werner) 
to the Chairman of the Committee of Governors of Central Banks (Hubert 
Ansiaux), 12 June 1970.
© Family Archives Pierre Werner.
Au cours de sa réunion du 9 juin, le Conseil des Ministres des Communautés 
Européennes a pris connaissance du rapport intérimaire sur la réalisation 
de l’union économique et Monétaire que je lui ai présenté à cette occasion.174 
Le Conseil a pris acte des conclusions de ce rapport. Il résulte des débats 
que les objectifs fondamentaux décrits dans le document ont trouvé l’accord 
des Gouvernements. Toutefois, le Conseil a constaté qu’il est désirable 
d’approfondir certains aspects des suggestions faites, notamment en rapport 
avec les actions à entreprendre au cours de la première étape. 
 D’un côté, il paraît nécessaire de présenter des recommandations 
concrètes en matière de politique économique et budgétaire.
 D’autre part, en ce qui concerne les progrès à accomplir en matière 
monétaire, le Conseil des Ministres souhaiterait être plus amplement éclairé 
sur certains aspects techniques et économiques des propositions qui lui sont 
présentées.
 Comme d’autres collègues qui se sont prononcés en ce sens, j’estime que 
sur ce point il est opportun de disposer d’un avis du Comité des Gouverneurs 
des Banques Centrales. 
 Aussi vous saurais-je gré d’inviter le Comité que vous présidez à me faire 
parvenir son avis sur les questions suivantes:
a) Quelles pourraient être, dans la première étape, les modalités d’un 
régime de change spécifique propre aux monnaies des Etats membres? En 
particulier, quels seraient les avantages et les inconvénients, sur le plan 
économique comme sur le plan monétaire, d’un rétrécissement des marges 
entre les monnaies des pays membres du Marché Commun, également dans 
le cas où le dollar ne serait plus utilisé comme monnaie d’intervention, ce qui 
ramènerait la possibilité de fluctuation de 3% à 11/2% au maximum?
b) En ce qui concerne l’instauration d’un Fonds de Stabilisation des 
Changes, tel que décrit dans l’annexe 4 du rapport, quels pourraient en être 
les avantagea et les inconvénients dans une vue d’affirmation progressive des 
objectifs monétaires de la Communauté? Il s’imposerait de dire ce qui milite 
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en faveur de sa création au cours de la première étape ou ce qui au contraire 
recommande, soit son élimination totale, soit son instauration dans une étape 
subséquente. A défaut de la création de ce fonds, au cours de la première 
étape ou d’une étape subséquente, j’aimerais savoir ce qui peut et doit être fait 
dès à présent en vue de resserrer les liens monétaires qui unissent les pays 
membres de la Communauté et de permettre à celle-ci d’aboutir à la création 
d’un régime monétaire basé sur la constitution d’un ‘European Reserve Board’ 
et d’un ‘Fonds de Réserve Européen’ dans la période prévue de dix ans. 
c) Indépendamment des deux questions précédentes, il importerait 
d’examiner ce qui devrait être accompli en tous cas au cours de la première 
étape afin de resserrer de manière effective les politiques monétaires des 
pays membres, en ce compris l’harmonisation des instruments de politique 
monétaire dont ils disposent actuellement. 
 Afin de permettre au groupe que je préside de tirer des conclusions 
fondées et réalistes de l’ensemble des informations fournies, je vous saurais 
particulièrement gré de veiller à ce que les réponses, même discordantes, 
soient aussi précises que possible et étayées des arguments pertinents 
invoqués de part et d’autre. 
 Je me rends compte de l’effort particulier que je demande aux membres 
du Comité, puisque ces questions exigeront une concertation très poussée et 
une étude concentrée. Cependant, vous n’ignorez pas les nécessités politiques 
qui obligent mon groupe à déposer son rapport final au mois de septembre. 
C’est pourquoi, je vous serais obligé de veiller à ce que votre Comité puisse me 
faire parvenir son avis pour le 15 juillet au plus tard. 
 En remerciant les membres du Comité de l’attention qu’ils voudront bien 
attacher à la présente, je vous prie d’agréer. Monsieur le Président, l’assurance 
de ma considération la plus distinguée. 
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Banknotes in the Netherlands Central Bank in 1968.
The Interim Report of the Werner Group stated that ‘psychological and political 
considerations argue in favour of the adoption of a single currency which 
would guarantee that the undertaking was irreversible’. The adoption of a 
single currency would imply that the Netherlands Central Bank would no 




 Introduction to document 33
The Council of Ministers of 8 and 9 June 1970 endorsed the interim report175 
and gave its approval for the Werner Committee to continue its work. 
Establishing economic and monetary union within a time limit of ten years 
from 1 January 1971 was confirmed as the objective. The Council of Ministers 
asked the Werner Committee to submit its final report by September 1970.176 
 Giving further thought to the question of the institutions thus became 
a priority matter. Karl Schiller, the German Minister, immediately proposed 
that the group describe the powers of the bodies responsible for short-term 
economic policy on the one hand and monetary policy on the other. Werner 
wanted to involve Schöllhorn and Brouwers (renowned for their inflexible 
economist’s viewpoints) in defining practical ways of coordinating economic 
policies. Schiller insisted on more efficient procedures for economic policy 
convergence. 
 To put the finishing touches to the interim report, of which a first rough 
draft was planned for August 1970, the ad hoc group met four times.177 At 
the meeting in Luxembourg on 27 July, Brouwers tabled his paper on the 
institutional aspects for the final stage of economic and monetary union, 
presented here as document 33.
 The interim report defined monetary union as: ‘A monetary zone sufficient 
to itself involves, internally, currency convertibility, the irrevocable fixing of 
exchange rates, the elimination of exchange-rate fluctuations and complete 
liberalisation of capital movements. At the same time, national currency 
denominations may be retained, or it may set the seal on the establishment of 
a single Community currency. From the technical point of view, it might seem 
immaterial which of these solutions is opted for, but psychological and political 
considerations argue in favour of the adoption of a single currency which would 
guarantee that the undertaking was irreversible.’178 Inevitably this entailed the 
transfer of powers from national bodies to Community bodies to keep a proper 
and effective grasp of short-term economic developments. Consequently, and 
with due regard for the needs of the final stage, real harmonisation of short-
term economic policy instruments in the Member States was to be established 
from stage one.
 To keep a grasp of short-term economic policy in this way, two bodies 
appeared essential. First a strong and independent central policy body was 
required, under the democratic control of the European Parliament, and able to 
exert a decisive influence on deflationary and inflationary effects arising from 
national budgets. It should also take decisions on access to the Community’s 
money markets for national authorities. The second requirement was to set 
up a common central bank, responsible for issuing banknotes, credit policy, 
175 ‘Interim Report on the Establishment by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union – 
“Werner Report”’ [20 May 1970]. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement no. 
7 (1970).
176 Communiqué drawn up by the Belgian Presidency following the Council of Ministers’ 
meeting, Luxembourg, 8–9 June 1970. Family Archives Pierre Werner.
177 The group met in Paris on 7 July 1970, Luxembourg on 27 July and 11 September and 
Copenhagen on 25 September, at the occasion of the annual meeting of Governors of the 
International Monetary Fund.
178 Interim Report on the Establishment by Stages.
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official currency reserve management, and maintaining the external value 
of the currency. This central bank was to be an autonomous, financially 
independent institution, with its statute and powers laid down in Community 
law. According to the proposal the central policy body would be entrusted to 
give the bank directives. Apart from that, the bank, brought into being through 
a full merger of the existing central banks, was guaranteed a certain degree 
of independence, not unlike that of the Federal Reserve System in the United 
States.
 Putting such a system into effect required marked alterations to the 
Community’s institutional structure, which entailed new treaty provisions, 
preferably in stage one, as they should confer on the Community bodies the 
powers to make the gradual transition from stage one to the final stage. 
33.
Note by the President of the Short-Term Economic Policy Committee of the EEC 
(Gerard Brouwers) to the Werner group on the final phase of the monetary 
union, 22 July 1970. 
© Family Archives Pierre Werner.
Note d’accompagnement
Comme convenu, je vous envoie par la présente une note en vue de la 
discussion relative au transfert des compétences nationales aux institutions 
communautaires.
 Ce transfert se situe à la fin d’un processus devant permettre – ainsi qu’il 
est dit dans le document de discussion sur la procédure de consultation sous 
le point D – un renforcement progressif de l’influence de la Communauté sur la 
politique conjoncturelle dans les Etats membres.
 En outre, il me semble souhaitable de préciser dans notre rapport qu’en 
tout cas il sera nécessaire d’harmoniser au cours de l’avant-dernière étape les 
activités du secteur public des différents Etats membres en matière de création 
de liquidités.
Note
Phase finale de l’union monétaire; transfert nécessaire de compétences nationales 
aux institutions communautaires
Le rapport intérimaire décrit l’union monétaire comme suit: 
 ‘Une zone monétaire individualisée implique à l’intérieur la 
convertibilité des monnaies, la fixation irrévocable des rapports de parité, 
l’élimination des marges de fluctuation des cours de change et la libération 
totale des mouvements de capitaux. Elle peut s’accompagner du maintien 
de signes monétaires nationaux ou consacrer l’établissement d’une monnaie 
communautaire unique. Du point de vue technique, le choix entre ces deux 
solutions pourrait paraître indifférent, mais des considérations d’ordre 
psychologique et politique militent en faveur de l’adoption d’une monnaie 
unique qui garantirait l’irréversibilité de l’entreprise’.
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Cette définition d’une union monétaire implique les conséquences suivantes:
– La création de liquidités dans l’ensemble de la zone doit être de la 
compétence d’un organe central.
– La politique monétaire et de crédit, c’est-à-dire la mise en œuvre 
d’instruments inflationnistes et déflationnistes ne peut plus être laissée à 
l’appréciation des Etats membres individuels. En effet, ils ont une incidence 
directe sur les autres Etats membres.
– La politique monétaire à l’égard du monde extérieur devient une 
affaire communautaire; les contrôles en matière de devises à l’intérieur de la 
Communauté sont supprimés en ce qui concerne les mouvements de fonds et 
de capitaux.
– Suppression des balances de paiements internes.
– Les effets déflationnistes et inflationnistes des budgets nationaux ne 
peuvent pas davantage être laissés au libre arbitre des autorités nationales.
 C’est pourquoi il est également nécessaire que l’accès des pouvoirs 
publics au marché des capitaux soit réglementé au niveau communautaire.
– La politique des revenus, avec ses effets inflationnistes ou déflationnistes 
éventuels, a une incidente directe sur les événements économiques dans la 
Communauté, quel que soit le pays dans lequel les effets inflationnistes ou 
déflationnistes ont leur origine. Des efforts devront être faits en vue de mettre 
en place une politique commune des revenus.
 Cela signifie que dans un certain nombre de domaines les compétences 
des organes nationaux devront être transférées à des organes communautaires.
 Une première nécessité pour une bonne et efficace maîtrise de la 
conjoncture par ces organe est une harmonisation poussée des instruments 
de la politique conjoncturelle dans les Etats membres, harmonisation qui dès 
la première étape devra être mise en place en fonction des besoins de la phase 
finale.
 Pour cette maîtrise de la conjoncture, deux organes semblent 
indispensables:
1) Un organe central de la politique qui peut exercer une influence décisive 
sur les effets déflationnistes et inflationnistes qui émanent des budgets 
nationaux et qui décide de l’accès des autorités nationales au marché des 
capitaux de la Communauté. Au minimum, cet organe doit être habilité, si les 
circonstances l’exigent, à décider pour chaque Etat membre s’il est souhaitable, 
à la lumière de la situation économique, que cet Etat membre ait un excédent 
ou un déficit budgétaire et pour imposer aux Etats membres des obligations en 
ce qui concerne l’’ampleur admissible de ces soldes.
 Il s’agit ici des soldes de l’ensemble des dépenses et des recettes 
publiques, donc pas uniquement celles des autorités nationales, mais aussi 
celles des organes subordonnés et para-étatiques.
 En ce qui concerna l’affectation et le financement des soldes, il est 
également indispensable de prévoir le pouvoir d’édicter des directives 
obligatoires, notamment pour ce qui est:
– du mode de financement des déficits (par la création de monnaies ou par 
un recours au marché des capitaux communautaire);
– de la création d’une réserve conjoncturelle.
L’organe central de politique devra pouvoir mener une politique efficace et 
devra, par conséquent, abstraction faite du contrôle parlementaire dont il 
sera question plus loin, pouvoir prendre des décisions indépendamment des 
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organes nationaux. Cela implique que l’organe de la politique ne saurait être 
composé de ministres nationaux.
 Il sera nécessaire d’examiner ultérieurement les autres conditions que 
l’organe de la politique devra remplir. Les compétences d’ordre économique 
et monétaire qui sont conférées à l’organe sont à tel point importantes qu’une 
délégation à un seul homme semble exclue, de sorte que ces tâches devront 
être confiées à un collège. En tout cas, il faudra que les décisions puissent être 
prises en temps utile et que le collège soit complètement indépendant des 
gouvernements nationaux. Il est évident que des pouvoirs communautaires 
dans le secteur économique et monétaire ne peuvent être exercés par 
une autre instance que celle qui exerce également les autres compétences 
sociales et économiques qui sont ou qui seront encore transférées au niveau 
communautaire et pour lesquelles il y a lieu de rendre compte au Parlement 
européen (par exemple, la politique des ententes, la politique agricole, etc.).
2) Une banque centrale commune qui devra être chargée:
– de l’émission de billets de banque dans la Communauté;
– de la politique du crédit de la Communauté;
– de la gestion des réserves monétaires officielles de l’union;
– du maintien de la valeur externe de la monnaie.
Cette banque centrale devra être une institution autonome et financièrement 
indépendante dont le statut et les pouvoirs seront fixés par le droit 
communautaire. Il faudra, en même temps, déterminer la responsabilité 
politique de la politique la banque centrale. A cet égard, il faudrait envisager 
de permettre à l’organe de la politique de pouvoir donner, dans certains cas 
clairement défini des directives obligatoires, selon une procédure qui offre 
des garanties suffisantes pour l’indépendance de la banque (par exemple, 
publication des opinions divergentes de la banque).
 En principe, on pourrait concevoir que les banques centrales actuelles 
fusionnent complètement dans la banque centrale commune. Il semble 
toutefois plus réaliste d’envisager, pour cette banque commune, une sorte 
de ‘Fédéral Reserve System’, à la tête duquel se trouverait un ‘Board’ qui 
contrôlerait et qui donnerait des indications aux banques affiliées dans les Etats 
membres, où les banques centrales existantes devraient être transformées. 
Dans ce système, celles-ci ne devraient donc plus être habilitées à pratiquer 
une politique nationale du crédit et elles ne seraient plus responsables qu’à 
l’égard du ‘Federal Reserve Board’.
 Pour réaliser les objectifs précités, l’organe central de la politique 
disposerait de pouvoirs politiques importants qui seraient retirés aux 
gouvernements nationaux et, par conséquent, au contrôle des parlements 
nationaux. Cela implique que le transfert des tâches des autorités 
nationales aux autorités communautaires doit s’accompagner d’un transfert 
correspondant de pouvoirs des parlements nationaux au Parlement européen. 
En raison de la position importante que les Etats membres conserveront au 
sein de la Communauté, ce Parlement ne devra pas être uniquement composé 
d’une chambre de représentants élus au suffrage direct, mais aussi d’un sénat 
dont les membres seraient désignés par les Etats membres. Comme les effets 
des relations mutuelles entre l’organe de la politique, la chambre et le sénat 




 La mise en œuvre du système décrit ci-dessus exige des modifications 
sensibles de la structure institutionnelle de la Communauté. Il est essentiel 
que l’on puisse encore s’entendre au cours de la première étape sur le texte des 
nouvelles dispositions du Traité, qui ne définiront pas seulement la structure 
de l’étape finale, mais conféreront aussi aux organes communautaires les 
pouvoirs nécessaires pour pouvoir réaliser un passage progressif de la 
première étape à l’étape finale. C’est au cours des étapes ultérieures que pourra 
s accomplir le travail de longue haleine qu’exige l’instauration des institutions 
précitées - comme, par exemple, l’intégration des banques nationales dans un 
‘Federal Reserve System’.
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The German Minister Karl Schiller took a tough stance in the negotiations on 
monetary integration in which his economist position conflicted with the mon-
etarist position of the French.
He is pictured here at the press conference at the close of the emergency meet-
ing on the monetary crisis in November 1968. 
Otmar Emminger, the vice president of the German Bundesbank, remembers 
the meeting as the most unpleasant conference he ever attended. In between 
the long meetings in which little progress was made, he and other attendees 




 Introduction to document 34
On 7 October 1970, the Werner Group met in Luxembourg to resolve the final 
points of disagreement. The differences of opinion stemmed from the idea of 
establishing an exchange stabilisation fund during the first stage. The inflexible 
attitude displayed by the Germans in particular made it seem unlikely that a 
compromise solution acceptable to all parties would be reached. Werner 
initiated a lengthy and complex mediation process between the various 
parties seeking agreement on the plan for economic and monetary union. In 
his memoirs, Werner wrote:
‘Schöllhorn insisted that we propose the establishment of a stabilisation 
fund during the second stage, which itself was to be preceded by a 
thorough examination. At the risk of compromising unanimity, I was 
obliged to harden my attitude. I was convinced that a plan that provided 
for no monetary innovation for the first three years, that was solely 
devoted to promoting procedures for the harmonisation of economic and 
budgetary policies with no accompanying monetary stimulus, was likely 
to get bogged down in endless Community discussions. […] Moreover, 
the proposals put forward by Raymond Barre179 required a new financial 
mechanism. The plan, which the group’s members were proposing 
should bear my name, could not disregard my previous initiatives in this 
area. I therefore firmly requested that the establishment of the fund be 
considered for the first stage. My view was supported by Ansiaux and 
Clappier. Yet opposition to the idea remained strong. Finally, after intense 
debates, with each person making every effort to avoid the talks ending 
in failure, I managed to secure a compromise that was unanimously 
accepted.’180 
On 8 October 1970, at a press conference in Luxembourg, Werner presented 
his report, of which document 34 reproduces the main conclusions. The name 
Werner Report was not merely a label thought up by the press but was the 
actual subheading on the document at its official presentation. Yet in the 
subsequent version sent to the European Parliament and in later versions, the 
Commission ‘forgot’ this title. 
 The Werner Report represented a major step forward in the European 
integration process. It provided for the establishment of an economic and 
monetary union in two main stages over a period of ten years (1971–1980), 
the ultimate aim being the irreversible convertibility of the Member States’ 
currencies, the complete liberalisation of capital movements and the 
irrevocable fixing of exchange rates, with the prospect of replacing the national 
currencies by a single currency. 
 The first stage was set out in detail. It was to start on 1 January 1971 and 
last for three years, the aim being to ensure that the economic infrastructure 
was in place to prepare the ground for progress in institutional terms. The 
guidelines for economic and monetary policy were to be gradually established 
on a joint basis. Exchange relations between the Community currencies were 
179 See document 20.
180 Pierre Werner, Itinéraires luxembourgeois et européens. Évolutions et souvenirs: 1945–
1985, Volume 2 (Luxembourg : Éditions Saint-Paul, 1992), 130
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to be progressively tightened and any increase in fluctuation between the 
Member States in general would be confined within relatively stable limits. 
 Once the results of this first stage had been assessed in line with a 
specific plan of action, a second stage was perceived, possibly preceded by a 
transitional phase. This second stage would provide for the continuation of the 
action undertaken in stage one, but along more restrictive lines, leading to the 
irrevocable fixing of exchange rates between the various currencies and, ideally, 
to a single currency. Although it was conceivable that the national currencies 
might be maintained, the Werner Report emphasised that the introduction of 
a single currency was vital for political and psychological reasons as it would 
give people the sense of having a common European identity and would 
develop solidarity and commitment. It would guarantee that the union would 
be irrevocable.181 Preparations for the final stage were to include the creation 
of a mechanism for monetary solidarity between the Member States, known as 
the ‘European Fund for Monetary Cooperation’, which would be placed under 
the control of the Governors of the Central Banks. A council would be set up to 
establish macroeconomic policy among the Six.
 In terms of institutions, the Werner Report recommended that a centre 
of decision for economic policy, which would be ‘politically responsible to a 
European Parliament’, be set up, as well as a Community system for the central 
banks. These institutional arrangements would require major transfers 
of responsibility from the states to the Community and would therefore 
presuppose a revision of the Community treaties. The plan also provided for 
consultation with the social partners — employers and trade unions — for all 
important decisions in the monetary field.
 The EC Commission adapted the Werner Report, bringing it in line with 
its own view182 which was influenced by the international economic climate 
and certain political sensitivities (Gaullist France refused the transfers of 
sovereignty provided for in the report). The report was approved and set in 
motion on 22 March 1971.6
181 See document 34, VII, C 




Report by the Werner Group to the Council and the Commission on the realization 
by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community, Final Version, 8 
October 1970.
Bulletin of the European Communities, 1970, supplement 11/70. Luxembourg: 
Official Publications Office of the European Communities. © European Union.
VII. Conclusions
The Group, recalling that the Council adopted on 8 and 9 June 1970 the 
conclusions presented by the Group in its interim report183, suggests to the 
Council that it should accept the contents of the present report and approve 
the following conclusions:
A. Economic and monetary union is an objective realizable in the course of 
the present decade provided only that the political will of the Member States to 
realize this objective, as solemnly declared at the Conference at The Hague184 is 
present. The union will make it possible to ensure growth and stability within 
the Community and reinforce the contribution it can make to economic and 
monetary equilibrium in the world and make it a pillar of stability.
B. Economic and monetary union means that the principal decisions 
of economic policy will be taken at Community level and therefore that 
the necessary powers will be transferred from the national plane to the 
Community plane. These transfers of responsibility and the creation of the 
corresponding Community institutions represent a process of fundamental 
political significance which entails the progressive development of political 
cooperation. The economic and monetary union thus appears as a leaven for 
the development of political union which in the long run it will be unable to do 
without.
C. A monetary union implies, internally, the total and irreversible 
convertibility of currencies, the elimination of margins of fluctuation in rates 
of exchange, the irrevocable fixing of parity ratios and the total liberation of 
movements of capital. It may be accompanied by the maintenance of national 
monetary symbols, but considerations of a psychological and political order 
militate in favour of the adoption of a single currency which would guarantee 
the irreversibility of the undertaking.
D. On the institutional plane, in the final stage, two Community organs 
are indispensable: a centre of decision for economic policy and a Community 
system for the central banks. These institutions, while safeguarding their 
own responsibilities, must be furnished with effective powers of decision and 
must work together for the realization of the same objectives. The centre of 
economic decision will be politically responsible to a European Parliament.
183 Interim Report on the Establishment by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union – 
‘Werner Report’ [20 May 1970]. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement no. 7 
(1970).
184 See document 22.
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E. Throughout the process, as progress is achieved, Community instruments 
will be created to carry out or complete the action of the national instruments. 
In all fields the steps to be taken will be interdependent and will reinforce one 
another; in particular the development of monetary unification will have to be 
combined with parallel progress towards the harmonization and finally the 
unification of economic policies.
F. At this stage the laying down of a precise and rigid timetable for the whole 
of the plan by stages does not seem feasible. It is necessary in fact to maintain 
a measure of flexibility to permit any adaptations that the experience acquired 
during the first stage may suggest. Particular emphasis should therefore be 
placed on the first stage, for which a package of concrete measures is presented. 
The decisions on the details of the final stages and the future timetable will 
have to be taken at the end of the first stage.
G. The first stage will commence on 1 January 1971 and will cover a period 
of three years. In addition to the action approved by the Council in its decision 
of 8 and 9 June 1970 it will entail the adoption of the following measures:
1. The consultation procedures will have a preliminary and obligatory 
character and will call for increased activity by the Community organs, in 
particular the Council and the Commission, as well as the Committee of 
Governors of the central banks. These consultations will principally concern 
economic policy at medium term, short-term economic policy, budget policy 
and monetary policy.
2. The Council will meet at least three times a year to lay down, on the 
proposal of the Commission, the broad lines of economic policy at Community 
level and quantitative guidelines for the principal elements of the whole of 
the public budgets. Once a year, in the autumn, the economic policy in the 
Community will be the subject of recommendations contained in an annual 
report on the economic situation of the Community which will be transmitted 
to the European Parliament and to the Economic and Social Committee and 
which the Governments will bring to the notice of the national parliaments.
3. In order to promote efficiency in the Council’s labours and to ensure 
sufficient coordination, the Council must be in a position to assemble rapidly 
persons of high standing representing Governments and central banks, who 
will be able to hold prior consultations.
4. Before the adoption of the broad lines of economic policy at the 
Community level, consultations will take place between the Commission and 
the social partners in accordance with procedures to be laid down.
5. The budget policy of the Member States will be conducted in accordance 
with Community objectives. For this purpose, within the framework of the 
meetings of the Council referred to in paragraph 2 above, a Community survey 
will be effected before the Governments draw up their budget proposals on a 
definitive basis. The national budget procedures will be synchronized. In the 
fiscal field, countries will adopt the harmonization advocated in the present 
report and the integration of financial markets will be intensified.
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6. The Committee of Governors will play an increasingly important role in 
the coordination of monetary and credit policy; in particular it will lay down 
in this field the general guidelines for the Community. It will be able to express 
opinions and make recommendations to the central banks of the member 
countries and express opinions to the Council and the Commission.
7. To reinforce solidarity within the Community in the matter of foreign 
exchange, the central banks are invited, from the beginning of the first stage, to 
restrict on an experimental basis the fluctuations of rates between Community 
currencies within narrower bands than those resulting from the application of 
the margins in force in relation to the dollar. This objective would be achieved 
by concerted action in relation to the dollar. According to circumstances and to 
the results achieved in the standardization of economic policies new measures 
may be taken. These will consist of a transition from a de facto regime to a 
de jure regime of intervention in Community currencies and the progressive 
narrowing of the margins of fluctuation between Community currencies.
8. The actions foreseen in the foreign exchange field will be facilitated by 
the intervention of an agent charged with the tasks of statistical registration 
information, and advice.
9. The rapid harmonization of the instruments of monetary policy is 
necessary. For this reason it will be necessary as soon as possible to undertake 
the preparatory work in this field.
10. The modifications to be made in the Treaty of Rome in order to make 
possible the final realization of economic and monetary union must be 
prepared in good time during the first stage.
11. In accordance with Article 236185 of the Treaty of Rome, an 
intergovernmental conference will be called in good time before the end of 
the first stage with a view to drawing up the necessary modifications for the 
complete realization of economic and monetary union. A special meeting of 
the Council will be called to draw up a balance sheet of progress achieved in 
the first stage and lay down a programme for specific action in the years to 
come.
H. The second stage will be characterized by the promotion on a number of 
fronts and on ever more restrictive lines of the action undertaken during the 
first stage: the laying down of global economic guidelines, the coordination of 
short-term economic policies by monetary and credit measures, and budget 
and fiscal measures, the adoption of Community policies in the matter of 
structures, the integration of financial markets and the progressive elimination 
185 ‘The Government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to the Council 
proposals for the revision of this Treaty. If the Council, after consulting the Assembly 
and, where appropriate, the Commission, expresses an opinion in favour of the calling of 
a conference of representatives of the Governments of Member States, such conference 
shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of determining in 
common agreement the amendments to be made to this Treaty. Such amendments 




of exchange rate fluctuations between Community currencies.
 The reinforcement of the intra-Community links in monetary matters 
must be effected as soon as possible by the establishment of a European Fund 
for monetary cooperation as a forerunner of the Community system central 
banks for the final stage. In accordance with the experience acquired in the 
matter of the reduction of margins and the convergence of economic policies 
it may well be possible to establish the Fund during the first stage and in any 
event in the course of the second stage. The preparatory work for this purpose 
must be put in hand as soon as possible.
 The Group expresses the wish that the Council should approve the 
suggestions contained in the present report and should make, on the proposal 
of the Commission, all the arrangements needed for the realization of the 
plan by stages, and in particular before the end of the year any that may be 
necessary to put the first stage into operation on 1 January 1971.
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 Introduction to document 35
On 26 October 1970, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs met in 
Luxembourg to take official delivery of the Werner Report.186 Werner, chairman 
of the committee and also the host of the meeting in his capacity as Prime 
Minister of Luxembourg, launched the discussions with a brief statement 
summarising the content of the report. His statement is reproduced here as 
document 35.
 Looking back at the process of reflection in the ad hoc group, Werner 
highlighted the legitimacy of the conclusions in the interim report, 187 which 
the Council had taken over as its own, as well as the efforts the experts had 
put into going over specific questions from the Council for the purpose of 
concluding the study.
 Concerning the establishment of the institutional structure to ensure 
that Community policy would be effective, the Werner Report concluded that 
for the final stage of economic and monetary union there would have to be 
a centre responsible for taking decisions on economic policy. A Community 
banking system would also have to be set up. As they were not competent to 
make proposals for political structures, the experts had not been able to sketch 
out the broad outlines of these bodies.
 Concerning enhanced coordination of economic and budgetary policies, 
the report described in detail the fields in which Community action should 
continue, and the consequences of it for regional and structural policy. To 
hammer out common guidelines, systematic methods of informing and 
communicating had to be devised. The report advocated conducting three 
reviews in the course of the year, resulting in an annual report on the economic 
situation in the Community. As regards budgetary policy, there would be 
a search for common guidelines with respect to certain overall quantitative 
features and methods of financing the budget. In this connection, the governors 
of the central banks were to receive wider powers.
 The report defined in more precise detail the key features of stage one: 
the methods for comparing and contrasting economic and budgetary policies 
and setting up cooperation between them. At the same time it presented broad 
outlines of the policy on financial markets and the currency and credit policy. 
Stage one was scheduled to begin on 1 January 1971 and to last three years, 
and was regarded as being experimental in character. The transition to the 
next stage would require the Community to take stock of the results achieved. 
On this basis, an intergovernmental conference would decide on the details 
and the precise timetable for further developments between 1974 and 1980.
 Within the committee, there had been differences of opinion over the 
defining of the Community’s ‘monetary personality’; these had been overcome 
thanks to the opinion which the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks 
had been asked to deliver, and which clarified the technical aspects. In the 
monetary field, it was stipulated that from stage one the central banks would 
conduct de facto reductions in exchange-rate fluctuations between their 
currencies. It was planned to set up a European monetary cooperation fund as 
186 See document 34.
187 Interim Report on the Establishment by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union – 




soon as possible; its powers would be developed in stages. It would eventually 
absorb the mechanisms for short-term currency support and medium-term 
mutual assistance. The closing words of the statement provide, perhaps, the 
best key to a reading of the aim in view: ‘I am happy to note that on all these 
aspects we forged a unanimous collective view.’ 
 In his memoirs Werner later commented: ‘I had succeeded in avoiding 
the report’s being fragmented by separate opinions on important points. That 
unanimity had had to be achieved at the cost of a rigidity in our thinking which 
could have given cause to fear that it would detract from the implementation 
of the plan. […] The Community will soon be exposed to monetary upheavals 
which will distort the sequence of planned priorities.’188
35.
Statement by the Luxembourg Prime Minister and Minister of Finance (Pierre 
Werner) to the Council of Ministers of the European Communities, 26 October 
1970.
Bulletin de documentation. Directorate for publications, Press and Information 
Service, Ministry of State. 26 October 1970, No 6; 26th year. Luxembourg. © 
Service Information et Presse du Gouvernement luxembourgeois.
J’ai l’honneur de rendre compte des travaux du groupe ad hoc institué pour 
faire rapport sur la réalisation par étapes de l’union économique et monétaire 
dans la Communauté. Lors de la session du Conseil des 8 et 9 juin 1970, 
j’avais présenté un rapport intérimaire qui comportait un certain nombre de 
conclusions sur la poursuite des travaux du groupe. Le Conseil a bien voulu 
faire siennes ces conclusions et indiquer les orientations requises pour 
l’achèvement de l’étude. Je suis heureux de pouvoir vous présenter aujourd’hui 
le rapport final du groupe.
 Comme une grande partie du rapport intérimaire reste valable et ne 
comporte pas de modifications de texte, nous avons fondu dans un seul 
rapport les éléments considérés dans le rapport intérimaire et ceux étudiés 
ultérieurement.
 D’après l’échange de vues intervenu en Conseil et d’après les propres 
constatations du groupe, il nous incombait d’une part de combler certaines 
lacunes et de préciser certains développements, d’autre part de réaliser dans 
la mesure du possible un avis concordant et collectif sur certains aspects qui 
avaient donné lieu à des avis divergents au sein du Comité.
 Il nous avait été demandé d’abord d’approfondir les aspects institutionnels 
et d’esquisser les grandes lignes des organes chargés au stade final de la 
politique conjoncturelle d’une part et de la politique monétaire d’autre part. 
Mon groupe n’avait pas compétence pour faire des propositions tenant au droit 
international ou constitutionnel. En soulignant pour la phase finale la nécessité 
d’un centre de décision pour la politique économique et la constitution 
d’un système communautaire des banques centrales, notre préoccupation 
fondamentale était d’assurer l’efficacité de la politique communautaire dans 
ces deux domaines surtout au moment où celle des organismes nationaux tend 
188 Pierre Werner, Itinéraires luxembourgeois et européens. Évolutions et souvenirs: 
1945–1985, Volume 2 (Luxembourg: Éditions Saint-Paul, 1992), 131.
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à s’affaiblir du fait de transferts successifs de compétence.
 Le second ordre d’idées sur lequel nous devions nous pencher était celui 
du renforcement de la coordination des politiques économique et budgétaire. 
Sur ce point nous avons essayé de donner une description aussi complète 
que possible des domaines dans lesquels l’action communautaire doit être 
poursuivie, les conséquences qui en découlent pour la politique régionale et 
structurelle. En ce qui concerne la première étape, nous avons approfondi 
plus particulièrement les méthodes de confrontation et de coopération des 
politiques économique et budgétaire, tout en indiquant dans les grandes 
lignes la politique des marchés financiers, la politique de la monnaie et du 
crédit. Le souci primordial du groupe est d’accroître l’efficacité des méthodes 
d’information et de consultation afin de dégager des orientations communes. 
Le rapport consacre toute une section à des propositions de procédures 
comportant notamment trois examens intervenant tout au long de l’année et 
donnant lieu à la rédaction d’un rapport annuel sur la situation économique 
de la Communauté. En matière de politique budgétaire des orientations 
communes seront recherchées pour certains éléments quantitatifs globaux et 
les modes de financement du budget. Nous pensons que les attributions des 
Gouverneurs de banque centrale devront être élargies.
 C’est à la description de la première étape qui doit débuter au premier 
janvier prochain et s’étendre sur trois années que le groupe a consacré le 
plus de soins. Il s’est avéré en effet que pour avancer utilement il importe de 
déclencher l’action parallèle sur un ensemble de fronts. La première étape 
aura dans une large mesure un caractère expérimental.
 Avant de passer à la seconde étape, nous proposons de procéder 
à un inventaire des résultats réalisés et de convoquer une conférence 
intergouvernementale devant fixer le détail et le calendrier précis de 
l’évolution entre 1974 et 1980 que nous indiquons seulement dans ses grands 
traits. Pour surmonter les divergences de vues qui étaient apparues dans la 
première phase de nos travaux, nous avons dû consacrer un effort particulier 
pour la définition des actions à entreprendre afin de marquer la personnalité 
monétaire de la Communauté.
 Pour cette partie de notre étude, nous avons été grandement servis par un 
rapport du Comité des Gouverneurs de banque centrale auquel j’avais soumis 
un questionnaire sur les aspects techniques. Je rends hommage à l’excellence 
de ce rapport et à l’esprit coopératif des Gouverneurs.
 Dans le domaine proprement monétaire, nous avons repris dans 
le rapport la décision du Conseil en date du 9 juin 1970 selon laquelle la 
Communauté ne devra pas se prévaloir dans les relations de change entre les 
pays membres de dispositions éventuelles permettant un assouplissement du 
système international des changes. Le groupe préconise pour la première étape 
un certain nombre d’actions dont la réalisation est conditionnée pour chacune 
par le résultat de l’action antérieure. Les Banques centrales procéderont à des 
limitations en fait de fluctuations des cours de change entre leurs monnaies. 
Cette limitation successive des marges pourra prendre ensuite un caractère 
officiel. Afin de faciliter le déroulement des opérations préconisées nous pensons 
qu’il sera opportun de confier à un agent la tâche d’enregistrer les soldes. 
 Nous avons résolu la controverse de la création d’un fonds de 
stabilisation des changes en proposant de constituer aussitôt que possible un 
fonds européen de coopération monétaire dont les attributions feront l’objet 
de développements successifs. Pour autant que les techniques prévues pour 
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la première étape auront fonctionné normalement et sans heurts et qu’une 
convergence suffisante aura été réalisée, le fonds pourra être éventuellement 
instauré déjà au cours de la première étape. En tout cas, il devra être mis en 
place au cours de la seconde étape. Il finira par absorber les mécanismes de 
soutien monétaire à court terme et de concours mutuel à moyen terme.
 Je suis heureux de constater que sur tous ces aspects nous avons réalisé 
un avis collectif unanime. Ces réponses communes évidemment ne traduisent 
pas toutes les préférences individuelles des membres du groupe. Mais nous 
estimons qu’après avoir fait le tour de la question, au cours de longues 
confrontations d’idées nous avons réussi à traduire le vœu du parallélisme 
dans les actions à entreprendre sur le plan économique et financier. Notre 
ambition était de briser définitivement le cercle vicieux des préalables 
économiques et politiques. Entre l’opinion qui considère l’union monétaire 
comme le couronnement de l’intégration européenne et celle qui en ferait le 
moteur quasi tout puissant, nous avons essayé de tracer une ligne médiane. 
Je pense que les propositions sont dans la ligne des traités existants, qu’elles 
tendent précisément à assurer la réalisation de la plénitude de leurs objectifs. 
Aussi pour la première étape, pouvons-nous faire une grande partie du chemin 
sans modification des traités. Toutefois, une forte volonté politique doit 
accompagner ce processus tout au long de sa réalisation.
 La mise en œuvre à partir du 1er janvier de ce processus constituera pour 
la Communauté une chance de relance que les Européens attendent et qui est 
d’ailleurs dans l’intérêt commun de nos pays.
 Je termine en rendant hommage à la compétence et à la bonne volonté 
de mes collaborateurs. Cette expérience était pour moi personnellement 
enrichissante au point de vue intellectuel et exaltante comme travail d’équipe.
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 Introduction to document 36
During his university studies in Paris, Pierre Werner forged links with 
eminent professors including Jacques Rueff, Charles Rist, Wilfrid Baumgartner 
and Fernand Colin, who stimulated his interest in economic and monetary 
questions. Some of these relationships lasted for several decades, such as 
those subsequently forged with Pierre Wigny and Robert Triffin, with whom 
Werner shared many ideas. 
 As the ad hoc group carried out its work, Pierre Werner held in-depth 
intellectual exchanges with some of these figures, and they shared his sense of 
satisfaction at the drafting of the stage-by-stage plan and at the agreement that 
had been reached. 
 On 28 October 1970, Jacques Rueff sent a personal letter – reproduced 
here as document 36 – to Pierre Werner to congratulate him on his monetary 
plan, emphasising the plan’s lack of dogmatism and the fact that it proposed 
compromises to problems that could not be resolved in the current 
circumstances.
 Rueff recognised the good judgment and realism of his former student, 
both in his art of securing compromises and in the written style of the plan by 
stages.
 At the end of his letter, Rueff restated his 1949 credo — ‘Europe will 
be created by means of a single currency or not at all’189 — a vision that the 
Werner Plan helped turn into reality.
36.
Letter by Jacques Rueff to the Luxembourg Prime Minister and Minister of 
Finance (Pierre Werner), 28 October 1970.
© Family Archives Pierre Werner.
J’ai pris connaissance avec un extrême intérêt de votre projet monétaire. 
 Permettez-moi de vous dire que j’en admire profondément la sagesse 
et le réalisme. J’espère ne pas vous choquer en vous disant que ce qui me 
plaît le plus en lui est son absence de dogmatisme. Il propose des solutions 
de transaction à des problèmes que l’état actuel des choses ne permet pas de 
résoudre. 
 J’espère qu’on vous suivra et qu’ainsi, vous aurez donné une confirmation 
à la formule que j’employais en 1949 dans la revue Synthèse: l’Europe se fera 
par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas. 
 Je vous prie de croire, mon cher Ministre et Ami, à l’assurance de mon 
fidèle souvenir et de mes plus cordiales pensées. 
189 Synthèses. Revue mensuelle internationale 4(1950), 267.
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Although discussions on monetary integration are often of a complex and 
technical character, the policies that come out of these negotiations do have a 
real effect on the daily lives of citizens.
The above picture shows how fluctuating exchange rates made tourists flock 
the exchange office at Amsterdam Central Station during 




 Introduction to document 37
Having received the Werner Report on 15 October, it was time for the European 
Commission to act under its own banner. On 29 October the Commission 
submitted a communication to the Council of Ministers on the realisation by 
stages of economic and monetary union. It reproduced the essence of the 
Werner Report and supplemented it with two proposals for decisions to step 
up the coordination of short-term economic policy, as well as the cooperation 
between the central banks. Without repudiating the substance, it toned 
down federalist or supranational turns of phrase. The Commission proposals 
explicitly added what Werner later described as ‘my own, unstated conviction 
that the transfer of certain powers to the Community should be limited to what 
was necessary to keep the union together and ensure that Community action 
was effective.’190
 To prepare the ground for the next stage, the Commission undertook to 
submit to the Council, by 1 May 1973, a Communication on progress achieved 
and on new steps to be taken, including amendments to the EC Treaties. 
Nonetheless, the Commission refrained from proposing a programme for the 
later stages.
 This time it fell to the German Government to criticise the Commission. 
Germany, soon supported by the Netherlands, accused the Commission of 
having watered down the ideas of the Werner Report, the representation 
of which by the Commission gave it a more monetarist slant. Bonn was also 
dissatisfied that the Commission did not put forward proposals that went 
beyond the first phase. It set the stage for more than just a Franco-German 
confrontation. 
37.
Proposal by the European Commission for a Council Decision on strengthening 
coordination of the Member States’ short-term economic policies, 30 October 
1970.
Bulletin of the European Communities, November 1970, Supplement 11/70. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. © 
European Union.
The Council of the European Communities,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 
and in particular Articles 103 and 145 thereof,
Having regard to the final communiqué of the Conference of Heads of State or 
Government in The Hague on 1 and 2 December 1969, and particularly point 
8 thereof,191
190 Pierre Werner, Itinéraires luxembourgeois et européens. Évolutions et souvenirs: 
1945–1985, Volume 2 (Luxembourg: Éditions Saint-Paul, 1992), 134–135.
191 See document 22.
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Having regard to the Council resolution of…,
Having regard to the proposal of the Commission, 
Whereas, on 8 October 1970, the Working Party set up by the Council decision 
of 6 March 1970 forwarded to the Council and the Commission its report on 
the realization by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community,192
Whereas such economic and monetary union cannot be achieved unless the 
coordination of the economic policies of the Member States is strengthened 
during the first stage of the plan,
Whereas new procedures must be prepared to this end, allowing, if necessary, 
decisions, directives or recommendations to be agreed as provided for in the 
Treaty,
Whereas, taking into account the absence of any synchronization of the time-
tables now in force in the Member States for the establishment of budgets, 
the most suitable dates for determining common short-term economic policy 
guidelines are February, June and October,
has decided as follows:
Article 1
Each year the Council shall hold three sessions devoted to the examination 
of the economic situation in the Community. On the basis of a Commission 
memorandum, accompanied where necessary by proposals for decisions, 
directives or recommendations, it shall work out common guidelines for the 
short-term economic policy to be followed by the Member States.
Article 2
The first examination shall take place during the month of February; its 
purpose shall be to review the economic policy pursued in the previous year 
and to adapt that for the current year to the exigencies of the development of 
the economic situation.
Article 3
A second examination shall take place in the month of June. Its purpose shall 
be:
(a) To clarify the policy to be pursued in the current year;
(b) To determine, within the framework of compatible, preliminary economic 
budgets, quantitative guidelines for the public budgets of the following 
year, before the drafts of these are finally agreed by the Governments of the 
Member States. These guidelines shall concern the variation in the volume of 
the budgets, the volume of balances and the methods of financing or utilizing 
these.




A third examination shall take place in October. On this occasion, the Council, 
on a Commission proposal, and after consulting the European Parliament, 
shall draw up an annual report on the economic situation of the Community 
making it possible to lay down the guidelines which each Member State will 
have to observe in its economic policy for the following year.
Article 5
The Governments shall communicate this annual report to their national 
parliaments before these adopt the budget. 
Article 6
This decision is addressed to the Member States.
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During the 1960s, the Netherlands Government was a strong supporter of 
global cooperation within the framework of the Bretton Woods system, which 
met the country’s export interests in the sense of fixed exchange rates, a stable 
basis for trade. The Netherlands therefore considered any European initiatives 
in monetary matters to be devoid of national, Dutch interest, even pointless, 
and they were rejected. 
 This approach shifted in the early 1970s when, following the proposals 
to build an economic and monetary union and the impact of the unstable 
international monetary climate, the Dutch adopted an increasingly positive 
attitude to European monetary cooperation. It was in this context that 
the government reacted to the conclusions of the Hague Summit and 
the establishment of the Werner Committee. The approach taken by the 
Netherlands in the negotiations was determined at the outset by Finance 
Minister Johan Witteveen, who believed that the development of monetary 
cooperation should depend on the harmonisation of economic policies.193 
In the clash between ‘economists’ and ‘monetarists’ that characterised the 
development of the stage-by-stage plan, the Dutch clearly came out on the side 
of the economists, in the same way as the Germans. 
 In the Netherlands the Ministry of Finance had a notable influence in 
the coordination of the European monetary policy and cooperated closely 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even if sometimes diverging interests 
and tensions arose.194 The publication of the interim report by the Werner 
Committee presented one such case. Finance Minister Witteveen reminded his 
colleagues in the cabinet that ‘at the conference at the Hague Summit, it was 
decided, under pressure from the Foreign Ministry, that European monetary 
integration should be achieved in the near future. The undersigned has always 
had concerns in that respect.’195 But ‘the discussions conducted within the 
various bodies meant that a broad consensus was able to be achieved […] and 
a collective approach […] was adopted when taking decisions’.196
 The Werner Report itself197 won the support of the Netherlands 
Government.198 It was perceived as an acceptable compromise between the 
monetary facilities and measures requested by France, and the coordination 
of economic policy advocated by the Dutch and the Germans. Moreover, the 
report stressed the need to strengthen the decision-making process and 
Community responsibilities. In his memoirs, Pierre Werner describes the 
initial reactions to the official presentation of the report and the prospects 
for practical action in the immediate future. ‘The President of the Council, 
193 See also document 22.
194 See for example the introduction to document 15.
195 Minutes Cabinet Meeting, 5 June 1970. National Archives (The Hague), Archive of the 
Council of Ministers (2.02.05.02) inv.no. 987.
196 Jan Willem Brouwer and Anjo G. Harryvan, ‘Les Pays-Bas et la coopération monétaire 
européenne, 1968–1972’, In Le rôle des ministères des Finances et de l’Économie dans la 
construction européenne (1957–1978), Actes du colloque tenu à Bercy les 26, 27 et 28 mai 
1999, vol. 1 (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2001), 
87.
197 See document 34.




Minister Scheel, congratulated me and thanked me most warmly, as did the 
Finance Ministers Snoy and Möller (FRG) and the State Secretary to Colombo, 
Pedini. French Minister Maurice Schumann was more cautious in his reaction. 
The Netherlands representative offered his support but objected to the 
fact that, with the agreement of my colleagues, I had convened an informal 
meeting of the Finance Ministers for 9 November. […] Maurice Schumann took 
me to one side and informed me of the various reactions within the French 
Government.’199 The French authorities rejected the Werner Plan. 
 On 29 October 1970, the EC Commission published its own report.200 
For the Netherlands Government, the plan drafted by the EC Commission was 
unacceptable. Document 38 offers evidence of this reaction. In his memoirs 
Werner himself wrote with a slightly bitter undertone: ‘The unofficial meeting 
of the Finance Ministers on 9 November, particularly requested by my 
colleagues Snoy, Schiller and Möller, was first postponed and then cancelled 
when I learned that Giscard d’Estaing, who had been of great assistance 
for my work, could not attend the meeting in person. In the meantime, the 
Commission had taken up the issue. It was considered from that moment on 
that the follow-up to the reports would come in the form of official reports 
between the Commission and the Council of Ministers.’201
38.
Memorandum of the Chief of the Directorate for Economic Cooperation of the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rob van Schaik) to the Minister (Joseph 
Luns) and the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Hans de Koster) on the monetary 
union, 5 November 1970.
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1965-1974 (2.05.313), inv.no. 19479. Translation: Huygens ING, 
The Hague.
Tomorrow, Minister Witteveen will probably raise the issue of the Economic 
and Monetary Union in the Council of Ministers; this with an eye on the meeting 
that the Finance Ministers of the Six will probably have next week (perhaps 
the meeting will be cancelled due to illness of Minister Giscard, the initiator). 
Minister Witteveen has unsuccessfully opposed against this meeting, which, 
additionally, takes place outside the regular meetings of the Finance Ministers. 
Given the importance of the discussion topic, Minister Witteveens believes that 
he cannot avoid attending the meeting.
 Undoubtedly, the Finance Ministers will want to discuss the proposals 
issued this week by the Commission in response to the report of the Werner 
group. In our opinion, which is shared by the Ministry of Finance, the Finance 
199 Pierre Werner, Itinéraires luxembourgeois et européens. Évolutions et souvenirs: 1945–
1985, Volume 2 (Luxembourg: Éditions Saint-Paul, 1992) 134.
200 Commission memorandum and proposals to the Council on the establishment by 
stages of economic and monetary union, 30 October 1970. Bulletin of the European 
Communities, no. 11 (1970), part 1, chapter 2. This document is also available at http://
aei.pitt.edu/1092/ [accessed February 2012]. See also document 37.
201 Pierre Werner, Itinéraires luxembourgeois, 134.
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Ministers should not comment on the proposals of the Commission.202 These 
proposals have, in fact, been submitted to the Council and moreover concern a 
matter already pending before the Council. The report of the Werner group203 
was written commissioned by the Council.
 Since (most) Finance Ministers will particularly want to speak about the 
Commission proposals, it will probably be impossible for Minister Witteveen 
to keep the proposals entirely out of the discussions. In that case, a negative 
opinion of Minister Witteveen on the Commission proposals would be fitting. 
It is the intention of the Commission that the Council will not decide on the 
report of the Werner group itself, but on a draft resolution written by the 
Commission, in which all the parts of the Werner report that are considered 
essential by the Netherlands have been removed, or seriously weakened. The 
‘centre de décision’ for economic policies (the supra-national body) considered 
to be essential in the Werner Report is not mentioned at all by the Commission. 
Instead of the provision that this body will be politically responsible to a 
European parliament, now only competences to be subject to democratic 
control at the community level are mentioned. Instead of the key provision 
on the treaty changes to be adopted that are necessary for the full realization 
of the Economic and Monetary Union before the end of the first stage, the 
Commission in its draft resolution only talks about measures to be taken after 
the first stage. This latter formula cannot prevent, unlike the formula from the 
Werner report that after the first phase the EEC would slide down towards the 
French views in the monetary field without having reached agreement on the 
end goal.204 If the Council were to accept the Commission proposals unchanged, 
the opportunity offered by the Summit to bring the European integration an 
important step closer to an end by taking the economic-monetary route, would 
be lost for the time being.
 Given the objections mentioned above, which are fully shared by the 
Ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs, the Commission proposals appear 
unacceptable for the Netherlands, at least in their present form.
202 See document 37.
203 See document 34.
204 In the meeting of the interdepartmental Coordination Committee for European 
Integration and Association Issues on, it is pointed out more clearly that the changes 
in the proposals were made at the insistence of the French: ‘The way in which the 
Commission has intended to disrupt the coherence of the ideas from the Werner Rapport 
in her own proposals in favour of the one-sided, short term vision of the French is 
considered as a very questionable development’. National Archives of the Netherlands 
(The Hague),Archive of the Cabinet of the Prime-Minister (2.03.01), inv.no. 2707. This 
document is available on the Huygens ING website: www.europadocs.eu.
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While the Werner Group was dicussing the introduction of a common currency, 
Great-Britain was not yet a member of the European Community. 
Nevertheless, the first Euro-coin was offered to the Former Secretary of State 
of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom. George Brown received the prototype 
during a meeting in The Hague in December 1971. The coin was designed and 





 Introduction to document 39
Although the United Kingdom was attached to the European idea, it was 
initially reluctant to participate in the project to establish a European 
Economic Community and expressed reservations at the possibility of 
moving towards a supranational system. In 1948 the British had opposed 
any binding coordination between the economies of the member countries of 
the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation. Consequently London 
refused to join the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. Yet strong 
impetus from the British business community, which had observed the rapid 
economic development of the EEC, effected a change in the British position 
later on. The UK applied to join the Community, but its application was rejected 
on two occasions, in 1963 and 1967, following French vetoes. This meant that 
at the dawn of the 1970s, the British were mere spectators of the debates on 
the establishment of an economic and monetary union between the Six.
 Following the Conservative Party’s victory in the elections of 18 June 
1970, the United Kingdom had a Conservative government, led by Edward 
Heath. The new Prime Minister publicly expressed commitment to his 
country’s joining the European Community. He was convinced that economic 
and monetary union were in the best interests of Western Europe and the 
United Kingdom. 
 When the Heath Government took office, the Werner Committee had 
already issued its interim report.205 In the meetings of the Werner Committee, 
Ansiaux – supported by Werner in the chair and with Benelux backing – 
prompted the strengthening of monetary solidarity. The consequences of 
the UK’s possibly joining the mechanisms for monetary cooperation were 
analysed in detail.206 So was the effect the pound sterling would have on the 
European Reserve Fund. The final version of the Werner Report, published on 
8 October 1970, was carefully studied in London. As the document focused 
on stage one207 and given that the effects of embarking on that stage would be 
comparatively innocuous for the United Kingdom,208 the British attitude was 
positive. Pierre Werner was heavily involved in drawing up the English version 
of the report and wrote several key passages of it himself. He worked hard to 
have it disseminated in the UK and explained the principles and concepts set 
out in it in detail in the debates and lectures he gave with his opposite number 
and later friend, Edward Heath.209
 In November 1970, the Foreign Office, which was negotiating the terms 
of the United Kingdom’s accession to the European Communities, gave its 
205 Interim Report on the Establishment by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union 
–‘Werner Report’ [20 May 1970]. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement no. 
7 (1970).
206 Commission européenne, Groupe interservices, ‘Note portant sur la réalisation 
de l’Union économique et monétaire dans la perspective de l’élargissement de la 
Communauté’, 28 April 1970. Historical Archives of the European Commission, BAC 
375/1999 578, vol. 2, 0181–0191.
207 Stage one was to start on 1 January 1971 and last three years.
208 In stage one, the consultation procedure would be stepped up, possibly involving 
British participation.
209 Interview with Henri Werner, son of Pierre Werner, recorded at the CVCE on 1 June 
2010. CVCE/Family Archives Pierre Werner.
196
document 39
official reaction to the Werner Report210 and the Commission Plan.211 Taking 
a forward view to accession in 1973, the Foreign Office referred to the radical 
changes the stage-by-stage plan proposed over a ten-year period. The main 
considerations are reproduced in document 39.
 The United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Accession on 22 January 1972. 
It entered into force on 1 January 1973. In his memoirs, Prime Minister Edward 
Heath singled out the event as one of the three points – the other two were also 
related to the British accession to the EEC – of his life at which he felt ‘the most 
profound sense of satisfaction’.212 
39.
Reaction of the British Foreign Office to the Werner Plan, 9 November 1970.
The National Archives of the United Kingdom (London, Kew), Sub-committee 
of Official Committee on Monetary aspects of UK entry to EEC. Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 9 November 1970, FCO 30/789. © Crown Copyright.
– – – 
Implications for the UK: Summary
75. The First Stage proposals of Werner213 would certainly present some 
sizeable problems for us but it is reasonable to assume that we should not be 
the only member of the Community to face such problems. Other countries 
would also have difficulties. But our problems in some fields could be rather 
more troublesome than theirs (in relation, for example, to projections of the 
course of domestic prices, and of the current account surplus). However, these 
problems ought not in general to be incapable of agreed solutions within the 
Community. There would be relatively little surrender of national sovereignty 
in the economic field, though, as the first stage progressed, sovereignty would 
pass steadily towards the centre. 
76. The Community’s traditionally ‘pragmatic’ progress suggests that each 
step would be tried and tested by experience before Members move on to the 
next. If we join the Community in 1973 we shall have a hand in determining 
the final shape — and timing — of the Union. At the ultimate stage economic 
sovereignty would to all intents and purposes disappear at the national level 
and the Community would itself be the master of overall economic policy. The 
degree of freedom which would then be vested in national Governments might 
indeed be somewhat less than the autonomy enjoyed by the constituent states 
of the USA. 
210 See document 34.
211 See document 20.
212 Edward Heath: The Course of My Life (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998) 732.
213 See document 34.
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I. Line to take with the Six
77. Over the past year Ministers of both the present and previous British 
Governments have said on several occasions that they welcome the Six’s moves 
towards EMU, and that the UK would be ready to play a full part, as a member 
of an enlarged Community, in carrying out a plan for its achievement. But they 
have avoided any specific comments on features of the Plan because the Six 
have been discussing it among themselves, and it would have been unwise to 
intervene while the issues were still very fluid.
78. Although the situation is now somewhat clearer, it will continue to be 
advantageous to HMG214 to avoid taking any attitude on the detail of the Werner 
proposals — as distinct from their general direction — until the Ministers of 
the Six have pronounced themselves. The latter are due to discuss the Werner 
Report at a meeting on 23 November, and at a meeting on 14 December are 
expected to take a decision, based on proposals by the Commission, about the 
2 outstanding elements of the Barre Plan215 and about setting in motion the 
first stage Werner proposals (including specific decisions on increased co-
ordination of short-term economic policies and on increased collaboration 
between the EEC Central Banks). 
79. Meanwhile, the subject of EMU will be certain to come up at the talks 
which the Chancellor of the Exchequer216 is due to have at the end of November 
and early in December with, successively, the Finance Ministers of France217, 
Germany218 and the Netherlands.219 These talks will provide a good opportunity 
to gauge the political attitude of the Six towards the Werner Report, and to 
help shape HMG’s judgment about the attitude it should adopt. 
80. Although uncertainties remain about the political attitude of the Six, the 
situation is now clearer in some respects. The Werner Report draws a line 
between two distinct stages. In the first stage, the Six Governments are enjoined 
to develop ever closer collaboration in the conception and execution of their 
economic and monetary policies. At the end of that stage they should assemble 
in conference to decide upon radical changes of a federalist character; to agree 
upon new central institutions and to a steady transfer to them of effective 
powers of economic and monetary management. The second stage would then 
be devoted to a development of those central authorities until the Community 
became a single monetary unit, probably with a single Community currency. 
81. It seems likely that all Six Governments will endorse the proposals for 
the first stage, which do not of themselves involve any specific and overt 
surrenders of sovereignty. M. Werner himself reasonably describes the 
first stage proposals as experimental so that, as he puts it, nobody need get 
alarmed and so that the candidate countries can expect to be full members 
before things have gone further. But the Six — or some of them, notably the 
214 Her Majesty’s Government.
215 See document 20.
216 Anthony Barber.





French — are likely to be much more cautious about proposals for the second 
stage. We do not believe that the Six Governments will commit themselves 
now to undertake a revision of the Treaty of Rome in 1973, and to establish 
thereafter central economic and monetary authorities. On the other hand, it 
looks as if there will be some pressure, perhaps from the Germans and the 
Dutch, to secure fairly precise commitment to the longer-term objectives as a 
precondition to launching the proposals for the first stage. 
82. What line should HMG adopt now on the Plan for EMU? It would be rash 
for us to appear to be more committed to centralist ideas than the French. Not 
only would such an attitude lack credibility; it might well be against our own 
interests and would arouse much controversy at home. If the negotiations 
succeed, we should be a Member of the Community by, say, January 1973, and 
we should then be able to take part in any conference which might later be 
convened to set up central authorities. 
83. On the other hand, against our present expectation, unfolding events 
either within the Six or at home may confront British Ministers inexorably with 
the need to take a definite position on the longer-term implications of EMU. If 
so, this will need the most careful consideration, in the light of the positions 
taken up by the Six. The best general line might be to stress the importance of a 
pragmatic approach, and of concerted Community effort to improve structural 
and regional policies. 
84. Meanwhile we are faced, for practical purposes, with the specific 
proposals for the immediate future; the Barre proposals and the possible steps 
towards systematic co-ordination of policies in the first stage. Tactically, it 
would be wise to express a welcome for these steps and a confidence that we 
should be able to take them, in due course, along with other members of the 
Community and in agreement with them. As for the rest, clearly it will need 
time and experience to see the way forward.
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 Introduction to document 40
On 23 November 1970 the Council of Ministers discussed the Werner report, 
as well as the conclusions of the Commission based on it, for the first time. 
The ministers convened in a tense atmosphere. To the Netherlands and to 
Germany the proposals the Commission had presented on 30 October were 
unacceptable.220 They were considered to have ‘watered down’ the Werner 
report, made it more monetarist, and circumvented the need to change the 
Treaty of Rome.221 It appeared as if the Commission had responded to the 
French reservations to the report by proposing its alternative.222
 Against this background Commission President Franco Malfatti started 
the meeting with an attempt to take the sting out of the objections. His personal 
views appeared more moderate than that of the European Commission as 
a whole. During a conversation with the German Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Walter Scheel two months earlier, Malfatti had stressed that everything had 
to be done to reach a breakthrough and create a real economic and monetary 
union. He hoped that it would be possible to take decisive steps towards the 
establishment of such a union on the basis of the work of the Werner Group 
before the end of the year.223
 Perhaps it was this personal view on the need for further European 
integration that made the verbal explanation of the report by the President seem 
rather different from that what the Commission had written in its proposals. In 
his account, Malfatti stressed the need for democratic control and stated with 
regard to the end phase of the process that ‘although the Commission keeps 
silent on some points, that does not mean that these points are completely 
lost out of sight’.224 He pointed to the fact that the Commission would keep 
the right to initiated procedures and proposals to strengthen coordination 
and to develop the economic union. This was more in line with the position 
the delegations of the Netherlands, Italy and Germany. To them, the terms of 
the end-phase of the economic and monetary union had to be clear before 
220 Report of the Netherlands interdepartmental Coordination Committee on European 
Integration and Association issues 17 November 1970, National Archives of the 
Nederlands (The Hague), Archive of the Cabinet of the Prime-Minister (2.03.01) inv.no. 
8874. This document is available on the Huygens ING website: www.europadocs.eu.
221 See introduction to document 37 and Note of the Netherlands Ministry of Finance, 
‘The move towards an economic and monetary union in the EEC’, 11 November 1970. 
National Archives (The Hague), Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1965-1974 
(2.05.313) inv.no. 14318. This document is available on the Huygens ING website: www.
europadocs.eu.
222 Femke van Esch, Mapping the Road to Maastricht: A Comparative Study of German and 
French Pivotal Decision Makers’ Preferences concerning the Establishment of a European 
Monetary Union during the early 1970s and late 1980s (Wageningen: Polsen & Looyen, 
2007), 207.
223 Report of the conversation between the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Walter 
Scheel and the President of the European Commission Franco Malfatti, 18 September 
1970. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1970 (München: R. 
Oldenourg Verlag, 2001), Band III, Dokument 433, p. 1620.
224 Report of the 131st meeting of the Council of the European Communities., 23 
November 1970. Report by the Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the 
European Communities. National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive 
of the Council of Ministers (2.02.05.02), inv.no. 981. This document is available on the 
Huygens ING website: www.europadocs.eu.
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entering into the first phase. This was not explicit in the Commission proposal, 
especially not in comparison to the Werner Report. It was, therefore, perhaps 
somewhat bewildering that the Commission President went on to stress that 
his interventions were not to be understood as changes in the Commission’s 
original proposal.
 Document 40 contains the summary of the meeting made by office of the 
Permanent Representative of the Netherlands.
40.
Report by the Permanent Representation of the Netherlands of the 131st 
meeting of the Council of the European Communities, 23 November 1970. 
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Council of 
Ministers (2.02.05.02), inv.no. 981. Translation: Huygens ING, The Hague.
– – –
For his personal account the Chairman, Minister Schiller, summarized the 
debate as follows: In principle, all delegations approach the Werner Report in 
a positive and constructive way. The oral presentation by President Malfatti 
is easier to accept for various delegations than the proposals formulated. In 
this light a certain convergence of views appears possible. Several delegations 
believe that at the end of the first phase the experiences will have to be 
discussed at an Intergovernmental Conference and the Treaty amendments for 
the following phases be prepared under Article 236 of the Treaty.225 By many, 
the need for an effective parallelism has been put forward, such as narrowing 
of the band width on the one hand and policy coordination on the other. 
Limitations of powers of national authorities must lead to transfer of those 
responsibilities. Therefore, a strengthening of democratic control is necessary. 
Several delegations have stressed the equal priority of the goals, growth, 
stability and employment. Some delegations stress that the first phase should 
start as soon as possible and attach less importance to a clear specification of 
the other stages. Other delegations, however, particularly want clarity on the 
other stages before entering the first. There is also uncertainty about whether 
or not the central banks can operate according to guidelines of the Council. 
Finally the question arises whether in the first phase, clear obligations for the 
final stage have to be accepted.
225 ‘The Government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to the Council 
proposals for the revision of this Treaty. If the Council, after consulting the Assembly 
and, where appropriate, the Commission, expresses an opinion in favour of the calling of 
a conference of representatives of the Governments of Member States, such conference 
shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of determining in 
common agreement the amendments to be made to this Treaty. Such amendments 




This conclusion of the Chairman was of course completely his own. The 
President of the Commission, Mr. Malfatti, noted in response to this 
summary that his interventions were not to be understood as changes in the 
Commission’s original proposal.
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In May 1953, young members of the Belgian branch of the European 
Movement protest on the streets of Liège in favor of the abolition of frontiers 
and customs controls in Europe.
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The Werner Plan gave rise to many reactions and statements of position. Pierre 
Werner later recollected its immediate effects: ‘Even before the Governments 
had had a chance to give their official view, comments in the press showed that 
the arguments […] which had arisen in committee were going to be reproduced 
in the judgements passed by public opinion and the Governments.’226
 The German press, despite wondering whether some views in the 
report were not utopian, was, generally speaking, inclined to sign up to it. The 
Government in Bonn endorsed the plan and expressed an urgent wish that it 
be ratified as it stood before the end of the year. In France, the publication 
of the plan sparked renewed debate over supranationality. Foreign Minister 
Maurice Schumann wrote in the monthly publication Vision: ‘the economic and 
monetary union of the Six must not be jeopardised by a premature institutional 
jumble […] We should embark on the first, three-year stage before worrying 
about the other stages.’227 Gaullist circles in particular were exasperated about 
the allusion in the report to the establishment of two decision-making centres, 
one drawing up the common economic policy and the other the common 
monetary policy. In 1992 Werner noted in his memoirs: ‘My working party had 
declared itself incompetent to make proposals on political structures. But it 
felt bound to point to the need for such policies to be formulated centrally, even 
if the decision-making power remained in the hands of the existing structures, 
which for economic policy meant the Council and the Commission.’228 In the 
Werner Committee discussion gradually focused on the nature and powers 
of the decision-making bodies at an advanced or final stage. Meanwhile, 
the Dutch were trying to establish a link with the negotiations on British 
accession.229 According to Werner, Germany’s Foreign Minister Walter Scheel 
rejected a proposal to stop the clock symbolically at midnight on 31 December, 
as it appeared that people did not want to hold a session before the end of 
the year. Besides, Schumann had revealed to him that he wanted to postpone 
discussions till January.230 
 In January 1971, the Franco-German summit in Paris between President 
Georges Pompidou and Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt promised a potential 
breakthrough. Economic and monetary union were on the agenda. The 
conclusions of the summit highlighted both the differences and the views held 
in common. Germany shared France’s opinion that economic and monetary 
union needed to become operational rapidly and effectively, and that an 
appropriate instrument was necessary for the purpose. It was up to the Council 
of Ministers to take a decision on the issue. Despite asserting its political 
determination to set up an economic and monetary union within a decade, 
France refused to agree to such a target as a legal obligation. The French had no 
intention of carving the duration of the first stage in stone, even if they agreed 
on what it would involve, and did not support setting up a central bank with its 
own accountability. What the two governments agreed on was that progress 
226 Pierre Werner, Itinéraires luxembourgeois et européens. Évolutions et souvenirs: 







towards economic union and monetary union should go hand in hand. To bring 
this about, France saw it as vital that an ‘escape clause’ be introduced for the 
duration of stage one. This clause would mean that if a country refused to the 
follow the Community’s recommendations for putting its economy in order, 
each of the partners could withdraw from its mutual assistance obligation. 
Even though Germany was not opposed to the idea in principle, Bonn thought 
it would be more fitting for a clause of this kind to take effect in stage two. 
Diplomatic sources stressed that the only motive for Germany’s attitude 
towards the Werner Plan was its concern to safeguard the stability of the 
German economy and currency. Germany saw the coordination of economic 
policies as a prerequisite to monetary integration. Bonn believed that the 
European economies needed to converge on common objectives in advance 
of the gradual introduction of Community measures with a monetary impact. 
This involved a reduction in fluctuation margins between the currencies, 
changes in parities, and the establishment of a European Reserve Fund). The 
German argument also considered that countries in a balance of payments 
crises (such as France) were in favour of a monetary union to resolve their 
problems without reforming their economic policy and counting on European 
reserves, which would essentially be German reserves.231
 The Paris Summit resulted in an agreement between France and Germany 
on the method to establish economic and monetary union. On the basis of this 
common position, the Council of Ministers, meeting on 8 and 9 February 1971, 
adopted the decisions required for the implementation of the first stage of the 
Werner Plan, which was due to run from 1 July 1971 to 31 December 1973.
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Note by the Luxembourg Embassy in Bonn to the Luxembourg Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (Gaston Thorn) on the Franco-German position regarding the economic 
and monetary union, 27 January 1971
Family Archives Pierre Werner. © Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Luxembourg
Faisant suite à votre télex no 32/71 du 27 janvier 1971, j’ai l’honneur de vous 
faire rapport sur la conférence au sommet ci-dessus mentionnée.
 Ce rapport ne porte que sur les questions européennes, mon interlocuteur, 
le secrétaire d’Etat von Braun, n’ayant pas été en mesure de me donner des 
informations sûres quant aux problèmes de la ‘Ostpolitik’232 et de Berlin. Cet 
aspect de la conférence fera l’objet d’une autre dépêche, dès qu’il m’aura été 
possible de recueillir les données nécessaires. 
I. Union économique et monétaire
Selon M. von Braun, des divergences de vues entre les deux partenaires 
au sujet de l’union économique et monétaire subsistent. En marge de la 
conférence ministérielle du 14 décembre 1970, on avait prêté à la RFA une 
231 See also document 44.
232 In 1970 the German socialist-liberal government led by Willy Brandt introduced a 
new policy concerning the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
with the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Sovjet-Union and Poland. This new 
‘Ostpolitik’ led to the realization of formal relations between the two German states and 




a) de vouloir, par le biais de l’union économique et monétaire, s’attaquer au 
compromis luxembourgeois de janvier 1966233 pour réintroduire la règle de la 
majorité,
b) de tendre, par des modifications du traité de Rome, à un changement 
dans les rapports entre le conseil des ministres et la commission.
 Cette double hypothèse manque de tout fondement. La RFA est d’accord 
avec la France pour que l’union économique et monétaire devienne active 
(tätig werden) rapidement et efficacement et qu’à cet effet un instrument 
approprié doive être créé.
 Il s’agit d’examiner quel instrument, quel appareil peut être créé
1. sans modification du traité,
2. par une addition au traité sur la base de l’article 235,234
3. par une modification du traité sur la base de l’article 236.235
 A la lumière des possibilités qui se seront dégagées de l’examen de ces 
différentes hypothèses, il appartiendra au conseil de décider de l’appareil 
‘Apparat’ à créer. (Mon interlocuteur n’a à aucun moment prononcé le mot 
d’institution).
 Les deux partenaires sont d’accord qu’il faut se fixer comme but la 
réalisation de l’union économique et monétaire endéans une période de dix 
ans. Dans le chef de la France, cela signifie qu’elle a la volonté politique de 
réaliser cet objectif; elle refuse cependant de l’accepter comme une obligation 
juridique.
 Le contenu de la première étape est plus ou moins arrêté. La France 
toutefois n’entend pas que la durée de cette étape soit fixée d’une façon trop 
rigide. Elle pourra comporter une durée de trois ans, grosso modo. (A en croire 
certains échos dans les journaux, M. Schiller aurait déclaré que de nombreuses 
questions techniques restent à résoudre).
 La France n’a pas donné son accord pour l’institution d’un système 
bancaire central ayant une responsabilité propre.
 Par contre, il y a eu accord entre les deux gouvernements quant au 
parallélisme dans le développement entre l’union économique, d’une part et 
l’union monétaire, de l’autre. La RFA voit dans ce parallélisme une condition 
233 The Luxemboug compromise of 29 January 1966 made an end to an institutional 
crisis within the European Communities, which started at 30 June 1965 when France 
decided to boycott the Council of Ministers because of disagreement on the decision 
making process within the Communities. The compromise was an informal agreement 
stating that when a decision was subjected to qualified majority voting, the European 
Commission would postpone a decision if any member states felt that very important 
interests were under threat.
234 ‘If any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the functioning of the 
Common Market, one of the aims of the Community in cases where this Treaty has not 
provided for the requisite powers of action, the Council, acting by means of a unanimous 
vote on a proposal of the Commission and after the Assembly has been consulted, shall 
enact the appropriate provisions’.
235 ‘The Government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to the Council 
proposals for the revision of this Treaty. If the Council, after consulting the Assembly 
and, where appropriate, the Commission, expresses an opinion in favour of the calling of 
a conference of representatives of the Governments of Member States, such conference 
shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of determining in 
common agreement the amendments to be made to this Treaty. Such amendments 




fondamentale. Mon interlocuteur m’a affirmé avec force que la RFA veut à tout 
prix éviter qu’une ‘Communauté de stabilité’ ne se développe en ‘communauté 
d’inflation’. L’Allemagne veut sauvegarder sa stabilité avant tout.
 M. Pompidou, pour rendre ce parallélisme effectif, a émis l’idée de 
prévoir une ‘clause de prudence’ pour la durée de la première étape. Cette 
clause signifierait que si un pays se refuse de suivre les recommandations 
de la communauté en vue de son assainissement économique chacun des 
partenaires pourra se retirer de son obligation de concours mutuel.
 Le Gouvernement fédéral ne s’oppose pas a priori à cette suggestion, mais 
il estime au premier abord qu’elle devrait valoir au-delà de la première étape. 
Il est disposé à créer les conditions les meilleures pour assurer un progrès au 
prochain round. Une crise européenne en ce moment, à ses yeux, serait fort 
malencontreuse.
 Ces propos, à mon sentiment, laissent supposer que le Gouvernement 
fédéral ira aussi loin que possible dans la voie des concessions à l’égard 
de la France. Dans ce contexte, j’ai fait état de spéculations qui prêtent au 
gouvernement allemand l’intention d’être souple dans la question de l’union 
économique et monétaire, dans l’espoir que la France prendra une attitude 
moins rigide sur Berlin pour ne pas gêner la Ostpolitik de M. Brandt. Mon 
interlocuteur a repoussé énergiquement cette spéculation et a affirmé avec 
vigueur que la seule motivation de la position allemande à l’égard du Plan 
Werner était sa préoccupation de sauvegarder la stabilité de l’économie et 
de la monnaie allemande. (M. Schumann aurait d’ailleurs, au sein du cabinet 
français, donné la même motivation de la politique allemande). 
II. Elargissement de la communauté
Ce sujet n’a pas été très approfondi. Deux problèmes ont émergé de l’échange 
de vues sur ce point.
1. Il faut exiger de l’Angleterre la ‘Bereitschaft’ de participer à un règlement 
financier définitif.
2. La proposition britannique quant à sa contribution initiale pendant la 
phase transitoire est insuffisante. La solution française, de son côté, va trop 
loin. Il s’agit de trouver une solution moyenne qui serait correcte (fair).
 D’après les Français, les négociations ne pourront pas être conduites 
à leur terme avant l’été. La convocation d’une conférence pourrait devenir 
nécessaire dans deux cas: en cas de succès de la négociation et en cas d’échec.
 La délégation allemande a eu le sentiment que les Français ont 
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At the end of the 1960s, the rationale behind economic and monetary policy 
received a fresh boost under the patronage of Willy Brandt and Georges 
Pompidou. In the context of discussions on the completion, deepening and 
enlargement triad, and believing that setting up a genuine monetary dimension 
was a way of giving greater depth to the process of Community integration, 
Brandt made a proposal to study the possibility of creating a common currency 
fund, a monetary reserve fund. The idea was inspired by Robert Triffin at 
the suggestion of Jean Monnet.236 Schiller, Minister for Economic Affairs and 
Finance, however, was unconvinced. The lack of internal consensus made the 
German Government as a whole sceptical about the feasibility of Europe’s 
economic and monetary plans. As this reservation had been expressed during 
the proceedings of the ad hoc group, Pierre Werner and Jean Monnet were in 
constant consultation with each other. They lobbied Brandt individually and 
together to stir the requisite political influence into action, thereby breaking 
the deadlock in the negotiations and building a consensus around common 
positions.
 Reaction in Germany to the publication of the Werner Report had been 
positive. Speaking to the Bundestag, Brandt described the paper as ‘[a] new 
Magna Carta for the European Community’.237 In a letter to Schiller Brandt 
wrote that the final adoption of the Werner Report by the Council of Ministers, 
‘will probably be the most important decision since the signing of the Rome 
Treaties’.238 
 In France, discussions took a different turn. President Pompidou, in 
particular, thought that transferring fundamental powers in the monetary 
sphere to the Community institutions was neither realistic nor desirable. As 
for future moves towards economic and financial integration, France wanted 
to take on as few commitments as possible. President Pompidou gave explicit 
orders not to conclude the negotiations as planned.239  Faced with this lack 
of enthusiasm, and certain reservations expressed by Germany that echoed 
Schiller’s scepsis about the financing clauses as long as there had been no 
tangible achievements in the area of policy coordination, the Councils of 
Ministers of 23 November and 14 December 1970 back-pedalled and no 
decision on launching stage one of the Werner Plan was taken.
 To break the deadlock, Mr Werner, chairman of the group, wrote to the 
five Heads of Government on 29 December 1970 to voice and to express his 
confidence that a rapid and unanimously acceptable solution would be found. 
Willy Brandt’s reply, presented as document 42, focuses on the prospects for 
236 Pierre Werner, Itinéraires luxembourgeois et européens. Évolutions et souvenirs: 1945–
1985, Volume 2 (Luxembourg: Éditions Saint-Paul, 1992), 102.
237 ‘Declaration on European policy’, 6 November 1970. In: Willy Brandt, Reden und 
Interviews, Volume 1 (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1971), 
238.
238 Letter from Willy Brandt to Karl Schiller, 21 October 1970. Historical archives of 
the Bundesbank, N.2, Vol. 156, quoted in Andreas Wilkens, ‘Une tentative prématurée? 
L’Allemagne, la France et les balbutiements de l’Europe monétaire (1969–1974)’. In 
Elisabeth Du Réau and Robert Frank (ed.), Dynamiques européennes. Nouvel espace. 
Nouveaux acteurs. 1969-1981 (Paris: Publication de la Sorbonne, 2002), 77-103. 
239 Compte rendu du conseil restreint du mercredi 18 novembre à 15 h 30 consacré aux 
affaires européennes: Archives de France, 5 AG 2, vol. 1043, point II.
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the stage-by-stage plan as specified following the Franco-German summit of 
January 1971.
 The Werner Report was the focus of discussions at the meeting of the 
Council of Ministers of 8 and 9 February 1971, at which it was decided that 
the report should be put into action. The Council agreed on four texts, as well 
as on a general resolution on economic and monetary union. These were 
the decision to strengthen the coordination of short-term economic policies, 
cooperation between the central banks, and the implementation of a medium-
term financial assistance mechanism. The fourth element was the medium-
term economic policy programme (1971–1975) of the Community.240
42.
Letter by the German Chancellor (Willy Brandt) to the Luxembourg Prime 
Minister (Pierre Werner), 1 February 1971.
© Family Archives Pierre Werner.
The reason why I have not written until today to thank you for your kind letter 
of 29 December 1970 is that I wanted to wait until after my talks with President 
Pompidou in Paris so that I could refer in more detail to the continuing 
treatment of the staged plan, a matter to which you and I both attach great 
importance.
 You rightly associated your New Year wishes, which I warmly reciprocate, 
with your wishes for the European construction project, which we intend to 
continue promoting in the same way in the coming year. A very important part 
of last year’s work is associated with your name, and I should like to thank you 
once again on behalf of the Federal Government.
 I continue to regard the ‘Werner Report’ as a strategic milestone 
document. The aim of economic and monetary union that we proclaimed in 
The Hague241 must now be enshrined in joint resolutions to guarantee that the 
process will be irreversible and that monetary union, the importance of which 
you particularly stress, will also be an economic union with assured stability 
and satisfactory growth.
 At our talks in Paris, we were unable and unwilling to make any 
presumptions regarding agreement among the Member States of the European 
Community, but I do hope that we have helped to accelerate that agreement.
 President Pompidou and I reaffirmed the political will to achieve union 
within a reasonable period of a decade or so. In pursuit of that goal, we intend 
to proceed realistically and pragmatically. Having reached broad agreement 
in Brussels on the substance of the first stage, which should last for about 
three years, we should now be able to establish a few general principles for the 
subsequent stages. These principles include the need, which was recognised 
in Brussels, to confer on the Community the powers that it needs to create a 
cohesive economic and monetary union that can act effectively. I put it to my 
French interlocutors that, to this end, the Community institutions, including 
the European Parliament, must naturally be enabled to exercise at any time the 
powers conferred on them; this also means that the national central banks, by 
240 Bulletin of the European Communities, no. 4 (1970), 26-27.
241 See document 22.
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envisaging their incorporation into a European central bank organisation, are 
making a direct contribution to the achievement of the objectives of economic 
and monetary union.
 The French Government agrees that, during the first stage, the Council, 
with the support of the Commission, should examine the measures required 
for passage to the subsequent stages in the fields of economic and monetary 
policy as well as the necessary institutional measures. The French Government 
does not in any way rule out the possibility of amendments to the Treaties, 
although it has not hitherto considered it necessary or desirable to state 
explicitly that the procedures under Articles 235 and 236242 would have to be 
followed for future measures which could not be implemented on the basis of 
the existing treaty provisions.
 In response to German concerns about the possibility of unbalanced 
progress in the fields of economic and monetary policy, President Pompidou 
proposed a reservation clause that would enable a Member State to withdraw 
monetary assistance if it were not prepared to apply appropriate recovery 
measures to arrest the decline in the value of its currency. This idea will have 
to be examined in detail. In the course of the discussions, the German side 
also mooted, as an additional point for consideration, the idea of averting the 
danger of progress stalling at the end of the first stage by limiting the lifetime 
of all first-stage monetary measures, institutions and mechanisms to about 
four years or a little more. If the agreed balance in progress between the 
economic and monetary fields cannot be achieved during the first stage, this 
arrangement would provide governments with an additional time span to take 
any necessary remedial action.
 I look forward with confidence to the forthcoming resumption of our 
deliberations in Brussels. You may rest assured that the Federal Government 
will play its part in bringing to fruition the work to which you have devoted so 
much of your energies.
242 ‘The Government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to the 
Council proposals for the revision of this Treaty. If the Council, after consulting the 
Assembly and, where appropriate, the Commission, expresses an opinion in favour of 
the calling of a conference of representatives of the Governments of Member States, 
such conference shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose 
of determining in common agreement the amendments to be made to this Treaty. 
Such amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all Member States in 
accordance with their respective constitutional rules.’
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During their terms as statesmen, the French President De Gaulle and the 
German Chancellor Adenauer contributed to an institutionalisation of Franco-
German bilateral meetings. Here they are pictured together during a manifes-
tation on 9 May 1962 in Bonn. The manifestation supported European integra-
tion and the friendship between France and Germany. 
French and German leaders in general played an important role in the history 
of European integration. In the case of monetary integration the bilateral 
meeting between Pompidou and Brandt in 1971 provided an opportunity to 




 Introduction to document 43
Reports of the bilateral Franco-German meeting on 25 January 1971 held 
that Willy Brandt made some important concessions to Georges Pompidou 
with regard to the completion of the economic and monetary union. For 
the Netherlands this implied that two essential elements of the union – the 
description of the main institutional characteristics for the end phase and 
agreement on the necessary treaty changes before the transition to the second 
phase – were no longer attainable.243
Document 43 reflects the deliberation of the Coordination Committee 
on this issue and reveals the interdepartmental differences that existed in 
deciding on the position to take in the discussions in Brussels. This illustrates 
that although governments present themselves as a unitary actor on the 
European level, the deliberation at the national level is important to understand 
why countries take certain positions towards European integration. The 
Coordination Committee decided to leave the decision on the position to take 
in the next EEC-meeting to the Council of Ministers. On 5 February the Cabinet 
discussed the issue, concluding that there were still a lot of insecurities in the 
negotiations. Foreign Affairs Minister Joseph Luns suggested not to not make 
any concessions to the French on monetary integration before they agreed 
to the British accession to the EEC. Johan Witteveen, Minister of Finance, on 
the other hand was doubtful whether the interest of France in an economic 
and monetary union was as big as previously thought. In this uncertainty, the 
Cabinet thought it best to leave its delegation leeway to act according to the 
circumstances encountered in the negotiations.244
43.
Conclusions of the Netherlands Interdepartemental Coordination Committee 
on European Integration and Association Issues regarding the economic and 
monetary union, 3 February 1971.
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Council of 
Ministers (2.02.05.02), inv.no. 1078. Translation: Huygens ING, The Hague.
The Coordination Committee245 held a very detailed discussion on the topic: 
economic and monetary union (EMU), which will form the main theme of the 
meeting of the Council of the European Communities on 8 and 9 February 
1971. Because of the importance of the problem at hand here as well as the 
243 Letter Posthumus Meyjes to the members of the Coordination Committee for 
European Integration and Association Issues, 1 February 1971: National Archives of 
the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1965-1974 
(2.05.313), inv.no. 14318. This document is available on the Huygens ING website: www.
europadocs.eu.
244 Minutes of the Council of Ministers (Netherlands Cabinet), 5 February 1971: 
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Council of Ministers 
(2.02.05.02), inv.no. 1105. This document is available on the Huygens ING website: www.
europadocs.eu.
245 See the introduction to document 15.
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fact that opinions varied somewhat with regard to the tactics to follow by the 
Netherlands, the Coordination Committee considered a discussion on this 
matter necessary in the Council of Ministers.
 The Coordination Committee began by noting that the bargaining position 
has significantly deteriorated since 14 December 1970.246 Particularly due to 
the concessions247 that Chancellor Brandt has made during his visit to Paris the 
front of the Five against France has weakened, if it not totally collapsed. Italy248 
might retain some of the position it has held thus far, but how long this will last 
is uncertain, especially since Italy will prove susceptible to concessions with 
respect to the future regional policy of the Community.
 Nevertheless, some difference in appreciation of the meaning of these 
developments appeared in the Coordinating Committee. For some, this 
represents a serious and alarming state of affairs. For others, this development, 
although disappointing, is still no reason to despair of an ultimate solution that 
will remain within the limits of acceptability. In particular the fact was pointed 
out that although the German government has dropped a number of important 
desiderata regarding the transition from the first to the second stage and 
towards the end goal, it has on the other hand again reinforced the position by 
the formulation of the ‘clause de prudence’ (specifically the establishment of 
the temporary nature of the first phase).
 The first question concerns the contents of the first phase, in particular 
the opportunity not to accept a number of monetary elements of the first phase, 
now that it looks as if the Dutch desiderata regarding the outline of the end 
goal and the need for treaty amendments will not, or only partly, be achieved. 
This refers to the ‘guillotine clause’ designed by Minister Schiller (which lets 
the monetary provisions of the first phase expire automatically if one does not 
reach agreement on the transition to the second phase) and on the other hand 
to the late abandonment of narrowing the band width. 
 On the acceptability of the guillotine clause consensus existed in the 
Coordination Committee, although the effectiveness of this was not considered 
highly by some. In particular, the representative of the Nederlandsche Bank 
believed that once agreed to, a narrowed band width cannot be undone 
without considerable risk. Several participants therefore argued great caution 
246 136th Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities, 14 December 
1970.
247 After the bi-annual Franco-German meeting on the 25 January 1971 it was reported 
that Brandt made some important concessions to Pompidou with regards to the 
completion of the Economic and Monetary Union. For the Netherlands this would imply 
that two essential elements of the Union – the description of the main institutional 
characteristics for the end phase and agreement on the necessary treaty changes before 
the transition to the second phase – were no longer feasible. Position paper Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the members of the Coordination Committee regarding the 
Netherlands position on the economic and monetary union during the EEC Council of 8 
February, 1 February 1971. National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1965-1974 (2.05.313), inv. no. 14318. This document 
is available on the Huygens ING website: www.europadocs.eu.
248 The Italian Secretary of the Treasury, Mario Ferrari-Aggradi, states that ‘the economic 
and monetary union can only be established against the background of a strongly 
developed political integration. The EMU can not only be a technical issue.’ Report by 
the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands of the 136th Meeting of the Council 
of Ministers of the European Communities, 14 December 1970. National Archives of the 
Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Council of Ministers (2.02.05.02), inv.no. 1076. 
This document is available on the Huygens ING website: www.europadocs.eu.
213
document 43
on this part of the first phase, because otherwise one relinquishes a necessary 
monetary instrument without guarantees regarding the conduct of economic 
policy. Narrowing the band width should therefore only be considered on an 
experimental basis and in its relative, non-absolute form.
 The same question of the expediency of taking measures, be they 
revocable or not, in the first phase can also be asked with regard to the medium 
term support mechanism, although the problems are less stringent than in the 
case of the narrowing of the band width. Chances are after all, that in the first 
phase little use will be made of this mechanism. It was agreed to leave the 
decision on the acceptability of the narrowing of the bandwidth to the Council 
of Ministers.249 For the rest, however, the desirability and acceptability of 
hollowing out the monetary contents of the first phase were questioned.
 The second question on which the discussion in the Coordinating 
Committee focused concerned the tactics to be followed. It was generally agreed 
that the Netherlands must continue to seek alignment to the proposals of the 
Werner Committee. Assuming, however, that one cannot make progress with 
this principle, the question arises to what extent the Netherlands may settle 
for less. Especially on the part of the Ministries of Economy and of Finance 
belief exists that here is some scope for agreement, and such particularly with 
the support of Italy and by seeking affiliation with the good elements in the 
otherwise weakened German position. The Coordination Committee agreed 
however that there is no need to come to a result on 8 and 9 February and 
that a postponement of the decision need not be avoided. There is no reason 
for the Netherlands to achieve a rapid result and for that purpose abandon 
substantive positions.
 On the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent 
Representative, this possibility of delay was linked to the accession negotiations. 
Given the negative French conduct on 1 and 2 February and given the politically 
essential parallelism between enlargement and deepening, there is much be 
said to defer a decision on the first phase, as desired by France, until the time 
is also right for a crisis in the accession negotiations. It is the only lever that can 
be used against France. To this end the Netherlands might, for instance, ask for 
a ‘reflection period’ of 1 to 2 months on 9 February, using the argument that 
the debate on monetary union has led to a new situation. The other ministries, 
notably Economic Affairs and Finance, deemed this tactic unsuitable, either 
because no result can be expected, given the isolated Dutch position in this 
regard, or because one fears that through such a connection even the few 
positive points that appear feasible in the area of monetary union may be 
lost. Indeed, after France will, for other reasons, have made a concession with 
regard to membership, the Netherlands would no longer have any bargaining 
power on the monetary union. This last point was raised particularly by the 
representative of the Ministry of Finance.
 The Chairman of the Coordination Committee250 concluded that the 
249 In the Council of Ministers, Minister of Finance Johan Witteveen declared that 
concerning the medium term support mechanism one should not further than the 
proposals of the Commission. The Netherlands delegation was ordered to act to 
circumstances. Report of the Netherlands Council of Ministers, 5 February 1971. 
National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Council of Ministers 
(2.02.05.02), inv.no. 1105. This document is available on the Huygens ING website: www.
europadocs.eu.




feasibility of the ‘reflection period’ does not seem high without support from 
other Member States; there is much to be said for a delay in decision-making 
by continuing to argue for a number of key issues (although isolation is to be 
avoided), yet the direct link with the accession should better not be expressed. 
On this latter part the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
expressed a reserve. 




 Introduction to document 44
The Werner Report stipulated that the implementation of the first stage 
of economic and monetary union should start on 1 January 1971. But the 
Council of Ministers’ meeting on 14 December 1970, in which the decision 
was expected to be adopted, ended with no result. This outcome was due to 
the constant opposition of France, which refuted any idea of supranational 
institutional construction that Germany considered as a priority. As a matter of 
fact France and Germany held opposite views in terms of both the preparations 
for economic and monetary union and its implementation. France held a 
‘monetarist’ view that advocated an increasing stabilisation of exchange rates, 
which would ultimately be definitively and irreversibly fixed. Germany, took 
a more ‘economist’ approach, insisting on the prior convergence of policies 
and economic and monetary performance. France lauded intergovernmental 
cooperation, whereas for Germany, the Community method was essential. 
 The Franco-German Summit of January 1971 was an opportunity to 
break the deadlock. France accepted the transfer of some responsibilities 
to the Community during the final stage, but rejected any idea of structural 
changes being made to the decision-making process – a principle that was 
important to the Germans, and to the Dutch. Amendments to the Treaty of 
Rome were not discussable to Paris, as was any threat to the predominance 
of the Council of Ministers, or to the unanimity rule (for important matters). 
The principle of parallelism, an important basis for the Werner Report and 
an approach that received the consensus of the incumbent political forces, 
was substantially changed. Nonetheless, and under German pressure, the 
French accepted a future autonomous system for the European central bank, 
but not a decision-making centre for economic policy. Yet the Community 
method was rejected and it was left to the governments of the Community 
countries to achieve harmonisation through consultation. In turn, the Germans 
accepted a reduction in exchange-rate fluctuation margins, the introduction 
of monetary support and the creation of a European Fund, from the first 
stage. Their demands, based on the Schiller Plan that Germany had advocated 
from the outset, were met. It was decided that the transition from the first 
to the second stage would not be automatic. If the partners were unable to 
reach an agreement on the final stage and on its economic and institutional 
implications, the measures recommended for the first stage, particularly the 
reduction of fluctuation margins, would be dropped. This is what the French 
deemed a ‘precautionary clause’ and the Germans a ‘safeguard clause’. 
 Bonn maintained the hope that, in order to save the monetary 
measures included in the first stage, Paris would subsequently make 
concessions concerning the economic policy recommended for the second 
stage. Accepting monetary constraints from the initial stage was a risk 
that the Germans were willing to bear, even without guarantees for future 
harmonisation of economic policies or institution-building. The Federal 
Government made these concessions with the firm conviction that if it 
insisted on the provisions of the Werner Report being adopted in full, this 
could spark off a renewed crisis for the Six, at considerable political cost and 
with the risk of bringing the emerging monetary cooperation to a standstill. 
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 In his memoirs, Pierre Werner describes how the Benelux countries, 
joined by Italy, criticised the private discussions between the French and the 
Germans. In the days following this summit, Jean Monnet was in close contact 
with Willy Brandt in a bid to convert the negative clause into a positive one: if 
agreement were reached on the rest of the provisions, the monetary provisions 
in the first stage would be renewed for the second stage.251 The lines of a new 
compromise were sketched out, and the Council of Economic and Finance 
Ministers, meeting on 8 and 9 February 1971, worked to reach a decision. 
This resulted in an agreement that took the form of a resolution on the stage-
by-stage achievement of economic and monetary union.252 It meant that the 
monetary measures to be taken in the first phase (reduction of the exchange 
fluctuations, a mechanism for mutual financial support, and the prospect of a 
common reserve fund) would be annulled, unless agreement on a conversion to 
the second phase was reached within five years. The Netherlands’ authorities 
deemed it the ‘guillotine clause.’253 Authored and proposed by the German 
Minister for Economic Affairs Karl Schiller, the compromise, perceived largely 
as unsatisfactory, was accepted it because there was no viable alternative. 
 On 10 February 1971, Schiller commented on the establishment of an 
economic and monetary union following the previous day’s discussions. The 
text of his statement is given in document 44. In his statement, he declared 
that he was ‘very happy to have reached an agreement. Given the role that 
the Federal Republic played last year in the Werner Group and the Council, 
this successful conclusion in Brussels is a clear demonstration that through 
our policy we are strongly committed to (…) integration policy and have 
contributed to its advancement.’254
251 Pierre Werner, Itinéraires luxembourgeois et européens. Évolutions et souvenirs: 1945–
1985, Volume 2 (Luxembourg: Éditions Saint-Paul, 1992) 134–138. 
252 Adopted on 22 March 1971 by the Council and the representatives of the governments 
of the Member States. See document 45.
253 Code Message J.M.A.H. Luns to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 February 
1971: National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague), Archive of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1965-1974, (2.05.313), inv.no. 19482. This document is available on the 
Huygens ING website: www.europadocs.eu.




Statement by the German Minister of Economic Affairs (Karl Schiller) in Bonn, 
on the session of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities on 8-9 
February, 10 February 1971.
Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung. 12.02.1971, no. 
22. (Bonn: Deutscher Bundesverlag, 1971). © Presse- und Informationsamt der 
Bundesregierung.
Yesterday‘s decision represents a turning point of moment. Yesterday an 
important breakthrough was achieved, or, as the French have written today in 
Paris: ‘Europe sets out on the journey’. Yesterday we formulated a goal that can 
perhaps best be described so: Europe as an economic and monetary union will 
be a community of stability and growth open to the world. Importance is also 
attached in some formulations to a sequence-first of all stability, then growth.
 Yesterday‘s discussion took place in an exceptionally friendly atmosphere 
and everyone was at pains to display the necessary readiness for compromise.
 Since December 14 and 15, when we found ourselves in a certain 
confrontation, talks and soundings have been going on between Paris and 
Bonn in the course of the Franco-German consultations as also between Rome 
and Paris and with the Commission. All these preparatory talks and soundings 
well prepared the compromise that was found yesterday. Yesterday the so-oft-
invoked ‘spirit of The Hague’255 was present, something which has not always 
been the case.
 At the conclusion of these soundings and preparatory talks, I was able, 
on January 29, to outline in the German Bundestag, in the name of the Federal 
Government, our line of negotiation for the round in Brussels yesterday and 
the day before; it had partly resulted from these preparatory talks, although 
also from our own ideas of the objectives and our assessment of the situation. 
If I compare these eight points with what was achieved yesterday, it is seen 
that there is almost total agreement.
1 Our first thesis was that the initial stage of this phased plan was no goal 
in itself. The political will to proceed to the transition to the further stages and 
to the completion of the economic and monetary union would also have to be 
expressed. Now, since yesterday it has been officially stated in Brussels, and I 
quote:
‘The Council and the representation of the Member States proclaim their 
political will to create in the course of the next ten years an economic and 
monetary union in accordance with a phased plan starting to operate on 
January 1, 1971.’ 
You see that there has been adherence to the old date, January 1, 1971, after 
the tradition already exercised in Brussels in former cases to stop the clock.
2. Secondly, in the Bundestag we stated the desire to ensure an effective 
parallelism between the monetary policy union and the economic policy 
union. In Brussels it now says, and I quote: 
‘The creation of the currency union will have to be accompanied by, 
in particular, parallel progress in the convergence and subsequent 
standardization of the economic policies.’
255 See document 22.
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3. Thirdly, we have said that the final stage must not get lost in any remote 
European fog, there to vanish finally altogether, but that we would have to lay 
down certain basic principles for the final stage without, however, anticipating 
in a perfectionist fashion all detailed arrangements for the final stage. In point 
of fact we have been able to define, for the final stage, the organizational 
requirements, the necessary transfer of powers, and the further institutional 
development.
4. In this connection – and this is the fourth point– a particular part is played 
by the question as to what is to become of the Community organs. We have said 
that these must now be placed in a position whereby they can exercise their 
powers quickly and effectively, that parliamentary control is necessary. Now, in 
Brussels, it has been decided, and I quote: 
‘The institutions of the Community will be placed in a position to 
exercise. Their economic and fiscal policy responsibility quickly and 
effectively. The Community policies laid down within the framework of 
the economic and monetary union are subject to the deliberations and 
the control of the European Parliament.’
This version, that those measures the Community will institute in future 
within the framework of the economic and monetary union are to be subject 
to the deliberations and the control of the European Parliament, was the 
maximum that we, especially the Netherlands and the Federal Republic, were 
able to get out of our French friends, whose ideas, particularly in relation to the 
European Parliament, are naturally somewhat different from ours, even if we 
have already indicated our agreement with this formulation.
5. Fifthly, we said in the Bundestag that, in view of the various ideas of our 
central banks, we now had to ensure a certain central bank policy on our own 
responsibility for a European central bank system. We ourselves take the view 
that an independent European bank system could be an outstanding model 
with autonomy, even for the future common monetary policy to be pursued in 
the final phase. Now, the Brussels Resolution says, and I quote: 
‘Within the framework of its own responsibility, the Community’s central 
bank system contributes to the realization of the Community’s aims of 
stability and growth.’
In addition, there is another Resolution, adopted by the Council, with which the 
governors of central banks are invited themselves to lay down in consultation 
with one another, the modalities.
6. Sixthly, we said that it would have to be ensured that, at the end of the 
initial stage, legally binding decisions were taken for the transition from the 
initial stage and that in this connection measures amending and supplementing 
the Treaty – and for this there are, as is well-known, various Articles in the 
Treaty – must be agreed and, moreover, up to the completion.
 In Brussels, the Council’s common Declaration of Intent was formulated 
to the effect that measures for the full realization of the economic and monetary 
union must be laid down before the conclusion of the initial stage. Then follow 
three categories – which we already been able to discuss to a certain extent 
with our friends in Paris, in the sense of an exchange of view and not in the 
sense of joint decisions. These three categories concern decisions taken within 
the framework of the existing Treaty, decisions pursuant to Article 235256 – that 
256 If any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the functioning of the 
Common Market, one of the aims of the Community in cases where this Treaty has not 
provided for the requisite powers of action, the Council, acting by means of a unanimous 
219
document 44
is, through supplementing the Treaty according to a certain procedure – and, 
finally, also of amendments to the Treaty according to procedures outlined in 
Article 236.257
 In this way we succeeded in securing the agreement of our French 
partner that for the decisions to be taken at the conclusion of the initial stage 
amendments to the Treaty would envisaged – something that it was certainly 
impossible to achieve on December 14 and 15 last.
7. Then, as the seventh point, in the Bundestag, we expressed the view 
that, in order to ensure that the development of the economic and monetary 
measures would actually and effectively, run parallel an expiration clause 
ought to be included. This would mean that if, after a certain time, the economic 
policy measures were not running parallel to the monetary policy measures, 
the monetary policy measures would lapse at a certain date.
 In Brussels we have now also discussed this ‘clause de prudence’, as M. 
Pompidou called it when I put it forward in Paris in a number of variants. After 
a very lively debate it was agreed by everybody. The period over which these 
monetary measures are to run is thereby limited to five years. This present year 
was, as is usual at the conference table, our concession. In the matter itself, in 
the substance, we have secured the full acceptance of the ‘clause de prudence’. 
For us, this is of particular significance, since what takes place economically, 
in economic policy, in the initial stage, consists, in essence, in the Community, 
of the Council giving aids for the orientation of economic and fiscal policy to 
the Member State bodies in order to bring the individual policy measures into 
closer alignment. All this is the intention for the initial stage.
 Where something really legally binding takes place is in the sphere of 
monetary policy. In the initial stage the central banks will together undertake 
interventions in the foreign currency markets. Possibly a Reserve and 
Foreign Currency Offset Fund will be instituted in the first stage. Through 
the interventions the band widths will be narrowed of extended within the 
framework of the International Monetary Fund. All in all, those are the three of 
four groups of measures planned for the initial stage.
 We considered that if by the end of the initial stage corresponding 
measures had not put in an appearance in the sphere of economic policy, these 
monetary policy measures would remain as a torso of the entire economic 
and monetary union but would then cease to operate, whereby it is not our 
intention that this entire process would go back to square one, to January 1, 
1971. Instead, our intention is, by fixing this date, to exert a healthy pressure, 
so that at the end of the initial stage decisions for the correction of economic 
policy can be taken.
8. Eighthly, we also said, finally, in the Bundestag, that the Resolutions must 
be so formulated that the candidate countries – the United Kingdom, Denmark, 
Ireland and Norway – would be able to take an option at the conclusion of the 
vote on a proposal of the Commission and after the Assembly has been consulted, shall 
enact the appropriate provisions’.
257 ‘The Government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to the Council 
proposals for the revision of this Treaty. If the Council, after consulting the Assembly 
and, where appropriate, the Commission, expresses an opinion in favour of the calling of 
a conference of representatives of the Governments of Member States, such conference 
shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of determining in 
common agreement the amendments to be made to this Treaty. Such amendments 




initial stage. This has clearly been achieved. It has also been talked about that 
at the conclusion of the initial stage, when the actual legally binding decisions 
in the economic and fiscal spheres are to be taken, we shall possibly be able 
to welcome a larger number of members. There is no doubt that even in this 
respect our ‘clause de prudence’ – there was no express mention of it in the 
discussion itself – is adequate.
 Therefore, we were successful in Brussels in making the line of 
compromise we had imagined prevail. In point of fact we have not surrendered 
anything fundamental, but the vital elements, the principles as set out in 
exemplary fashion and very clearly in the Werner Report, have been preserved.
 On the way now secured the process towards the economic and monetary 
union can now be followed without any dangerous list towards the monetary 
policy side.
 Nor do we want to decide on such an uncontrolled automation in the 
development such as we are confronted by in, for instance, the European 
agricultural market regulations, about which no one, not even the farmers, are 
happy and which, because of the inherent force in this apparatus, can only with 
difficulty be corrected.
 With regard to this new version of the decision, it has often been said that 
with this phased plan we – like our French friends – are pursuing a pragmatic 
line. I would say that there certainly is a pragmatic element in the initial stage, 
but it is a pragmatism for a limited period, a pragmatism with a firm goal, for, 
particularly, the final stage.
 That, in essence, is the result of the consultations of last Monday and 
Tuesday. It certainly does not mean that we have anticipated all the working 
group under Prime Minister Werner set us in its report last year, but what could 
be achieved under the present circumstances was in fact yesterday achieved – 
more, indeed, than anyone had previously thought possible.
 Moreover, it is also clear to us that the decisions do not cover the whole 
of the ten years, over the whole period up to 1980, but that the next important 
junction and final decision will come at the conclusion of the initial stage in 
the categories I have already described, namely, the decision on the necessary 
supplementation, demanded of us, of the experiences we have gained up to 
then in the sphere of monetary policy by corresponding safeguards in the 
sphere of economic policy.
 In the coming days and weeks there will be a pretty deep discussion on 
what has, and what has not, been achieved and on what is to be expected in the 
coming period for the further development of Europe. We are naturally very 
gratified that we have now succeeded in arriving at an agreement.
 This doubtless also documents sufficiently and particularly with regard 
to the special role the Federal Republic has played this last year within the 
Werner Group and in the Council – that, within the framework of our overall 
policy towards the outside, we have made headway, in the staunchest way 
possible, in our policy towards the West and our policy towards integration.
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 Introduction to document 45
The EC Commission accepted a number of recommendations set out in 
the Werner Plan258 on 30 October 1970, although it toned them down 
considerably.259 The Council followed the Commission’s proposals on 22 
March of the following year. On the basis of deliberations by the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council, it adopted a resolution on the achievement by stages 
of economic and monetary union. The resolution paradoxically referred to the 
interim report260 of the Werner Committee and not to the final report. 
 Avoiding the difficult questions raised by the Werner Report, such as 
the institutional infrastructure or the transfer of responsibilities from the 
states to the Community, the Commission resolution focused solely on the 
first stage, beginning retroactively on 1 January 1971 and due to be completed 
on 31 December 1973. At the end of this process, which had no binding legal 
value, the Community was to have set up a zone within which persons, goods, 
services and capital would move freely. The irrevocable fixing of parity rates 
between the currencies of the Six and the organisation of cooperation between 
the central banks were also stipulated. The transfer of various powers and 
responsibilities to the Community would be limited to what was required for 
the cohesion of the union and the efficiency of Community action. The idea of 
creating new Community institutions was completely left aside.
 To prepare for the transition to the following stage, the Commission 
agreed to submit a communication to the Council before 1 May 1973 containing 
an assessment of the progress made, and proposals on which to take action, 
including amendments to the treaties. 
 On the same day, the first measures for the application of this resolution 
were adopted. The programme for the achievement of economic and monetary 
union by stages was supported by three other Council decisions. The first was a 
decision on strengthening the coordination of short-term economic policies,261 
including three annual assessments of the situation in the Member States. 
The second concerned the reinforcement of cooperation between the central 
banks,262 based on the coordination of monetary and credit policies. The third 
involved the introduction of medium-term financial aid.263 
 Despite the political will of its members, the building of economic and 
monetary union — one of the first initiatives of which was the creation of 
the monetary snake — was partly compromised by the monetary difficulties 
stemming from the dollar crisis in spring 1971 and the oil shock in 1973.
258 See document 34.
259 Commission memorandum and proposals to the Council on the establishment by stages 
of economic and monetary union, 30 October 1970. Bulletin of the European Communities, 
no. 11 (1970), part 1, chapter 2. This document is available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1092/ 
[accessed February 2012]. See also document 37.
260 Interim Report on the Establishment by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union – 
‘Werner Report’ [20 May 1970]. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement no. 
7 (1970).
261 71/141/EEC. Official Journal of the European Communities (27 march 1971), no. L 
73/12, 174-175. This document is available at the EEC website: eur-lex.europa.eu.
262 71/142/EEC. Official Journal of the European Communities (27 march 1971), no. L 
73/14, 176. This document is available at the EEC website: eur-lex.europa.eu.
263 71/143/EEC. Official Journal of the European Communities (27 march 1971), no. L 




Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities and the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the achievement 
by stages of economic and monetary union, 22 March 1971.
Selection of texts concerning institutional matters of the Community from 1950 
to 1982. Luxembourg: European Parliament – Committee on Institutional Affairs, 
1982, p. 177-183. © European Parliament.
The Council of the European Communities and the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States.
– – – 
Have adopted this resolution:
I
In order to achieve simultaneously within the Community a satisfactory rate 
of growth, full employment and stability, to correct the structural or regional 
imbalances arising therein and to strengthen the Community’s contribution 
to international economic and monetary cooperation and thereby to achieve a 
Community enjoying stability and growth, the Council and the Representatives 
of the Governments of the Member States express their political will to establish 
an economic and monetary union, during the coming decade, in accordance 
with a plan by stages beginning on 1 January 1971.
The steps to be taken must be such that, at the conclusion of this process, the 
Community will:
1. Constitute an area within which persons, goods, services and capital 
may move freely and without distortion of competition, without, however, 
giving rise to structural or regional imbalances, under conditions permitting 
economic activity to expand on a Community scale;
2. Form a single currency area within the international system, characterized 
by the total and irreversible convertibility of currencies, the elimination of 
margins of fluctuation of exchange rates, the irrevocable locking of parities – 
all of which are essential preconditions for the creation of a single currency 
– and including a Community organization of the Central Banks:
3. Possess such powers and responsibilities in economic and monetary 
matters as will enable its institutions to administer the union. To this end 
the requisite decisions on economic policy shall be taken at Community level 
and the necessary powers shall be conferred upon the institutions of the 
Community.
Powers and responsibilities shall be distorted between Community institutions 
on the one hand and Member States on the other in accordance with what is 




The institutions of the Community shall be put in a position to exercise their 
responsibilities in economic and monetary matters efficiently and with speed.
Community policies pursued within the framework of the economic and 
monetary union shall be subject to debate and control by the European 
Parliament.
The Community organization of the Central Banks shall, within its field of 
responsibility, assist in achieving stability and growth within the Community.
The principles set out above shall be applied to the following:
– the internal monetary and credit policies of the union;
– monetary policy towards the outside world;
– policy with regard to the unified capital market and capital movements 
to and from third countries;
– budgetary and fiscal policies as related to the policy of stability and 
growth; as regards budgetary policy proper. the margins within which the 
essential elements of public budgets as a whole should lie, in particular the 
variation of their amount, and the size, mode of financing and use of balances, 
shall be determined at Community level;
– the structural and regional measures which are also necessary, as part of 
a properly supported Community policy, to promote the balanced development 
of the Community and resolve the major problems.
II
As progress is made towards the ultimate objective Community instruments 
shall be created as necessary to replace or to supplement national instruments.
The measures to be taken in each sector shall be interdependent, each 
reinforcing the other; in particular, progress towards monetary union must be 





In order to attain these objectives, the Council and the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States agree to set in motion from 1 January 1974 
a series of measures to be carried out during a first stage lasting three years:
1. Acting on a proposal from the Commission, the Council shall lay down 
such provisions for strengthening the coordination of short-term economic 
policies as will make coordination really effective, in particular by making more 
intensive and widespread use of the obligatory prior consultation procedures. 
This coordination of short-term economic policies shall take into account the 
guidelines under the medium-term economic policy programmes.
To this end the Council has agreed that, acting on a proposal made by the 
Commission after consultation with both sides of industry through the 
Economic and Social Committee or by other means, it will lay down the broad 
outlines of economic policy at Community level and quantitative guidelines for 
the essential elements of public budgets.
To facilitate coordination of economic policies the Council has agreed that, 
acting on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the opinions of 
the Committees concerned, it will take the necessary measures for progressive 
harmonization of the instruments of economic policy, and in particular for the 
synchronization of national budgetary procedures.
2. In order that effectively free movement of persons, goods, services and 
capital and progress in interpenetration of economies may be achieved at a 
faster rate the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission and having 
regard to the need to preserve a balance, shall decide on measures concerning:
–  Community rules determining the uniform basis for assessing the 
value added tax within the meaning of the Decision of 21 April 1970 on 
the replacement of financial contributions from the Member States by the 
Communities’ own resources;264
– the harmonization of the scope, basis of assessment and the mode of 
levying excise duties, in particular those which have an appreciable influence 
on trade;
– the harmonization of those kinds of tax which are likely to have a direct 
influence on capital movements within the Community, in particular the 
taxation of interest from fixed-interest securities and dividends;
– the further harmonization of the taxation of companies and firms;
– the progressive extension of duty-free concessions granted to private 
individuals crossing frontiers within the Community.
Before the end of the first stage the Council shall examine the results of 
research on the alignment of rates of value added tax and excise duties and the 
proposals of the Commission in this field.
3. With a view to encouraging the free movement of capital the Council, 
acting on a proposal from the Commission, shall:
264 Decision 70/243 ECSC , EEC, EURATOM. Official Journal of the European Communities 
(28 April 1970), no. L94. This document is available on the CVCE website: www.cvce.eu.
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– adopt a Directive laying down procedures for progressive liberalization 
whereby issues of securities on the capital market will be authorized without 
discrimination and abolishing any differential treatment in the introduction on 
the market of securities issued by residents of other Member States:
– establish a procedure for the progressive coordination of the policies of 
Member States in respect of capital markets.
4. In order to reduce, by means of regional and structural measures, 
any tensions that could prejudice the ultimate attainment of economic and 
monetary union, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, 
shall decide on the measures necessary for a first step towards resolving the 
most urgent questions. Bearing in mind the directions contained in the third 
medium-term economic policy programme, and in particular by providing the 
Community with the necessary means under the treaties in force.
5. With a view to strengthening the coordination of the monetary and credit 
policies of Member States the Council has agreed that:
– more stress shall be laid in the Monetary Committee and the Committee 
of Governors of Central
Banks on obligatory prior consultation:
– the Central Banks shall be invited, within the limits of their powers 
and several responsibilities, to coordinate their policies in the Committee 
of Governors of Central Banks, while observing the guidelines for general 
economic policy issued by the Council;
– the Monetary Committee and the Committee of Governors of Central 
Banks shall work closely together in the harmonization of the instruments of 
monetary policy.
6. The Council has agreed that the Community shall progressively adopt 
common standpoints in monetary relations with third countries and with 
international organizations; in particular, it shall not avail itself in matters of 
exchange rates between Member States of any arrangements which might lead 
to a weakening of the international exchange system.
7. The Council and the Member States shall invite the Central Banks of 
Member States, from the beginning of the first stage and on an experimental 
basis, to hold exchange rate fluctuations between the currencies of Member 
States within margins narrower than those resulting from the application 
of the margins in force for the US dollar, by means of concerted action with 
respect to that currency.
The Council has agreed that, depending on circumstances and on the results 
obtained in the harmonization of economic policies, further measures may 
be taken, consisting of a transition from a de facto to a de jure system, of 
intervention in the currencies of Member States and of successive reductions 
in the margins of fluctuation between the currencies of Member States. The 
Committee of Governors of Central Banks shall report twice yearly to the 
Council and to the Commission on the effect of the concerted action by the 
central Banks on the exchange market, and whether there is a need for further 
measures in this field.
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8. The Council shall invite the Monetary Committee and the Committee of 
Governors of Central Banks to draw up in close collaboration and by 30 June 
1972 at the latest, a report on the organization functions and statutes of a 
European Monetary Cooperation Fund to be integrated at a later stage into 
the Community organization of the Central Banks provided for in Section I(2), 
with a view to the possible establishment of this Fund during the first stage, 
if the results obtained in reducing margins and aligning economic policies so 
justify. They shall submit this report to the Council and to the Commission.
9. In order to promote the harmonious implementation of the plan for 
economic and monetary union and, above all, to ensure that economic 
measures keep sufficiently in step with monetary measures, the monetary 
provisions, that is to say those of Section III (7 and (8), and the mechanism 
for medium-term financial assistance shall be operative for five years from the 
beginning of the first stage. After agreement has been reached to proceed to 
the second stage, the provisions mentioned above shall continue in force.
– – – 
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 Introduction to document 46
At the invitation of French President Georges Pompidou, the Heads of State or 
Government of the Six met in Paris from 19 to 21 October 1972 with the future 
Member States to determine their programme for an expanded Community of 
nine. At the end of this summit, a first joint declaration set out the objectives 
and policies to be pursued by the enlarged Community.265 This declaration is 
reproduced here as document 46. It laid down new areas for action, involving 
the creation of a Regional Development Fund (ERDF), and of environmental, 
social, energy and industrial policies. The Nine agreed to step up political 
cooperation, firmly believing that Europe should be able to make its voice 
heard on the world stage and to help foster balanced international relations 
by affirming its own views. Alongside enlargement, it was agreed that efforts 
should also be made to strengthen integration to facilitate governance in an 
enlarged Europe. The Member States also agreed to work towards a European 
union, to be established by 1980, but no specific details as to its institutional 
framework were provided.
 The Paris Summit also reiterated the Community’s aim to build an 
economic and monetary union by the end of 1980 at the latest. An ambitious 
eight-year programme of deepening was embarked on to implement the 
decisions taken in The Hague in 1969. The need to reach a decision on the 
creation of a European Monetary Cooperation Fund by 1 April 1973 was 
restated. No details were given, however, of how the Community bodies 
might participate in the operation of this Fund. Emphasis was placed on the 
irreversibility of economic and monetary union, although the vital principle 
that monetary union and the coordination of economic policies must be 
pursued in parallel – the backbone of the Werner Report – was not mentioned. 
 Monetary Europe suffered from the increasingly unstable international 
monetary situation. It reacted to the suspension of the dollar’s convertibility 
into gold on 15 August 1971, which sounded the death knell for the Bretton 
Woods Agreements, by establishing the currency snake, or European Monetary 
System (EMS) in March 1972. This was a mechanism involving an intervention 
threshold for selling and an intervention threshold for purchasing for each 
currency. No currency was allowed to fluctuate in relation to another snake 
member by more or less than 2.25% around its bilateral parity.
 However, destabilised by the oil crises, the weak, floating dollar and 
diverging economic policies, the snake lost most of its members within two 
years, finally becoming a ‘Mark’ zone for Germany, Denmark and the Benelux 
countries. 
265 ‘Enlargement’ was seen in the opening of negotiations with the countries that had 




Declaration of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the enlarged 
Community, Paris, 19-21 October 1972.
Bulletin of the European Communities, 1972. Supplement 10/72. Brussels: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
© European Union.
– – –
Economic and Monetary Policy
1. The Heads of State and Government reaffirm the resolve of the Member 
States of the enlarged Community to move irrevocably the Economic and 
Monetary Union, by confirming all the details of the Acts passed by the Council 
and by the Member States representatives on 22 March 1971266 and 21 March 
1972.267
The required decisions will have to be taken during 1973 to allow transition to 
the second stage of the Economic and Monetary Union on 1 January 1974 and 
in view of its complete realization by 31 December 1980 at the latest. 
The Heads of State and Government reaffirmed the principle of parallel 
progress in the various fields of the Economic and Monetary Union.
2. The declared that fixed but adjustable parities between their currencies 
are an essential basis for achieving the Union and expressed their resolve to 
set up mutual defence and support mechanisms within the Community, which 
will allow the Member States to ensure that they are honoured. 
They decided to set up officially a European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
before 1 April 1973. Based on the EEC Treaty, the Fund will be run by the 
Governors Committee of the Central Banks within the overall guidelines of 
economic policy adopted by the Council of Ministers. In its early stage the Fund 
will function on the following basis:
(i) Concertation between the Central Banks over the required shrinkage of 
fluctuation margins between their currencies;
(ii) MultiIateralizing of positions arising from interventions in Community 
currencies and multilateralizing inter-Community rules.
(iii) Utilization for the above of a European monetary unit of account.
(iv) Administration of short-term monetary support between the Central 
Banks.
(v) The very short-term financing of the Agreement on shrinking the margins 
and short-term monetary support, will be regrouped within the Fund through 
an updated mechanism. For this, the short-term monetary support will be 
adjusted technically without changing its basic character or the consultation 
procedures involved.
266 See document 45.
267 On 21 March 1972, the Council adopts a resolution on the application of the resolution 
of 22 March, 1971 on the attainment by stages of economic and monetary union in the 
Community. Official Journal of the European Communities (18 April 1972), no. 38, 2-3. 
This document is available on the EUR-Lex-website: eur-lex.europa.eu.
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document 46
The competent Community agencies will have to submit reports:
(i) On short-term aid dealings by 30 September latest;
(ii) On terms for progressive pooling of reserves by 31 December 1973.
3. The Heads of State and Government insisted on the need for closer 
coordination of Community economic policies and adopting more effective 
procedures for same.
In the present economic situation, they consider that the anti-inflation 
campaign and stabilization of prices must get priority. They officially briefed 
their authorized Ministers when the enlarged Council meets on 30 and 31 
October 1972, to take specific measures in the various areas ripe for effective 
and realistic short-term moves to attain these objectives allowing for the 
different conditions in the countries of the enlarged Community.
4. The Heads of State and Government express their resolve that the 
Member States of the enlarged Community will contribute through a joint 
outlook in guiding the reform of the international monetary system towards 
the adoption of a lasting equitable order.
They consider that the system should be based on the following principles:
(i) Fixed but adjustable parities,
(ii) An overall convertibility of currencies,
(iii) An effective international regulation of world liquidity supply.
(iv) Curtailing the role of national currencies as reserve resources,
(v) An equitable and effective adjustment process,
(vi) Equality of rights and obligations for all under the system,
(vii) The need to reduce the unbalancing effects of short-term capital 
movements,
(viii) Consideration of the developing countries interest.




During the monetary crisis of 1974, the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
and the French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing are pictured in a cartoon 
of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as the two European leaders coming to 




The history of monetary unification in Europe is one that spans the entire 20th 
century. The First World War resulted in the demise of the gold standard, which 
had laid the foundations for the almost legendary stability of the European 
monetary system in the 19th century. The major economic and monetary 
negotiations held in the interwar period did not succeed in providing a stable 
response to the challenges raised by the Great War – more states meant 
more currencies and more protectionism. The Second World War dismantled 
what remained of the 19th-century monetary order. The new international 
monetary system founded by the Allies (with the exception of the Communist 
countries) at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference temporarily restored a 
degree of calm to the capitalist world, with the creation of global institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and above all 
with the introduction of a new standard. Under this gold exchange standard, 
currencies were backed by gold but also by currencies convertible into gold. 
This system initially operated as a dollar standard, since only the United States 
had sufficient gold reserves in the immediate post-war period. 
 As well as addressing the more general question of the monetary 
organisation of what would gradually become the Western bloc, the Allies also 
had to deal with the more pressing concern of a Europe brought to its knees by 
two World Wars.  The documents presented in this book show that the history 
of European monetary integration from 1945 to 1973 is crucial if we are to 
understand why the countries of Europe, or at least some of them, introduced 
the euro by signing the Maastricht Treaty on 7 February 1992.
 Despite the rapid realisation that an organisation of the monetary 
system in Western Europe (and in Turkey and Greece) was essential, opinions 
differed as to the path that should be taken to achieve this objective. Since the 
1948 Hague Congress, dissensions on monetary issues between proponents 
of a more united Europe have come to light. Should a common currency be 
the crowning achievement of European economic unification, or should it 
be introduced at an earlier stage to underpin this unification by stimulating 
trade between the Member States? This opposition between ‘monetarists’ and 
‘economists’ was at the heart of the monetary debates in Europe in the second 
half of the 20th century; it reflects the fact that a European monetary union 
had to be conceptualised in the absence of an existing political entity.
 This divergence of opinion did not initially prevent some decisions from 
being taken. First, the United States and Europe had to tackle the question of 
how to fund reconstruction, for which the Europeans did not have the dollars 
to buy the equipment they needed. This problem, known as the ‘dollar gap’, 
was resolved by the Marshall Plan, which led to the establishment of the OEEC, 
and, for monetary matters, the European Payments Union.
 The EPU was soon seen as being merely a temporary solution. Besides, the 
fledgling European integration process changed things: in 1951 six countries 
decided to pool their coal and steel output and envisioned to move to more 
far-reaching agreements. The ECSC and from 1957 the EEC gave a new impetus 
to the economic organisation of Western Europe, yet raised various monetary 
questions. For although the European Monetary Agreement of 1958 replaced 
the EPU and enabled the convertibility into gold and dollars of some European 
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currencies, it did not meet all the EEC’s monetary needs. This was the reason 
for the establishment of a Monetary Committee and the introduction of some 
additional provisions for the coordination of monetary policies in the Treaty of 
Rome.
 Yet the gradual establishment of the Common Market – the heart of the 
EEC – by its six members soon prompted the EEC Commission, and figures 
such as Jean Monnet, to reflect on subsequent stages. More so, because the 
international monetary system had entered a period of difficulties. Realising 
that the EEC needed a degree of monetary stability to build a customs union 
and to develop its common agricultural policy, the Commission and the Member 
States held discussions on the question of currencies in the 1960s. The road 
ahead would be a long one, and results did not come straight away. However, 
real progress was made with the creation of the Committee of Governors in 
1964 that followed the Commission’s Action Programme for the Second Stage 
and through the continued work of the Monetary Committee.
 As time went on, the countries of Europe stepped up their discussions. 
Raymond Barre took over from Robert Marjolin, who had written chapter 8 of 
the Action Programme, and published recommendations to urge the Council 
of Ministers to address the monetary question. As the difficulties facing the 
dollar and the International Monetary System worsened, discussions resulted 
in the decisions taken at the Hague Summit of 1969. This meeting between the 
Heads of State or Government of the Six led to a period where the monetary 
cooperation process took on a political slant. The gradual decline of the IMS, 
its inability to guarantee the stability of monetary exchanges and the United 
States’ adoption of a monetary policy that was incapable of safeguarding the 
IMS, forced politicians to address the thorny monetary question.
 A committee was therefore set up – the Werner Committee – and tasked 
with examining the possibility of an economic and monetary union. The work 
of this committee and its repercussions, largely documented in this book, 
ultimately appeared to end in failure. Admittedly, it resulted in the creation of 
a ‘European monetary snake’ and the European Monetary Cooperation Fund. 
Yet the snake was destined to fail from the moment it was created and was 
soon reduced to a Mark zone, excluding the Italian lira, the British pound and 
the French franc.
 If the 1950s and 1960s were characterised by a monetary waltz between 
technical experts, the political logic that prevailed after the Hague Summit 
was not really in line with the reasoning of technical experts. This showed in 
Pompidou’s reservations concerning the Werner Plan. For although the French 
had been promoting a notion, albeit a vague one, of a European monetary 
identity since the 1960s, national sovereignty remained central to their 
thinking. More generally speaking, despite European integration being based 
on transfers of sovereignty, the supreme powers of the state had not yet been 
affected in real terms. These powers included one of the most symbolic of all, 
the right to mint coins. The dialectic between the need for greater monetary 
unity and national sovereignty reflected the difficulty in building a single 
currency without the existence of a political entity. Several of the documents 
reproduced in these pages focus on this vital question.
 This political difficulty, which had been an issue since the early days of 
the European integration process, led to the Werner Plan stalling in 1973. Two 
years later, given the economic and inflationary divergences between France 
and Germany, building a monetary union without first addressing the question 
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of economic convergence seemed a dangerous prospect. The beginning of 
the 1970s also saw the official end of the international monetary system that 
had been established in 1944. In these changing circumstances the European 
monetary problem was still fundamentally the same as it had been all along: 
how could it be possible to have a common customs tariff, common policies 
such as the CAP, and relatively free movement of goods, capital and people, in 
a context of monetary instability?
 This book therefore ends on a note of uncertainty. Nonetheless the EEC 
was to continue its quest for stability between currencies. The Werner Plan 
proved to be decisive, becoming a point of reference in the 1980s – all the 
more so because its failure in no way put an end to discussions on monetary 
issues. Although not held as frequently, these did not stop between 1973 and 
1978. In 1978, negotiations led to the establishment of a European Monetary 
System (EMS). Moreover, the work of the Werner Group had shown that it 
was possible to overcome a major difference of opinion that had prevailed 
in Europe throughout the 20th century: the opposition between monetarists 
and economists, between proponents of a union built through currency and 
advocates of a union built by economic convergence which would culminate in 
a currency.
 Although the EMS worked reasonably well, it did not fully resolve the 
vital question of European monetary stability. The driving force of the Franco-
German duo, bogged down in difficult issues until 1985 over issues like the 
European contribution, enabled the now twelve Member States to forge ahead. 
The Single European Act of 1986 mentioned a common monetary policy, yet did 
not detail any specific plans. However, following the ratification of the Single 
Act a new committee was convened, chaired by Jacques Delors, President of 
the European Commission. At this point the importance of the Werner Plan 
became evident: Delors considered it the inspiration for his committee. In 
1989 the ensuing  Delors Plan laid the foundations for today’s euro. For Werner 
himself, the Delors Plan appeared in line with his own monetary ideas. Yet this 
viewpoint must be substantially qualified: the Werner Plan referred to the 
‘social partners’ – employers and employees – and described an economic and 
monetary union that was balanced in terms of economic policy and monetary 
policy. The Delors Report focuses primarily on monetary union.
 But what chiefly sets the Delors Plan apart from the Werner Plan is 
an external factor, namely the political will of France and Germany to move 
towards a monetary union and to accept the loss of sovereignty that resulted 
from it. In the early 1990s French President François Mitterrand and German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl played a role that Georges Pompidou and Willy Brandt 
had been unable to fulfil, one which Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut 
Schmidt instigated during the introduction of the European Monetary System 
ten years previous. Without this clear political will, it is unlikely that EMU 
would exist today.
 The main thrust of the Delors Report was included in the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty which paved the way for monetary union. This soon began to take shape 
with the adoption of the first measures: independence of the central banks, the 
establishment of the European Monetary Institute in 1994 and the European 
Central Bank in 1998. The final outcome of this process was the introduction 
of the euro, in several stages, between 1999 and 2002.
 These events appeared to herald the dawn of a new monetary era. Indeed 
the crisis that began in 2008 even led to an initial strengthening of the euro 
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and the ECB. European countries that had refused to join the euro, including 
the United Kingdom, found themselves facing difficulties. Yet it is the absence 
of a common economic policy that has today put European monetary union in 
danger.
 This is where the fundamental difference between the Werner and Delors 
Plans is particularly important. The debates that took place between 1945 and 
1973 appeared to have resulted in the conclusions of the Werner Committee, 
underpinned by the idea of a balance between economic and monetary 
aspects. In this perspective, discussions from the 1960s onwards were held 
on the question of coordination between the budgets of the Community 
Member States, a matter that in 2012 is the subject of a new treaty. But the 
major paradigm shift in economic science in the 1970s – the transition from 
Keynesianism to monetarism – changed things considerably. The Bundesbank, 
which had to give its assent to any decisions on monetary union and had played 
an important role in this paradigm shift – did not drive the Delors Report to 
place more emphasis on economic policy.
 At the time of writing Europe has not yet completed its quest for monetary 
stability, a vital element for a European Union that is growing ever larger. 
Moreover, the euro question now involves a range of other issues: European 
Union enlargement, which makes governance of the Union (and therefore of 
the euro) more difficult; and the democratic deficit of the European integration 
process as such, which is fuelling growing opposition to ‘Brussels’. Enthusiasm 
for the European integration process, well represented in the 1950s and 1960s, 
has given way to a scepticism verging on hostility, endangering the entire 
process, including the Economic and Monetary Union. The 2005 referendums 
in France and the Netherlands have illustrated this sentiment.
 In view of all this, the discussions raised in the collection of documents 
reproduced within these pages, dating from the 1940s to the 1970s, should 
also serve to help us understand the fortunes and misfortunes of a currency 
which seems to have forgotten that it is not merely a monetary arrangement 
but also has an economic and political role to play.
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 Chronology of post-war monetary integration in Europe
1947
18 November 
Agreement on Multilateral Monetary Compensation is signed between the 
Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, France, Italy and the Netherlands — 
first post-war agreement for inter-European Monetary Cooperation.
1948
16 April 
The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) is established 
which was made responsible for the supervision of the distribution of 




The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), is set up to administer 
Marshall Aid, issued the Bissell Plan which proposed a multilateral clearing 
system in which all payments between the member countries would be settled 
automatically on a monthly basis.
1950
19 September 
The European Payments Union (EPU) is established by the members of the 
OEEC. EPU functions as a clearing system by facilitating the convertibility of 
European currencies and compensating and balancing payments between 
European countries. The union enters into force retrospectively on 1 July 1950.
1955
2-3 June 
Messina Conference, which leads to the establishment of the Spaak Committee.
5 august
European Monetary Agreement (EMA) signed to continue monetary policy 
cooperation after the termination of EPU at the end of 1958. 
1956
21 April
The Spaak Committee presents its report to the Foreign Ministers of the Six. 
The report is the first official document on monetary unification since the 
presentation of the Bissell-plan in 1949.
1957
25 March
The Treaty of Rome is signed.
– Article 67 lays down that the ‘Member States shall progressively abolish 
between themselves all restrictions on the movement of capital’. 
– Article 105 provides for the setting up of a Monetary Committee 
with advisory status to promote the coordination of monetary policies. 
– Article 107 lays down that each Member State should treat its policy with 
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regard to rates of exchange as a matter of common concern.
1958
4 June 
First meeting of the Monetary Committee of the European Economic 
Community (EEC).
27 December
– Ten European countries restore the convertibility of their currencies 
as laid down in Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund. 
– The EPU is replaced by the EMA. EMA establishes a European margin 
of fluctuation against the US dollar as well as a European Reserve Fund and a 
mechanism for multilateral settlements.
1960
9 March




The Action Committee for the United States of Europe, chaired by Jean Monnet, 
calles for the set up a European Union of Monetary Reserves, as a prelude to a 
common monetary policy and a European currency.
1962 
23 October
Council Regulation on the value of the Unit of Account and the Exchange 
Rates to be applied for the purpose of the Common Agricultural Policy. Prices 
of agricultural products are to be expressed in a common unit defined by a 
fixed amount of gold. Amounts are to be expressed in Units of Account and 
converted into the national currencies of member states.
24 October
The Commission issues a memorandum on the Action Programme of the 
Community for the Second Stage defining monetary union as the third stage 
of unification. The report suggests that ‘there needs to be a single currency, to 
ensure the success of the Common Market’.
1964
15 April
Council Decision on the establishment of the Medium-Term Economic Policy 
Committee.
8 May
The Council issues several decisions in the monetary field:
– Council Decision on the establishment of the Committee of Governors of 
the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community.
– Council Decision on cooperation between the Member States in the field 
of budgetary policy, establishing the Budgetary Policy Committee.
– Council Decisions on cooperation between Member States in the field 





Council Regulation setting the conditions for alterations to the value of the 
Unit of Account used in the Common Agricultural Policy.
1969
12 February
The Commission submits to the Council of Ministers a memorandum on 
‘appropriate policy in the Community on current economic and monetary 
problems’ (also known as the Barre Memorandum), recommending an 
alignment of economic policies and the establishment of a mechanism for 
Short-Term Monetary Support..
5 March
The Commission sends a Memorandum to the Council containing requirements 
and procedures for action in the field of capital in the context of a ‘common 
market’.
10 August
Introduction of monetary compensatory amounts in order to avoid sudden 
changes in farm prices caused by abrupt changes in exchange rates between 
European currencies.
1-2 December 
The Hague Summit. The Heads of State agree ‘to take all necessary steps to 
achieve economic and monetary integration’.
1970
2 January 
The Central Bank Governors sign an agreement establishing a system of Short 
Term Monetary Support.
12 January
The Snoy Plan — Proposal of Belgium to progress towards economic and 
monetary union by stages.
12 February 
The Luxembourg Plan — Proposal of Luxembourg to progress towards 
economic and monetary union by stages.
23 February 
The Schiller plan — Proposal of Germany to progress towards economic and 
monetary union by stages.
24 February
The Ministers of Finance of the EEC decides to establish an ad hoc committee 
for a closer examination of the various proposals and ideas on the creation of 
a monetary union.
4 March
Commission submits a memorandum to the Council putting forward a plan for 
the establishment of an economic and monetary union in three stages, with a 
timetable for the period from 1970 to 1978.
6 March 
The Finance Ministers of the Six meet in Paris and assign a committee of 
experts presided by Pierre Werner to investigate how to progress towards 
economic and monetary union by stages.
20 May 
Interim report of the Werner Group.
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9 June
The Council of Ministers approves the interim report and gives the go-ahead 
for further discussions.
1 August
Ansiaux Report on the margins of exchange rate fluctuation between European 
currencies.
8 October
Official submission of the Werner Report (‘Werner Plan’).
17 October
The EEC’s Medium-Term Economic Policy Committee adopts the preliminary 
draft of the EEC’s third medium-term economic policy programme, covering the 
period 1971–75. This programme, closely linked to the Werner Plan, confirms 
that the ‘plan by stages’ has to be based on comprehensive quantitative 
guidelines which are valid for the whole of the Community and related to the 
main features of economic development. 
26 October
The Werner Plan is presented to the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers. Pierre 
Werner makes an explanatory statement.
30 October
Commission communication and proposals on the stage-by-stage 
implementation of economic and monetary union (the Werner Plan).
3 December
Session of the European Parliament, debate on the attainment by stages of the 
economic and monetary union of the Community (the Werner Plan). Adoption, 
by unanimous vote, of the draft resolution on the Werner Plan put forward by 
the Economic Affairs Committee.
14 December
The European Council approves the Werner Plan.
1971
22 March
Resolution of the Council on the implementation of the Werner Plan. The 
Council adopts three 
decisions:
– Medium-term financial assistance;
– Strengthening of the coordination of short-term economic policies;
– Strengthening of cooperation between the Central Banks.
15 Augustus
US President Nixon ends the convertibility of dollars into gold; the Bretton 
Woods System came to an end. 
18 December
The Smithsonian Agreement is signed in Washington set new parities between 
European currencies and the dollar.
1972
10 April
Basle Agreement in which the Committee of Governors of the European Central 
Banks introduce an additional mechanism to narrow exchange rate fluctuation 
by setting up the European ‘currency snake in the tunnel’. The currencies of the 
six participants are only allowed to fluctuate against each other by a margin of 
2.25%, like the undulations of a snake.  The margin is thus reduced by half of 
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what was agreed at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington.
1 May
The currencies of the accession countries Denmark, Great Britain and Ireland 
join the snake. 
23 June
The British Pound drops out of the snake, followed by the Irish and Danish 
currencies. 
12 September
The Ministers of Finance of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom agree to set 
up a European Monetary Cooperation Fund in the first stage of the economic 
and monetary union.
19-21 October
The European Council in Paris reconfirms the objective of an economic and 
monetary union.
31 December




Breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. Many currencies abandon parities, 
EC-currencies no longer maintain the margin against the US dollar, the snake 
is released out of the tunnel. 
3 April
Council Regulation establishes a European Monetary Cooperation Fund. 
30 April
Commission communication to the Council on the progress achieved in the 
first stage of economic and monetary union, and on the measures to be taken 
in the second stage. 
1974
9-10 December 
Conference of the Heads of State in Paris reaffirms the objective of EMU.
1975
8 March
Report of the Study Group ‘Economic and Monetary Union 1980’, commonly 
called the Marjolin Report, states that ‘Europe is no nearer to EMU than in 
1969. In fact if there has been any movement it has been backward’.
18 March
The Council adopts a European unit of account based on a composite basket of 
the Community currencies. It will be used initially under the Lomé Convention 
and for European Investment Bank operations and will later be introduced 
gradually into other sectors of Community activity. 
29 December 





Lecture of Roy Jenkins, President of the European Commission, at the European 
University Institute in Florence on the prospects for European Monetary Union. 
1978
6-7 July
The European Council in Bremen agrees on the French-German proposal to 
launch the European Monetary System (EMS).
1979
13 March
End of the Snake, start of the EMS. The eight participating Member States 
(the United Kingdom stays outside) are required to maintain their exchange 
rates within certain fluctuation margins. The European Currency Unit (ECU) is 
created, the value of which was determined by a basket of European currencies.
1984
25-26 June
The European Council of Fontainebleau agrees unanimously on the amount of 
compensation to be granted to the United Kingdom.
1986
17 February
The Single European Act is signed, providing for the completion of the frontier-
free market by the end of 1992. 
1987
1 July
The Single European Act enters into force. 
1988
27-28 June 
Decision by the Hanover European Council to set up an expert committee 
chaired by the Commission President, Jacques Delors, to study, and propose 
concrete stages towards, economic and monetary union.
1989
12 April 
Presentation of the Report of the Delors Committee on economic and monetary 
union.
8-9 December
Strasbourg European Council decides to convene an Intergovernmental 
Conference before 1990 to draw up amendments of the Treaty for final stages 
of economic and monetary union. 
1990
25-26 June
European Council in Dublin agrees to set up an Intergovernmental Conference 




The first phase of EMU is entered. It involves the removal of most of the 
remaining restrictions on capital movements, increases coordination of 
individual economic policies and intensifies cooperation between central 
banks. 
8 October
Pound sterling joins the EMS exchange-rate mechanism. 
14-15 December
Two Intergovernmental Conferences, one on Economic and Monetary Union 
and one on Political Union, are launched by the European Council in Rome.
1991
9-10 December 
European Council in Maastricht reaches agreement on the draft Treaty 
on European Union: completion of economic and monetary union and 
introduction of the single European currency by 1999 at the latest. The United 
Kingdom opts out. 
1992
7 February
The Treaty on European Union is signed in Maastricht. This Treaty establishes 
the conditions and the timetable for the introduction of the single European 
currency. 
16 September
Black Wednesday — The United Kingdom is forced to withdraw sterling from 
the EMS exchange rate mechanism because it was not able to keep the currency 
above its agreed lower limit.
17 September
Italy withdraws its currency from the EMS exchange rate mechanism
1993
1 January
The Single Market establishing the free movement of persons, goods, services 
and capital enters into force.
2 August
The fluctuation margins within the EMS exchange rate mechanism are widened 
to 15% as a result of unrest on the financial markets.
1 November
The Treaty on European Union enters into force. 
1994
1 January
The Second stage of EMU is entered and the establishment of the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI). 
26-27 May 
Inaugural conference for a Stability Pact in Europe is held in Paris. 
15 November




The Commission adopts a Green Paper on the practical arrangements for the 
introduction of the single currency. 
10 July
Council formally adopts broad economic policy guidelines and 
recommendations to 12 Member States with excessive public deficits. 
15-16 December
European Council in Madrid agrees to name the European currency unit “Euro” 
and confirmed the introduction of the single currency on 1 January 1999.
1996
6 November
Commission report to the Council on convergence in the European Union in 
1996 concludes that a minority of Member States meet the criteria for the 
introduction of the single currency by 1 January 1999.  
13-14 December 
European Council in Dublin agrees on a new exchange rate system and on a 
Stability and Growth Pact. It is also agreed to not enter the third stage of EMU 
in 1997 but as early as possible in 1998 because a majority of countries does 
not meet the criteria. 
1997
16-17 June
The European Council in Amsterdam approves three resolutions and adopts 
regulations to enable the smooth transition to the third phase of EMU. The 
Stability and Growth Pact is adopted to ensure budgetary discipline after 
creation of the euro, as well as a new exchange rate mechanism.
2 November




European Finance Ministers decide that 11 countries will participate in the 
euro. 
4 June
First meeting of the Euro-11 group made up of ministers of the Member States 
that will participate in the third stage of EMU. 
1999
1 January
With the creation of the euro-Area, the ECU ceases to exist. The euro is adopted 
as a currency in the international exchange markets. 
2002
1 January
The euro bank notes and coins are brought into circulation.
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